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ABSTRACT 
The process of trade liberalisation and market-oriented economic reforms was initiated in many 
developing countries in early 1980s; and it intensified in 1990s. In 1994, Cote d’Ivoire was 
assisted by the IMF to implement trade-policy reforms under Structural Adjustment Programme 
(SAP). After adopting SAP, the country witnessed soaring balance-of-payment problems, 
contraction of output, unemployment and the loss of government revenue. Several factors, which 
were at play resulted in dismal economic performance under SAP. In order to consolidate gains 
in competitiveness, and achieve high and sustainable growth, the Ivorian authorities coordinated 
efforts to establish and intra-regional custom tariffs among the member of the West African and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and bilateral 
agreements. 
It is against this background that this study is undertaken, in order to evaluate the impact of 
different trade-policy regimes on trade, welfare and revenue in Cote d’Ivoire. This study used 
one model: World Integrated Trade Solutions/Software for Market Analysis and Restrictions on 
Trade (WITS/SMART). The WITS/SMART model was used because of its ability in analysing 
the tariff effect of a single market on disaggregated product lines. The model also has the 
capability to analyse the effects of trade-policy reforms in the presence of imperfect substitutes.  
Using the WITS/SMART model, the study considered seven trade-liberalisation frameworks for 
Cote d’Ivoire: full implementation of the ECOWAS free trade agreement (FTA), ECOWAS 
common external tariff (CET), WAEMU CET, WAEMU FTA, EPAs, BFTAs and WTO FTA.  
The WITS/SMART model reveals that all trade liberalisation scenarios may cause welfare gains 
– due to the plummeting of prices. However, in all trade liberalisation scenarios, welfare gains 
were found to be is insignificant. In all cases, welfare gains fell far short of compensating for 
revenue loss. The impact of trade liberalisation on exports and imports was met with mixed 
reactions. For the WAEMU customs union and the ECOWAS customs union, and WTO FTA, 
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trade reforms are likely to face serious balance-of-payment problems, as imports exceeded 
exports by significant margins.  
With respect to revenue loss, of all trading arrangements, the WTO FTA presents a serious 
challenge for Cote d’Ivoire revenue followed by BFTAs, ECOWAS FTA, EPAs, ECOWAS 
CET, WAEMU CET, and WAEMU FTA with anticipated revenue losses. Another challenge for 
Cote d’Ivoire is the presence of trade creation effects, which were observed in all trade reform 
scenarios. From this study, it appeared that WAEMU CET poses serious threats of trade creation 
followed by WTO FTA, BFTA, SADC FTA, COMESA CET, SADC CET, EPAs and WAEMU 
FTA.  
Specifically, the study highlighted that Cote d’Ivoire, on balance loses out on trade liberalisation, 
mainly from revenue loss and possible de-industrialisation from trade-creation effects. The study 
has also revealed that Cote d’Ivoire offers excessive tax exemptions, which worsens the fiscal 
position of the country in the face of trade liberalisation. Hence, based on the findings, this study 
recommends that Cote d’Ivoire needs to call for the design of a financial facility aimed at 
assisting industries affected by trade-creation effects.  
The country needs to consider improving the collection of revenue from alternative sources, such 
as VAT, excise duties, personal and company taxes and excise duty, in order to cushion itself 
against the revenue loss impact of trade reforms. Government could also consider widening the 
tax base, by taxing the informal sector, which has been growing rapidly in the past years. In 
addition, policies aimed at exports promotion, such as export subsidies, trade finance and the 
strengthening of trade-promotion organisations should be considered.  
The outcome of this study provides a wake-up call to developing countries engaged in the WTO 
negotiations and other regional trading arrangements. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Trade liberalisation is one of the most promising and challenging task for a globalising world. 
The world trade organisation is an institution that serves the interest of countries and regions 
within the ongoing process of trade negotiations (WTO, 2015). 
 
Some economists believe that free trade enhances welfare and growth. This theory is supported 
by Melnikas (2015) when he concluded that generalized trade liberalization in the form of 
unilateral tariff or the reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade improve growth performances. In 
addition, research that examined the relationship between trade reforms and economic growth in 
the 1990s revealed that trade reforms are associated with high growth though the strength of the 
relationship varies across countries. However, in the 1990 the results from trade reforms have 
varied considerably among nations and have sometimes fallen short of expectations. The 
distributive effects of trade liberalisation are diverse. Trade liberalisation improves aggregate 
welfare but the gains are small and unequally distributed (UNCTAD, 2012).  
  
Given the complex dimension of trade liberalisation, the first section of this chapter will provide 
some background information on how trade liberalisation has affected economies.  
Thereafter, the problem statement of this study will be presented. This is followed by a 
discussion on the background of the study, the problem statement, the objectives of the study,  
the hypotheses in the study, and the layout of the study, and finally, the summary. 
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1.2 Background to the Study 
Economists have long acknowledged the gains from international trade. Throughout centuries, 
international trade has brought different parts of the world together, helped spread ideas and 
knowledge, and affected the course of regions and nations. 
The world economy has witnessed a massive trade liberalization of world trade since 1950. This 
occurs under the aegis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which came into 
existence in 1947 and was replaced by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1993. 
Brülhart (2011) noted that many developing countries opted for trade liberalisation as an 
alternative after the import substitution policies in the 1950s-1970s became less meaningful. 
However, a turnaround of protectionism started in the industrialized nations and disseminate to 
the developing countries in the 1970s. Trade reforms were later expanded and strengthened in 
the 1980s and the 1990s across the developing part of the world: East Europe, Latin America, 
East Asia, South Asia, and to a smaller extent the Middle East and Africa (De Sousa, Mayer & 
Zignago 2012). 
Economists tend to believe that movement towards freer trade, on balance, provide positive 
benefits. Caliendo and Parro (2015) looked at the trade and welfare effect of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). They found that NAFTA increased real incomes in Mexico by 
1.3%. Their findings support the notion that lowering barriers to trade when they are already low 
improves welfare.   
The process of trade liberalisation and market-oriented economic reform started in many 
developing countries in the early 1980s; and it intensified in the 1990s (United Nations 
Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2005).  
UNCTAD (2005) has identified three categories of countries implementing trade-policy reforms. 
The first group consists of several countries in East Asia, which continued their own dynamic 
industrial and trade policies, which were initiated in the 1960s. The second group includes many 
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countries, mostly in Africa, which have gone through the reform programmes designed and 
dictated by the Bretton Woods Institutions, these being the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The third group comprises several Latin American countries that 
undertook economic reform since the early 1980s, initially under pressure from the Bretton 
Woods Institutions.  
The world trade however, has witnessed an increase in its volume between 2004 and 2014. The 
increase in trade has largely been driven by the rise of trade between developing countries 
(UNCTAD, 2015).  The participation in international trade varies significantly among 
developing regions. BRICS countries account for an important part of developing countries' 
trade, especially with respect to exports of intermediates and manufacturing products. Other 
developing countries such as Cote d’Ivoire participate in a much more limited way because they 
are largely confined with the supply of raw materials (UNCTAD, 2015). 
The contents and philosophy of the trade-reform programmes implemented in these three 
categories mentioned above were quite like those designed by the Bretton Woods Institutions, 
also called the “Washington Consensus”. Universal and uniform trade liberalisation was a part of 
that “Consensus”, which in the view of this study caused a fundamental problem – because 
countries are at different level of developments, hence, a one-size-fits-all policy can not be 
realistic.  
In addition to trade liberalisation, reform outside tariff cuts and programmes, which were part of 
the Bretton Woods Institutions included mainly: capital-account liberalisation, devaluation at the 
early stages of reform to compensate for trade liberalisation, fiscal and financial reform through 
contractionary macroeconomic policies, such as budget cuts, increases in interest rates and 
privatisation (UNCTAD, 2005). 
 
In 1980, Cote d’Ivoire was assisted in implementing these reforms by the Bretton Woods 
Institutions following the decline in international prices of agricultural products. The government 
then engaged in structural adjustment programs (SAPs) which lasted throughout the 1980s – and  
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was financed by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The aim of 
the structural adjustment program was to allow developing countries to be more market oriented 
and focus on production and trade to revitalize their economy and reduce poverty. Structural 
adjustment programs, however, have failed to reduce poverty and provide sustainable economic 
growth (Nwabugo,2011; Kingston 2011; Ogbonna, 2012). 
 
The Objective behind these reform programmes was to minimise government’s role in the 
economy to that of merely providing a necessary institutional framework. In this regard, a free 
market economy takes centre stage. This then becomes a catalyst for growth and the 
diversification of exports and output structure in favour of manufactured goods (Sulaiman, 
Migirao, and Aluko, 2014).  
Following this wave of trade reforms, over the years, a number of countries have been 
liberalising their economies through various established regional trading blocs. This has resulted 
in regional trade arrangements (RTAs) becoming dominant features of the world trade system 
(Khorana, Kimbugwe and Perdikis, 2009). In Africa, the Economic community of Western 
African States (ECOWAS), the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) were no exception to this 
phenomenon. Recent studies reveal a trade slowdown over the past three years (2012 to 2015) 
spread across most of the developing and developed countries (UNCTAD, 2015). 
 
Among the developing countries, the trade slowdown reached all regions including Sub Saharan 
Africa. During the last decade international trade was characterized by a progressive shift in the 
use of trade policy instruments. Although tariff protection remains an important instrument only 
in certain sectors for a limited number of countries, the use of other non-tariff trade restrictive 
measures has become more widespread. The latest financial crisis which has been characterized 
by volatile exchange rates and competitive devaluation, has had important impact on 
international trade flows. The European Central Bank (2016) finds that a deceleration in the pace 
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of trade liberalization and the ongoing changes in the Chinese economy also explains the global 
slowdown. 
 
Also, the rise in income inequality in advanced economies have spread populism ideas and 
increase protectionism (Centre for European Reform, 2016). Tariffs remain relatively high and 
tariff peaks continue to affect important sectors – including some of key interest to low income 
countries such as agriculture, apparel, textiles and leather products. Trade liberalisation, 
however, through regional integration, has been instrumental in the economic development of 
countries through an increase in trade volumes, technology transfer, the promotion of political 
stability and the promotion of social cohesion – especially in the region of Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Menyah, Nazlioglu & Wolde-Rufael 2014). 
 
Although trade-liberalisation measures present great benefit – especially to less developed region 
such as Africa, many African countries are striving to diversity their exports. Agriculture and 
natural resources still represent a large share of their exports baskets (UNCTAD, 2015). 
With regards to trade policy and markets access, Cote d’Ivoire has been a member of the 
Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) since 1973 (ECOWAS, 1975). 
The country has shown willingness to comply with the multilateral trading system which it 
considers to be a triggering factor for its regional integration and development. Hence it became 
a member of the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in 1994 and 1995, respectively (WAEMU, 2017). In 2008 the country also 
sets up an initial framework for an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European 
Union (European Commission, 2014). 
1.2.1 Benefits of Trade Liberalisation 
The WTO general agreement on trade and services has defined the fundamental architecture for 
addressing the trade-restrictive services regulation. The general agreement on trade and services 
(GATS) provides for the scheduling of measures that result in better treatment for domestic 
suppliers and a less favourable treatment for foreign suppliers. 
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Regional trade agreements (RTAs) can also provide opportunities to pursue ‘’WTO’’ service 
liberalisation with trading partners. The possible objectives of RTA include: 
● securing the binding of existing levels of market access; 
● negotiating new market access in sectors of priority commercial interest; 
● Most-favoured-nation commitments to access the benefits offered to future RTA partners; 
improved transparency through disciplines on domestic regulation in terms of (standards, 
licensing, recognition of qualifications); 
 
Regional trade agreements, such as the free-trade agreements and the customs-union agreements 
have created significant gains both for governments and citizens. Khorana, Kimbugwe and 
Perdikis (2009) argued that besides consumers having access to a wider variety of goods 
produced from the other member countries, most producers would also gain from the common 
external tariffs. 
 
The consumers from the regional bloc would have access to duty-free goods from the other 
countries in the trading bloc (Viner 2014). Free trade area creates both trade creation and trade 
diversion. Trade creation occurs when trade increases. However, trade diversion occurs when a 
free trade agreement shifts imports from a more efficient supplier to a less efficient supplier 
which in itself causes a reduction in national welfare. National welfare gains occur when trade 
creation outweighs trade diversion. Thus, a country would only enter a free trade agreement if 
the free trade agreement is welfare improving (Suranovic, 1997). This happens when trade 
creation outweighs trade diversion. The market with trade creation would generate national 
welfare gains while the market with trade diversion would generate national welfare losses. But 
it is also possible for trade diversion to outweigh trade creation. This is welfare reducing. The 
only way to prevent this is to ensure that all barriers to trade against all countries are removed. 
This would reduce trade diversion. 
 
The impact of trade liberalisation on economic growth works mainly through improving 
efficiency and stimulating exports which have powerful effects on both supply and demand 
 THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALISATION ON COTE D’IVOIRE 
 
7 
 
within an economy. However, the relative importance of the precise mechanisms by which 
export growth affect economic growth are not always easy to discern. The effect of tariff 
liberalization could be greater when domestic product market and labor market regulations are 
less stringent. Recent theoretical work by Helpman and Itskhoki (2014) shows that in the wake 
of trade liberalization, labor market frictions can persistently depress productivity during the 
transition to the new steady state as they result in misallocation of labour.  
 
Evidence also supports the notion that nations more open to trade tend to be richer than nations 
that are less open to trade. Economists believe that on the poverty front, there is strong evidence 
that trade openness is a more trustworthy friend of the poor than protectionism. Research has 
shown that protectionism reduces trade to below potential levels. Specifically, empirical studies 
show a country’s own trade restrictions may create a significant bias against exportables (Ng and 
Yeasts, 2000). Ng and Yeasts (2000) identified controls as being a hindrance to imports. It 
therefore, follows that a country starved of imports is likely have retarded growth, since imports 
are an essential ingredient of economic growth – especially if the composition of imports is made 
up of capital goods and raw materials. 
 
Trade liberalisation is seen as a solution to rampant inefficiency and misallocation of resources 
in developing countries. It is, therefore, expected that a country, which embraces trade 
liberalisation would witness faster economic growth, due to a reduction in the distortions in price 
relativities. Khan (2012) looked at the impact of trade liberalization on economic growth in 
Pakistan. His study confirmed the results of the earlier economists by supplementing it with 
some of the much-debated national and international aspects. His research predicts that trade 
liberalization can have a positive and beneficial effect on economic growth if it is supported by 
appropriate sequencing of prudent macroeconomic policies including good management, 
integrated and strengthened efforts made by domestic institutions, focused and targeted flow of 
foreign direct investment (FDI’s) towards export-oriented industries and services, and improved 
market access.  
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Another recent literature was that of Manni and Afzal (2012), who observed that trade 
liberalization policies opens up the opportunity for countries’ economies to enhance growth and 
foster overall development. Manni and Afzal (2012) study the effects of trade liberalization on 
economic growth of developing countries using a case of Bangladesh economy between 1980 
and 2010. The results of their study suggested that, both real exports and imports would increase 
with greater openness, which in turn, would eventually lead to economic growth. 
Rondinelli (2013) also showed that Philippines managed to improve the conditions of 
unemployment and reduced bankruptcy tendencies among the medium- and small-scale 
businesses after trade liberalisation. 
Duncan and Quang (2003) noted that poor countries usually have high ratios of labour-to-land 
and labour-to-capital. As a result, poor countries produce labour-intensive activities; while first-
world countries tend to produce capital-intensive products. Duncan and Quang (2003) observed 
that the removal of trade barriers that favour capital-intensive industries’ development trigger an 
increase in employment of the low-skilled labour. From this standpoint, trade liberalisation 
would result in an increase in employment, irrespective of the factor intensity of a country. In 
this way, trade liberalisation is seen as a panacea to poverty in developing countries.  
From this preceding discussion, it is therefore clear that the outcome of trade liberalisation on 
poverty is not always straightforward.  
Although there is still controversy on the impact of trade liberalisation on poverty and welfare, 
research shows a number of paths that trade liberalisations could influence welfare. Import 
restrictions of any kind create an anti-export bias – by raising the price of importable goods 
relative to exportable goods (Tussie and Aggio, 2005). The removal of this bias through trade 
liberalisation would encourage a shift of resources from the production of import substitutes to 
the production of export-oriented goods (Tussie and Aggio, 2005). This, in turn, would generate 
growth in the short-to-medium term, as the country adjusts to a new allocation of resources more 
in keeping with its comparative advantage (McCulloch, Winters and Cirera, 2001).  
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On the other hand, recent studies on Non-tariff measures, show that Non-tariff measures that are 
poorly designed or captured by special interests can hurt competitiveness whereas well-designed 
ones can effectively overcome market failure (Baccheta and Berevelli, 2012). 
Ongoing efforts to enhance data availability on non-tariff barrier measures will help complement 
existing studies of the impact of tariff liberalization (Staiger, 2015). Productivity gains for 
emerging and low-income countries such as Cote d’Ivoire could conceivably be even higher 
given their comparatively higher barrier to trade. 
1.2.2 Challenges of Trade Liberalisation 
The global economy has been growing at a moderate pace and this is expected to continue in the 
coming years. The rise of populism and deglobalisation is threatening decades of prosperity that 
was achieved through trade.  The world economic outlook (2017) noted that the Brexit vote and 
the Recent United States election are both contributing to uncertainty about the future. They 
reveal that protectionist policy on trade could harm the American economy and have a negative 
spillover effect on the global economy as a whole. Thus, there is a real danger that free trade will 
be damaged in the coming years. 
 
Bastiaens and Rudra (2016) found that developing countries are now facing low commodities 
prices and severe fiscal challenges. Their research reveal that further efforts made by government 
to reduce trade taxes to support trade liberalization will be problematic because trade taxes are a 
key source of government revenues.  As a result, authoritarian regimes in developing countries 
will be more effective in implementing domestic tax reforms as a substitute for trade taxes. 
Democratically elected leaders will undermine domestic tax reforms because they are more 
susceptible to middle and upper-class demands for lower taxes in a competitive economy. 
 
In addition, measures that relate to custom procedures need to be addressed to facilitate trade. In 
SADC region for example, initiatives have been introduced to improve the flow of trade 
(Shumba, 2015). Along these initiatives, there has also been measures to promote capacity 
building and integrity. In addition, there has been agreements in the SADC region to harmonize 
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the hours of operation at certain border post (Shumba, 2015). All these initiatives contribute to 
the challenges trade liberalization is currently facing.  
 
A research by Rondinelli (2013) examined a case in the Philippines. It blamed the loss of tariff 
revenues in the Philippines on increased levels of foreign borrowing, deficit-budget problems, 
inadequate funds for crucial sectors, such as health, education and social services. The problems 
experienced by these sectors could easily have been addressed if the economy were to be 
liberalised, thus attracting foreign direct investments to invest in key sectors reducing financial 
strain of government in respect of limited resources such as taxes. 
 
According to the IMF (2013), about two thirds of the gains of trade liberalisation were realised 
by the developed economies. Developing economies, such as China, and India have of late 
gained much from trade liberalisation. However, the low-income earners have lost much of their 
gains because of their structural rigidities. 
 
Trade-diversion effects in trade liberalisation constitute a factor derived from the customs union, 
in which those that gain are the producers from the region (Baldwin, 2014). This means that in 
the case of implementing trade liberalisation, the most efficient producers outside the trade bloc 
are locked out to make room for a less-efficient producer from the regional trade agreement to 
grow and enjoy the largest trade gains. However, it should be noted that in such an arrangement, 
the consumer becomes the ultimate loser; since the consumer-welfare gains are denied.  
 
Another problem of trade reforms stems from the fact that differently structured groups are 
affected by the gains and losses of the reform. The general public is the winner therefore 
individual gains are small. Because the losers are a small group, which often is the political and 
economic elite, the individual disutility is large.  
 
Samuelson (2004) questions the economic credo of free trade. He constructed a special case of 
trade between China and the US. He argues that under normal circumstances free trade will lead 
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to higher income than in autarky. However, he finds that technical improvement in china raises 
productivity there while productivity in the United States (US) remained constant. Thus, the US 
suffers welfare losses while China gains. 
This is supported by a recent study of the United States International trade commission (2017) 
which shows that the trans-pacific partnership agreement will lead to an increase in imports of  
the United States textile and apparel, especially imports coming from Vietnam.   
 
Another critics of trade liberalisation, such as Lee (2005), have blamed it for a host of ills, such 
as rising unemployment and wage inequality. Increased foreign competition can lead to plant 
closings and job losses concentrated in certain regions and industries. It may contribute to 
increased anxiety and wage pressures, as well as rising income inequality (Lee, 2005). The level 
of employment is a key determinant of overall economic welfare, especially in developing 
countries, where the systems of social protection are weak. In particular, the impact of trade 
liberalisation on the level and structure of employment determines, to a large extent, its impact 
on poverty, wage and income distribution, and the quality of employment. These latter variables 
are clearly among the central points of contention in the debate over trade liberalisation (ILO, 
2001). 
Trade reforms in recent years have resulted in negative changes in output in different sectors and 
associated impacts on employment, which are an important aspect of the political economy 
(Brenton et al., 2009).  In addition, Brenton et al. (2009) note that trade reform entails changes in 
prices; and an important consideration is how these would affect households, especially the 
poorest. This issue is still uncertain.  
The implementation of the RTAs has in some cases been observed to contribute to welfare loss, 
especially in cases where trade diversion exists. Consumers are forced to buy commodities and 
inefficiently produced goods, which come at a premium due to a RTA. Potential losses of trade 
diversion are predicted by Viner’s (1950) seminal work on the formation of a customs union. 
Studies have revealed that custom unions generate potential losses in revenue and welfare (see 
for example Sangeeta et al., 2009).  
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Besides the trade effects, regional trade agreements, such as the FTA and customs union are 
likely to negatively impact different actors within the economy (consumers, producers and 
governments) (Khorana, Kimbugwe and Perdikis, 2009). For example, consumers are likely to 
gain access to cheap and poor quality goods produced within the regional bloc. Producers are 
likely to face stiff competition from other countries in the region and beyond (Khorana, 
Kimbugwe and Perdikis, 2009). 
Trade liberalisation is not a panacea. It needs to be accompanied by complementary policies if 
the intended benefits are to be realised. Policies, which support education, infrastructure, 
financial and macroeconomic policies, are lacking. As a result, the African continent has failed 
to yield strong growth results. The precise mix of trade and other policies that are needed would 
largely depend on the specific circumstances of each country (McCulloch, Winters and Cirera, 
2001). 
Another problem of trade liberalization is the weak tax instrument. Brenton et al. (2009) and 
Waglé (2011) criticise weak tax administrations, as well as large informal sectors (with 
unrecorded or illicit transactions), coupled with the high cost of administration, results in a 
narrow tax base. Because of the difficulties encountered in collecting domestic tax revenue, 
developing countries usually face serious revenue challenges after introducing trade 
liberalisation (Waglé, 2011). 
However, Waglé (2011) argues that there is a possibility that trade liberalisation pays for itself 
over time. Conventional wisdom reported in tax policy advice to developing countries over the 
past 30 years has been that domestic consumption or income taxes are superior to import duties 
because the former can meet the government’s revenue target with lower rates, a wider base, and 
without a protectionist bias (Waglé, 2011). However, this can only work in countries with strong 
and sophisticated domestic tax-collection instruments.  
The belief that trade liberalisation lead to gains is premised on the assumption that there is 
perfect competition, and that there are always constant returns to scale in production. This is 
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clearly at odds with the real world, as most developing countries suffer from market failures, 
such as positive production externalities in import-competing sectors (ILO, 2001).  
Ocampo et al. (2007) underscored that the argument that trade liberalisation enhances increasing 
returns is ambiguous. Rather, trade liberalisation is often deplored, on the grounds that it 
sometimes leads to deindustrialisation. Hence, protectionism, aimed at promoting 
industrialisation, is justified on these grounds. Empirical evidence has shown that 
industrialisation is an a priori requirement for export success (ILO, 2001).  
Government in developing countries rely heavily on imports taxes as their main source of 
revenue. Hence in the presence of a trade liberalisation, these countries will be forced to seek 
alternative funding to meet the budget deficit. Makochekanwa (2012) revealed that African 
countries, such as Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe that derive revenue 
from taxes and tariffs as a key source of national income have had problems with trade 
liberalisation.   
The configuration of RTAs is diverse and becoming more complex with overlapping 
RTAs and networks of RTAs spanning within and across continents at the regional and 
subregional levels. The reasons influencing the choice of FTAs over customs unions, appears 
to play a vital role also in the choice of RTA configuration. Countries are opting for simple 
RTA configurations, such as two parties, rather than the more burdensome plurilateral RTAs, 
which are more typical of customs unions. Crawford and Fiorentino (2005) found that Bilateral 
agreements account for over 75 per cent of all RTAs notified. 
 
Like those of most developing countries, Cote d’Ivoire's government is tied to custom receipts, 
which accounted for more than 40% of its total fiscal receipts during the period 1960-1998 
(Bedia, 2006). Although trade liberalization and regional integration offer economic growth 
opportunities in the long run, in the short run they will result in a reduction in the revenue of 
the country and worsen an already high budgetary deficit. Furthermore, for Cote d'lvoire and 
other WAEMU member countries engaged in this process, the union offers indisputable 
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advantages but insists that these countries adopt a common external tariff (CET) and modify 
intra-zone custom duties through maximum limit tax rates. For Cote d’Ivoire, the tariff union is 
realized in the new context known as "Open Regionalism". 
In the beginning of the 1990s, the international institutions and partners in development 
suggested the privatization of several public enterprises and a freeze on the public wage bill. In 
addition, they suggested the liberalization of the agricultural sector, mainly cocoa and coffee, 
which represented the heart of the country's finances. Despite the implementation of the IMF 
policies, Cote d’Ivoire suffers from a huge debt burden with an external debt that grew from $7.4 
billion to $17.7 billion from 1980-1990. Total debt rose from 73.3% in 1980 to 164.3% in 1990 
(Kingston, Godspower, and Dienye, 2011).  
 
Cote d’Ivoire became one of the most indebted countries in the world qualifying the country 
under the IMF Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) programme in 2001 (Kingston et al, 
2011). The impact of trade liberalization is complex so therefore, one must carefully examine the 
income distribution of a trade reform to determine who the losers and the winners are before 
such policies are implemented. 
Nicita, Olarreaga, and Porto (2011) looks at pro-poor trade policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Their 
results suggest that Sub-Saharan Africa own trade policy is biased in favour of poor households. 
Whereas, the trade policies of the trading partners tend to be biased in favour of Sub-Saharan’s 
rich households. The findings suggest that Africa’s own trade policy appears to redistribute 
income from rich to poor households. This is mostly explained by agricultural protection, which 
is significantly high both in developing and developed countries. Hence, in this setting, 
liberalization could be bad for poverty.  
 
Although African countries over the last 25 years have removed most of the trade barriers 
considered to be the main impediments to export performance, their export growth has been 
sluggish after trade liberalisation, the level and composition of the continent’s exports have not 
substantially changed (UNCTAD, 2008). The performance of the export sector, after trade 
liberalisation, fell short of expectations; and the improvement has been small relative to the 
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experience of other developing regions. African countries have not been able to diversify their 
exports towards manufacturing goods and high-tech products, which are both price- and income-
elastic and do not suffer from the international markets shocks.  
The World Bank (2015) estimated that Inter-African trade is low and has the highest of intra-
regional cost in any developing region. Their study revealed that intra-African trade costs around 
50 per cent higher than in East Asia. 
In recent years, developing countries’ exports grew at a faster rate than those of developed 
countries. Developing countries’ merchandise exports grew at an annual rate of 8.2 per cent for 
the period 1980-2010, compared with 6.6 per cent for developed countries (Michalopoulos and 
Ng, 2013). Michalopoulos and Ng (2013) noted that for the thirty years, that is, 1980-2010, only 
the developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and the group of developing countries in Europe, 
Middle and North Africa – whose exports are dominated by oil, experienced trade growth slower 
than that of developed countries.  
Ancharaz et al. (2011) have argued that weak institutions, policy inconsistency, weak supply 
response, lack of trade-facilitation instruments, including trade finance, and complex customs 
arrangements further impede intra-regional; and international trade is the most important barrier 
to the continent’s export performance.  
In addition, many African countries, including Cote d’Ivoire, suffer from, low rates of domestic 
savings, lack of institutional transparency, political instability and conflicts (Fell, 2007). Even if 
trade liberalisation is taken as the supreme rule to economic development, these negative 
fundamentals make it difficult for Africa to benefit from trade liberalisation. 
One of the major concerns about Africa is that there is a lack of data to back up negotiations, as 
observed by Brenton et al. (2009). To reach effective agreement through negotiation would 
require accurate information to conduct the necessary background research that takes into 
consideration different assumptions when comparing third-party tariffs, preferential tariffs and 
rules of origin for the region. Since adequate information may not be available on measures of 
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support, it is doubtful whether negotiations could proceed on a sound basis. Even if some 
information were available, they are not many African countries that have the expertise to 
conduct a comprehensive analysis of the existing information, without the benefit of expert 
technical assistance.  
The protection of agricultural markets is still a topic that seems to divide developing countries 
and member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). Renegotiations of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture under the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) were to bring parties together, but little consensus has been made 
so far. For Africa, so much affected by distortions in agricultural markets, this is a major 
disappointment. African countries have increased their calls for fair trade practices in response to 
the limited progress that has been made in the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations and 
are beginning to show more interest in multilateral trade negotiations. 
 
The potential gains from eliminating remaining trade barriers over the years have been unfairly 
distributed (Ann et al, 2016). The potential productivity gains from full elimination of remaining 
tariffs suggests that aggregate productivity could rise, on average, by around 1 percent across 
advanced economies. Trade liberalization can boost productivity by improving the quality and 
variety of intermediate inputs available to domestic producers. Recent firm-level evidence for a 
number of countries confirms the quantitative importance of this input channel (see Topalova 
and Khandelwal, 2011; Amiti and Konings, 2013; Halpern et al., 2015).  
With regards to ECOWAS, coordination problems between members have made it difficult to 
operationalise trade facilitation agreements and measures although exports increased by nearly 
260% between 2000 and 2014. Exports from the region are increasingly destined for China and 
India in Asia and Spain, France and the Netherlands in Europe. Also, the share of intra-
ECOWAS exports in the region’s total exports has increased only marginally since 2000 from 
7.7% to 8.3% in 2014 (Tuffour et al, 2016).  
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Moreover, progress has been less rapid for many other countries, particularly in Africa and the 
Middle East. In contrast to the successful integrators, most developing countries depend 
disproportionately on production and exports of traditional commodities, especially primary 
commodities (Tuffour et al, 2016). The reasons for their marginalisation are complex, including 
deep-seated structural problems, weak policy frameworks and institutions, and protection at 
home and abroad. 
1.2.3 Cote d’Ivoire’s Past Experience on Trade Liberalisation. 
The trade regime in Cote d'Ivoire became restrictive in the 1970s and in the second half of the 
1970s and in the early 1980s arbitrary prices and quantitative restrictions were introduced on a 
wide range of imports competing with domestic manufacturers (Aka, 2006). His research found 
that textiles and foods related manufacturing received the highest effective protection, followed 
by chemicals. Similarly, quotas were also high in food processing, beverages followed by textiles 
and chemicals (Aka, 2006).   
 
During the boom years in the second half of the 1970s, Cote d'Ivoire benefitted from the rise in 
world coffee and cocoa prices (Harrison, 1990). This resulted in an increase in revenue, most of 
which were absorbed by the government, were used to increase investment and expand public 
spending and infrastructure.  
 
By the end of 1979 the growth process slowed due to the fall in the international prices of 
agricultural products and exacerbated by both the 1973 and 1978 oil crises coupled with the 
deterioration of terms of trade (Harrison, 1990). 
The severe macroeconomic imbalances that followed the decline in commodities prices forced 
the government to adopt an austerity program in 1982 (Kingston, 2011). According to Kingston 
(2011) the adjustment program was followed by a major trade reform introduced in mid-1984 
which was effectively implemented in 1985 and extended in 1986 and early 1987. When trade 
reforms were introduced in 1985, the economy experienced a period of growth, but 1987 was a 
recessionary period (Harrison, 1990). 
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The reform removed quantitative restrictions and reference prices, rationalized the tariff 
structure, and introduced temporary tariff surcharges. The objective behind the tariff reform was 
to equalize effective protection across different sectors by lowering tariffs on final goods and 
raising tariffs on inputs and intermediate goods. The surcharges declined over a five-year period 
to allow firms previously protected by non-tariff measures to adjust. 
The tariffs changes and the removal of quotas were implemented in two phases. During the first 
phase (1985), reforms were imposed on key sectors including textiles and food processing. In the 
second phase (early 1987), the reform was extended to the rest of the manufacturing sector 
(fertilizers, machinery). 
 
Harrison (1990) used a panel of 287 firms in the Cote d'Ivoire to test for imperfect competition 
before and after the 1985 trade reform. She found that that protected sectors such as textiles have 
significant mark-ups of price over marginal cost. There is also evidence that price-cost margins 
fell between 1985 and 1987. However, the fall in mark-ups for exporting sectors is likely to be 
linked more to the real appreciation of the currency than to increases in domestic competition. 
 
Aka (2006) in his work we have tried to quantify the poverty, inequality and welfare impacts of 
trade liberalization and tax reform in Cote d’Ivoire. The main findings are as follows. About 
30.90% of households were affected by absolute poverty. But as far as the socioeconomic groups 
are concerned, the poverty situation is diversified among household groups. The most affected 
by poverty are public employees, followed by coffee and cocoa farmers and private employees. 
Furthermore, coffee and cocoa farmers, private employees, and the self-employed are those 
contributing the most in global poverty. The liberalization reforms on the coffee-cocoa sector 
were introduced in 2002. Some estimates suggest that the coffee-cocoa sector was less profitable 
in 2005 than in the previous years (OECD, 2005). 
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1.3 Statement of the Problem 
Trade liberalisation presents a serious challenge for Cote d’Ivoire, as the country is still coming  
from a period of civil war, dividing communities and damaging the already fragile public 
institutions. Even though most of the fighting were over by late 2004, the violence left behind a 
legacy of contentious issues that have not yet to be sufficiently resolved. Trade liberalisation 
needs to be followed by domestic reforms.  
Capital outflows continued to be one of the most damaging consequences of bad governance on 
the continent. Much of the money that leaves Africa is held in foreign accounts that have been 
embezzled by corrupt government leaders. For example the late president of Cote d’Ivoire, was 
reputed to have amassed a personal fortune of US$ 12 billion (Tupy, 2005). Bad governance 
constitutes a hindrance to implement efficient reforms. 
To make matter worse Cote d’Ivoire relies heavily on its tariff lines. Imports into Côte d'Ivoire 
for instance are subject to a number of levies. In addition to the uniform customs duty of 5 per 
cent there is a fiscal duty, which varies between 5 and 30 per cent, and a statistical tax of 2.5 per 
cent (MOC, 2014).  
Moreover, some special taxes apply to particular products, mainly alcohol, tobacco, fuel, as well 
as some meats, fish and dairy products. A limited number of tariff lines enjoy free entry 
(medicines, books and periodicals, as well as certain agricultural and textiles inputs). Côte 
d'Ivoire does not apply any seasonal tariffs or variable levies (MOC, 2014).  
Notwithstanding the adverse effects of trade liberalization, Cote d’Ivoire has continued to 
liberalize its trade and embark on different economic partnership agreements under regional 
groupings, and at a multilateral level. Within the regional grouping, the country signed free trade 
agreements with the EU. In ECOWAS, only Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana have agreed to the 
economic partnership agreement. Cote d’Ivoire has signed but not ratified the agreement yet. 
Under ECOWAS, Cote d’Ivoire has a custom union with the other member countries such as 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria 
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Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. All these agreements have serious implications for the Ivorian 
economy. 
The continued efforts to liberalise trade by Cote d’Ivoire were taken against the background of 
renewed protectionism by powerful economies after the 2008/09 world economic recession, as 
noted by the IMF (2013); 
In view of the above discussions, the research questions emerging from the discussion are: Has 
trade liberalisation led to trade creation for Cote d’Ivoire? Has trade liberalisation led to welfare 
gains? Has trade liberalisation led to loss of revenue in Cote d’Ivoire? Has trade liberalisation led 
to an increase in imports? Has trade liberalisation led to an increase in exports?  
Who is Cote d’Ivoire’s major trading partner? The objectives that address these questions are 
presented below. 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to estimate and discuss the expected impact on the different trade-
policy regimes in Cote d’Ivoire. Specifically, this study intends to; 
(a) Evaluate the impact of the ECOWAS custom union on imports, exports, revenue, trade 
creation and diversion and welfare implications in Cote d’Ivoire;  
(b) Evaluate the impact of ECOWAS FTA on imports, exports, revenue, trade creation and 
diversion and welfare implications in Cote d’Ivoire;  
(c) Evaluate the impact of WAEMU custom union on imports, exports, revenue, trade creation 
and diversion and welfare implications in Cote d’Ivoire; 
(d) Evaluate the impact of WTO FTA on imports, exports, revenue, trade creation and diversion 
and welfare implications in Cote d’Ivoire; 
(e) Evaluate the impact of bilateral agreements on imports, exports, revenue, trade creation and 
diversion and welfare implications in Cote d’Ivoire; 
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(f) To come up with a trading block that is more beneficial to Cote d’Ivoire amongst WTO, 
EPAs, and ECOWAS. 
(g) Analyse the implication of the study’s findings on trade policy in Cote d’Ivoire. 
1.5 Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses will be tested: 
H10: The Null Hypothesis: Trade liberalisation leads to trade creation and welfare gains. 
H11: Alternative Hypothesis: Trade liberalisation does not lead to trade creation and welfare 
gains. 
H20: Null Hypothesis: Trade liberalisation leads to the loss of government revenue. 
H21: Alternative Hypothesis: Trade liberalisation leads to gains in government revenue. 
H30: Null Hypothesis: Trade liberalisation leads to an increase in imports and exports.  
H31: Alternative Hypothesis: Trade liberalisation does not lead to an increase in imports and 
exports.  
H40: Null Hypothesis: ECOWAS is the most important trading partner for Cote d’Ivoire. 
H41: Null Hypothesis: ECOWAS is not the most important trading partner for Cote d’Ivoire. 
1.6 Significance of the study 
The aim of this study is to add to the body of knowledge and fill the gap in the literature on the 
impact of trade liberalisation on revenue, imports, exports, welfare, trade creation and trade 
diversion in Cote d’Ivoire. Nowhere in the world is the need for poverty reduction greater than in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
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 As in any other economy, trade plays an important role in the development process and can help 
to alleviate poverty. However, as it has been highlighted in the previous section, past researchers 
have taken conflicting positions on whether to liberalise African economies, or not.  
Hozouri (2017) discussed the impact of trade liberalisation on economic growth. His research 
focused on 12 countries from the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA). His result 
shows that economic growth have significant and inverse relationship with tariff changes.  
Mano–Bakalinov (2016) also looks at trade liberalisation and economic growth in Macedonia. 
His findings suggest that the relationship between trade reforms and growth through may vary 
across transition economies. Nevertheless, his results show that policies focusing on market 
liberalisation and opening the economy to trade have a positive effect on Macedonian economic 
growth, both in the short run and the long run. 
However, the impact of trade liberalisation on an economy is not very clear. For example trade 
liberalisation increases both exports and imports, the difference between these two, the trade 
balance, may increase or decrease depending on tariff reductions (Ju, Wu and Zeng, 2009). 
According to Ju, Wu and Zeng (2009), the impact of trade liberalisation on the overall balance 
would be the more important question for policy makers. The impact of trade liberalisation on 
the trade balance, therefore, needs to be investigated empirically. 
Ju, Wu and Zeng (2009) noted that previous researches, which attempted to find out how trade 
liberalisation affects a country’s imports, found that it generally leads to a positive impact (Melo 
and Vogt, 1984; Bertola and Faini, 1991; and Santos-Paulino, 2002a). There are also empirical 
researches focusing on the effects of trade liberalisation on exports, where the findings are more 
mixed. Some of these show that those countries, which embarked on liberalisation programs had 
improved their export performance (Thomas, Nash, and Edwards, 1991; and Santos-Paulino, 
2002b); whereas, others have found little evidence of such a relationship (Greenaway and 
Sapsford, 1994; Jenkins 1996). 
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The impact of trade reforms on imports, exports, welfare, revenue, trade creation and trade 
diversion needs to be investigated. Although there is a guideline from theory on the possible 
implications of trade liberalisation on the above-mentioned fundamentals, the results differ from 
one country to another. Hence, an empirical study is of paramount importance. 
In addition, most countries have entered into trade agreements without knowing the implications 
of these agreements quantitatively. This has been primarily due to the fact that developing 
countries do not have the necessary expertise and data when negotiating. Cote d’Ivoire 
unfortunately did implement a trade liberalisation in 1985 which led to the increase in poverty to 
a country already in bad shape.   
This study, therefore, comes at an opportune time, as it will review the impact of the various 
trade agreements on Cote d’Ivoire and be used as an instrument to influence future negotiations. 
The discussion in this report is timely for several reasons: 
Firstly, it takes place at a right time when many African countries are looking for ways to take 
advantage of the opportunities globalisation brings. Countries could derive substantial benefits 
from the trade agreement. If prudently used, this opportunity could allow these countries to build 
a strong and diversified productive sector that is more responsive to export opportunities 
(UNCTAD, 2008). This study intends to explore whether Cote d’Ivoire will benefit from the 
commodity boom – after creating market access through liberalisation especially with the EU.  
Secondly, Cote d’Ivoire’s economy is mostly based on agricultural product. The country 
produced around 33% of the world supply of cocoa annually (World Cocoa Foundation, 2014). 
The death of President Houphouet-Boigny in 1993 the sole ruler of the country and the decline in 
the world cocoa prices during the 1980s have all played an important role in undermining the 
stability of the Ivorian economy. 
 Despite these ambiguous factors, globalisation has played an important role in the deterioration 
of the Ivorian society and economy, degrading the lives of the millions of Ivorian citizens 
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dependent on cocoa for their livelihoods. Given that Africa was consistently a net food producer 
until 25 years ago, this is an opportune time to reflect on what has happened to Cote d’Ivoire’s 
agricultural production and, on how to reconstruct its agricultural export sector.  
Thirdly, Cote d’Ivoire has been implementing trade-liberalisation measures for a long period 
now, so it is perhaps time to take stock and reflect on the trade performance after liberalisation, 
in order to propose remedial actions where these are needed.  
The agricultural sector alone represents 27% of Cote d’Ivoire’s gross domestic product and 
employs 60% of the country labour force (IMF, 2016). The coffee and cocoa sector create 50% 
of Cote d’Ivoire total exports revenue and employs 700,000 farmers. Therefore, there is clear 
evidence that Cote d’Ivoire’s trade liberalization need to be supported by complementary 
policies aimed at enhancing the production of goods. Though the cocoa industry remains the 
most important contributor in the Ivorian society, Ivorians do not consume cocoa rather Western 
Europe consumes the largest proportion with 33% compared to 24% in the United States alone 
(Fell, 2007).  
 
This implies that Cote d’Ivoire is highly dependent on the changes of Western Europe’s demand 
for cocoa. The continued foreign demand for cocoa continues to prevent the Ivory Coast from 
diversifying its economy, aggravating the fragility of their society by reinforcing their 
dependency on a volatile agricultural commodity. Trade liberalization is a policy suggested by 
the developed countries to the developing ones as a solution to end poverty. Under normal 
circumstances, developing countries fail to compete with the powerful economies, because of 
uneven playing fields. In the light of this, it seems plausible and intuitive to examine the impact 
of trade liberalisation on Cote d’Ivoire. 
 
The relevance of this study hinges on the fact that there is no substantial research that has been 
carried out to untangle the effects of trade liberalisation in Cote d’Ivoire. Despite the abundant 
literature on the trade liberalisation in Africa and the world, very few researches were undertaken 
in Cote d’Ivoire. This study on the impact of different trade policy regimes Cote d’Ivoire, 
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therefore, adds to the body of knowledge and closes this gap. To the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, previous studies in this area by a number of researchers are both outdated and not 
comprehensive.  
Rather, these have concentrated on the effect of trade liberalisation on particular sector, like 
justice. For example, Fell (2007) studied the impact of trade liberalisation on environmental 
justice in the Ivorian society. She concluded that the irresponsibility that the chocolate industry 
has demonstrated in suppressing the truth behind chocolate production mirrors the negligence 
with which the West has implemented neoliberal economic policies in the Ivory Coast, as the 
liberalization of the Ivorian cocoa market has left a legacy of poverty, environmental 
degradation, and civil war. 
 
Aka, Bedia (2006) studied the effects of poverty, inequality and welfare effects of trade 
liberalization in Cote d’Ivoire using a computable general equilibrium model analysis. 
 
Kingston (2011) concentrated on the impact of structural adjustment programme that was 
implemented in Cote d’Ivoire in the 1990s. As a result, this does not capture a detailed analysis 
of the impact of Cote d’Ivoire’s different trade-policy regimes. 
 
Yaoxing and N’guessan (2010) reviewed the relationship between foreign direct investment, 
trade openness and growth in Cote d’Ivoire. 
The distinguishing characteristics of this study are its objective of coming up with a broader 
understanding of the impact of trade liberalisation on trade creation, trade diversion, revenue and 
welfare effects in Cote d’Ivoire. 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no studies have been undertaken on estimating the 
impact of trade liberalisation on Cote d’Ivoire. Against this background, the thesis contributes to 
the current issues in trade liberalisation, and its effect on Cote d’Ivoire. The importance of this 
study is to close a knowledge gap within the current existing literature. An important feature of 
 THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALISATION ON COTE D’IVOIRE 
 
26 
 
this thesis is the empirical link that it establishes between Cote d’Ivoire trade policies, exports, 
imports, trade creation and trade diversion, welfare and revenue implications.  
The methodology employed by other studies was either the WITS/SMART model, the TRIST 
model, or the CGE models. For example, Zafar (2005); Karingi et al. (2005); Karingi et al. 
(2006); Lang (2006); Othieno and Shinyekwa (2011); Francois and Pindyuk (2013); 
Makochekanwa (2012); Bilal, Dalleau and Lui (2012); Onogwu and Arene (2013); McIntyre 
(2005); Hallaert (2007); These all used the WITS/SMART model to estimate the effects of a 
particular trade agreement of specific indicators, such as revenue and welfare. Other studies 
made use of only the TRIST model, for example Hamilton (2009); Brenton (2004) and Wangle 
(2011).  
Researchers who used the CGE models include Boyer and Schuschny (2008), Laery (2010), 
McDonald and Walmsley (2011), Karingi et al. (2005), Tekere and Ndlela (2003), Keck and 
Piermartini (2005).  
This thesis, instead, has made use of both the WITS/SMART, since the intention of this study is 
centred on static gains rather than dynamic gains, which require CGE models. The model 
allowed this research to put into perspectives the impact of the trade reforms that Cote d’Ivoire 
has implemented on a wide range of indicators, such as exports, imports, trade creation and trade 
diversion, welfare and revenue implications. The WITS/SMART model was used to evaluate the 
impact of trade policies on Cote d’Ivoire with respect to impact on exports, imports, trade 
creation and trade diversion, welfare and revenue implications.  
The findings of this study should also be of benefit to a number of stakeholders. These 
stakeholders are: investors, civil society, developmental partners, manufacturers, the banks and 
regulators: The Ministry of Commerce, the ECOWAS Commission, and other Government 
Ministries, as well as the Central Bank of Western African States.  
It is in the light of these past developments and the increased negotiations of trade that it is 
imperative and intuitively important, at this juncture, to carry out a detailed study. The study 
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shows the effects of previous trade liberalisation and planned trade protocols. Therefore, the 
study provides the suggestions to Cote d’Ivoire’s negotiators and the relevant stakeholders on the 
implications of such commitments. The light this study sheds on various stakeholders in Cote 
d’Ivoire, coupled with academic interests necessitated this research. Finally, the results of this 
study are likely to have implications for other developing countries – especially those that are in 
Sub Saharan Africa. 
1.7 Layout of the Study 
The thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 reviews Cote d’Ivoire different trade policy regimes 
in the context of the macroeconomic framework. It also, discusses the implications of trade 
reforms, taking into account the revenue implications for Cote d’Ivoire. Chapter 3 analyses Cote 
d’Ivoire’s trade performance within the regional blocs, bilateral and multilateral levels. Chapter 4 
provides theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of trade liberalisation on trade, welfare 
and revenue, which comprise the objectives of the study.  
Chapter 5 outlines the methodology to be used in this research. In this chapter, the 
WITS/SMART is discussed. Chapter 6 presents the empirical results on the impact of the 
ECOWAS customs union and the ECOWAS FTA on Cote d’Ivoire, as well as their economic 
interpretation. Chapter 7 discusses the empirical results of the EU FTA on Cote d’Ivoire and 
their economic interpretation. Chapter 8 presents the empirical results of EPAs on Cote d’Ivoire 
and their economic interpretation.  
Chapter 9 presents the empirical results on the WTO FTA on Cote d’Ivoire and their economic 
interpretation. Chapter 10 presents the empirical results on the bilateral agreements on Cote 
d’Ivoire and their economic interpretation.   
The last chapter, Chapter 11, sums up the study by linking the different parts of the research and 
providing an interpretation of the results, as well as the implications of these findings for the 
policy-makers. 
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1.8  Summary 
The chapter has introduced the subject matter of trade liberalisation. Trade liberalisation lies at 
the heart of the “Washington Consensus”.  Over the years, trade liberalisation has been sold to 
developing countries, as a set of divine rules to end poverty and stimulate economic growth. 
Evidence has revealed from this chapter that the distributive effects of trade liberalisation are 
diverse and not always pro-poor. Trade liberalisation presents opportunities, costs and benefits, 
as well as certain disadvantages. 
The study has reviewed the benefits of trade liberalisation. Trade liberalisation brings individuals 
in developing countries into contact with new technologies, products and skills. The acquired 
technology and skills should promote an outward shift of the production possibility frontier. 
International trade also offers market access. Countries can circumvent the natural limitations of 
their own small domestic markets – particularly through regional integration. As result, 
production for exports can increase employment opportunities directly.  
Trade liberalisation can also result in increased foreign competition; but it can also weaken the 
monopoly position of domestic enterprises and result in lower prices and better services for 
consumers.  
The section has also reviewed the challenges, which come with trade liberalisation. Trade 
liberalisation is expected to create adjustment costs, encompassing a wide variety of potentially 
disadvantageous short-term outcomes. Cote d’Ivoire, in particular, implemented trade 
liberalization in 1985 followed by a structural adjustment program in the 1990s which were the 
reduction in the government’s expenditures and the devaluation of the currency. Cote d’Ivoire 
was a relatively stable nation until it began the engagement with the World Bank and IMF in 
1989. 
Cote d’Ivoire’s economy has not responded favourably to quick trade liberalisation. The 
immediate experience of the liberalisation of the cocoa and coffee sector resulted in an increase 
in agricultural poverty, high economic instability, widespread child labour practices. The 
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consequences of the structural adjustment program were the reduction in the quality of 
education, the decline in the quality of the national health system, a decrease in the purchasing 
power of the poor and a decrease in the standard of living.  
The expansion of exports in Cote d’Ivoire was too slow to compensate for the loss of domestic 
market shares in the short run. The rigid structural policies prescribed by the World Bank and the 
IMF left Cote d’Ivoire but with no choice than to perform the set of reform policies in exchange 
for aids. These ill-advised policies produced devastating effects on the poor. 
Cote d’Ivoire was never deterred by these preliminaries of trade liberalisation. The country went 
on to make more commitments in ECOWAS, ACP – EU, and Cote d’Ivoire just ratified a Trade 
Facilitation Agreement which will help ensure that developing countries receive the assistance 
needed to reap the full benefit of a trade agreement. As discussed above small economies, like 
Cote d’Ivoire, have no option but to liberalise, or at risk of being marginalised by the global 
economy. It is against this background that this study estimates the impact of trade liberalisation 
on the Ivorian economy. The study comes at an opportune time, as the country has been through 
a decade of economic decay.  
The economic meltdown has inevitably weakened the country’s capacity to respond to trade 
liberalisation. In this regard, this study explores the possible effects of trade liberalisation on 
revenue, consumer welfare, imports, exports, trade creation and trade diversion.  
The relevance of this study hinges on the fact that there is no comprehensive study that has been 
carried out in Cote d’Ivoire. Previous studies in this area, by a number of researchers, are both 
outdated and not comprehensive. The distinguishing characteristics of this study are its objective 
of coming up with a broader understanding of the impact of trade liberalisation on Cote d’Ivoire. 
The next chapter will discuss Cote d’Ivoire’s trade policy regimes. Of specific interest, trade 
policy instruments, bilateral, regional and multilateral integration will be reviewed in this 
section. The main purpose of this discussion is to explore in detail the trade policies, which Cote 
d’Ivoire has implemented overs the years. The thrust of this thesis is to estimate the impact of 
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trade liberalisation on Cote d’Ivoire. It is, therefore, fundamental to examine the different trade 
policies that have been applied by Cote d’Ivoire. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS AND TRADE-POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Chapter Two of this study examines the trade policy regimes applied by Cote d’Ivoire in 
response to the macroeconomic dynamics and the implications of trade reforms on revenue. An 
examination of Cote d’Ivoire’s trade policies is critical, because it provides the the foundation 
for this study, since the main objective of this study is to estimate the impact of trade 
liberalisation on Cote d’Ivoire. Of specific interest, trade-policy instruments, bilateral, regional 
and multilateral integration are reviewed. The analysis forms the basis for the subsequent 
chapters – to review how these polices have affected Cote d’Ivoire.  
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the structure of the economy. Section 
2.3 examines macroeconomic dynamics. Section 2.4 covers the definition of trade policy. 
Section 2.5 examines trade policy features and trends in Cote d’Ivoire. It also covers the 
evolution of Cote d’Ivoire’s trade policy from independence to date. Various trade legislations 
adopted by Cote d’Ivoire analysed here provide a backbone for the study, as they form the basis 
for the evaluation of the impact such measures have had on the economy.  
Section 2.6 reviews Cote d’Ivoire’s tariff structure, and goes on to analyse the country’s 
compliance with international commitments. Section 2.7 discusses the importance of customs 
revenue to Cote d’Ivoire, which is one of the objectives of this study. Section 2.8 provides a 
summary of the major issues discussed in this chapter. 
2.2 The Structure of the Economy 
Due to its relative economic prosperity, observed until recently a steadily positive growth rates – 
Cote d’Ivoire was for a long period the main development hub of the subregion. The World 
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Cocoa Foundation (2014) noted that despite the crisis, Cote d’Ivoire has remained the world’s 
leading cocoa producer.  
 
The economy of Cote d’Ivoire is primarily dependant on its agriculture, particularly on cocoa 
and coffee and other exports crops such as rubber, palm oil, cotton, sugar cane, bananas, 
pineapple and foods crops such as plantain, yams and cassava (UN COMTRADE, 2016). 
  
The recent development and prospects of Cote d’Ivoire is quite promising. Since the end of the 
2011 postelection crises, the government was able to achieve an economic growth of 8.8% in 
2013, the secondary sector advances with 13.3% and the tertiary 12.6% in 2013 (African 
Economic Outlook, 2014). The budget situation was much better in 2013 after decline in 2011 
and 2012. 
 
The country’s revenue increased after a reorganisation of the tax administration. This positive 
view must not hide the big challenges as the country’s GDP per capita is much lower than it was 
in 2000. The first priority is to make growth inclusive and durable to meet the pressing need of a 
young population looking for jobs. National competitiveness needs to be addressed, a much 
simpler taxation accompanied by a less rigid custom procedure are the challenges the 
government needs to address. Cote d’Ivoire’s current tax are 62 compared to the African average 
of 36 (African Economic Outlook, 2014). 
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Figure 2. 1: Sectoral Contribution to GDP 
Source: African Economic Outlook (2014) 
Growth has been driven by the services sector (48% of GDP), thanks to strong performance in 
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telephony, transport and commerce due to the improved security situation and the increase in 
imports (AFDB, 2013). The secondary sector (22% of GDP), particularly the building and public 
works sub-sector, was consolidated as a result of the construction of socio-economic 
infrastructure. The primary sector however (30% of GDP) slowed in 2012 owing to the 
degradation of agricultural production infrastructure and poor performance in export agriculture 
and mineral extraction (AFDB, 2013). The vegetative rest period caused the slowdown in cocoa 
production and the decline in export agriculture, while the decrease in mineral extraction is due 
to a fall in oil and gas production due to natural depletion and the closure of some wells for 
works. 
 
The Agricultural sector presents a huge scope for trade since it is the largest sector of the 
economy. Under normal circumstances, a country like Cote d’Ivoire, which is solely dependent 
on its agricultural sector needs to imperatively analyse the impact of a trade liberalisation. But, is 
trade liberalisation good for Cote d’Ivoire? The answer to this question is empirically derived in 
this study. 
2.3  Macroeconomic Dynamics  
The economy performed fairly well in the 1970s. The economic growth has been overally 
positive at the dawn of the independence years (1960) to the end of the 1970s. This period 
corresponds the golden years of Cote d'Ivoire where growth was mainly driven by the rapid 
expansion of cocoa and coffee exports revenues. Within this period the growth rate of per capita 
GDP was around 1.54%, one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa (Jidoud, 2012).  
 
Unfortunately, commodity prices have dramatically fallen in the starting of the 1980s leading to 
unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances (World Economic Ouloook, 2013). This was fuelled 
by the high interest rates and the appreciation of the US dollar in terms of the CFA Francs. 
Export earnings have substantially fallen and debt burden skyrocked leading to an adjustment 
process with the support of the world bank. 
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This results in huge government spending cuts that hampered growth. The economy went 
through a recession. A sluggish recovery started in mid 1990s following the franc devaluation. 
Economic activity has gained a fresh momentum since the end of the 2011 socio-political crisis. 
Although it only reflects a partial ‘’catch-up’’ effect, growth reached 9% in 2012 ( Jidoud, 
2012). This demonstrates the resilience of the Ivorian economy in the wake of growth shock in 
2011 that marked a 4.8% contraction of GDP. 
2.4 Trade Policy Defined 
Trade policy consists principally of tariffs and other border measures intended to tax and regulate 
the importation of goods (OECD, 2014). The purpose of trade policy is to help a nation’s 
international trade run more smoothly by setting clear standards and goals, which can be 
understood by potential trading partners (WTO, 2010). In many regions, groups of nations work 
together to create mutually beneficial trade policies. 
 Prior to trade liberalisation, countries used quantitative import restrictions, administrative 
barriers and other non-trade measures, as well as foreign-exchange controls to control trade in 
most product areas (Dean et al., 1994). In Africa, trade liberalisation has reduced the coverage of 
non-tariff measures considerably (UNCTAD, 2008).  
Quantitative and detailed trade policy analysis and information are more necessary now than 
they have ever been. In the recent years, globalization and, more specifically, trade opening have 
increasingly become a heated debate. Questions have been raised about whether the gains from 
trade exceed the costs of trade. Concerns regarding the distributional effects of trade reforms 
have also been expressed.  
 
According to UNCTAD, one of the main policies associated with trade liberalisation has been 
the conversion of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) into tariff equivalents, is a process known as 
“tariffication”. UNCTAD insisted on the adoption of the policies that would lead to the 
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conversion of the various non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to equivalent tariff rates through a process 
called tariffication (WTO, 2014). 
Africa is now one of the regions of the world where NTBs are least used (IMF, 2005). In the 
review of its Trade Restrictiveness Index, the IMF (2005) compares NTB data on 12 major 
trading countries and the European Union. The data show that Africa’s major trading partners 
have had very high NTBs; while African countries have reduced their NTBs considerably.   
This study used tariffs as trade-policy instruments to evaluate the impact of different trade policy 
regimes on Cote d’Ivoire. The use of tariffs as trade-policy instruments is sufficient to evaluate 
the impact of trade liberalisation on Cote d’Ivoire because Cote d’Ivoire established a common 
external tariff (CET) with other countries from WAEMU. The CET establishes four categories of 
products on which tariffs are zero, five, ten and 20 percent (OTEXA, 2012).  
2.5  Trade Policy Features and Trends 
After its independence, Cote d’Ivoire was at the peak of its relatively long period of growth 
during 1960-1979 and the country’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of 5.7% (aka, 2006).  
 
Some observers named this period of sustained growth the "Ivorian Miracle". The performance 
of the economy, based on growth in agricultural exports, led to an increase in the country's 
revenues then managed by the stabilization fund and support of agricultural products 
(CAISTAB), a public marketing board. 
 
Kingston et al (2011) also said that by the end of 1979, the growth process slowed because the 
decline in international prices of agricultural products was aggravated by both the 1973 and 1978 
oil crises. Since the early 1980s the macroeconomic situation has worsened, and the emergence 
of persistent budget deficits has constrained the government's investment in development 
programmes previously initiated-in several sectors.  
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To face the persistent decline in the international prices of agricultural products, the economic 
policy choice during the period 1970-1979 was the diversification and modernization of the 
agricultural sector (ICO, 2002). Unfortunately, the end of the decade was marked by economic 
crisis and more deterioration of the terms of trade which forced the government to engage in 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) that lasted throughout the 1980s and were financed by 
the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in an attempt to restore a stable 
macroeconomic environment and foster growth (Kingston, et al, 2011).  
However, these programmes did not to restore the health of the economy but rather worsened the 
economic situation of the country. 
 
In the early 1990s, the international institutions and partners in development suggested the 
privatization of several public enterprises and a freeze on the public wage bill. In addition, they 
suggested the liberalization of the agricultural sector, mainly cocoa and coffee, which 
represented the backbone of the country's finances. In the meantime, the CFA franc was 
devalued by 50% in 1994, followed by the suppression of the CAISTAB in January 1999 (ICO, 
2002). 
2.5.1  Structural Adjustment Programme  
Cote d’Ivoire implemented a structural adjustment programme (SAP) with the help of the World 
Bank and the IMF. The main focus of SAP was the privatisation of the cocoa industry between 
1988 and 1995. Even though Cote d’Ivoire’s exports increase from US$3 billion to US$5 billion 
from 1980 to 1995, the incidence of poverty doubled from 17.8% to 37% of the population 
(Kingston, 2011).  
 
The strain on the economy meant that farmers were under increased pressure to produce more 
cocoa. The need to expand the production of cocoa output led to the illegal exploitation of 
children. The loan package (SAP) also required Cote d’Ivoire’s government to reduce national 
spending in order to correct the government budget deficit. Reduction in government 
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expenditures affected the social well-being of the people, as user fees were introduced into the 
national health system, and education budgets were cut. 
Hence, the results was a decline in the quality of education as highly skilled individual left the 
country to seek better employment overseas mainly to France and Canada. Despite the 
implementation of the IMF policies, Cote d’Ivoire suffers from a huge debt burden with an 
external debt that grew from $7.4 billion to $17.7 billion from 1980-1990 (Kingston, 2011).  
 
Cote d’Ivoire’s currency was devalued by 50% to lower the cost of exports (Harrison, 1990). 
This affected the poor as their savings and purchasing power declined. The IMF suggested the 
liberalization of the agricultural sector, mainly cocoa and coffee as well as the economic 
liberalization of the cocoa market in 1999 allowed for the arrival of several multinational 
companies and foreign investors in the cocoa sector. The goal of liberalisation was to increase 
the price farmers receive for their crops. However, evidence suggest that cocoa farmers did not 
experience benefits from these price increases (ICO, 2002). 
2.5.2  National Trade Policy (NTP) 
Côte d'Ivoire does not have any independent official body responsible for reviewing or advising 
the Government on trade policy (MOC, 2014). According to a WTO Secretariat report on Côte 
d'Ivoire's trade policies and practices, the objective of Côte d'Ivoire's liberalization is to revive 
the economy which has been in recession for seven years due to the decline the world prices of  
coffee and cocoa, which account for more than half of the country's export earnings.  
 
Côte d'Ivoire has ratified the Uruguay Round Agreements and it has applied the General 
Agreement since 1947, firstly as a French Overseas Territory and then, since 1963, as a 
contracting party (WTO, 2015). In the Uruguay Round Agreements, Côte d'Ivoire restrained all 
duties applicable to agricultural products at a ceiling rate.  
 
The European Union is Côte d'Ivoire's major trading partner, accounting for 52 per cent of its 
exports and 54 per cent of imports in 1992. Trade relations with France are very close and the 
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latter supplies 10.5 per cent of imports and takes 6.5 per cent of Ivorian exports whereas the 
Netherlands supplies 1.9 per cent of Ivorian imports and is an important outlet, purchasing 8 per 
cent of Ivorian exports, especially cocoa (UNCTAD, 2013). 
 
Its major trading partners in Africa belong to the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and, first and foremost, to the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU). Among African countries, the major suppliers are Nigeria, with 18 per cent of 
imports, mainly oil and natural gas, followed by Cameroon and Senegal (UN COMTRADE, 
2016). Although the number of import levies is quite high with at least four separate duties 
(customs duty, fiscal duty, stamp duty and a levy on imports carried by sea), their levels have 
been considerably reduced.  
 
Zake (2011) has also shown that trade facilitation has involved a much broader agenda covering 
customs automation through the adoption and regular upgrading of ASYCUDA (Automated 
System for Customs Data), the use of post-control audits and risk management, and the adoption 
of international standards. Trade-facilitation efforts to reduce time barrier can be seen as trade-
liberalisation measures. This is one policy measure Cote d’Ivoire has adopted. 
2.5.2.1 Tariff-Based Instruments  
The tariff-based instruments adopted by Cote d’Ivoire and discussed in this section are custom 
duty, fiscal duties, export tax and duty-drawback systems. 
(i) Custom duty and fiscal duty 
Cote d’Ivoire’s imports into Côte d'Ivoire are subject to a number of levies. There is a uniform 
customs duty of 5 per cent, a fiscal duty, which is between 5 and 30 per cent and most imports 
are subject to a 0.6 per cent levy on imports carried by sea (Worldwide Tax Summaries, 2015). 
In addition, some special taxes apply to particular products, mainly alcohol, tobacco, fuel, as 
well as some meats, fish and dairy products.  
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(ii) Export Taxes 
Export taxes can take different forms. They can be ad valorem taxes, specified as a percentage 
tax of the value of the product; or a specific tax, specified as a fixed amount to pay per unit of a 
product. It can be a progressive tax, i.e. characterised by a high tax rate when the price of the 
product is high; and a lower tax rate when the value of the product is lower. All types of export 
taxes have the effect of reducing the volume of exports; and they are, therefore, a form of export 
restriction (Piermartini, 2004). 
Export taxes can be applied to the reference prices for coffee, cocoa, wood and cola nuts. One of 
the objectives of these taxes, reintroduced on coffee and cocoa in 1994 after a four-year interval, 
is to stimulate diversification towards exports with a higher value added and, in the case of 
wood, to discourage deforestation. 
This is particularly so after the 2008-2009 economic crises. In 2009, export taxes and restrictions 
emerged as ninth top category among state measures discriminating against foreign commercial 
interests (Evenett, 2009). The trend continues upward, making export taxes and restriction the 
fifth top measure in 2012, after bail-outs, trade remedies, tariffs and non-tariff barriers (Evenett, 
2012).  
Export tax is known as droit unique de sorties (DUS) is a specific tax set in local currency 
(FCFA) per kilogram of cocoa bean that can be periodically revised. For example for 2009-2010 
crop season exporters pay 210 FCFA (US$ 0.57) as the DUS when cocoa cargo is loaded into the 
vessel at the port of Abidjan and of San-Pedro (Essoh, 2014).  
 
Registration tax is known as tax d’enregistrement which is an ad valorem tax set at a percentage 
of the price CIF and can be also periodically revised. Exporters pay the registration tax first 
when they register and then fill legal formalities with the government as official cocoa exporter 
annually. 
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The statistical tax in Cote d’Ivoire is 2.5 per cent. To this value must be added the value added 
tax (VAT) whose modal rate is 20 per cent applied to the price of imports plus import duties 
(WWTS, 2015).  
(iii) Import tariffs 
A import duty, applied to all incoming goods regardless of origin, serves primarily as a source of 
revenue. Cote d'Ivoire applies a common external tariff (CET) together with other countries 
belonging to the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). This economic and 
monetary union comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. 
The CET establishes four categories of products on which tariffs are zero, five, 10, and 20 
percent (Otexa, 2012). 
A customs duty is levied on all goods coming from places other than franc zone countries. 
Products from franc zone countries, especially France, receive preferential customs treatment. 
An excise tax is levied on alcoholic beverages and tobacco; export duties and taxes are imposed 
on specified commodities. 
Customs and other import tariffs are all levies collected on goods that are entering the country or 
services delivered by nonresidents to residents. They consists of imposed levies for revenue or 
protection purposes and are determined on a specific or ad valorem basis as long as they are 
limited to imported goods or services. According to the customs tariff Customs duties range from 
0 per cent to 35 per cent, depending on the classification of the imported goods. The statistical 
tax in Cote d’Ivoire is 2.5 per cent. To this value must be added the value added tax (VAT) 
whose modal rate is 20 per cent applied to the price of imports plus import duties. Upon imports, 
goods are also subject to a statistical duty of 1 per cent, a community levy of 0.5 per cent and to 
a VAT of 18 per cent (WWTS, 2015) . 
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2.5.2.2 Non-Tariff Measures 
Cote d’Ivoire adopted Non-tariff measures under the WTO guiding principles, which are 
discussed in this section below. This includes import and export licensing, standard and quality, 
trade defence mechanisms, anti-dumping and countervailing mechanisms, safeguard measures, 
and rules of origin. 
(i) Import and Export Licencing 
About 72% of exporters in Côte d’Ivoire perceive non-tariff measures (NTMs) as barriers to 
trade (ITC, 2014). Exporters in the country face more challenges in the regional market than in 
global markets. One of the major obstacle Cote d’Ivoire face is the delivery of certificates of 
origin to export in neighbouring countries. Malpractices and briberies constitute another 
challenges for exporters. 
 
Licences are issued to importers regardless of whether they are producers of like products and 
licence applications are processed within a period of 2-3 weeks (WTO, 2013). Under the 
regulations, licence-holders are required to use a specific percentage of the licences allocated to 
them, and to surrender the unused remainder thereof, which is then reassigned to other eligible 
importers. 
 
Most of Cote d’Ivoire’s trade is governed by automatic import and export licence. However, 
imports and/or exports of certain goods may be subject to specific licensing administered by the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOC) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(MARD). The government has maintained import licensing, in accordance with the WTO 
Standards and Quality. 
 
(ii) Standards and Quality 
The national standardization and certification (CODINORM) is the national body responsible for 
the following tasks: The promotion of quality management in companies. The management of a 
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technical documentation collection and of a bookstore for standards and quality-related works; 
the management of a national product certification and quality management system and also the 
management of the national WTO enquiry point on standards and regulations; 
Standards are used as instruments of trade policy to authenticate the quality and specification of 
imports and exports in conformity with international safety requirements and regulations that aim 
largely at consumer protection (MOC, 2014). 
(iii) Trade Defence Mechanisms 
Every WTO’s member state has the right to impose trade remedies, such as anti- dumping and 
countervailing duties, to correct the competitive imbalances created by unfair trade practices, 
when they cause or threaten to cause serious injury to local industry. Member countries are also 
allowed to apply safeguard measures in case of the surge of imports that cause, or threaten to 
cause, serious injury to local industry (WTO, 2010). In this regard, Cote d’Ivoire’s government is 
actively monitoring such unfair trade practices. 
(iv) Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures  
Anti-dumping measures are typically tariffs in addition to customary duties that are imposed to 
counteract certain unfair pricing practices by foreign companies that threatens to injure domestic 
consumers (Skyles, 2005). 
According to the WTO (2013), dumping occurs if a company exports a product at a price lower 
than the price it normally charges on its own home market. Dumping brings about unfair 
competition; hence, many governments take action against dumping, in order to defend and 
protect their domestic industries (WTO, 2013).  
The WTO agreement under GATT (Article 6) allows governments to act against dumping, where 
there is genuine “material” injury to the competing domestic industry. In order to do that the 
government has to be able to show that dumping is taking place, to calculate the extent of 
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dumping (how much lower the export price is compared to the exporter’s home market price), 
and to show that the dumping is causing injury, or threatening to do so (WTO, 2013).  
Cote d’Ivoire’s government has put in place measures to regulate and strengthen the 
investigating authority, thereby enabling it to establish the existence of unfair trade practices 
caused by dumping and subsidised imports. Good economic governance, in areas such as 
taxation and business licensing is a fundamental pillar for the creation of a favourable business 
environment (ITC, 2014).  
(v) Safeguard Measures 
A WTO member may restrict the imports of a product temporarily (take “safeguard” actions) if 
its domestic industry is injured or threatened with injury caused by a surge in imports (WTO, 
2013). Under GATT Article XIX, members are permitted to apply a global safeguard if a product 
is  being imported "in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten  
serious injury" to domestic producers of like or directly competitive product. 
In order to apply safeguard measures, the injury has to be serious. However, they are improperly 
used, some governments preferring to protect their domestic industries through “grey area” 
measures – by using bilateral negotiations outside GATT’s auspices (WTO, 2013). 
Côte d'Ivoire does not have any specific legislation on safeguard measures. However, in order to 
prevent the influx of certain imported goods, which are threatening the survival of local industry, 
government has considered a mix of safeguard measures under the WTO rules (MOC, 2014). 
Cote d’Ivoire’s legislation on safeguard measures falls under the Competition (Safeguards) 
(Investigation) Regulations of 2006 in line with GATT Article XIX of the WTO. In addition, 
government has undertaken to monitor rules of origin and preferential treatment provisions under 
signed trade treaties or agreement. For instance, the introduction of the Common External Tariff 
(CET) of the WAEMU as of 1 January 2000 unified, simplified and lowered the customs tariff.  
Taking into account the standing supplementary duties of the WAEMU and the ECOWAS, 
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levied solely on imports from third countries (including the community levies of 1.5 per cent ad 
valorem and the statistical fee of 1 per cent ad valorem). The country has made use of those 
instruments to protect its domestic producers (WWTS, 2015). 
Côte d’Ivoire did not create legislation to fight price dumping and duties that threaten domestic 
activities. But before the Marrakesh agreement, specific duties were levied on certain meats and 
dairy products to countervail the negative impacts of subsidies that the EU granted its export 
products.  
(vi) Rules of Origin 
The WTO committee has provided an agreement which aims at long-term harmonization of rules 
of origin, other than rules of origin relating to the granting of tariff preferences (WTO, 2016). 
This serves to ensure that such rules do not themselves create unnecessary obstacles to trade. 
The rules of origin are gradually becoming an economic, political and trade instrument, and their 
effect goes well beyond the avoidance of trade deflection. This is complicated by globalisation, 
and the way a product can be processed in several countries before it is ready for the market 
(WTO, 2013). Not all trade between regional trade agreements (RTAs) partners are carried out 
under its preferential regime, and that for a number of reasons, amongst which the impossibility 
of meeting the rules of origin  requirements, lack of information on existing RTAs. 
In Cote d’Ivoire, few outstanding issues remain as far as the rules of Origin negotiations are 
concerned. These discussions started from the Rules of Origin used in the Cotonou Agreement. 
This has already resulted in simplifications that could help West Africa thereby Cote d’Ivoire to 
develop, such as the "single transformation" for textiles products.  
 In recent years, the Ivorian economy has suffered from the influx of goods entering Cote 
d’Ivoire under the guise of preferential trading arrangements specifically goods that are 
manufactured in Nigeria.  
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2.5.2.3 Trade Development Instruments 
In line with the provision of the WTO, Cote d’Ivoire undertook a number of measures to develop 
its trade. The priority for the Ivorian government was to make growth inclusive and long lasting 
to respond to the pressing need of a young population. National competitiveness need to 
improve, also the country needs better roads, less rigid customs and much simpler taxation which 
is currently 62 compared to the African average of 36 (African Economic Outlook, 2014)   
(i) Buy Cote d’Ivoire development Initiative 
The development objective of Cote d’Ivoire is to transform the country by 2020 into an emerging 
nation. After a decade of multifaceted crises, the Government of Côte d’Ivoire embarked on 
March 28, 2012 a comprehensive medium-term development strategy called the National 
Development Plan (IMF, 2016).  
The Government requested assistance from the World Bank, which has helped set in place an 
advisory group dedicated solely to the mobilization of external public and private financing to 
push the country along the path of sustainable growth. The major challenges the government of 
Côte d’Ivoire faces are the consolidation of peace and national reconciliation, public 
administration capacity building, good governance and enhancing the business climate (IMF, 
2016). 
But the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative Completion Point was reached in 
June 2012 and the first phase of the French Government’s Debt Settlement and Development 
Contract is now in effect, so the future looks bright for Côte d’Ivoire (AFDB, 2013). But 
progress is still needed in land and taxation matters, notably how to obtain construction permits 
more easily. 
(ii) Value Addition 
The country supplies 40% of the world’s cocoa, as well as coffee (300 000 tonnes a year) 
(African Economic Outlook, 2014). Cote d’Ivoire’s exports are dominated by primary products, 
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whose international prices are vulnerable to frequent shocks. To survive the challenges of the 
ever-increasing competition on the international trading environment, the government of Cote 
d’Ivoire has placed greater emphasis on the production and export of processed goods in all 
sectors of the economy.  
 
In that regard, the government wants to boost the industrial sector’s share of the economy from 
around 30% of GDP in 2012 to 40% by 2020, and is looking into how to increase raw-material 
processing, taking into account that some strategic Global Value Chain (GVCs) do not have 
much room for direct industrial input, such as those whose related products are not traded on 
world markets (African Economic Outlook, 2014).  
 
(iii) Cluster Initiatives 
The cluster concept has gained growing prominence on the agenda of international development 
organizations over the last decade. The foundations of this paradigm can be traced back to the 
work of the economist Alfred Marshall, who in Principles of Economics described the 
phenomenon as “the concentration of specialized industries in particular localities” and noted 
that these agglomerations of small-scale businesses enjoyed economies of scale comparable to 
those of large firms (Marshall, 1980).  
 
In recent times, donors and development agencies have shown growing concern to the potential 
of cluster initiatives to bring about pro-poor effects. Generally speaking, thriving clusters can 
generate income and employment opportunities for the local community and become drivers of 
broad-based local economic development. 
 
Cote d’Ivoire is part of Accelerating Trade in West Africa (ATWA) which is a new initiative 
aiming to establish a durable, multi-donor vehicle dedicated to enhancing regional integration, 
expanding trade and reducing trade costs along key trade routes in West Africa (Saana 
Consulting, 2016). ATWA will work along national government, regional commissions and the 
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private sector and will address both “soft” policy and trade facilitation issues and “hard” 
infrastructure constraints to ensure meaningful impact (Saana Consulting, 2016). ATWA is 
financed by the Danish aid agency, Danida, although other development partners have already 
expressed interest to join. 
Cluster initiatives is beneficial for developing country such as Cote d’Ivoire because there are 
proven benefits accruing in terms of the attainment of economies of scale, strengthening the 
capacity of local institutions, reducing the cost of collective actions, lowering production and 
transaction costs, global competitiveness and the development of comparative advantages  
(iv) Trade Incentives 
Taxing exports is not an optimal policy because it distorts trade and reduces world welfare, 
although it may raise welfare for an individual country. 
An export tax improves the terms of trade of the exporter but can be welfare-enhancing only if 
the terms of trade gain outweighs the deadweight losses from inefficiencies in resource 
allocation that result from the tax. Cote d’Ivoire like many other least developed countries uses 
export tax as a source of revenue. The Ivorian producers receive no more than 40% of the world 
prices for cocoa (Kireyev, 2010). 
 
Côte d’Ivoire export taxes are considered an important source of fiscal revenue and also an 
indirect way to tax the land used to generate profit. Fiscal levies form part of budget revenue; 
quasi-fiscal levies are collected to finance sector institutional structures and are not included in 
fiscal revenue.  
 
(v) Trade Finance 
Trade finance is of particular importance to promote industrial production and trade, in view of 
the credit and liquidity challenges that the country is faced with. The relatively excessive 
liquidity of the banks is caused the large amount of sight deposits, which explains why banks 
 THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALISATION ON COTE D’IVOIRE 
 
49 
 
offer few long-term loans and explains why the cost of banking operations are still the weak spot 
of the economy. Access to loans remains very difficult for many economic operators, especially 
long-term credit (only 6% of all loans) (African Economic Outlook, 2015).  Small Medium 
Enterprises also have little access to short-term working capital, unlike large firms.  
In this regard, the government has been of late prioritising the spending on the poor which rose 
to 9.3% of GDP in 2013 from 8.6% in 2012, but the 2013 national human development report 
said the multidimensional poverty rate increased from 31.8% in 2008 to 34.4% in 2011 (African 
Economic Outlook, 2014) 
(vi) Export Credit Reinsurance 
Côte d’Ivoire’s exports market consists of some 800,000 small producers facing, through several 
hundred local intermediaries, three to ten large buyers (Kireyev, 2010). 
Exporters require protection from certain unforeseen commercial and political risks, such as 
unpredictable payment risks inherent in export transactions, especially when entering new 
markets or dealing with new buyers. The political and security climate in Cote d’Ivoire had 
improved substantially in recent years. 
The government of Côte d’Ivoire is undertaking comprehensive reform of the cocoa sector. The 
goals of these reforms are to increase competition among buyers and the share of world prices 
obtained by farmers, introduce market-based instruments for risk management, and further 
promote cocoa transformation and export of finished products.  
The authorities intend to reduce all taxes to no more than 22 percent of the CIF price. This would 
help align export taxation in Côte d’Ivoire with international practice (Kireyev, 2010). 
 
(vii) Trade Promotion 
Trade promotion activities are designed to market the country’s exports to the rest of the world. 
The ministry of Commerce is the national body mandated to carry out trade promotion. Other 
bodies involved in trade promotion activities include the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme 
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(ETLS). It is the main ECOWAS operational tool for promoting the West Africa region as a Free 
Trade Area (Olayinka, 2014). This is in line with the one of the objectives of the community 
which is the establishment of a common market through “the liberalisation of trade by the 
removal, among Member States, of customs duties levied on imports and exports, and the 
elimination among Member States of non-tariff barriers. 
(viii) Export Basket Diversification 
The country’s export basket is dominated by a few traditional primary product lines, whose 
international prices are vulnerable to frequent shocks. To survive the challenges of the 
increasingly competitive international trading order, the government of Cote d’Ivoire undertook 
major efforts to diversify export crops and end its dependence on cocoa and coffee. In the forest 
zone, diversification products were palm oil, coconut oil, and rubber, all of which enjoyed a 
comparative advantage on the international market. 
 Cote d’Ivoire’s prospects are quite good, the economic recovery through major public work 
produced growth at 8.8 per cent (African Economic Outlook, 2014). The positive must not hide 
the big challenge, such as per capita GDP which is still lower. Hence growth must be inclusive. 
(ix) Trade Facilitation 
The trade facilitation agreement was adopted by the general council in November 2014 into the 
WTO’s legal framework (WTO, 2014). The agreement will serve as means of assisting 
developing country and least developed country in securing assistance and support. Once the 
trade facilitation agreement enters into force, the expected reduction in total trade cost for low 
income countries will be 14.5 per cent (WTO, 2014). Trade facilitation concepts help customs 
administrations meet their duties. Similarly, business supply chains are very fluid and no two 
supply chains appear to be the same. The benefits of trade facilitation and reduced transaction 
costs between business and government are self-explanatory. 
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Many developing countries view export diversification as an important policy objective. It has 
two dimensions: exporting a wider variety of products, and serving more overseas markets.  
Gonzalez (2013) argued that export competitiveness starts with trade facilitation. Gonzalez 
categorised elements of trade facilitation into hardware and software. Hardware includes roads, 
bridges, ports and airports, which are the necessary landing docks for the business of doing trade. 
The software of the transactions that allow trade to be processed: customs and border procedures; 
automation of processes; transparent and consistent fees and charges; and regulatory consistency 
on how rules at the border are applied. 
 
The WTO, through the ongoing Doha Development Agent (DDA), is seeking to address both of 
these angles in its negotiating and non-negotiating agenda. However, despite the immediate 
utility of trade facilitation for both business and government organisations, the implementation 
of trade facilitation concepts is often riddled with difficulties. The country was ranked 126th out 
of the 132 countries in the World Economic Forum Global Enabling Trade Index which 
measures institutions, policies and services to facilitate trade in countries (ITC, 2012). 
Most of these can be associated with conflicting interests, institutional limitations and lack of 
knowledge. 
 
In the same vein, Trade facilitation and market integration issues have continuously been 
highlighted as the key to allowing greater gains from trade in West Africa by ECOWAS 
countries. Cote d’Ivoire is in the process of streamlining and simplifying trade facilitation, by 
eliminating customs delays and improving customs administration. These trade policy 
instruments have a direct effect on Cote d’Ivoire’s trade. A review of the trade policy regimes 
provides an evaluation mechanism aimed at informing policy in Cote d’Ivoire.  
2.6  Trade Agreements 
Cote d’Ivoire is a signatory to the Economic Community of Western African States, the Western 
Africa for Economic Monetary Union, Africa Caribbean and Pacific – the European Union and 
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the World Trade Organisation Trade agreements (MOC, 2014). The country also has over 32 
Bilateral Trade Agreements, which provides a Most Favoured Nation (MFN) regime. This 
includes the European Union, Ghana, Brazil, Sweden etc. All the arrangements provide 
frameworks for further liberalisation of trade, and Cote d’Ivoire has made commitments within 
each of these arrangements towards that objective (WTO, 1995). 
2.6.1  World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
The WTO (2014) stated that the promotion of competitive exports and global trade-tariff 
reductions was a necessary improvement for trade liberalisation. It was also noted that most 
developing countries were advocating improved market access to service sectors. The 
discussions on trade facilitation were to clear and improve the relevant aspects of Article V 
(dealing with the freedom of transit of goods from other WTO Member States), Article VIII 
(dealing with trade-related fees and formalities) and Article X, which deals with transparency in 
the regulation and administration of trade regulations (WTO, 2014). 
 
There is also consensus that developing countries have a great deal from free trade (Krueger, 
1999; Srinivasan, 1999; Stiglitz, 2000; Tangermann and Josling, 1999; Huff, 2000).  
 
Firstly, developed countries can give developing countries one- way trade preferences. This is 
the basis of the Generalised System of Preferences, designed to promote exports from developing 
countries to developed countries. Secondly, under the Enabling Clause, developing countries can 
exchange virtually any trade preferences to which they agree. This provision is intended to 
promote trade among developing countries themselves. Under the Enabling Clause, preferences 
need not to lead to full free trade areas; partial preferences across a subset of goods are 
permitted. Finally, under Article XXIV of GATT, any two or more of the WTO members can 
form an FTA or customs union.  
 
Cote d’Ivoire signed the Agreement of the GATT in 1947 and became a member in 1963 and the 
country has also been a WTO member since the WTO was founded in January 1995 (WTO, 
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2015). Under GATT 1947 and through subsequent rounds of negotiations that took place, Cote 
d’Ivoire assumed a number of tariff bindings that have restricted its ability to increase customs 
duties on various commodities of export interest to other WTO members and has also made an 
offer under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (WTO, 1995).  
The offer concerns certain professional services and other business services, certain construction, 
and certain tourism-related services such as (hotels, and restaurants) and a few transport services. 
The lack of competition results in higher prices and affects the competitiveness of Ivorian 
exports.  The WTO secretariat believed that greater liberalization would stimulate competition 
and allow costs to be reduced, while at the same time diversifying the number and origin of 
suppliers (WTO, 1995).  
In the Uruguay Round Negotiations, Côte d'Ivoire's main objectives were to improve the legal 
framework of multilateral trade and to maintain special and differential treatment for developing 
countries. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) deals with the rules of trade between nations at 
a near global level.  
The instant benefit of being a member of the WTO is that Cote d’Ivoire is able to enjoy the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) and National Treatment Clauses out of 152 members who are members 
to the WTO (WTO, 2011). The MFN clause means that a country cannot discriminate against 
any other member countries.  
Concessions or preferential treatment have to be applied to all the member states. The National 
Treatment principle states that a country cannot discriminate in its tax and non-tax laws to 
similar products in the domestic market (WTO, 2010). Ivorian exports would not suffer from 
unfair treatment on the export markets. Cote d’Ivoire’s participation in the WTO is very 
convenient for the country, as it would not necessarily need to sign bilateral trade agreements. 
Cote d’Ivoire is currently participating in the ongoing Doha Development Round (DDA). 
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The negotiations are centred on the following areas, among others: Agriculture, non-agricultural 
market access (NAMA), industrial tariffs, non-tariffs barriers, trade in services, trade facilitation, 
trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) and development (WTO, 2010). 
Negotiations are on the most significant differences among the developed nation led by the 
United States and the European Union and the major developing Countries led by the BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). 
Negotiations in NAMA are aimed at reducing, or when appropriate, eliminating tariffs including 
the reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, tariff escalation, as well as non-tariff barriers – in 
particular on products of export interest for developing countries (WTO, 2004).  
There is contention against the US and the EU over their maintenance of agricultural subsidies 
because they are seen to operate as trade barriers. The negotiations are taking into account 
special and less-than-full reciprocity in reduction commitments for developing countries. Cote 
d’Ivoire, together with other developing countries, would like to see more tariffs cut by 
developed countries, and less agricultural subsidies by the developed countries for their exports 
to be competitive. Efforts have been made to revive the talk between the US, China and India but 
so far it has been without success. The future of the Doha Round remains uncertain. 
According to the international centre for trade and development, Cote d’Ivoire’s official are well 
aware of what they stand to lose if no reciprocal free trade agreement with the EU is reached. 
Almost 70% of the total population is engaged in agricultural activity in Cote d’Ivoire therefore 
without a duty-free quota-free access to the EU market, the local community especially the 
vulnerable ones will be tremendously affected (ICO, 2002).  
Among the officials’ concerns is preferential access to the EU for their main exports including 
cocoa, bananas, wood, tuna and the four canneries’ exports to the EU which are the backbone of 
the business in Cote d’Ivoire.  With trade preferences lifted, and no EPA in place, tariffs would 
rise from zero percent to over 20 percent (ICTSD, 2014). This is a move that could wipe out the 
entirety of Côte d’Ivoire’s exports to Europe.  
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In 2002 Cote d’Ivoire entered into a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, or TIFA, with 
the United States to raise the level and strength of the dialogue with WAEMU on trade and 
economic issues (WTO, 2012).  Under the TIFA, the United States and WAEMU discussed on 
critical trade and investment issues, including discussions about regional and multilateral trade 
concerns strengthening and diversifying UEMOA’s trade, and the utilization and implementation 
of the U.S African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Since its launch in 2000, AGOA has 
provided opportunities for real people and businesses, for example most of the exports from Côte 
d’Ivoire to the United States enter the U.S. market duty-free either on a most favoured nation 
(MFN) or a preferential basis (WTO, 2012).  
 In developing countries such as Cote d’Ivoire there is the need for trade capacity building 
assistance to maximize the benefits of trade preference programs, help diversify the economy, 
and improve the trade environment. 
Because the Ivorian industry is already coming under increased competition due to preference 
erosion with respect to some competitor countries, such as South Korea which can now export 
tuna at a tariff of 12 percent under the EU-Korea FTA, a failure to reach a deal would not just 
undermine Côte d’Ivoire’s exports of primary products to Europe but it would also reverse the 
industrialisation process already underway in some sectors (ICTSD, 2014).  The case of cocoa 
illustrates the dilemma they are facing. 
In the years since 2005, when the WTO Aid for Trade in initiative was launched, some US$200 
billion has been mobilized in funding, with US$60 billion of this to least-developed countries 
(LDCs) including Cote d’Ivoire (WTO, 2010). However, much more needs to be done in terms 
of addressing both supply-side and demand-side issues facing countries on the margins of global 
trade in products other than minerals.  
 
Discussions are currently focused on the revised proposals submitted by member states on 
possible commitments to be undertaken in the Trade Facilitation Agreement. More and better 
trans-border transport infrastructure is essential for promoting regional integration.  
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The Economist (2013) reports that "shipping a car from China to Tanzania costs US$4,000, but 
getting it from there to nearby Uganda can cost another US$5,000. The WTO trade facilitation 
agreement in Bali in December 2013 promises to reduce these costs, by simplifying customs 
procedures and making them more transparent, encouraging cooperation among customs 
agencies (WTO, 2004). 
  
Cote d’Ivoire is the 5th country to accept the trade facilitation agreement (WTO, 2014). This 
agreement provides guidelines for effective cooperation between customs and other authorities 
on trade facilitation issues. 
With respect to aid for trade, development is at the heart of the Doha Development Agenda and 
cuts across all the areas of negotiations. The Doha package mandates the negotiations to consider 
all Special and Differential (S&D) Treatment provisions, with a view to making them more 
precise, effective and operational (WTO, 2004). S&D is critical for developing countries to 
enable them to implement their commitments and obligations – including providing them with 
policy space, flexibility and balanced rules (WTO, 2004).   
Because of differences in expectations in areas of negotiation, as discussed above, it is obvious 
that there are significant obstacles and costs for traders in Cote d’Ivoire, as they go about their 
daily business of moving goods to market and participating in the international trading system.  
We look forward to constructive engagement on trade facilitation issues, especially in the WTO 
trade facilitation negotiations, to promote measures to reduce customs and cross-border 
inefficiencies. This study comes at an opportune time, as it enables the country to evaluate the 
effect of WTO on trade, welfare and revenue in Cote d’Ivoire. 
2.6.2  ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement 
The cotonou agreement is an agreement that was reached in 2000 between the EU and the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific groups of States and a second revision of the agreement was 
adopted by the EU council in November 2010 (European Commission, 2016). The Lome 
Convention which is a series of trade agreement between the ACP and the EU were granting 
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unilateral trade preferences to the ACP within the EU because the ACP were granted free market 
access to EU countries wheras the EU did not get any corresponding.  
 
The Lome Conventions (1975 – 2000) granted the ACP countries a preferential entrance into 
global markets, and to diversify their export base (Lui and Bilal, 2009 and Lang, 2006). The 
Lome Convention expired in 2000 (Lui and Bilal, 2009; Lang, 2006). As a result, in 2000, ACP 
countries and the EU signed a new agreement called the Cotonou Agreement. The new trading 
regime between the EU and ACP countries created reciprocal trade relations in conformity to the 
WTO trade rules from 2008 on (Lang, 2006).  
The Convention provided a framework for trade, aid and political relations between the EU and 
ACP countries.  Under Lome, the ACP countries had free non-reciprocal access to the EU 
market for substantially all products. The Lome Convention also provided for EU official 
assistance to the ACP countries, financed through the European Development Fund (Lui and 
Bilal, 2009; Lang, 2006 and Karingi et al., 2005).  
The Lome Convention non-reciprocal trade preferences expired on 31 December 2007 (Lui and 
Bilal, 2009). Before this date, in February 2004, the ACP countries and the EU launched the 
Economic Partnership Agreements replacing the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) (Lui 
and Bilal, 2009). The major objective of EPAs was to promote the development of ACP 
countries. The EPAs also aimed to foster the smooth integration of the ACP into the world 
economy, through sustained developments and contributing to poverty eradication (Lui and 
Bilal, 2009; Lang, 2006 and Karingi et al., 2005).  
The aim of EPAs was to comply with WTO rules by being based on the principle of reciprocity. 
This meant that the EU would open up its markets to ACP-produced goods and in return, the 
ACP states would open themselves up to EU exports. EPAs will open the door for imports into 
the EU and ACP. Therefore there should be a clear understanding on the level of liberalisation 
required by each ACP country. Ideally, there would be a regional consensus when entering into 
an EPA. Cote d’Ivoire signed interim Economic Partnership Agreements in December 2007 
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(Stevens and Kennan, 2005).  These agreements were put in place to prevent disruption of their 
exports to the EU after the trade provisions of the Cotonou Agreement expired at the end of that 
month and to provide additional time to negotiate a more comprehensive regional EPA. 
 The signing of EPAs will lower the costs of inputs and manufactured goods; increase the 
competitiveness of the local economy by encouraging the diversification of production and 
development of manufacturing so as to better integrate into international supply chains and 
access local, regional and international markets and will also address services such as 
telecommunications, transport, banking and construction which are the backbone of a modern, 
growing economy such as Cote d’Ivoire (De Gucht, 2010). This explains why Cote d’Ivoire 
seems to be the key driver pushing for the completion of the EPA in the region. The country 
stands to lose especially in the cocoa and banana sectors if preferences to the EU are terminated 
(European Commission, 2010). 
West-Africa moved its market access offer from 60% to 75% in terms of tariff lines throughout 
the EPA negotiations, and agreement on this issue has been reached at a technical level in 
January 2014, and this current offer of 75% continues to be a concern for civil society and the 
private sector, as in value terms it would appear to liberalize more than 80% of EU’s current 
imports into West Africa (European Commission, 2010).  
 
(a) The Implication of the ACP – EU Agreement for Cote d’Ivoire 
West Africa accounts for more than 38% of total trade between the EU and all African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) regions and European annual exports to West Africa are worth 
approximately €31 billion whereas West African exports to the EU account for €37 billion 
(European Commission, 2015). The EU supplies a large part of the equipment that contributes to 
economic growth and development in the region and is the main export market for West African 
agricultural and fisheries products 
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The proposal of the agreement aims to put ACP-EU trade relations on a solid legal footing based 
on the respect of WTO and EU law, as well as balance and fairness towards other ACP and 
indeed non-ACP developing countries. 
 
Côte d'Ivoire has signed but not yet ratified its agreement, but the country still has to make the 
choice on how to go ahead and establish a partnership with the EU such as maintaining free 
access to the EU, they can take the necessary steps towards ratification of their respective interim 
EPAs or conclude the regional West African EPA (European Commission, 2014). The rest of the 
West African region largely comprises Least Developed Countries, they have duty free access to 
the EU under the Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme while full EPA negotiations continue. 
 
The country stands to lose especially in the cocoa and banana sectors if preferences to the EU are 
terminated hence, Côte d’Ivoire signed the interim EPAs because it is particularly concerned 
about its exports such as cocoa, bananas and conserved tuna, to the EU market. However, Cote 
d’Ivoire’s prime minister noted that if the EPA negotiations would not lead to a conclusive 
result, 41% of Côte d'Ivoire exports would face EU customs duties causing an estimated 772 
billion FCFA annual loss (European Commission, 2010). 
 
Cote d’Ivoire and other African countries, have immediate access into the EU market. However, 
the ACP countries will be allowed 15 to 25 years to open up to EU imports, which address the 
African State’s concerns regarding implementation time and policy space (Lui and Bilal, 2009). 
According to Lui and Bilal (2009), EPAs help create the right conditions for trade, investment 
and sustainable development. Together with development aid, the agreements could deliver a 
number of benefits for Cote d’Ivoire. 
More markets and more sales, by opening the EU market fully to imports from Cote d’Ivoire, 
new market opportunities would be created for the country. Trade between Cote d’Ivoire and the 
EU would be strengthened. The majority of EPAs concluded to date are neither complete nor 
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comprehensive trade agreements. Almost all signatory states were countries that would bear 
substantial economic costs if they lost their preferences in the EU market (Meyn, 2008). 
 
The EPA will help West Africa, as well as Cote d’Ivoire to integrate better into the global trading 
system and will support investment and economic growth in the region. The agreement is the 
first Economic Partnership that brings together not only the 16 countries of the region but also 
their two regional organisations: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). This is a clear indication of 
the West African drive towards closer regional integration, which the EPA seeks to support. 
 
Also, the French, Spanish and German agricultural lobbies’ succeeded in protecting their farmers 
from ACP agricultural exports – of which more than 97% enter the EU market already duty and 
quota free and which account for less than 1.5% of EU’s total imports (Meyn, 2008). This 
explains why the rich EU member states are also increasingly unwilling to promote ACP 
development mainly because of increasing unemployment rates and inequalities in most 
European states. 
In the interim EPA texts several restrictions are imposed on provisions specifically dedicated to 
infant industries, making them in fact more akin to traditional safeguards. In the case of Cote 
d’Ivoire the maximum length for infant industry protection is 8 years (Lui and Bilal, 2009). 
The extent to which the opening up of trade with the EU would affect Cote d’Ivoire is reviewed 
in this study. 
2.6.3  Regional trade integration 
Regional integration within ECOWAS and WAEMU is another important platform through 
which Cote d’Ivoire is undertaking further trade liberalisation measures. Cote d’Ivoire’s trade 
policy is exogenously determined by the regional trading protocols. Since the 1990s, all 
ECOWAS and WAEMU countries have been liberalising their trade and foreign exchange 
regimes unilaterally under market economic reforms supported by the IMF and the World Bank 
(Kingston et al, 2011). 
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(a)  ECOWAS 
The Economic Community of Western African States is made up of 15 member states. This 
comprises: Cote d’Ivoire, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinee, Guinee 
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The ECOWAS was 
established in May 1975 in Lagos in Nigeria. The organisation is headquartered in Abuja, and 
sought to promote value creation of the regions natural wealth (Yabi, 2010).  
The regional integration programme under ECOWAS came into existence because West Africa 
was the source for substantial amount of the industrialized world’s raw materials. The primary 
objectives of ECOWAS were to promote cooperation and integration, leading to the 
establishment of an economic union in West Africa. This aimed at raising the living standards of 
its people, ensuring economic growth, improving relations among Member states and 
contributing to the progress and development of the African Continent (ECOWAS Treaty, 1975). 
The decade of the 1990s has been particularly crucial for ECOWAS’ evolution into an 
organization capable of intervening diplomatically and militarily in cases of serious threats to the 
security of a Member State and within the community space. ECOWAS consequently 
contributed in the arduous resolution of protracted and devastating civil wars in Liberia (1990-97 
and 2003-2007) and Sierra Leone (1991-2002), (Yabi, 2010). 
 
The bigger challenge in terms of ECOWAS membership is the formation of blocs within 
ECOWAS that have become formalized in separate regional organizations and arrangements 
with separate agendas (although interestingly without a governance mandate). For example, the 
seven Francophone states (plus Guinea Bissau), organized in the WAEMU (West Africa 
Economic Monetary Union) since 1994, have remained relatively closely linked to France via a 
monetary union (Zone CFA) and to each other. 
 
It remains to be proven empirically whether Cote d’Ivoire has been able to exploit this market. In 
order to gain from trade liberalisation Cote d’Ivoire opened its trade access in the ECOWAS 
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market, Cote d’Ivoire signed the WAEMU customs union and the EU-FTA but has not yet 
ratified the latter. 
(i)    ECOWAS FTA 
A free trade area (FTA) represents an economic bloc in which all barriers to trade are abolished 
among member countries, but each member maintains its own independent external trade 
barriers beyond the bloc. The free trade agreement as opposed to the custom union does not 
specify the external tariffs of all signatories contractually (McLaren, 2004). 
 
The creation of such a FTA with the EU will obviously create important challenges as well as 
opportunities for ECOWAS countries. While EPAs will confer additional legal security to 
already existing preferential market access to the EU, they will also result in a major 
liberalisation effort for ECOWAS and other ACP countries. These countries will have to 
dismantle almost all tariffs on goods imported from the EU, their main source of imports. This 
could have a significant impact on national producers, on the level of tariff revenues and on the 
level of intra-regional trade (Lang, 2006). There is therefore a need to examine in detail the 
potential impact of EPAs in development terms. 
(ii) ECOWAS CUSTOMS UNION 
A custom union. It allows free trade among its members and adopts a common external tariff 
against countries outside the custom union (Peter, 1979). The Economic Community of West 
African States has decided to establish a common external tariff (CET), which is currently being 
finalised. The tariff, set at 35 percent at most, will modify the rights and obligations ECOWAS 
member countries (ICTSD, 2012). Member States, in a customs union, would also adopt and 
apply the same rates of customs duty on goods imported from outside their territories. The 
customs union also adopts and applies common trade regulations on all goods coming from 
outside their territories. The same rates of customs duty are referred to as a Common External 
Tariffs (CETs). The CET is higher than bound tariffs because in the case of Cote d’Ivoire since 
its current bound tariff of 14.9 percent is so low that even a CET limit of 20 percent would be too 
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much (ICTSD, 2012). ECOWAS is currently a free trade area but with the adoption of a common 
external tariff, it would become a full-fledged customs union.  
(b) WAEMU  
WAEMU is a regional organisation of eight West African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo). They share the same currency West 
African francs (CFA francs), monetary policies, and French as an official language. The 
objective of the union is to promote regional economic integration and create a common market 
(Egoume and Nayo, 2011). The economy is predominantly agricultural, cocoa, coffee, timber, 
cotton are among the cash crops produced and exported by the union and Cote d’Ivoire 
represents the largest economy of the union. (Egoume and Nayo, 2011). 
 
The creation, between 1996 and 2000, of the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU) customs union was an important step toward greater regional integration in western 
Africa (Goretti and Weisfeld, 2008). WAEMU countries share the same currency and have 
established institutions and regulations to foster economic integration, such as regional tariff 
agreements and tax harmonization. Within the WAEMU, Côte d’Ivoire provides the largest share 
of intra-zone imports, it has the largest manufacturing base, particularly in Agro-Industry, the 
largest and most technologically advanced oil refinery in West Africa, supplying oil products to 
all of its neighbors (Burkina Faso, Mali, and Ghana) (Egoume and Nayo, 2011). 
 
The main objective behind the creation of the WAEMU was part of an initiative to boost regional 
integration and policy effectiveness after the CFA franc was devalued relative to the French 
franc in 1994 (Goretti and Weisfeld, 2008). 
 
(i) WAEMU FTA 
Although creation of the customs union has improved the region’s trade regime, both structural 
constraints and competitiveness concerns have impeded its implementation. There are still costly 
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border procedures, lack of compliance with community rules, especially in terms of the rules of 
origin, weak governance and inadequate transport infrastructure (Goretti and Weisfeld, 2008). 
 
Progress in setting up a free Trade area in WAEMU is currently moving at a snail pace. Recent 
trade initiatives bring both opportunities and challenges. An Economic Partnership Agreement 
(EPA) with the European Union (EU) could bring reaching reciprocal trade liberalization 
between the WAEMU and the EU. Finally, global trade liberalization, for example through a 
revived Doha Round, could further improve market access and affect world market prices for 
some of the region’s main agricultural products like Cote d’Ivoire. 
Côte d’Ivoire has set up an initial framework for an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
with the EU. This agreement combines the benefits of a trade agreement with development 
assistance targeted at Côte d'Ivoire but its final goal remains to conclude a full EPA with all the 
members of the West African region.  
Both WAEMU FTA provide costs and benefits to Cote d’Ivoire. This study reviews how Cote 
d’Ivoire faired with respect to trade, revenue and the welfare implications of WAEMU FTA.  
 (ii)  WAEMU Customs Union 
A customs union is created when two or more customs’ territories decide not to charge duty on 
goods traded amongst them (COMESA, 2009). Member States in a customs union also adopt and 
apply the same rates of customs duty on goods imported outside their territories. The customs 
union also adopts and applies common trade regulations on all goods coming from outside the 
territories. The same rates of customs duty are referred to as a Common External Tariff (CET).  
As a member of the WAEMU Customs Union, Cote d’Ivoire does not charge tariffs on imports 
from the other seven WAEMU member countries. Imports from all other countries are subject to 
tariffs based on the WAEMU Common External Tariff (CET) schedule of 0 percent for essential 
social goods, 5 percent for raw materials and inputs for local manufacture, 10 percent for semi 
finished goods, and 20 percent for finished products (WTO, 2014). 
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The adoption of the free trade agreement in 1996 and of the CET in 2000 reduced tariff rates and 
streamlined the tariff structure Although no tariff or quantitative restriction is applied to 
intraregional trade in domestic products. The simple average most favored nation (MFN) tariff 
rate is 14.2 percent (Goretti and Weisfeld, 2008). 
This study reviews how Cote d’Ivoire faired with respect to trade, revenue and the welfare 
implications of the WAEMU customs union. This study looks at the scope for boosting 
intraregional trade and it discuss prospects for enhancing trade with other countries.  
 
2.6.4 Bilateral Trade Agreements 
Cote d’Ivoire entered into Bilateral Trade Agreements encompassing both Preferential Trade 
Agreements (PTAs) and Most Favoured Nation (MFN) with over 34 countries across the globe. . 
Côte d'Ivoire is not a signatory to the Agreement on the Global System of Trade Preferences 
(GSTP) among Developing Countries though it has signed a number of commodities agreements 
under the auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, including the 
agreements on coffee, cocoa, rubber and tropical timber (WTO, 1995). 
Some of the countries with which the country signed bilateral trade agreements include the 
ECOWAS countries, the European Union, Sweden, Brazil and Ghana (WTO, 1995). These 
agreements are aimed at broadening the scope for market access on the basis of reciprocity. 
China which is Cote d’Ivoire’s third top import destination with about US$ 1.44 billion also 
signed a Bilateral investment treaty with Cote d’Ivoire which emphasises on favoured national 
treatment between the two nations (Berger, 2008). 
Cote d’Ivoire entered several bilateral agreement, under the EPAs the country became  the first 
country in Africa to sign a stepping tone bilateral agreement with the EU in 2007 and  recently it 
entered a bilateral trade agreement with Singapore in 2014 (MTI, 2014; European Commission, 
2010). In view of this, based on the fact that most Cote d’Ivoire trading partners are part to 
regional trade agreement, there is a greater possibility of the upcoming bilateral trade agreements 
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being harmonised to an FTA trading protocol. This situation brings about an invisible bilateral 
free trade agreement (BFTA), which has the same impact on the economy of Cote d’Ivoire as 
does a visible one.  
This study evaluates the impact of BFTAs on trade, revenue and welfare in Cote d’Ivoire. The 
selection of these countries is based on trade flows. Hence, the analysis undertaken in Chapter 3 
becomes useful to evaluate any possible members of BFTAs for Cote d’Ivoire. 
2.7  Cote d’Ivoire’s Tariff Structure  
Cote’s tariff structure and the WAEMU CET/ECOWAS CET are both based on a cascading 
principle, whereby the duty charged is proportionate to the level of value added. Final goods are 
levied the highest rates, while raw materials and capital goods are charged lower tariff rates. This 
is done, in order to promote the manufacturing sector and to protect the industries producing 
finished products from outside competition. Tariff rate, applied, simple mean, manufactured 
products (%) in Côte d'Ivoire was 12.62 as of 2013 which was the highest value over the past 20 
years was 23.73 in 1993 (African Economic Outlook, 2014). 
The WAEMU customs union entails free movement of goods between the member countries and 
the application of a common external tariff (CET) on imports from other countries. 
The WAEMU CET and the extended ECOWAS common external tariff (CET) to all countries in 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2014 with five bands (0%, 5%, 
10%, 20% and 35%) changed the regional issues and economic opportunities greatly (African 
Economic Outlook, 2014). 
 
Cote d’Ivoire’s tariff structure is a very complex one under the WAEMU CET/ECOWAS CET 
as the country is a signatory of the two. WAEMU countries apply CET to import from the other 
ECOWAS countries, and in turn ECOWAS countries apply country specific tariffs to imports 
from the WAEMU (Goretti and Weisfeld, 2008). Both WAEMU and ECOWAS are putting in 
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place region wide programs to address cumbersome custom procedures and uneven application 
of the rules. 
 The country is among the few countries in the region with high tariffs. This implies that the 
country has to move away from its current regime, characterised by large tariff dispersion, in 
order to comply with the 25 per cent dispersion under the ECOWAS/WAEMU CET. 
Table 2. 1: Structure of ECOWAS CET  
Category 
 
Description Average Duty rate Number of Tariff lines 
0 Essential Social Goods 0% 85 
1 Raw materials 5% 2146 
2 Inputs and Intermediate goods 10% 1373 
3 Final consumption goods 20% 2165 
4 Capital goods 35% 130 
Source: European Centre for Development Policy Management (2013) 
 
Table 2.1 shows the distribution of tariff lines across tariff bands for ECOWAS.  
The ECOWAS CET is organized into five different tariff bands, of 0 per cent, 5 per cent, 10 per 
cent, 20 per cent and 35 per cent. The first four bands are taken from the UEMOA CET the last 
tariff band, the so called “fifth band” was added after much discussion and strong argumentation 
provided by Nigeria, supported by West African agricultural producers, notably from UEMOA 
countries. 
2.7.1 The structure of the ECOWAS and WAEMU CET 
The WAEMU tariff rates constitute an important source of revenue for WAEMU countries. In 
2013, import duties represented at least 13 per cent of total government revenue in Cote d’Ivoire 
as well as all WAEMU countries (WAEMU COMMISSION, 2014).  
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Table 2.2 also shows that WAEMU CET only has 4 bands, the fifth tariff band applied by 
ECOWAS for specific good for economic development, implies a custom tax increase for 
WAEMU countries such as Cote d’Ivoire. However, the upward alignment of tariffs, on the other 
hand results ceteris paribus in gains in revenue. Can the revenue gains compensate for the loss in 
revenue? This question is answered empirically in this study. 
The price elasticity of Import Demand varies strongly across WAEMU countries, in Cote 
d’Ivoire the price elasticity of Import Demand was about 0.2% in 2014 which was one of the 
lowest in the region (WAEMU COMMISSION, 2014) 
A unilateral liberalisation of tariffs under the WTO context, therefore, requires the country to 
apply zero tariffs on the remaining tariff lines. Since the effect of this move on revenue is 
ambiguous, this therefore, means that Cote d’Ivoire could possibly see an increase in VAT 
revenue, due to the increase in imports, which could later compensate for the loss of tariff 
revenue, as suggested by Waglé (2011). 
Table 2. 2: Structure of ECOWAS and WAEMU CET 
 
Category Description WAEMU Duty Rate (in 
Percent) 
ECOWAS Duty Rate (in 
Percent) 
0 Essential social goods 0 0 
1 Raw materials and specific 
inputs 
5 5 
2 Inputs and intermediate goods 10 10 
3 Final Consumption goods 20 20 
4 Specific goods for Economic 
Development 
- 35 
Source: WAEMU COMMISSION (2014) 
• Columns in Table 2.2 represent: 
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• Category 0: Basic Social goods based on a restricted list: for public health purposes 
(medicines, medical rehabilitation equipment) or for educational purposes (Books, Journals) 
• Category 1: Basic goods, raw materials, basic foodstuffs (powdered milk, cereals), raw 
materials (seeds, breeding animals species), capital goods (industrial machinery, computers)  
• Category 2: Inputs and intermediate products: Semi-processed products (crude oil, ply wood, 
paper roll) 
• Category 3: Finished Consumer goods ready for consumption 
2.8 The Importance of Customs Revenue to Cote d’Ivoire  
Brenton et al. (2009) emphasised that developing countries are keen to improve the structure of 
their trade incentives by way of an outward-looking trade and competitive strategy. Brenton et 
al. (2009) argue that developing countries, especially low-income countries, face serious 
revenues challenges if they liberalise their economies. The revenue situation is worsened by the 
fact that in most developing countries tariffs are an important source of tax revenue, because of 
the weakness of the domestic tax base and other tax instruments (Brenton et al., 2009).  
Changing the level of revenue collected through custom duties necessarily has an impact on a 
government’s budget. The decline in receipt from 1999 has been compensated by an increase in 
revenue from internal taxes notably from VAT and excise duties (WAEMU COMMISSION, 
2014). 
Cote d’Ivoire is among those countries that depend on import duties as a source of fiscal 
revenue. According to MOC (2014), the percentage of national revenue collected by customs in 
overall taxes declined from 37.08 per cent to 30.49 per cent from 2010 and 2011, respectively. 
The decline in customs revenue was caused by continuous implementation of regional trading 
protocols, such as FTAs with the EU. The contributions of domestic sources of revenue, which 
are considered in this study – such as VAT and excise duties – are significant.  
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Figure 2.2: Cote d’Ivoire’s Public Finance as a percentage of GDP 
 
 Source: MOF (2015) 
  
Higher revenue and better management of spending reduced the overall deficit, which shrank 
from 2.6 per cent in 2012 to 2 per cent in 2013 (see Table 2.3). This can be explained by a big 
rise in imports of intermediate and capital goods (African Economic Outlook, 2014). The 
increase in imports will create additional tax revenue for the country. 
2.9 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the macroeconomic developments in the Ivorian economy and trade 
policy developments, which the government undertook in response to the pressure from 
globalisation forces. The main purpose of this chapter was to reveal Cote d’Ivoire’s past 
developments, current and future prospects for its economy, and to see how it is positioned to 
benefit from trade agreements. The country’s prospects are quite good. The economic recovery, 
through major public works projects, with further social reforms is producing a better business 
climate. 
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Côte d’Ivoire provides the largest share of intra-zone imports, the largest manufacturing base, 
particularly in Agro-Industry and the largest and most technologically advanced oil refinery in 
West Africa, supplying oil products to all of its neighbors (Egoume and Nayo, 2011). 
 
Also the significant role that cocoa plays in the Ivorian economy today renders it vital to the 
social and economic health of the Ivorian state, yet, foreign interests continue to control the 
Ivorian cocoa industry. Despite the prominence of cocoa production in Ivorian society, Western 
Europe consumes the largest proportion of cocoa in the world, 33%, compared to 24% in the 
United States alone (Fell, 2007). 
 
Thus, Cote d’Ivoire and other western African cocoa producers thus remain highly dependent on 
the changes in Western Europe's demand for cocoa. This fundamental dependency on one 
primary export commodity creates a precarious economic situation. The lack of economic 
diversity has created a fragile and vulnerable society, as nearly thirty percent of the local 
population remains dependent on a fiscally volatile agricultural commodity.  
 
Even today, the social significance cocoa holds in Cote d’Ivoire hinders Ivorians' ability to 
exercise significant power in the international cocoa market. 
 
Liberalisation in the cocoa sector in 1999 allowed for the entrance of foreign-owned cocoa 
groups and these multinational companies now control close to 90% of the internal market for 
cocoa and coffee, displacing local Ivorians in their rise to power (Egoume and Nayo, 2011).  
However, evidence suggests that cocoa farmers did not experience the benefits from these price 
increases. Indeed, in many ways liberalization seems to have hurt farmers more than it has 
helped them.  
 
On the trade-policy front, trade-policy instruments, bilateral, regional and multilateral integration 
have been reviewed. The main purpose of this discussion was to explore in detail the trade 
policies, which Cote d’Ivoire has implemented overs the years. This analysis formed the basis for 
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the subsequent chapters, in which this study will review how these polices have affected Cote 
d’Ivoire. Côte d'Ivoire has ratified the Uruguay Round Agreements. 
Cote d’Ivoire embarked on the creation of the West African Economic Monetary Union 
(WAEMU) customs union which was an important step toward greater regional integration in 
western Africa and serves as an initiative to boost regional integration and policy effectiveness 
after the CFA franc was devalued relative to the French franc in 1994 (Goretti and Weisfield, 
2008). 
 
The WAEMU customs union entails free movement of goods between member countries and 
application of a common external tariff (CET) on imports from other countries. Recent trade 
initiatives bring both opportunities and challenges. First, global trade liberalization, for example 
through a revived Doha Round, could further enhance market access and affect world market 
prices for some of the region’s main agricultural products. 
 
Secondly an ECOWAS-wide customs union could boost trade between the WAEMU and its 
West African neighbors. Finally, the Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and the 
Cote d’Ivoire could bring far-reaching reciprocal trade liberalization between the WAEMU and 
the EU. Cote d’Ivoire is also among the 79 Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries with which 
the European Union (EU) concluded the Cotonou Agreement in June 2000, which covers the 
period up to 2020. The Cotonou Agreement provides for the negotiation of regional economic 
partnership agreements.  
 
However, these trade agreements between the EU and African ACP countries were declared to 
violate terms set down by the WTO which demand that trade liberalization should be reciprocal 
in nature. The EU and ACP agreed to conclude new WTO compatible trading arrangements by 
gradually removing barriers to trade between them and enhancing cooperation in all areas 
relevant to trade. In order to find a substitute for the Cotonou Agreement, negotiations 
commenced to establish EPAs. 
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Cote d’Ivoire continued to shape its trade policy through its bilateral, regional and multilateral 
agreements. The country is a signatory to WAEMU, ECOWAS, ACP – EU and WTO 
agreements. In addition, the country also has over forty bilateral Preferential Trade Agreements. 
All the arrangements provide frameworks for the further liberalisation of trade; and Cote d’Ivoire 
has made commitments within each of these arrangements.  
The main objective of this study was to review the impact of different trade policy regimes Cote 
d’Ivoire has applied under WAEMU and ECOWAS, EPAs and WTO arrangements, as well as 
bilateral agreements in its economy. The challenge at hand is that Cote d’Ivoire has 19% of its 
total revenue from WAEMU tariff receipts (IMF, 2014); this means that in the case of further 
liberalisation Cote d’Ivoire would have to find another source of revenue to compensate for this 
loss. This would be the same situation for the ECOWAS. The application of the ECOWAS CET 
has placed some members in violation of the WTO bound rates. ECOWAS need to provide 
compensations to the WTO members negatively affected by the change of bound tariffs because 
the majority of West African countries have high bound tariffs of about 98 percent for some 
countries (ICTSD, 2014).  
ECOWAS members are currently working toward a common external tariff (CET). This new 
ECOWAS CET will replace the existing WAEMU CET. It is, therefore, imperative that a study 
be carried out to investigate the impact of trade liberalisation on welfare, revenue, imports, 
exports, trade creation and diversion, and prices. 
Having set a clear picture on the performance of the economy and the trade-policy regimes, 
chapter three will scrutinise Cote d’Ivoire’s trade performance, trends and developments with its 
trading partners. Of specific interest, Cote d’Ivoire’s exports and imports dynamics with 
WAEMU, ECOWAS, EU and WTO will be examined. The purpose of this discussion is to 
explore how Cote d’Ivoire trade has performed within the context of its trade agreements. The 
facts analysed here provide a preliminary picture of Cote d’Ivoire’s major trading partners which 
is was one of the objectives of this study. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
COTE D’IVOIRE TRADE PERFORMANCE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Cote d’Ivoire’s trade performance, the trends and developments with its trading partners, is 
reviewed in this chapter. Of specific interest, Cote d’Ivoire’s export and import dynamics with 
WAEMU, ECOWAS, WTO and EU are examined. The purpose of this discussion is to explore 
how Cote d’Ivoire’s trade has performed within the context of its trade agreements. The facts 
analysed here provide a preliminary clue to Cote d’Ivoire’s major trading partners. And this is 
one of the objectives of this study.  
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 to section 3.5 examines Cote d’Ivoire’s trade 
performance in WAEMU, ECOWAS, EU and WTO, respectively. These sections identify the 
major exports and export destination, the major imports and import sources, as well as Cote 
d’Ivoire’s trade balance with the above-mentioned trading blocs. Section 3.5 examines the 
geographical distribution of exports by groupings. Section 3.6 evaluates the geographical 
distribution of import sources by grouping. Both sections 3.5 and 3.6 provide an opportunity to 
evaluate Cote d’Ivoire’s major trading bloc. And this is one of the objectives of this study.  
Section 3.7 discusses the drivers of Cote d’Ivoire’s trade performance. Section 3.8 wraps up the 
chapter by outlining a summary of the important issues in this chapter. 
3.2  Cote d’Ivoire’s Trade Performance in WAEMU 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Cote d’Ivoire is a member of the WAEMU regional grouping, 
together with the other 7 member states. A review of how the country has performed in this 
region becomes pertinent, in order to enable stakeholders to understand whether the country is 
benefitting from WAEMU, based on its export performance. 
 THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALISATION ON COTE D’IVOIRE 
 
75 
 
In most studies, results have found that the level of intra-regional trade in UEMOA is low and 
suffers from various bottlenecks (see Agbodji, 2008; Coulibaly, 2009 and Salisu et al., 2012) 
Figure 3.1 shows Cote D’Ivoire’s trade evolution in WAEMU from 2009 to 2014. In addition, it 
also recorded the highest share of export during that period, though it has the least share of total 
imports in the region. This perhaps, is an indication that Cote-d’Ivoire is the major intra-regional 
exporter in the WAEMU region and is relatively independent of other member countries in the 
region in terms of import. 
Figure 3.1: Cote d’Ivoire’s regional trade share in WAEMU (in %) 2009 -2014 
 
Source: International Trade Centre (2016) and author’s own calculations 
 
Niger and Togo contributed the least to the total trade in the region with about 7.6 and 4.5 percent 
respectively with Niger which has not been able to contribute up to 10 percent to both export and 
import at any time in the region (UNCTAD, 2013). This is probably a signal to the low level of 
productivity and resource endowment of the country relative to other members. WAEMU is a small 
economic union compare to other major ones around the world and that there is still ample 
opportunity for it to increase trade within and outside the region. Despite the opportunities WAEMU 
offers, Cote d’Ivoire’s export performance has been characterised by inconsistency. 
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3.2.1 Cote d’Ivoire’s Major Export Markets in WAEMU 
The top export destinations for Cote d’Ivoire’s products in WAEMU from 2008 to 2014 are 
shown on the graph below. These destinations are: Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Senegal, Togo. As 
shown in table 3.1, Burkina Faso is the major export market for Cote d’Ivoire in the WAEMU 
region. In 2014, Cote d’Ivoire’s exports to Burkina Faso were valued at US$570 million. 
Table 3. 1: Cote d’Ivoire’s Top Export Markets in WAEMU from 2008-2014 (US$ Million) 
 
DESCRIPTION                                            PERIOD  
Exports 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Benin 104 96 110 97         137 66 71 
Mali 325 266 226 241         295 357 368 
Senegal 163 14 113 172         218 134 149 
Togo 138 70 66 140 123 105 186 
Burkina Faso 412 381 360 343 380 479 570 
Guinee Bissau 8.3 6.7 30 61 56 30 22 
Niger 55 59 52 46 63 53 86 
Source: UN COMTRADE Statistics (2016) 
The major crops produced in Cote d’Ivoire are cocoa, coffee, and cotton respectively in terms of 
export revenues generated. As one of the important cash crops for the Ivorian economy, Cotton 
production is mostly done in the northern region of the country. Recent production of cotton 
fiber is estimated to 5 million tons in five years from 2007 to 2011. Cotton export from the 
WAEMU market (Burkina Faso and Mali) represents more than 60% of the agricultural export 
and accounts more than 30% of the country’s total export (Essoh, 2014). 
 
It is interesting to note that Burkina Faso and Mali are the top exporting destination for Cote 
d’Ivoire. However, the major challenges, the region is facing is that WAEMU now also has a 
common framework for agricultural and mining policy, as well as for certain services categories, 
inter alia implementation is, however, far from complete in all areas. The effective continuation 
of reform, including trade liberalization, would enhance the business climate and would help to 
 THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALISATION ON COTE D’IVOIRE 
 
77 
 
attract the capital needed to develop the many as yet unexploited assets in the two countries, not 
only in the area of agriculture, livestock breeding and mining, but also in certain services. 
There is also little mechanization in agriculture, a key sector of their economies, which remain 
highly vulnerable to external shocks, including weather factors (Goretti and Weisfeld, 2008).  
 
The challenge currently facing Burkina Faso and Mali is to provide stable financing for their 
budgets, for the moment essentially based on the revenue earned from international trade, while 
continuing their trade liberalization efforts at the unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral 
levels and this undeniably has an impact on the region exports. The obstacles to trade need to be 
addressed by measures that go beyond the dismantling of tariff barriers. 
The WAEMU Commission (2014) reveals that boosting investment in member States depends 
on improving the business climate, which among other things consist of resolving the recurrent 
problem of load-shedding as well as dealing with the legal uncertainties, rather than focusing on 
the various incentives that are granted. 
 
Although Côte d’Ivoire has been the largest supplier in the WAEMU over time, for 2004–07 
WAEMU country shares of imports from Côte d’Ivoire generally declined, certainly due to its 
instability and further trade liberalization, which both led to trade diversion.  
Côte d’Ivoire’s cumulative losses in terms of trade volume with its WAEMU partners during the 
instability period that started in 1999 up to 2007 are estimated to be around US$8.7 billion 
against total actual aggregate intra-WAEMU trade flows of around US$15 billion (Egoume and 
Nayo, 2011). 
 
It appears that the lost trade for Côte d’Ivoire has been permanent to a large extent, and has cost 
Côte d’Ivoire almost 40 percent of its potential trade flows with the rest of the WAEMU 
(Egoume and Nayo, 2011). Côte d’Ivoire’s lost trade has resulted in trade gains for other 
WAEMU countries, reducing aggregate losses for the whole region over time. This also confirms 
that there has been trade diversion away from Côte d’Ivoire. This suggests that the more stable 
the country is the better it is for the entire region’s trade and economic performances. 
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Salisu et al (2012) found that geographical and political factors are the major drivers of bilateral 
trade between WAEMU members, therefore a country like Cote d’Ivoire should now take 
advantage of its relative stable and diversified economy to further liberalise its economy to reap 
the full benefits liberalisation can offer.  
3.2.2  Cote d’Ivoire’s Major Import Markets in WAEMU 
Cote d’Ivoire’s major import sources in WAEMU are Senegal, Burkina Faso, Benin and Mali. 
Senegal is the major supplier of Cote d’Ivoire’s imports from WAEMU (see table 3.2). The top 
exports destination of Senegal are India, France and Cote d’Ivoire and in 2013 Senegal exports to 
cote d’Ivoire was valued at US$93.3 million (EconomyWatch, 2010). 
UNCTAD (2013) noted that most of the recent increase in trade between West African countries 
can be attributed to the increased demand for primary commodities by the larger countries in the 
region. 
 
Cote d’Ivoire’s main import is fuel which is 25 percent of total imports, followed by rice, 
machinery and pharmaceuticals. The country main trading import partner are France, Netherland, 
United states and Nigeria (UN COMTRADE, 2015). Cote d’Ivoire therefore imports the least 
from the WAEMU region. In 2014 Cote d’Ivoire imported goods worth US$96 million from 
Senegal (see table 3.2). The imports growth in Cote d’Ivoire has increased for the period of study 
and this increase in imports is due to growing demand for intermediate and capital goods. 
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Table 3. 2: Cote d’Ivoire’s Top Import Sources from WAEMU from 2008-2014 (US$ 
Millions) 
 
DESCRIPTION                                            PERIOD  
Imports 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Benin 20 13 4.9 0.5 13 12 12 
Mali 1.05 0.87 1.09 0.3 11 7.01 6.1 
Senegal 54 56 49 67 87 96 94 
Togo 7.28 4.3 6.1 5.5 36 23 11 
Burkina Faso 0.42 0.98 3.5 4.04 33 30 16 
Guinee Bissau 0.004 0.012 2 1.53 0.62 5.11 0 
Niger 0.59 0.42 0.7 0.9 3.7 1.79 5 
Source: UN COMTRADE Statistics (2016) 
Burkina Faso is the second import source for Cote d’Ivoire, with imports valued at US$33 
million in 2012. Major imports from Burkina Faso include animal and vegetable products, 
motorcycles and batteries valued at US$9.8. million, US$97.97 million and US$1.18 million 
respectively. The sudden increase in imports from Burkina Faso can be attributed to the political 
instability Cote d’Ivoire had to go through which created a trade diversion. 
Benin is the third import source for Cote d’Ivoire, supplying US$12 million worth of goods 
imported by Cote d’Ivoire in 2014. Benin’s top export includes raw cotton, cashews and Gold.  
The top import destinations are China, India and Nigeria with a trade volume of US$163 million, 
US$149 million and US$71.5 million respectively. There is a large amount of informal trade in 
the region, therefore the accurate dates are difficult to come across. Nevertheless, the volume of 
imports from Benin was low for most of the past decade due to the instability in Cote d’Ivoire. 
As table 3.2 shows, only in 2011 imports from Benin started to increase. 
3.2.3 Cote d’Ivoire’s Trade Balance in WAEMU 
Cote d’Ivoire’s trade performance within the WAEMU region has shown positive results for the 
entire period of study. However, from 2010 to 2011 with partner country such as Benin there has 
been a decrease in the trade balance from US$105.1 million to US$87.5 million and an increase 
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in the following year from US$87.5 million and US$124 million (see table 3.3). This 
inconsistency in Cote d’Ivoire’s trade balance is exhibited with most WAEMU partner countries 
apart from Burkina Faso and Mali. For example, Cote d’Ivoire’s trade balance with Senegal and 
Togo decreased from US$131 million to US$38 million and from US$87 million to US$82 
million respectively from 2012 to 2013. The following year, there was a rise in the trade balance 
of Cote d’Ivoire with the same partner country from US$ 38 million and US$ 82 million to 
US$55 million and US$75 million respectively. A closer look at how Cote d’Ivoire’s trade 
balance dynamics evolved with its major trading partners in WAEMU gives a better picture of 
Cote d’Ivoire’s regional trade. Table 3.3 shows Cote d’Ivoire’s trade performance with its major 
trading partners in WAEMU. Countries, with which Cote d’Ivoire predominantly traded, such as 
Benin, Mali, Senegal and Burkina Faso are illustrated in Table 3.3 (see also appendix 5). 
At a glance, Cote d’Ivoire’s trade in WAEMU shows that the country is benefiting from its 
preferential trade agreements. A trade balance deficit is only observed in 2009 with Senegal as 
the trading partner (see table 3.3) and this could be the result of political instability the country 
went through. However, the quantity of exports is quite high in most member countries. 
Economic and political reforms, coupled with the demand for natural resources have positively 
affected the WAEMU countries and the GDP growth rate has been improving. Cote d’Ivoire’s 
political stability can also be a factor for such growing opportunities in the region since it is the 
largest economy in WAEMU. Also, the extent to which Cote d’Ivoire benefitted or lost in its 
arrangement with WAEMU is empirically reviewed in this study. 
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Table 3. 3: Cote d'Ivoire’s Trade Balance with Major Trading Partners in WAEMU (US$ 
Millions) 
 
DESCRIPTION       PERIOD 
  Exports 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Benin 104 96 110 97 137 66 71 
Mali 325 266 226 241 295 357 368 
Senegal 163 14 113 172 218 134 149 
Togo 138 70 66 140 123 105 186 
Burkina Faso 412 381 360 343 380 479 570 
Guinee Bissau 8.3 6.7 30 61 56 30 22 
Niger 55 59 52 46 63 53 86 
Imports    2008     2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Benin    20 13 4.9 9.5        13 12 12 
Mali  1.05   0.87 1.09 0.3 11 7.01 6.1 
Senegal     54     56       49        67 87           96 94 
Togo 7.28     4.3 6.1 5.5 36 23 11 
Burkina Faso 0.42 0.98 3.5 4.04 33 30 16 
Guinee Bissau 0.0004 0.012 2 1.53 0.62 5.11 0 
Niger 0.59 0.42 0.7 0.9 3.7 1.79 5 
Trade Balance 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Benin 84 83 105.1 87.5 124 54 59 
Mali 323.95 265.13 224.9 240.7 284 349.9 361.9 
Senegal 109 -42 64 105 131 38 55 
Togo 130.72 65.7 59.9 134.5 87 82 175 
Burkina Faso  
411.5 380.02 
356.5 338.6 347 449 554 
Guinee Bissau 
8.29 6.688 
28 59.47 55.38 24.89 22 
Niger 
54.41 58.58 
51.3 45.1 59.3 51.21 81 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations and UN COMTRADE Statistics (2016) 
3.3  Cote d’Ivoire’s Trade Performance in ECOWAS  
Cote d’Ivoire is a founding member of ECOWAS since its inception. Hence, the country over the 
years has been actively involved with trade negotiation within the group. From this background, 
it becomes necessary to review using facts from UN COMTRADE, showing how Cote d’Ivoire’s 
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trade has performed over years. This discussion assists in unpacking the major trading bloc for 
the country. This is one of the objectives of the study. 
Figure 3.2 shows Cote d’Ivoire’s trade performance in ECOWAS from 2008 to 2014. Cote 
d’Ivoire’s export performance went through ups and downs during the period under review. 
Exports to the ECOWAS was low in 2008 worth a value of US$3 billion but decrease in the 
following years to US$2.5 billion (see figure 3.2). Exports’ growth to ECOWAS remain constant 
from 2008 to 2009. In 2010 however, Cote d’Ivoire’s exports decline to US$2.4 billion. The 
subsequent years’ exports to ECOWAS follow an upward trend, rising to US$2.7 billion in 2011 
to US$4 billion in 2013. Exports from Cote d’Ivoire has maintained an upward trend for most 
part in the period of study only in 2014 exports decline to US$2.7 billion. This again shows the 
country resilience despite being affected by a political instability. In 2013, Cote d’Ivoire 
exported value in trade with its ECOWAS partners was worth US$4 billion, the highest for the 
period of study (see figure 3.2).  
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Figure 3. 2: Cote d’Ivoire’s Trade Performance in ECOWAS from 2008 to 2014 (US$ 
Million) 
 
 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE Statistics and author’s own calculation 
  
In 2013, the country’s exports went up to US$4 billion. For a country that had recorded high 
export performance and is one of the economic powerhouse in the region one would think that 
the country had found its feet, and had an export capacity that had created a market for itself. In 
fact, during the last decade Cote d’Ivoire experienced large trade losses in the ECOWAS and 
WAEMU region. A study of Egoume and Nayo (2011) confirms this where they found that Cote 
d’Ivoire estimated trade losses in the WAEMU region from the period 1999 to 2007 was about 
US$9 billion. It should, therefore, be expected that export earnings would continue to rise in the 
subsequent years given the potential an economy like Cote d’Ivoire possesses.  
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The export growth path was short-lived, as the country again witnessed a sharp decline in 
exports. Exports to ECOWAS however went down in 2014 to US$2.7 billion (see Figure 3.2). In 
2014, the country witnessed a reduction in exports value to ECOWAS worth US$39.96 million. 
The country’s export growth in ECOWAS has indeed been up and down. Following a political 
crisis that lasted almost a decade one would have expected exports to follow an upward trend at 
least during the recent years.  
In 2008 imports from ECOWAS was US$2.5 billion and decline to US$1.6 billion in 2009. This 
drastic decline in imports could have been as a result of trade diversion the country experienced. 
In the following year Cote d’Ivoire’s imports from ECOWAS experienced an increase from 
US$1.6 billion to US$2.1 billion. The imports bill went up from US$2.8 to US$3.1 billion in 
both years 2012 and 2013 respectively. For the subsequent years, the imports trend remained 
downward, imports to ECOWAS reduced from US$3.1 billion in 2013 to US$2.7 billion in 2014.  
3.3.1 Cote d’Ivoire’s Top Export Markets in ECOWAS 
Cote d’Ivoire’s major export destination in ECOWAS include: Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Burkina 
Faso, Benin, Togo, Guinee and Mali. Cote d’Ivoire’s exports for years have been dominating 
these countries in ECOWAS. 
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Table 3. 4: Cote d’Ivoire Top Export Markets in ECOWAS (US$ Million) 
 
DESCRIPTION PERIOD 
Country/Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Nigeria 625 715 668 663 867 862 609 
Senegal 163 146 113 172 218 134 149 
Togo 138 70 66 140 123 105 186 
Benin 104 96 110 97 137 66 71 
Ghana 450 563 783 303 431 1851 457 
Burkina Faso 412 381 360 343 380 479 570 
Guinee 577 72 56 58 89 74 55 
Sierra Leone 51 40 3.04 0.75 0.65 0.34 0.91 
Guinee Bissau 8.3 6.7 30 61 56 30 22 
Cape Verde 2.77 1.8 0.38 0.18 2.2 0.18 8.17 
Gambia 62 35 26 27 19 15 13 
Liberia 85 43 56 183 91 48 93 
Niger 55 59 52 46 63 53 86 
Mali 325 266 226 241 241 357 368 
Source: UN COMTRADE Statistics (2016) 
Over the years, the major top five export destinations for Cote d’Ivoire’s exports were Nigeria, 
Ghana, Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal. Cote d’Ivoire’s exports to Nigeria grew from US$625 
million to US$862 million from 2008 to 2013. 
Nigeria was Cote d’Ivoire’s major export destination in ECOWAS, with a staggering export 
receipt of US$668 million in 2010. Exports in Nigeria grew from US$625 million to US$663 
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million which is about 6 per cent. Exports in Nigeria decline in 2011 and this could probably be 
the results of political turmoil the country incurred. The results show that the second export 
destination for Cote d’Ivoire’s products is Ghana. Similar to Nigeria, Ghana exports grew from 
US$450 million to US$783 million which is a growth of about 74 per cent. Exports in Ghana 
decline in 2011 to US$303 million. In 2013, the exports to Ghana was worth US$1.851 billion 
the highest export for the period of study to any ECOWAS countries. Most of Cote d’Ivoire’s 
exports go to Nigeria and Ghana, at the expense of other regional member states. 
The UN COMTRADE (2015) reveals that Cote d’Ivoire’s major exports to Nigeria in 2013 
comprised refine petroleum product and palm oil– with an export value of US$638 million and 
US$63 million respectively whereas exports to Ghana on the other hand comprise special 
purpose ships which are 87% of the total exports to Ghana with a value of US$1.54 billion. 
The other largest export products from Cote d’Ivoire to Ghana are petroleum coke which an 
export value of US$21.7 million and crude petroleum of export value of US$15.4 million (UN 
COMTRADE, 2015). 
 Burkina Faso is the third largest export destination after Ghana in ECOWAS. Cote d’Ivoire’s 
exports with Burkina Faso have witnessed ups and downs over the last decade. Exports to 
Burkina Faso has been on a decline from 2008 to 2011 with a value of US$412 million to 
US$343 million which is about 16.7 per cent decline (see table 3.4). Exports to Burkina Faso 
rose moderately to US$380 million in 2012, then to US$479 million and US$570 million in 2013 
and 2014, respectively. One obvious explanation for this increase in exports could be the 
improved political and economic climate Cote d’Ivoire has enjoyed over the last years. Cote 
d’Ivoire recorded a marginal increase in exports to Burkina Faso from 2011 to 2014, with export 
receipts of US$343 million and US$570 million which is about 66.18 per cent. 
The UN COMTRADE (2015) shows that Cote d’Ivoire’s major exports to Burkina Faso in 2013 
were: refined petroleum, processed tobacco, minerals and chemicals fertilizer – generating 
export revenue of US$126 million, US$52 million and US$18 million respectively.  
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Mali is Cote d’Ivoire’s fourth export destination in ECOWAS. Exports to Mali has been on a 
decline from US$325 million to US$241 million 2008 to 2012 which is about 25 per cent 
reduction. In 2013 Exports to Mali picked up to US$357 million and grew further to US$368 
million in 2014 (see table 3.4).  According to UN COMTRADE (2015) Cote d’Ivoire’s major 
exports to Mali include refined petroleum, palm oil, plastic lids, soap, soups and broths worth 
US$152 million, US$17.8 million, US$14.5 million and US$12.8 million respectively. 
Senegal is Cote d’Ivoire’s fifth major export market in ECOWAS after Mali, with exports valued 
at US$149 million in 2014 (see table 3.4). Cote d’Ivoire’s major exports to Senegal are palm oil, 
sawn wood, coffee and tea extracts and bananas with an export value of US$52.3 million, 
US$14.5 million, US$11 million and US$9.41 million respectively. 
Togo is the sixth export market for Cote d’Ivoire in ECOWAS, with US$186 million worth of 
exports in 2014. Cote d’Ivoire’s major exports to Togo comprised: refined petroleum, palm oil, 
soap, beauty products and rolled tobacco with export value of US$46.7 million, US$6.06 million, 
US$8.52 million, US$6.07 million and US$4.35 million respectively. 
Guinee is the seventh export market in ECOWAS for Cote d’Ivoire’s products. In 2008, Cote 
d’Ivoire exported goods worth US$577 million the highest throughout the period of study. Cote 
d’Ivoire’s major export to Guinee consisted of rubber footwear, plastic lids, refined petroleum, 
textile footwear, light pure woven cotton with export value of US$19.8 million, US$12.1 million, 
US$4.48 million, US$3.6 million and US$2.85 million respectively. 
The republic of Benin is the eight export market for Cote d’Ivoire in ECOWAS, with US$71 
million in 2014. Cote d’Ivoire’s major exports to Benin are: Refined petroleum, light pure 
woven, soap, rice with an export value worth US$27.4 million, US$11.4 million, US$3.27 
million, US$3.27 million and US$2.67 million respectively. 
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3.3.2  Cote d’Ivoire’s Top Import Sources from ECOWAS  
As for its imports destinations, Cote d’Ivoire’s major import sources are: Nigeria, Senegal, 
Ghana, Guinee, Benin, Togo, Liberia and Mali and Burkina Faso.  
Nigeria plays an integral role in the Ivorian economy, as it is a major source of Cote d’Ivoire’s 
imports. In 2013, Nigeria supplied goods worth US$2.88 billion; representing 91 per cent of 
Cote d’Ivoire’s total imports from ECOWAS (see Table 3.5). Cote d’Ivoire’s major imports from 
Nigeria in 2013 included crude petroleum, rolled tobacco, chemical products and telephones to 
the values of US$2.56 billion, US$19.8 million, US$15.1 million, US$1.34 million, respectively. 
Crude petroleum is about 96 per cent of total export to Cote d’Ivoire and constitutes the main 
export from Nigeria to Cote d’Ivoire.  
Table 3. 5: Cote d’Ivoire’s Top Import Sources in ECOWAS (US$ Million) 
DESCRIPTION PERIOD 
Country/ Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Nigeria 2313 1434 2064 1570 2510 2886 2434 
Ghana 47 35 15 20 67 71 67 
Burkina Faso 0.42 0.98 3.56 4 33 30 16 
Mali 1.05 0.87 1.09 0.38 11 7 6.16 
Senegal 54 56 49 67 87 96 94 
Benin 20 13 9.7 9.56 13 12 12 
Guinee 26 22 15 16 22 44 2.38 
Liberia 11 10 13 37 0.2 2 0.36 
Sierra Leone 0.02 14 0.76 0.53 2.56 0.33 0 
Guinee Bissau 0.0004 0.012 2 1.53 0.62 5.11 0 
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Gambia 0.05 0.1 0.03 0 0.016 0.06 0.22 
Niger 0.59 0.42 0.7 0.9 3.7 1.79 5 
Cape Verde 7.85 0.19 0.008 0 0 0.0002 0 
Togo 7.28 4.3 6 5 36 23 11 
Source: UN COMTRADE Statistics (2016) 
Senegal is the second major import source from ECOWAS for Cote d’Ivoire. In 2013, Cote 
d’Ivoire imported goods worth US$96 million. Senegal’s major exports to Cote d’Ivoire in 2013 
comprised non fillet frozen fish, salt, soups and broth, rolled tobacco and packaged medicaments 
worth a value of US$54.3 million, US$9.34 million, US$9.6 million, US$8.19 million and 
US$3.57 million respectively.  
The third major import source from ECOWAS for Cote d’Ivoire is Ghana. In 2013, Cote d’Ivoire 
imported commodities worth US$71 million from Ghana. Ghana’s major exports to Cote 
d’Ivoire in 2013 included excavation machinery, used clothing, light pure woven cotton, 
stranded aluminium wire, industrial fatty acid, oils and alcohol to the values of US$10.2 million, 
US$6.63 million, US$6.38 million, US$5.9 million and US$5.17 million respectively. 
 Traditionally, Guinee is the fourth import source for Cote d’Ivoire’s imports in ECOWAS. In 
2013, Cote d’Ivoire’s import bill was US$44 million (see table 3.5). According to UN 
COMTRADE statistics, Cote d’Ivoire’s major imports from Guinee in 2013 included non-fillet 
frozen fish which is about 97 per cent of total imports from Guinee to Cote d’Ivoire with import 
bills of US$42 million. 
Benin was the fourth source of imports for Cote d’Ivoire in ECOWAS, contributing US$12 
million in 2013 (see table 3.5). The major imports from Benin in 2013 comprised light pure 
woven cotton, soybean meal, other vegetables residues, valued at US$7.18 million, US$2.39 
million and US$2 million, respectively.  
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Burkina Faso is the fifth import source from Cote d’Ivoire, with imports valued at US$30 million 
in 2013 (see table 3.5). Cote d’Ivoire’s import bill from Burkina Faso included raw zinc, other 
pure vegetable oils, Bi-Wheel vehicle parts, motorcycles, mixed minerals and chemicals fertilizer 
and other oily seeds valued at US$25.4 million, US$7.63 million, US$4.79 million, US$2.73 
million, US$2.24 million and US$1.68 million, respectively. 
In 2013, according to UN COMTRADE statistics, Togo was the sixth source of imports for Cote 
d’Ivoire. Cote d’Ivoire imported goods worth US$23 million from Togo. The composition of the 
import bill included refined petroleum, large construction vehicles, Bi-Wheel vehicle parts, raw 
plastic sheeting and delivery trucks, worth US$16.7 million, US$2.48 million, US$1.99 million, 
US$1.96 million, US$1.58 million, respectively. 
Other notable import sources from ECOWAS for Cote d’Ivoire, in descending order, based on 
2013 figures, are: Mali, Guinee Bissau, Liberia and Niger, with imports valued at US$7 million, 
US$5.11 million, US$2 million and US$1.79 million, respectively (see table 3.5). The 
composition of Cote d’Ivoire’s exports to ECOWAS is largely constituted by petroleum 
products, rubber and articles of rubber.  
3.3.3  Cote d’Ivoire’s Trade Balance in ECOWAS 
Cote d’Ivoire’s trade performance in ECOWAS over the years was characterized by a positive 
trade balance or trade surplus. A closer look at Cote d’Ivoire’s trade performance with its major 
trading partners reflects a clear picture on how the country is performing with the rest of the 
ECOWAS member states. Based on 2012, Cote d’Ivoire’s trade balance with its top trading 
partners was in the red (see Table 3.6). This was due to a larger increase in imports from 
ECOWAS member states compared to a relatively small rise in exports to ECOWAS. With 
Nigeria, in particular, Cote d’Ivoire registered a staggering US$1.6 billion trade deficit. In 2012, 
trade balance declined with other trading partners: Ghana, Burkina Faso, Mali and Togo to 
US$364 million, US$347 million, US$230 million, US$87 million, respectively.  
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This is a huge and unsustainable figure for a country like Cote d’Ivoire with a GDP of US$31 
billion. 
Table 3. 6: Cote d’Ivoire’s Trade Balance with ECOWAS Countries (US$ Millions) 
 
Description Period 
Exports 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Nigeria 625 715 668 663 867 862 609 
Senegal 163 146 113 172 218 134 149 
Togo 138 70 66 140 123 105 186 
Benin 104 96 110 97 137 66 71 
Ghana 450 563 783 303 431 1851 457 
Burkina Faso 412 381 360 343 380 479 570 
Guinee 577 72 56 58 89 74 55 
Sierra Leone 51 40 3.04 0.75 0.65 0.34 0.91 
Guinee Bissau 8.3 6.7 30 61 56 30 22 
Cape Verde 2.77 1.8 0.38 0.18 2.2 0.18 8.17 
Gambia 62 35 26 27 19 15 13 
Liberia 85 43 56 183 91 48 93 
Niger 55 59 52 46 63 53 86 
Mali 325 266 226 241 241 357 368 
Imports 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Nigeria 2313 1434 2064 1570 2510 2886 2434 
Ghana 47 35 15 20 67 71 67 
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Burkina Faso 0.42 0.98 3.56 4 33 30 16 
Mali 1.05 0.87 1.09 0.38 11 7 6.16 
Senegal 54 56 49 67 87 96 94 
Benin 20 13 9.7 9.56 13 12 12 
Guinee 26 22 15 16 22 44 2.38 
Liberia 11 10 13 37 0.2 2 0.36 
Sierra Leone 0.02 14 0.76 0.53 2.56 0.33 0 
Guinee Bissau 0.0004 0.012 2 1.53 0.62 5.11 0 
Gambia 0.05 0.1 0.03 0 0.016 0.06 0.22 
Niger 0.59 0.42 0.7 0.9 3.7 1.79 5 
Cape Verde 7.85 0.19 0.008 0 0 0.0002 0 
Togo 7.28 4.3 6 5 36 23 11 
Trade Balance 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Nigeria -1688 -719 -1396 -907 -1643 -2024 -1825 
Ghana 403 528 768 283 364 1780 390 
Burkina Faso 411.58 380.02 356.44 339 347 449 554 
Mali 323.95 265.13 224.91 240.62 230 350 361.84 
Senegal 109 90 64 105 131 38 55 
Benin 84 83 100.3 87.44 124 54 59 
Guinee 551 50 41 42 67 30 52.62 
Liberia 74 33 43 146 90.8 46 92.64 
Sierra Leone 50.98 26 2.28 0.22 -1.91 0.01 0.55 
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Guinee Bissau 8.29 6.688 28 59.47 55.38 24.89 22 
Gambia 61.95 34.9 25.97 27 18.984 14.94 12.78 
Niger 54.41 58.58 51.3 45.1 59.3 51.21 81 
Cape Verde -5.08 1.61 0.372 0.18 2.2 0.1798 8.17 
Togo 130.72 65.7 60 135 87 82 175 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations & UN COMTRADE Statistics (2016) 
 
Appendix 5 provides a detailed analysis of Cote d’Ivoire’s trade performance in ECOWAS and 
goes on to show the influence of Nigeria on Cote d’Ivoire’s trade. Taking the trade balance as an 
indicator of trade performance, Cote d’Ivoire’s trade surplus in ECOWAS reduced from US$600 
million in 2011 to a trade deficit of US$ 68 million in 2012. However, without Nigeria, Cote 
d’Ivoire’s trade deficit in ECOWAS would have turn into a positive trade balance of US$1.5 
billion. From this analysis, it is clear that Nigeria is the major contributor to Cote d’Ivoire’s trade 
balance. It therefore follows that if Cote d’Ivoire is to address its balance of payment problems it 
must start by putting strategies aimed at restructuring its trade with Nigeria. 
3.4 Cote d’Ivoire’s Trade Performance in EU (28)  
The European Union represented an important market for Cote d’Ivoire over the years. Indeed, 
the country is one of the EU main partner in West Africa as far as trade, partnership agreement 
and regional integration is concerned. Most of the technology used in the Ivorian industry is 
imported from the European Union Group of Twenty-eight (EU 28). The country has also 
experienced a political and military crisis, during this time the EU was the only major donor to 
provide technical and financial assistance to Cote d’Ivoire.  
Cote d’Ivoire has also enjoyed a preferential trade agreement with the EU under the Lomé 
Convention and the Cotonou Agreement. Recently, the country initiated and signed interim 
EPAs to further its trade with the EU. While full EPA negotiations continue and Cote d’Ivoire is 
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yet to ratify the treaty, it is necessary to review how Cote d’Ivoire’s trade has performed with the 
EU.  
Figure 3. 3: Cote d’Ivoire’s Trade with the EU (US$ Million) 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE Statistics (2016) 
Figure 3.3 shows how Cote d’Ivoire’s trade with the European Union has evolved from 2008 to 
2014. In 2008, Cote d’Ivoire exported merchandise worth US$4.4 billion. Cote d’Ivoire’s exports 
to the European Union increased by 4.5 per cent to register export earnings of US$4.6 billion in 
2009. Cote d’Ivoire, as with other regional groupings, that is, WAEMU and ECOWAS, 
registered a decline in exports in 2010. The sharp decline in export to the European Union was 
due to the financial crisis most European Countries faced. The country exported goods to the 
value of US$3.8 billion to the European Union (see Figure 3.3). 
Cote d’Ivoire’s exports increased the following year to US$4 billion in 2011. The country’s 
export to the European Union decline again in 2012, as the country recorded a US$3.8 billion in 
export earnings. From 2013 to 2014 Cote d’Ivoire registered a marginal increase in exports to the 
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European Union. The country exported goods worth US$3.9 billion and US$4.5 billion in 2013 
and 2014, respectively (see Figure 3.3).  
Cote d’Ivoire’s imports from the European Union were valued at US$2.3 billion in 2008. Cote 
d’Ivoire went on to record a fall in imports from the European Union in the succeeding year. The 
country’s import bill in 2009 was valued at US$1.9 billion. The downward trend in import 
continued in the following years as the country registered imports of US$1.8 billion and US$1.6 
billion in 2010 and 2011, respectively. From 2012 to 2013 Cote d’Ivoire’s import bill went up by 
US$2.4 billion and US$2.6 billion, respectively. Cote d’Ivoire’s imports from the European 
Union further increased by 9.5 per cent to US$2.9 billion in 2014.  
3.4.1 Cote d’Ivoire’s Top Exports Markets to EU (28) 
Traditionally, Cote d’Ivoire’s major export destinations to the European Union in descending 
order are: Netherland, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Spain, Switzerland, Poland and 
Sweden. 
The Netherland is Cote d’Ivoire’s principal export destination. This is because the Netherland is 
the country’s major buyer of Cocoa. The Netherland has dominated the European Union market 
as being the best export destination for Cote d’Ivoire, constituting at least 19.5 per cent for the 
period of study. 
France, Cote d’Ivoire’s former coloniser, has been an important export destination for Cote 
d’Ivoire over the years. According to the UN COMTRADE (2015) France has dominated the 
European Union, as being the best export market for Cote d’Ivoire, constituting at least 15 per 
cent of Cote d’Ivoire’s exports. France do not dominate Cote d’Ivoire’s trade as it once did. Cote 
d’Ivoire’s exports to the France amounted to US$ 1.36 billion in 2008. In 2009, exports went 
down to US$1.12 billion. In 2010 and 2011, the country exported goods worth US$716 million 
and US$630 million, respectively.  
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The country witnessed a dramatic decline in exports to France in 2012, as the exports receipts 
amounted to a mere US$502 million. In 2013 and 2014, Cote d’Ivoire’s exports to France 
marginally went up to US$788 million and US$800 million, respectively (see table 3.7). In 2013, 
Cote d’Ivoire’s major exports to the France were: cocoa paste, cocoa beans, bananas, processed 
fish, armored vehicles, cocoa butter and refined petroleum valued at US$209 million, US$108 
million and US$101 million, US$96.6 million, US$92.6 million, US$77.4 million and US$66.4 
million respectively. 
Table 3. 7: Cote d’Ivoire Top Export Markets to EU (28) (US$ Millions) 
DESCRIPTION       Period       
Exports 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Belgium 205 239 5.12 361 432 419 567 
France 1360 1123 716 630 502 788 800 
Germany 695 738 522 819 815 750 547 
Netherland 1100 1430 1452 1300 950 966 1300 
United Kingdom 278 259     280 127 258 239 230 
Italy    380 328 320 313 240 208 312 
Poland 95      97 114 139 119 136 153 
Spain 224     191 253 181 209 210 245 
Sweden 1.47     0.36 11 8 20 0.57 21 
Switzerland 74 218 170 164 269 253 406 
Source: UN COMTRADE Statistics (2016) 
Germany is traditionally the third export destination for Cote d’Ivoire after France. In 2014, Cote 
d’Ivoire exported goods worth US$547 million to Germany. In 2008, Cote d’Ivoire exported 
goods valued at US$695 million to Germany. In 2009 Cote d’Ivoire’s exports to Germany 
recorded significant gains to US$ 738 million. Cote d’Ivoire’s exports to Germany declined in 
2010 and picked up in the subsequent years. In 2010 and 2011 exports to Germany was valued at 
US$522 million and US$819 million, respectively.  The next three years, Cote d’Ivoire’s exports 
to Germany marginally decline to US$815 million, US$750 million and US$547 million 
respectively. 
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Italy is the fourth most important market for Cote d’Ivoire’s exports. In 2008, Cote d’Ivoire’s 
exported goods worth US$380 million to Italy. Cote d’Ivoire’s exports to Italy declined in 2009 
to US$328 million. The downward trend continued for the next 4 consecutive years, with an 
exports values of US$320 million, US$313 million, US$240 million, US$208 million 
respectively. In 2014, the country’s exports to Italy shot up to US$312 million. Cote d’Ivoire’s 
traditional exports to Italy are: tobacco and precious stones and metals. In 2013, Cote d’Ivoire’s 
major exports to Italy were: cocoa beans, processed fish, rubber, cocoa butter, raw cotton and 
veneer sheets valued at US$108 million, US$61.6 million, US$27 million, US$26.8 million, US$ 
16 million and US$15.4 million, respectively. 
Other important export markets for Cote d’Ivoire in the European Union are: United Kingdom, 
Spain, Switzerland, Poland and Sweden with exports in 2014 valued at US$230 million, US$245 
million, US$406 million, US$153 million and US$21 million, respectively (see table 3.7).   
3.4.2 Cote d’Ivoire’s Major Import Sources from the EU (28) 
Over the years, France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, Belgium, Sweden, 
Switzerland and Poland have been the most important import sources for Cote d’Ivoire.  
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Table 3. 8: Cote d’Ivoire’s Top Import Sources from (EU28) (US$ Million) 
 
DESCRIPTION PERIOD 
Country/Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Belgium 75 96 24 83 152 166 141 
France 1000 991 931 791 1210 1310 1364 
Germany 225 216 216 183 240 257 357 
Netherlands 156 164 140 135 195 242 245 
United Kingdom 159 103 119 73 172 172 192 
Italy 161 153 169 156 187 162 238 
Poland 20 15 23 21 25 28 29 
Spain 194 182 154 150 190 201 233 
Sweden 36 31 48 37 66 57 52 
Switzerland 44 27 49 48 3.72 42 38 
Source: UN COMTRADE Statistics (2016)  
Although Cote d’Ivoire’s imports from France went through ups and downs, the France has 
remained traditionally the major source of Cote d’Ivoire’s imports over the years. In 2008, Cote 
d’Ivoire imported goods worth US$ 1 billion from France. France’s imports went down by 0.9  
per cent in 2009 to US$991 million. Cote d’Ivoire’s imports to France reduced further to US$931 
million and US$791 million in 2010 and 2011, respectively. The following year, Cote d’Ivoire’s 
imports rebounded with a sharp increase of US$1.21 billion which was about 34.6 per cent rise 
in imports. The upward trend continued in 2013 and 2014 with an import bill of US$1.31 billion 
and US$1.36 billion respectively. 
Using the 2013 figures, Cote d’Ivoire’s major imports from France were: wheat, packaged 
medicaments, telephones, cars, non-fillet frozen fish and planes, helicopter or spacecraft valued 
at US$172 million, US$132 million, US$65.9 million, US$57 million, US$47.3 million and 
US$39.4 million, respectively. 
Germany is the second source of imports for Cote d’Ivoire in the European Union, after France.  
Cote d’Ivoire imported goods and services valued at US$225 million from Germany in 2008. 
Cote d’Ivoire’s import bill from Germany went down to US$216 million in 2009. In 2010, Cote 
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d’Ivoire’s imports to Germany remained at US$216 million. The downward trend continued to 
2011 where the country’s import bill went down to US$183 million. In 2012, Cote d’Ivoire’s 
imports from Germany shot up to US$240 million, and again rose to US$257 million in 2013.  
In 2014, Cote d’Ivoire’s imports from Germany shot up again to US$357 million. Using the 
2013 figures, Cote d’Ivoire imported cars, industrial food preparation machinery, cranes and 
washing and bottling machines valued at US$33.3 million, US$13.1 million, US$9.05 million, 
US$7.16 million, respectively. 
Netherland is the third major source of imports for Cote d’Ivoire from the European Union after 
Germany. From 2008 to 2010, imports to Netherland witnessed up and down. Imports from 
Netherland increased from US$156 million to US$164 million in 2008 and 2009, respectively.  
In 2010, import bill from Netherland was valued at US$140 million. The following year import 
declined to US$135 million. Cote d’Ivoire’s imports from Netherland picked up and witnessed 
an upward trend from 2012 to 2014 valued at US$195 million to US$245 million, respectively 
which is about 25.6 per cent increase. 
Other important sources for Cote d’Ivoire’s imports from the European Union in descending 
order are: Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland and Poland with import 
bills in 2014 of US$238 million, US$233 million, US$192 million, US$141 million, US$52 
million, US$38 million and US$29 million, respectively. 
3.4.3  Cote d’Ivoire’s Trade Balance in EU (28) 
Cote d’Ivoire over the years has enjoyed a trade surplus with the European Union. Table 3.9 
illustrates Cote d’Ivoire’s trade balance with the European Union from 2008 to 2014. In 2008, 
Cote d’Ivoire recorded a trade surplus of US$2.3 billion with the European Union.  
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Table 3. 9: Terms of Trade between Cote d’Ivoire and the EU (US$ Millions) 
 
DESCRIPTION PERIOD 
Exports 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Belgium 205 239 5.12 361 432 419 567 
France 1360 1123 716 630 502 788 800 
Germany 695 738 522 819 815 750 547 
Netherland 1100 1430 1452 1300 950 966 1300 
United Kingdom 278 259 280 127 258 239 230 
Italy 380 328 320 313 240 208 312 
Poland 95 97 114 139 119 136 153 
Spain 224 191 253 181 209 210 245 
Sweden 1.47 0.36 11 8 20 0.57 21 
Switzerland 74 218 170 164 269 253 406 
Imports 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Belgium 75 96 24 83 152 166 141 
France 1000 991 931 791 1210 1310 1364 
Germany 225 216 216 183 240 257 357 
Netherlands 156 164 140 135 195 242 245 
United Kingdom 159 103 119 73 172 172 192 
Italy 161 153 169 156 187 162 238 
Poland 20 15 23 21 25 28 29 
Spain 194 182 154 150 190 201 233 
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Sweden 36 31 48 37 66 57 52 
Switzerland 44 27 49 48 3.72 42 38 
Trade Balance 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Belgium 130 143 -18.88 278 280 253 426 
France 360 132 -215 -161 -708 -522 -564 
Germany 470 522 306 636 575 493 190 
Netherlands 945 1266 1312 1165 754 724 1055 
United Kingdom 119 156 161 54 86 67 38 
Italy 219 175 151 157 53 46 74 
Poland 75 82 91 118 94 108 124 
Spain 30 9 99 31 19 9 12 
Sweden -34.86 -30.64 -37 -29 -46 -56.43 -31 
Switzerland 30 191 121 116 265.28 211 368 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations & UN COMTRADE Statistics (2016) 
Cote d’Ivoire’s trade surplus increased further to US$2.6 billion in 2009. The following year 
however, the country’s trade surplus plummeted to US$1.9 billion. In 2011, the country’s trade 
surplus with the European Union rose spectacularly to US$2.3 billion (see Table 3.9). Cote 
d’Ivoire witnessed a sharp fall in its trade surplus with the European Union in 2012 to US$1.37 
billion. In 2013, trade surplus with the European Union decreased again to US$1.33 before 
recording a rise in the trade surplus of US$1.69 billion in 2014.  
3.5 Cote d’Ivoire’s Trade Performance in the WTO  
Cote d’Ivoire’s trade performance with the World Trade Organisation Member States is 
reviewed in this section. The WTO is made up of 160 members, excluding Cote d’Ivoire, and 
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including the EU (28) as one member. The WTO group includes WAEMU, ECOWAS, EU and 
other important trade partners to Cote d’Ivoire, such as the United States of America, South 
Africa, India and China. 
Table 3. 10: Cote d’Ivoire’s Trade Performance with the WTO 
 
Year Exports 
(USD Millions) 
Imports 
(USD Millions) 
Trade Balance 
(USD Millions) 
2008 9778 7883 1895 
2009 10280 6959 3321 
2010 10283 7849 2434 
2011 11049 6719 4330 
2012 10860 8769 2091 
2013 12083 12482 -399 
2014 12985 11177 1808 
Source: UN COMTRADE Statistics (2016) 
Table 3.10 shows how Cote d’Ivoire’s trade performed in the WTO in the period between 2008 
and 2014. In 2008, Cote d’Ivoire exported goods worth US$9.77 billion to WTO Member States. 
Cote d’Ivoire’s exports to the WTO went up to US$10.28 billion in 2009. In 2011, Cote 
d’Ivoire’s exports to WTO continue to grow as the country recorded an export value of 
US$11.09 billion. However, in 2012 Cote d’Ivoire’s exports went down to US$10.86 billion, to 
the WTO (see Table 3.10).   
In 2013, Cote d’Ivoire’s exports shot up by 11.26 per cent to US$12.08 billion. Cote d’Ivoire’s 
exports continued on an upward trend in 2014 to US$12.98 billion.  
Cote d’Ivoire’s import bill witnessed ups and down during the period under review. In 2008, the 
country’s imported bill recorded US$7.88 billion. The import bill fell marginally to US$6.95 
billion in 2009 before bouncing to US$7.84 billion in 2010. In 2011, the country’s imports to 
WTO fell again to US$6.71 billion. Cote d’Ivoire maintained the upward momentum in its 
imports to the WTO in 2012 and 2013 where the country’s imports were valued at US$8.76 
billion and US$12.48 billion, respectively. In 2014, the country’s imports fell to US$11.17 
billion.  
 THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALISATION ON COTE D’IVOIRE 
 
103 
 
3.5.1 Cote d’Ivoire’s Top Export Markets   
Cote d’Ivoire’s major export destinations in the global economy in descending order are: 
Netherlands, United States of America, South Africa, France, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Belgium, 
Germany, India, Ghana, Malaysia and Canada. 
Table 3. 11: Cote d’Ivoire’s Top Export Markets in 2014 
 
Importer Exported Value 
USD Millions in 
2014 
Trade Balance 
USD Millions 
in 2014 
Share in Cote 
d'Ivoire Exports 
(%) 
Export Growth in 
Value (2010 -2014) 
World 12,985.00 1,808.00 100 6 
Netherlands 1300 1,055.00 10.01 -2.72 
USA 1090 704 8.39 0.7 
South Africa 893 771 6.87 68.79 
France 800 -564 6.16 2.81 
Nigeria 609 -1825 4.69 -2.28 
Burkina Faso 570 554 4.38 12.17 
Belgium 567 426 4.36 224.39 
Germany 547 190 4.21 1.17 
India 532 -24 4.09 14.92 
Ghana 457 390 3.51 -12.59 
Malaysia 359 312 2.76 23.36 
Canada 356 326 2.74 10.01 
Source: UN COMTRADE Statistics (2016) 
On average, for the period from 2010 to 2014, Cote d’Ivoire’s exports increase by 6 per cent 
(UN COMTRADE, 2015). Cote d’Ivoire’s major export destination globally is Netherlands. In 
 THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALISATION ON COTE D’IVOIRE 
 
104 
 
2014, Cote d’Ivoire exported goods worth US$1.3 billion to Netherlands; representing 10.01 per 
cent of the country’s total exports (see Table 3.11). Cote d’Ivoire’s exports to Netherlands 
between 2010 and 2014, shrunk by 2.72 per cent. 
Cote d’Ivoire’s second major export destination in 2010 after Netherlands is the United States of 
America. In 2014, Cote d’Ivoire exported goods valued at US$1.09 billion constituting 8.39 per 
cent of Cote d’Ivoire’s total exports. Major exports in 2014 were cocoa, mineral fuels and oils, 
and rubber worth US$814 million, US$165.1 million and US$74.8 million, respectively. The 
United States of America is a major buyer of Cote d’Ivoire’s cocoa. Over the period of 2010 to 
2014, Cote d’Ivoire’s exports to the United States of America grew by 0.7 per cent. 
South Africa is the third export market for Cote d’Ivoire in the global economy. In 2014, Cote 
d’Ivoire exported goods valued at US$893 million to South Africa, representing a sober 6.87 per 
cent of Cote d’Ivoire’s total exports. South Africa is gradually becoming a major importer of 
Cote d’Ivoire’s products. Over a five-year period, that is, from 2010 to 2014, Cote d’Ivoire’s 
exports to South Africa grew by 68.79 per cent. Major exports to South Africa as at 2014 were: 
ships, pearls and precious stones, nuclear reactors and cocoa with export receipts of US$566.3 
million, US$283.2 million, US$15.1 million and US$13.6 million, respectively. 
France is the fourth largest export market after South Africa for Cote d’Ivoire. Traditionally, 
before the souring of relations between France and Cote d’Ivoire, France used to be the first 
largest export market for Cote d’Ivoire, followed by Netherlands. 
According to the UN COMTRADE (2015), Cote d’Ivoire’s exports to France were US$800 
million, representing 6.16 per cent of Cote d’Ivoire’s total exports in 2014. In 2009, exports went 
down to US$ 1.12 billion. In the three consecutive years, thus 2010, 2011 and 2012, the country 
exported goods to France witnessed a downward trend with exports value worth US$716 million 
and US$630 million, and US$502 million, respectively before bouncing to US$788 million in 
213. In 2014, Cote d’Ivoire’s exports to the France shoot up to US$800 million (see Table 3.11).  
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Cote d’Ivoire’s exports to France rose by 2.83 per cent over the period of 2010 to 2014 
demonstrating the diplomatic relations between Cote d’Ivoire and France are gradually 
improving to where it used to be. 
Other notable export destination for Cote d’Ivoire in descending order, based on the 2014 figures 
are: Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Belgium, Germany, India, Ghana, Malaysia and Canada, with export 
receipts of US$609 million, US$570 million, US$567 million, US$547 million, US$532 million, 
US$457 million, US$359 million and US$356 million, respectively. Cote d’Ivoire lost a 
significant market in Netherland, Nigeria and Ghana, as exports over 2010 – 2014 period 
dropped by 2.72 per cent, 2.28 per cent, and 12.59 per cent, respectively (see Table 3.11). 
3.5.2 Cote d’Ivoire’s Top Import Sources from WTO 
Cote d’Ivoire’s major import sources from the global economy in descending order are: Nigeria, 
France, China, Bahamas, India, United States, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, South Africa, 
Ghana and Malaysia.  
Nigeria is the first source of Cote d’Ivoire’s imports, reaffirming the importance of Nigeria for 
the Ivorian economy. In 2014, Cote d’Ivoire imported goods valued at US$2.34 billion from 
Nigeria, representing 21.77 per cent of Cote d’Ivoire’s total imports. Over the five-year period, 
that is, from 2010 to 2014, Cote d’Ivoire’s imports grew by 4.2 per cent. Cote d’Ivoire’s imports 
from Nigeria traditionally are: mineral fuels and oil, tobacco, chemical products, essential oils 
and perfumes, and electrical and electronic equipment. 
Using the 2014 figures, Cote d’Ivoire imported mineral fuels and oils, Tobacco, chemical 
products, essential oils and perfumes from Nigeria valued at US$2.4 billion, US$21.1 million, 
US$10.9 million and US$4.9 million, respectively. 
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Table 3. 12: Cote d’Ivoire’s Major Import Source from WTO 
 
Exporter Imported 
Value USD 
Millions in 
2014 
Trade Balance 
USD Millions in 
2014 
Share in Cote 
d'Ivoire Imports 
(%) 
Import Growth in 
Value (2010 -2014) 
World 11,177.00 1,808.00 100 9.23 
Nigeria 2434 -1825 21.77 4.2 
France 1364 -564 12.20 10.01 
China 980 837 8.76 15.74 
Bahamas 612 -603 5.47 397.37 
India 556 -24 4.97 40.17 
USA 386 704 3.45 13.08 
Germany 357 190 3.19 13.38 
Netherlands 245 1055 2.19 15.01 
Belgium 141 426 1.26 55.68 
South Africa 122 771 1.09 -2.68 
Ghana 67.00 390 0.59 45.37 
Malaysia 47 312 0.42 6.16 
Source: UN COMTRADE Statistics (2016) 
France was the second source of Cote d’Ivoire’s imports. France no longer dominates Cote 
d’Ivoire’s trade as it once did. In 2014, Cote d’Ivoire imported goods valued at US$1.36 billion 
from France, representing 12.2 per cent of Cote d’Ivoire’s total imports. Over the five-year 
period, that is from 2010 to 2014, Cote d’Ivoire’s imports grew by 10.01 per cent. Cote 
d’Ivoire’s imports from France are traditionally: cereals, vehicles, electrical and electronic 
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equipment, pharmaceutical products, nuclear reactors and machinery, articles of iron, aircraft and 
parts, and essential oils and perfumes.  
Using the 2014 figures, the top imports from France to Cote d’Ivoire were cereals, vehicles, 
Nuclear reactors, electrical equipment and pharmaceutical products valued at US$176.7 million, 
US$158.8 million, US$135.7 million, US$133.8 million and US$132.8 million, respectively. 
China was the third source of Cote d’Ivoire’s imports, reaffirming the importance of China for 
the Ivorian economy. In 2014, Cote d’Ivoire imported goods valued at US$980 million from 
China, representing 8.76 per cent of Cote d’Ivoire’s total imports. Over the five-year period, that 
is, from 2010 to 2014, Cote d’Ivoire’s imports grew by 15.74 per cent. Cote d’Ivoire’s major 
imports from China are traditionally: tobacco, electric and electronic equipment, nuclear reactor 
and machinery, iron and steel, fish and crustaceans, miscellaneous and chemical products, 
articles of iron, ceramic products, and plastics.  
Using the 2014 import figures, Cote d’Ivoire imported electric and electronic equipment, 
machinery, miscellaneous chemical products, vehicles, iron and steel, fish and crustaceans, 
articles of iron, and plastics from China, valued at US$142.9 million, US$127.6 million, 
US$95.4 million, US$77.4 million, and US$72.2 million, US$41.5 million, US$40.4 million, and 
US$28 million, respectively. 
The Bahamas is the fourth import source for Cote d’Ivoire, with an import value of US$612 
million in 2014; constituting 5.47 per cent of Cote d’Ivoire’s total imports (see Table 3.12). Cote 
d’Ivoire’s imports from the Bahamas over a five-year period, that is, from 2010 to 2014, grew by 
397 per cent. This shows that the Bahamas is a growing import destination for Cote d’Ivoire. 
Cote d’Ivoire’s major imports from the Bahamas in 2014 included ships, boats and other floating 
structures valued at US$612 million. 
Other visible important import sources for Cote d’Ivoire in descending order are: India, the 
United States of America, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, South Africa, Ghana and Malaysia, 
with import bills of US$556 million, US$386 million, US$357 million, US$245 million, US$141 
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million, US$122 million, US$67 million and US$47 million, respectively. Over the 2010 to 2014 
period, Cote d’Ivoire witnessed a positive growth of its imports from India, the United States of 
America, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Ghana and Malaysia with growth rates of 40.17 per 
cent, 13.08 per cent, 13.38 per cent, 15.01 per cent, 55.68 per cent, 45.37 per cent, and 6.16 per 
cent respectively.  
Cote d’Ivoire’s imports from South Africa went down by 2.68 per cent over the five-year period, 
which is, 2010 to 2014 (see Table 3.12). Overall, Cote d’Ivoire’s trade is expanding and 
diversifying. Several new suppliers provide Cote d’Ivoire’s imports as opposed to only France 
which used to be Cote d’Ivoire’s main supplier. 
3.5.3 Cote d’Ivoire’s Trade Balance Performance in the WTO 
Cote d’Ivoire’s total exports exceeded total imports by US$1.9 billion in 2014. In most previous 
years, and in 2014, Cote d’Ivoire registered a positive trade balance with its major trading 
partners – only France, Nigeria, China and India recorded a negative trade balance.  (see Table 
3.13).  
A closer look at Cote d’Ivoire’s trade balance with its major trading partners within the context 
of the WTO from 2008 to 2014, shows that Cote d’Ivoire managed to make a trade surplus with 
the Germany, USA, Netherlands and Ghana, throughout the period under consideration. Cote 
d’Ivoire’s trade balance with India has been positive from 2008 to 2012. Only recently, the 
country’s trade balance with India showed a trade deficit.  
It is also worth noting that Cote d’Ivoire’s trade even with the WTO is concentrated within a few 
countries. Appendices 6 and 7 provide Cote d’Ivoire’s export destinations and import sources, 
respectively. It is interesting to note that countries such as Nigeria, the largest economy in Africa 
followed by South Africa the second largest economy in Africa are the 5th and 3rd exports 
destination to Cote d’Ivoire in the WTO, respectively (see Table 3.11). In terms of imports 
Nigeria and South Africa, both occupied the 1st and the 10th position in the WTO as far as Cote 
d’Ivoire’s imports sources are concerned (see Table 3.12).  
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Table 3. 13: Cote d’Ivoire’s Terms of Trade with its Top Trading Partners in the WTO 
(US$ Millions) 
 
Description Period 
Exports 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Belgium 205 239 5.12 361 432 419 567 
Germany 695 738 522 819 815 750 547 
Netherlands 1100 1430 1452 1300 950 966 1300 
USA 945 800 1060 1318 877 741 1090 
France 1360 1123 716 630 502 788 800 
Nigeria 625 715 668 663 867 862 609 
South Africa 39 26 110 605 396 355 893 
Ghana 450 563 783 303 431 1851 457 
India  178 281 305 281 360 251 532 
China 45 54 79 116 109 152 143 
Imports 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Belgium 75 96 24 83 152 166 141 
Germany 225 216 216 183 240 257 357 
Netherlands 156 164 140 135 195 242 245 
USA 209 228 236 128 254 292 386 
France 1000 991 931 791 1210 1310 1364 
Nigeria 2313 1434 2064 1570 2510 2886 2434 
South Africa 89 98 136 84 124 111 122 
Ghana 47 35 15 20 67 71 67 
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India  131 128 144 179 389 321 556 
China 524 501 546 461 716 1424 980 
Trade Balance 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Belgium 130 143 -18.88 278 280.00 253 426.00 
Germany 470 522 306 636 575 493 190 
Netherlands 945 1266 1312 1165 754 724 1055 
USA 736 572 824 1190 623 449 704 
France 360 132 -215.00 -161 -708 -522 -564 
Nigeria -1688 -719 -1396 -907 -1643 -2024 -1825 
South Africa -50 -72 -26 521 272 244 771 
Ghana 403 528 768 283 364 1780 390 
India  47 153 161 102 -29 -70 -24 
China -479 -447 -467 -345 -607 -1272 -837 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations & UN COMTRADE Statistics (2016) 
3.6 Cote d’Ivoire’s Export Destinations by Grouping 
After having reviewed how Cote d’Ivoire’s exports have performed across the major trading 
bloc, it becomes necessary to come up with a summary of the export destinations for Cote 
d’Ivoire’s products. This analysis should assist in deriving the major trading partner for Cote 
d’Ivoire, based on exports. And this is one of the objectives of this study. 
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Figure 3. 4: Cote d’Ivoire’s Export Destination 
 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations and UN COMTRADE (2016) 
The European Union is the major export destination for Cote d’Ivoire, with its share of exports to 
total exports ranging from 41 per cent in 2010 to 38 per cent in 2014 (see Figure 3.4). The rest of 
the World (ROW) market dominated, as the second export destination in 2010, 2011, 2012, and 
2014 with exports’ share of 27 per cent, 32 per cent, 26 per cent, and 33 per cent respectively; 
but it went on to be overtaken by the ECOWAS in 2013 with an export’s share of 31 per cent 
(see Figure 3.4). The ECOWAS market, irrespective of its closeness to Cote d’Ivoire than the EU 
and ROW offers less scope for Cote d’Ivoire’s exports. ECOWAS is the third export destination 
for Cote d’Ivoire. The share exports in the ECOWAS market to the total exports in 2010, 2011, 
2012, and 2014 was valued at 22 per cent, 19 per cent, 23 per cent and 18 per cent, respectively. 
The WAEMU market recorded the lowest export’s share throughout the period under 
consideration, that is between 9 per cent and 11 per cent of total export’s share between 2010 to 
2014. 
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3.7 Geographical Sources of Cote d’Ívoire’s Imports by Grouping 
Again, discussion in this section partially addresses the question that seeks to investigate Cote 
d’Ivoire’s major trade grouping.  
Figure 3. 5: Cote d’Ivoire’s Major Import Sources by Grouping 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations and UN COMTRADE Statistics (2016) 
This again shows that the European Union and France do not longer dominates trade in Cote 
d’Ivoire as they once did. This is especially true because new emerging countries such as 
Nigeria, China, India, South Africa, the Bahamas and Malaysia constitute an important market 
for Cote d’Ivoire’s imports (see Table 3.12). Hence, the ROW constitutes the primary source of 
imports for Cote d’Ivoire. 
Cote d’Ivoire’s second import source is shared between ECOWAS and the European Union. 
ECOWAS was the second import source for Cote d’Ivoire in 2010, 2012 and 2013 with a share 
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of 28 per cent, 29 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively. However, in 2011 and 2014, the 
European Union was the second import source for Cote d’Ivoire with 27 per cent and 28 per cent 
of the country’s total import share, respectively. 
Although Cote d’Ivoire enjoys close economic ties with countries within the WAEMU region, 
the share of imports from WAEMU show lower contributions to Cote d’Ivoire’s import basket. 
This could be as a result of poor roads, lack of heavy trucks. 
Harsch (2003) confirmed this when he found that Burkina Faso’s animal product export to Cote 
d’Ivoire fell by 65 per cent because of the Ivorian crisis. In 2010, Cote d’Ivoire’s imports from 
WAEMU constituted 0.85 per cent of its total imports. In 2014 Cote d’Ivoire’s imports increased 
to 1.28 per cent. The lower contributions to Cote d’Ivoire’s import basket was as a result of 
economic disturbances caused by the Ivorian conflict. This is a worrying result, considering the 
potential the WAEMU region offers. Goretti and Weisfeld (2008) found that trade in WAEMU 
can be enhanced through less cumbersome procedures and even application of the rules. 
3.8 Composition of Cote d’Ivoire’s Trade 
This section examines what constitutes Cote d’Ivoire’s imports and exports. The purpose of this 
section is to review whether Cote d’Ivoire’s exports and imports are made up of primary or 
manufactured commodities. 
3.8.1 Composition of Cote d’Ivoire’s Exports 
 
Cote d’Ivoire’s exports over the years have been dominated by primary products. Table 3.14 
shows that in 2014, export of Cocoa, and mineral products alone constituted 55.4 per cent of its 
total exports.  
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Table 3. 14: Composition of Exports by SITC Section 
 
Composition (%) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Cocoa and cocoa preparation 36.89 38.18 31.19 25.62 35.38 
Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products 23.3 24.55 29.35 23.97 20 
Edible fruits, nuts 4.74 4.09 4.84 14.05 7.69 
Pearls, precious stones, metals 1.78 5.21 5.88 6.31 5.4 
Rubber and articles thereof 6.65 10 7.42 6.31 4.7 
Ships, boats 7.05 0.001 0.05 14.05 4.48 
Cotton 1.39 1.5 22.95 2.5 2.75 
Vehicles other than railway, tramway 0.48 0.53 0.32 2.06 2.25 
Animal, vegetable fats and oils 1.81 2.8 2.78 1.76 1.82 
Wood and articles of Wood 2.29 1.86 1.9 1.73 1.72 
Commodities and transactions not classified 
elsewhere 
13.62 11.29 13.93 1.67 13.76 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: UNCTAD Data Bases (2015) 
This outcome is in line with the observations from the African Bank Development Group (2013), 
whose report noted that Cote d’Ivoire’s agricultural sector contributed to 30 per cent of the 
country’s gross domestic product. The export diversification in Cote d’Ivoire appears to be a 
problem.  
Essoh (2014), also came up with the same results where he noted that the cocoa industry alone 
represented 40 per cent of the country’s total export. Cote d’Ivoire relies greatly onto cocoa 
production, hence any impact on the market affects all the other economic sectors. The Ivorian 
economy have always been highly concentrated, with only a few commodities such as Cocoa and 
Coffee generating the bulk of the export revenues. 
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This situation of exports being biased towards primary products raises serious concerns about the 
country’s ability to benefit from trade liberalisation, considering that the export of raw materials 
brings in low earnings. 
3.8.2 Composition of Cote d’Ivoire’s Imports 
In contrast to the composition of exports, Cote d’Ivoire’s imports are made up of finished 
products. Taking 2014 as a benchmark, Cote d’Ivoire’s imports were dominated by mineral 
fuels, nuclear reactors and machinery, vehicles, and ships which constituted 46 per cent of the 
total imports (see Table 3.15). 
Table 3. 15: Composition of Imports by SITC Section 
 
Composition (%) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Minerals fuels, oils, distillation products 24.36 28.36 30.61 25.6 25.89 
Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery 7.86 6.47 7.62 6.51 8.68 
vehicles other than railway, tramway 5.59 4.82 5.23 4.52 5.73 
ships, boats 10.84 0.03 4.1 21.6 5.68 
Cereals 7.87 11.29 9.31 5.5 5.62 
Electrical, electronic equipment 5.39 4.43 4.59 4.11 4.51 
Plastic and articles thereof 3.52 4.16 3.32 3.05 3.77 
Fish, crustaceans, aquatic invertebrates 3.62 4.92 3.40 2.9 3.49 
Pharmaceutical products 3.03 3.97 2.98 2.17 3.46 
Articles of iron or steel 2.14 2.01 1.97 1.73 3.11 
Commodities and transactions not classified 
elsewhere 
25.79 29.54 26.88 22.3 30.04 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: UNCTAD Databases (2015) 
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3.9 Summary 
Cote d’Ivoire’s trade performance, trends and developments with its trading partners have been 
reviewed in this chapter. Of specific interest, Cote d’Ivoire’s exports and imports dynamics with 
WAEMU, ECOWAS, WTO and EU were discussed. The purpose of this discussion was to 
explore whether Cote d’Ivoire has benefited from its trade agreements.  
Overall, Cote d’Ivoire’s foreign trade performance with its trading partners has not lived up to its 
expectations. The results show that Cote d’Ivoire’s trade with ECOWAS and the WAEMU 
members has been unstable and low especially for the latter. The country failed to take advantage 
of the market access created by liberalisation. This is supported by Egoume and Nayo (2011) 
who found that in the presence of instability in Cote d’Ivoire, lost trade in Cote d’Ivoire is 
estimated at around 40 per cent of its potential trade within the WAEMU. They further noted that 
Cote d’Ivoire’s exports to WAEMU declined from 55 per cent to 50 per cent due to the 
instability Cote d’Ivoire incurred during the period 2000 and 2007, respectively. WAEMU's 
successes and failures will have a big impact on the West African integration process because all 
eight countries also belong to the ECOWAS. 
Cote d’Ivoire’s trade with ROW has also been unstable. One explanation of this instability could 
be attributed to the fluctuation in trade with countries like China and the United States which are 
important partners as far as the ROW group is concerned. Cote d’Ivoire’s trade with the EU 
however, has enjoyed a relatively stable growth pattern. One possible explanation could be the 
fact that Cocoa’s exports which is Cote d’Ivoire’s main crop exports to the EU has not been 
affected by the political turmoil the country faced. 
Cote d’Ivoire’s major trading partners include Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa, Netherlands, 
France, China, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, the United States of America, and 
India. It worth noting that Nigeria and South Africa were outstandingly Cote d’Ivoire’s major 
import partner, being the top 10 import source for Cote d’Ivoire in 2014. In the trading blocs, EU 
is Cote d’Ivoire’s major trading partner, followed by the ROW, ECOWAS and WAEMU. 
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The next chapter will discuss both the theoretical literature and the empirical literature on trade 
liberalisation. The theoretical literature this study explores will include trade creation, trade 
diversion, the economies of scale argument, the static and dynamic effects of a customs union, 
the revenue and welfare effects of a customs union, and other policy effects of trade integration. 
The empirical literature explores two approaches in the trade literature, whereby the impacts of 
regional trade agreements (RTA) are assessed. One is the ex post approach that assesses the 
impact of RTAs by using a simple investigation of intra-regional trade pattern following the 
formation of RTA. The other is the ex ante approach that is undertaken at an earlier date before 
the formation of RTA.  
In the following chapter, the researcher provides a general review of some existing findings that 
draw heavily on the studies of past researchers.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
4.1  Introduction 
This section discusses both the theoretical literature on trade policy and the empirical literature 
on trade liberalisation. The theoretical literature that this study explores includes trade creation, 
trade diversion, as well as the economies-of-scale argument, the static and dynamic effects of a 
customs union, the economic integration theory, the revenue and welfare effect of a custom 
union, and any other policy effects of trade integration. The empirical literature explores two 
approaches in the trade literature whereby the impacts of regional-trade agreements (RTA) are 
assessed.  
One is the ex post approach that assesses the impact of RTAs by using a simple investigation of 
the intra-regional trade pattern following the formation of RTA. The other is the ex ante 
approach that was implemented at an earlier date – before the formation of RTAs. A review of 
some of the existing findings that draw heavily on the studies of past researchers is provided. 
The main focus of the literature review discussed in this chapter is to provide a framework for 
the objectives to be addressed in this study.  
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 outlines the theoretical literature. Subsection 
4.2.1 examines trade creation. Subsection 4.2.2 discusses the trade-diversion effects of trade 
liberalisation, which is one of the objectives of this study. Subsection 4.2.3 discusses the static 
and dynamic benefits of a customs union. Subsection 4.2.4 examines the revenue and welfare 
effects of a customs union. Subsection 4.2.5 discusses the economies-of-scale argument. Section 
4.3 examines the empirical literature. Section 4.4 summarises Chapter Four. 
 THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALISATION ON COTE D’IVOIRE 
 
119 
 
4.2 The Theoretical Literature 
The theoretical literature aimed at adressing the research objective is examined in this section. 
This literature includes trade creation, trade diversion, the static and dynamic benefits of a 
customs union, the revenue and welfare effects of a customs union, the economies-of-scale 
arguments, as well as the other policy effects of trade liberalisation. 
 4.2.1 Trade Creation   
The term trade creation was first introduced by Viner (1950), who says that trade creation occurs 
when more efficient or lower-cost producers in any country in a RTA displace the less efficient 
or higher-cost producers in the same RTA; and consumers, therefore, benefit from the lower 
prices. 
In standard analysis, when countries decide to embark on a free trade agreement, trade creation 
occurs when the removal of tariffs changes the prices of imported goods, such that less efficient 
domestic production is replaced by imports from members of the free trade area whose products 
are now cheaper with the tariff’s removal. Milner et al (2005) explain, “Trade creation usually 
describes the displacement of less efficient home production by globally efficient extra-regional 
production.”   
 
A Study by Gauto (2012) illustrates the fact that as many producers struggle to get the greatest 
benefit associated to the regional market, only the most efficient will succeed through providing 
consumers welfare benefits, cheaper commodities or imports. This is translated by the cheap 
imports in Cote d’Ivoire from ECOWAS countries, such as Ghana, Nigeria, among others. 
 
Corcos, del Gatto, Mion, and Ottaviano (2012) find that trade liberalisation results in richer 
availability of products varieties, tougher competition and weaker market power of firms. This 
also leads to better exploitation of economies of scale. 
With the introduction of an FTA, producers within the region would have additional market 
access, which they would now penetrate, if they are more efficient than the producers of the host 
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country. FTAs and customs unions that are trade-creating enhance efficiency, and are therefore, 
beneficial to the member countries and the world (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996; Urata and 
Okabe, 2010). 
Trade creation results in welfare gains if higher-cost domestic production is replaced by cheaper 
imports from one/or all of the countries in the RTA. A regional trade agreement like ECOWAS 
FTA, which comes in the form of an FTA would result in trade creation by lowering the prices of 
imports from the members of the FTA, for example, Burkina Faso into another FTA member like 
Cote d’Ivoire, thereby displacing production in the latter country (Cote d’Ivoire in this case). 
This situation leads to deindustrialisation in Cote d’Ivoire. 
In the case of a customs union, trade creation enhances efficiency; it results in the fall in 
domestic prices; and it unambiguously increases welfare in the importing country (Bhagwati and 
Panagariya, 1996; and Winters, 2003). Although RTA can create trade creation, in some cases it 
can also lead to trade diversion. 
4.2.2  Trade Diversion 
Trade diversion, on the other hand, implies that more efficient suppliers from outside the RTA 
with a customs union are displaced by less efficient producers within the RTA (Viner, 2014).  
Trade diversion occurs after the formation of a free trade area the elimination of tariffs leads to a 
substitution of goods from countries that are not part of the free trade area but are more efficient 
than the goods from countries that form the free trade area. Milner, et al. (2005) state, “Trade 
diversion usually relates to diverting trade from more efficient extra-regional suppliers to less 
efficient intra- regional suppliers.” 
Schiff and Winters (2003) argued that RTAs are trade diverting, if preferential liberalisation by a 
member country leads it to replace the lower-cost supply from non-member countries by the 
higher-cost supply by the partner country. The implementation of regional trade agreement, such 
as an FTA, gives preferential advantages to those countries that are members of the FTA. 
Countries outside the FTA would be charged tariffs at MFN rates by individual countries. These 
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MFN rates would be so high that foreign imports would become expensive in the local markets – 
yet, they could have been cheaper had they been afforded the same preferential treatments.  
A recent study by Hannan (2016) referred to trade diversion by looking at what happen to a 
country’s top exporter or top importer that is outside the trade agreement. He shows that the 
magnitude of trade diversion is small in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
Gauto (2012) noted that the adoption of a common external tariff that fails to divert trade is in 
most cases witnessed in trade between RTA and industrialised nations, such as China. This is 
explained by the fact that industrialised nations are involved in mass production. This gives them 
the advantages of an economy of scale despite the levying of a common external tariff on their 
cost of production. This this render CET ineffective by not being able to divert trade.  
However, some research studies do not support the possibility of trade diversion as a result of a 
customs union (Kemp and Wan, 1976; Vizjak, 2001; Dukec et al, 2003). In some cases, trade 
diversion is averted in a customs union because the CET would be too ineffective to switch trade 
from non-member countries to RTA members, as was observed by Meade (1955); Lewis et al. 
(1999); Amponsah (2002) and Cernat (2003).  
This is particularly so if imports are coming from industrialised countries, such as China with 
massive specialisation and economies of scale, which render the CET useless. In addition, RTA 
members have limited complementarities in their trade. Hence, this situation provides less scope 
for the displacement of imports from third countries with regional production (Amponsah, 2002).  
From this foregoing argument, it becomes clear that a trade diversion nexus trade liberalisation, 
which comes into effect through a customs union, is not automatic. It varies from case to case. 
Hence, this study fills the gap in the literature on whether trade agreements signed by Cote 
d’Ivoire are trade diverting or not. Economic integration, outside trade creation and trade 
diversion, also brings about static and dynamic gains. 
 THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALISATION ON COTE D’IVOIRE 
 
122 
 
4.2.3 Static and Dynamic Benefits of Economic Integration 
In terms of static and dynamic benefit, a free trade agreement (FTA) leaves future external trade 
policy to the discretion of each member government, thus providing a continual incentive for 
interest groups to try to influence the government (Mclaren, 2004).  
In theory, the formation of an RTA, such as a customs union, is associated with some static 
welfare effects and dynamic benefits. One of the benefits is the administration savings from the 
elimination of customs officers, and border patrols for trade among member States (Salvatore, 
2007).  
The removal of economic barriers among member states would result in a better division of 
labour, and consequently in an increase in production and prosperity. The elimination of trade 
barriers among member States is also associated with increased competition, which stimulates 
development through efficiency and the utilisation of new technology.  
New technology gives scope for the diversification of production and the export basket, thereby 
improving the foreign-exchange earnings of participating countries (UNCTAD, 2008). 
Shams (2003) looked at a case study of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
and concluded that the ultimate purpose of regional integration in that region is the economic 
development of its members as its name reveals, rather than forming different degrees of PTAs. 
Member countries of ECOWAS since its origins in the 1975s have been focusing their efforts on 
implementing certain development projects such as alleviating poverty, eradicating Malaria, 
promoting health and education, and combating HIV/AIDS, rather than reducing tariffs and 
promoting intra-regional trade. 
The withdrawal of tariff and non-tariff barriers among the member states may lead to increased 
competition among different firms, from different countries, producing similar goods in the same 
regional trade arrangement (UNCTAD, 2014). This would push production firms from all the 
involved member states to fully utilise new technology in product diversification.  
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According to the World Bank (2014), regional integration has managed to aid developing 
countries and attract bigger volumes of foreign direct investment more than they would have 
been able to attract if they operated independently. 
The size of most WAEMU countries is under 25 million people with national GDPs of less than 
US$ 12 billion. Such economies are, however, too small to attract any meaningful investment.  
The question of whether or not trade liberalisation has resulted in the import of new technology 
and led to the diversification of exports will be empirically investigated in this study. 
4.2.4 Revenue Effects  
In theory, there are opposing forces that generate ambiguity as to how tariff reduction affects 
revenue. Firstly, the fall in import duty results in a decrease in tariff revenue. Secondly, as the 
price of goods declines – due to a fall in tariffs – there is a tendency for imports to increase, 
thereby raising revenue.  
Mugano (2014); Brenton et al. (2009); Hamilton (2009); Makochekanwa (2012) and Wagle 
(2011) argued that the dismantling of tariffs by developing countries present serious revenue 
challenges. This is exacerbated by the fact that most developing countries have a fragile 
domestic tax base – worsened by the fact that other tax policy instruments, such as VAT, excise 
duties and income tax, are weak (Brenton et al., 2009; Hamilton, 2009; Makochekanwa, 2012 
and Wagle, 2011). 
Nevertheless, Wagle (2011) argued that, although trade liberalisation results in a loss of 
government revenue, it pays for itself over time, as countries strengthen their domestic revenue 
sources. Hamilton (2009) and Brenton et al. (2009) argue that the dismantling of tariffs results in 
a reduction in the prices of products, thereby increasing their demand. In this way, government 
revenue increases, due to contributions made by domestic revenue sources, such as VAT and 
excise duties. 
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4.2.5 The Economies-of-Scale Argument 
The ultimate challenge of developing countries is market access. Indeed, it is now well 
established that countries with better access to world markets have higher per capita income  
than countries with limited access (Coulibaly, 2009).  
A study by Brenton et al. (2009) revealed that the regional trade arrangements are mostly aimed 
to bring about economic gains, although the reduction of losses due to regional integration is 
sometimes inevitable. This forces production firms to explore the cheapest production means that 
lead to the best quality to compete against their regional competitors. This tends to result in 
improved consumer welfare. 
 
In addition, Kwok (2013) found that the gains from external scale economies outweigh those 
from comparative advantage as the number of goods increases. To him small countries gain more 
than large countries from trade because they are more specialised in production than large 
countries, despite the presence of external scale economies. This is again another important 
reason for a small economy like Cote d’Ivoire to embark on RTAs. 
4.2.6 Other Policy Effects of Trade Integration 
Jong and Ju (2009) investigates the effect of trade integration on military conflict. They found 
that increasing trade integration and openness significantly promote peace. In their analysis, the 
peace promotion effect of bilateral trade integration is significantly higher for contiguous 
countries that are likely to experience more conflicts. Regional integration creates a much larger 
political community that might lessen the scope for adverse discretionary actions by individual 
governments (Amponsah, 2002).   
In other words, whereas individually member nations may do well in embarking on policy 
reforms, group actions could influence all the members to abide by a common reform agenda. 
Intra-African trade expansion could also result in faster growth and income convergence within 
the community. Regional market integration would lead to the emergence of regional growth 
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poles capable of generating sufficient positive externalities to the less developed member States 
of the FTA (Economic Commission for Africa, 2012). As production structures are diversified 
away from primary products, the long-term dependence of African countries on the developed 
market economies for manufactures is expected to weaken. 
De Melo and Tsikata (2015) also explored the challenges and prospect of regional integration in 
Africa. Their study confirmed that the levels of interaction, responsiveness and consumer welfare 
have risen, allowing citizens to freely move across the borders of partner states. 
RTAs are also seen as a catalyst for political stability within the region. According to Mansfield 
(1993), regional trade integration is viewed as an instrument for fostering diplomacy and 
regional stability. It is, therefore, expected that regional trade arrangements could help reduce 
tensions and the possibility of war among potentially antagonistic nations. However, it is 
important to mention that free trade is not a guarantee for peace but it can contribute to socio-
cultural harmony and interstate cohesion (Kayizzi‐Mugerwa, Anyanwu, and  Conceição, 2014). 
4.3 Empirical Evidence  
There are two approaches in the trade literature whereby the impacts of trade agreements can be 
assessed. One is the ex post route that assesses the impacts of RTAs, by investigating the intra-
regional trade following the formation of the RTA. The other is the ex ante approach, which 
entails an investigation of the impact of intra-regional trade at an earlier date before the 
formation of the RTA.  
4.3.1 Evidence from Ex Post Studies 
Crawfurd, Mitchell, and Anderson (2017) studied the best trade policy to make Britain a global 
leader for trade and development after the Brexit. Their paper revealed that eliminating trade 
barriers, improving preferential access for the very poorest countries, cutting the red tape at the 
boarder and enhancing the aid for trade will benefit the United Kingdom consumers and 
businesses. 
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The United States International Trade Commission (2016) looked at the likely impact of the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement on the United States.  The findings suggest that the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) has a positive impact on the United States though it is a small 
percentage of the overall size of the economy. The United States exports and imports will be 
US$27.2 billion (1 percent) and US$48.9 billion (1.1 percent) higher, respectively. 
The commission estimates that the TPP will harmonize regulations, increase certainty and 
decrease trade costs for firms that trade and invest in the TPP regions. 
 
A study by Mugano (2015) conducted a quantitative assessment of the potential impact on 
revenue, trade and welfare on Zimbabwe, using the partial equilibrium model on bilateral free-
trade agreements. This study noted that trade liberalisation will be beneficial for Zimbabwe in 
terms of exports worth US$122.433 million and consumer welfare worth US$16.689 million. 
However, it was also noted that the country would lose revenue amounting to US$89 million 
whereas imports increased owing to the trade creation effects of US$104.573 million.  
Mugano (2015) noted that the possible impact of trade liberalisation from this study in 
sensitising Zimbabwe on the implementation of BFTA’s, suggesting that the government should 
increase revenue through alternative sources like expanding tax revenues through excise duty; 
value added taxes and expanding tax to small scale informal sectors. 
Another study by the Asian Development Bank Institute (2011) looked at the effects of bilateral 
trade agreements between Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Thailand, including the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) free-trade agreement with Thailand on the 
consumer-welfare effects. The findings from the WITS-SMART simulations revealed that, 
Thailand was the bigger beneficiary, rather than Japan, from the Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA). This is evident by the fact that its welfare is expected to rise by 
approximately US$1.2 billion with the zero-tariff trade regime. 
Choudhry, kalumnal and Varma (2013) evaluated the impact of Sri Lanka’s FTA using a sector 
specific analysis of the textile and clothing sector. Sri Lanka provided reduction in tariffs -35% 
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in 2003, 70% in 2006 and 100% in 2008. The result of the SMART analysis revealed that Indian 
exports of textile to Sri Lanka increased from US$121 million to US$395 million during the 
period 1999 to 2009. Trade creation effects dominate trade diversion effects. For example, when 
articles of apparel and clothing accessories were traded, trade creation was around US$ 555 
thousand and trade diversion was around US$ 248 thousand. 
Mugano (2013) conducted a study on the impact of a South African Development Community 
(SADC) Customs Union on Zimbabwe. The WITS-SMART Model was used for the study. The 
findings reported trade expansion valued at US$ 39 million and consumer welfare at US$ 7 
million. On trade Zimbabwe’s export were expected to fall by 0.94 per cent while imports were 
expected to surge by 2.05 per cent. However, the country lost revenue amounting to US$ 42 
million. 
On the trade front, Karingi, Lang, Oulamane, Perez, Sadni-Jallab and Hammouda (2005) showed 
that the customs union leads to significant changes in the total volume of trade. However, the 
terms of trade effects of the customs union establishment indicated that only Zimbabwe loses; 
while all the other four countries experience an improvement in the short run. On the total effects 
on welfare of the implementation of the customs union, the results indicated that all countries 
would gain, with Zimbabwe having a welfare gain equivalent to US$10.4 million. The authors, 
therefore, recommended that COMESA should move beyond the FTA to a customs union.  
Cernat (2003) used the gravity model to quantify the impact of nine regional trading 
arrangements on the trade flows among participants, and with third countries for the period 1994 
to 1998. COMESA is among the RIAs that were considered by Cernat, and this was after the 
establishment of the COMESA FTA. The results show significant trade creation effects – with 
no evidence of trade diversion and moderate trade expansion effects for all the RIAs. For 
COMESA, trade between members more than doubled, as a result of the trade-creation effect. 
Trade expansion was also quite significant with imports from third countries increasing by an 
average of 30 per cent.  
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Korinek and Melatos (2009) carried out an in-depth assessment of the trade effects of three 
regional trade agreements – the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), COMESA and the 
Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) – using a gravity model. The results show that 
the creation of AFTA, COMESA and MERCOSUR have increased trade in agricultural products 
between the member countries. However, there is no sign of trade diversion with respect to 
imports from outside the region (Korinek and Melatos, 2009). The agreements are, consequently, 
not trade-creating.  
Korinek and Melatos (2009) noted high intra-regional trade in AFTA and MERCOSUR and low 
intra-COMESA trade. MERCOSUR and AFTA have good infrastructures, which could assist 
trade facilitation, and thereby promote trade and a strong supply base, with high 
complementarities in the products traded (Korinek and Melatos, 2009). Korinek and Melatos 
(2009) argued that low intra-regional trade in COMESA is caused by a weak supply and a lack 
of complementarities in product traded, lack of basic infrastructures, such as information and 
communication technologies, and poor roads with a lack of connectivity in most cases. 
The Tariff Reform Impact Simulation Tool (TRIST) was used by the World bank to investigate 
the impact of various trade agreements. These studies were commissioned in Bolivia, Burundi, 
Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Seychelles, Tanzania and 
Zambia by the World Bank in 2009. The research was undertaken by Hamilton in 2009. 
Hamilton (2009) investigated the impact of a COMESA FTA on Ethiopia. The results suggest 
that an elimination of all tariffs on goods from COMESA FTA countries would result in a fall in 
tariff revenue by 4.8 per cent, as well as a reduction in total revenue by approximately 2.4 per 
cent. According to Hamilton (2009), imports are not projected to be heavily impacted (increase 
of 0.2 per cent).  
With regards to the EU free trade agreement, the study looks at six ex-post assessment of the EU 
free trade agreement with: South Africa, Mexico, Morocco, Tunisia, Chile and India. 
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Studies conducted by Assarson, (2005) on the impact of South Africa and the EU FTA support 
the view that EU-SA free trade agreement stimulated both export and imports. The analysis 
conducted compared the trade statistics between the years 1999 and 2004 which suggested that 
South Africa’s exports and imports to the European Union have increased by 75 percent and 93 
percent, respectively. This increase also suggests that trade creation has taken place.  
The Free Trade Agreement between Mexico and the 15 member countries of the European Union 
officially entered into force on July 1, 2000. Slootmaekers (2004) in his studies use a gravity 
model for import and export flows to quantify the trade effects of the EU-Mexico FTA. The 
results show that the EU-Mexico FTA had a positive trade creation effect for imports. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence for trade diversion; the FTA also generated a positive effect on 
imports with non-members.  
Elebehri and Hertel (2004) have compared the potential impacts on Morocco’s welfare, 
production and trade, from implementing the Morocco-EU FTA. The analysis pays special 
attention to several key structural features of the Moroccan economy. The results show that the 
FTA with the EU generates a welfare loss for Morocco as most of the manufacturing sectors 
contract under the FTA and only few export-oriented sectors, such as clothing, expand 
production. Hence it appears that the main effect of FTA with the EU is to lock the Moroccan 
manufacturing sector even more firmly into its current pattern of specialization. 
Boughzala (2010) studied the impact of the European Union free trade agreement with Tunisia. 
His study revealed that the FTA has on the whole boosted Tunisia’s economy and generated 
significant positive dynamics effects even though in reality trade liberalisation is far from being 
complete. 
Chile has put in place a free trade agreement with the EU which is its major trading partner.  
Chumacero et al (2004) studied the economic effect on the Chilean economy.  The simulation 
results for key sectors and aggregate variables reveal that aggregate consumption and welfare in 
the Chilean economy rose by approximately 1 per cent. Imports and exports would grow by 2.7 
per cent and 2 per cent, respectively and the real exchange rate would depreciate by 0.2 per cent. 
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A permanent increase in 1 per cent of aggregate private consumption and GDP are very 
significant benefits when put on the balance with the costs incurred by Chile during a decade of 
trade negotiations with the United States and the European Union. 
The European Union (EU) and India are currently negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement 
(FTA) and investment framework. The study of Khorana and Perdikis (2010) identified 
prospects of and the challenges to the proposed EU-India FTA; The findings suggest that to 
maximize the potential benefits of this FTA, trade barriers (tariff and non-tariff) in goods and 
services sectors should be addressed. India perceives that the EU and India are not equal partners 
and therefore India is demanding an asymmetrical approach. If no clear agreement emerges in 
these areas, it is apparent that the FTA could result in shallow integration which is likely to 
generate losses through trade diversion. 
Studies carried in West Africa have shown that regional integration has failed to stimulate intra-
regional trade. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), founded in 1975, 
reveals that the amount of inter-member trade is still less than 10 per cent of the total exports.  
Karrem (2015) examined the extent to which households have been affected by the Common 
External Tariff of the ECOWAS. The results show that the ECOWAS CET has reduced domestic 
prices of agricultural goods and also indicate that so far the CET has had a net positive effect on 
households in Nigeria, largely due to the gains from expenditure which outweighed the losses in 
the households’ purchasing power due to lower income from the sales of agricultural products. 
Thus, richer households have experienced lower welfare gains than poorer households. 
A study of the World Bank (2015) looked the impact of ECOWAS CET on Ghana. The study 
found that by increasing average tariffs on all non ECOWAS importers, the CET leads to a 
significant increase in protection and tariff revenues, as well as lower imports. The 
manufacturing firms would be split 50/50 in terms of winners and losers, and winners gain more 
than losers lose in magnitude of effect. Very few firms become unprofitable as a result and 
exporters to ECOWAS could gain, particularly if the CET encourages improvements in nontariff 
barriers to regional trade. 
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Busse, Borrmann, and Groβmann (2004) reviewed the impact of the ACP-EU Economic 
Partnership Agreement on ECOWAS countries. With regards to ECOWAS, the results revealed 
that trade creation will be higher in Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal and Ghana with values of 
US$452 million, US$90 million, US$93 million and US$60 million, respectively. Trade creation 
also exceeds trade diversion in all scenarios in all West African countries.  
Busse et al (2004) suggested that countries like Cote d’Ivoire who will benefit from the ACP-EU 
agreement should pay attention to vehicles, fish and petroleum oil since these are the most 
vulnerable products that are likely to be affected by the trade negotiation. 
Hamilton (2009) estimated Madagascar’s complete tariff liberalisation under the SADC FTA, by 
effectively setting all tariffs on imports from SADC countries to zero, while tariffs on imports 
from other countries remain unchanged. TRIST projects that tariff revenue would fall by more 
than 8 per cent; while imports would marginally increase by 0.2 per cent. Overall, Madagascar 
trade revenue is estimated to fall by 2.2 per cent (Hamilton, 2009). 
In Mozambique, Hamilton (2009) examined the impact of a complete tariff liberalisation on 
imports from SACU members by using the TRIST model. The model projected a short-term fall 
in tariff revenue by 38.3 per cent, as well as a reduction in total revenue by 13.5 per cent. 
Imports are not projected to be heavily impacted (increase of 1.0 per cent) (Hamilton, 2009). Still 
on Mozambique, Hamilton (2009) evaluated the impact that SADC Trade Protocol provides for 
preferential market access for products from other SADC member States on Mozambique. 
Hamilton (2009) investigated the impact of complete tariff liberalisation under the SADC 
Protocol; while the tariffs on imports from other trading partners remain unchanged.  
The findings showed that short-term, tariff revenue may decrease by approximately 39 per cent 
resulting in an overall reduction in trade revenue by 13.7 per cent; while imports were expected 
to increase slightly by 1.1 per cent (Hamilton, 2009). 
Hamilton (2009) also used the TRIST model to estimate the impact of SADC FTA on Tanzania. 
The results of the model suggest a short-term fall in tariff revenue by 8.8 per cent, as well as a 
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reduction in total revenue by approximately 2 per cent. Imports were not expected to be heavily 
impacted (increase of 0.2 per cent) (Hamilton, 2009). 
Hamilton (2009) considered the short-term impact of an FTA with SADC countries on the 
Seychelles. In the investigation, a scenario where all the tariffs on SADC imports are liberalised; 
while the tariffs on imports from other trading partners remain unchanged. The results indicate a 
19.4 per cent fall in tariff revenue, and an increase of 0.2 per cent in imports.  
Hamilton (2009) used the TRIST model to hypothesise complete tariff liberalisation on imports 
from EAC member states on Burundi. According to Hamilton (2009), the short-term impact of 
this reform is projected to involve revenue losses of 8.1 per cent (tariff revenue) and 3.4 per cent 
(total revenue). Hamilton (2009) noted that imports were expected to increase marginally by 0.5 
per cent.  
Hamilton (2009) estimated the impact of SADC FTA on Malawi, using the TRIST model. The 
study hypothesises complete tariff liberalisation with all SADC members; while tariffs on 
imports from other trading partners remain unchanged. The results show that tariff revenue 
would be predicted to fall by approximately 55 per cent; and the total trade revenue loss is 
projected to be 17.5 per cent (Hamilton, 2009). The model also suggests that imports would 
slightly increase by 1.3 per cent.  
Zepeda, Wise, and Gallagher (2009), evaluated the impact of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) on Mexico. The study shows that the FTA not only led to increased trade, 
but also to improvements in the macroeconomic, stability such as an increase in foreign 
investment, productivity and a stable macroeconomic climate for business. Zepeda et al (2009) 
noted that Mexico’s exports increased by 311 per cent in real terms between 1993 and 2007; and 
FDI more than tripled between 1992 and 2006 fuelled by investment liberalisation under 
NAFTA; the majority (58 per cent) came from the United States.  
With regard to macroeconomic stability, Mexico tightened its fiscal and monetary policies. On 
their own terms, these measures were a success. Inflation was brought below 5 per cent, from 
over 80 per cent in the 1980s. Since NAFTA, federal budget deficits have been low, about 1 per 
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cent of GDP (at least until the current economic crisis when deficits initially increased to 
stimulate the economy). This has been achieved; while Mexico dramatically reduced its 
international debt to a more sustainable level. There were significant gains in productivity, as 
Mexico’s domestic manufacturing sector witnessed a staggering 80 per cent increase in 
efficiency, due to stiff foreign competition (Zepeda et al, 2009).  
Earlier on, Susanto, Rosson and Adcock (2007) looked at the trade creation and trade diversion 
in North American Free Trade Agreement. They found out that US agricultural imports from 
Mexico have been responsive to tariff rate reductions applied to Mexican products. Thus, a one 
percentage point reduction in tariff would increase US agricultural imports from Mexico by 2.4 
per cent in the entire period. The result also shows that during NAFTA, a one percentage point 
decrease in tariff rates would increase US agricultural imports from Mexico by 5.31 per cent in 
the first 6 years of NAFTA. 
Fukao and Okubo (2002) carried out a study in the NAFTA region, and looked at how tariff 
preferences in the NAFTA may affect U.S. imports from Canada and Mexico. They found that 
NAFTA has resulted in trade diversion especially in U.S. imports of textiles and apparel products 
from Mexico. It appears that these imports have come at the expense especially of Asian 
suppliers. 
Krueger (1999) investigated the impact of RTA on NAFTA and found similar results. Krueger’s 
(1999) estimates show that the change in trade among NAFTA countries was not significant. She 
confirmed, however, that NAFTA countries import less from non-NAFTA trading partners. 
Additionally, Krueger observed that those commodities which Mexico traditionally exports to 
the United States grew more rapidly. Krueger also confirmed that Mexican traditional exports 
with the rest of the world also grew rapidly.  
This outcome, furthermore, indicates that the expansion of trade was trade-creating, and not 
trade-diverting.  
ECLAC (2004) estimated the fiscal implications of the free trade agreement signed between the 
United States of America and the five Central American countries of Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
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Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. The study reveals that the adverse impact of tariff 
elimination on fiscal revenue is relatively small in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, whereas the 
greatest impact was in Honduras, where it accounted for an almost five per cent loss of tax 
revenue in just the first year of the agreement.  
Negasi (2009) estimated the trade effect of regional economic integration in Africa. He looked at 
the trade creation and trade diversion effect of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) using disaggregated data from 2000 to 2007. The results show that the intra-SADC 
trade is growing in fuel and minerals, and heavy manufacturing sectors while it displays a 
declining trend in agricultural and light manufacturing sectors. This implies that SADC has 
displaced trade with the rest of the world in both fuel and minerals, and heavy manufacturing 
sectors. Thus, SADC has served to increase trade significantly among its members rather than 
with the rest of the world. 
Lewis, Robinson and Thierfelder (2001) used the CGE model to analyse the impact of the EU 
FTA on countries, sectors, and factors on seven Southern African countries (South Africa, 
Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). The results showed that 
the EU FTA is trade-creating. Trade creation has, however, posed a serious threat to SADC 
industries, which are still weak. From this analysis, Lewis, Robinson and Thierfelder (2001) 
observed that the unilateral trade agreement envisaged under the Lomé Agreement is more 
beneficial, in terms of real GDP and real absorption, for SADC countries than a SADC FTA.  
Milton and Siddique (2014) examined the impact of the Thailand-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement (TAFTA) on bilateral merchandise trade flows between Australia and Thailand. The 
results indicate that the Thailand-Australia Free Trade Agreement has had modest trade creation 
effects, with little evidence to suggest that this is at the expense of trade diversion. The findings 
of the study have obvious policy implications. 
The Asian Development Bank Institute (2011) also estimated the impact of bilateral agreements 
between Thailand, Australia, Japan and New Zealand, as well as the ASEAN FTA with Thailand 
on welfare. The simulation results from the two studies show that among the bilateral FTAs, 
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Thailand gains most from the Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), as its 
welfare is anticipated to increase by about US$1.2 billion, if the tariff-elimination process is 
completed. Among the alternative bilateral FTA scenarios, the Thailand-New Zealand 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) brings the least benefit to Thailand, 
increasing Thailand’s welfare by only US$11.3 million.  
However, according to the Asian Development Bank Institute (2011), Thailand stands to gain 
more from a regional bilateral free trade agreement (Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN)) especially if such region-wide agreements are comprehensive and foster services and 
trade, as well as reducing tariffs. The simulations show that an ASEAN plus three other Asian 
countries – Japan, the Republic of Korea, and China – generate, the largest welfare gains for 
Thailand of US$26.7 billion in economic welfare by 2017; while the inclusion of just South 
Korea to the ASEAN gives only welfare gains of US$2.6 billion. 
Still in Asia, Fukunaga and Isono (2013) have investigated the implications of multiple 
memberships on Asian countries on trade. In this regard, Fukunaga and Isono (2013) took stock 
of ASEAN’s own FTA, and five existing FTAs, to identify any possible benefits and challenges. 
The coexistence of five FTAs with different rules of origin (ROOs) creates a potential “noodle-
bowl” situation, which impedes the effective use of the FTAs (Fukunaga and Isono, 2013).  
Lee (2013) has used the CGE model to estimate the impact of the FTA between the US and 
South Korea (KORUS FTA) on South Korea. The results show that South Korea will witness an 
economic growth of 6 per cent; while the growth of consumption expenditure and welfare seem 
to follow a similar pattern as the growth of GDP (Lee, 2013). 
Lee (2013) found related results on the Korean-China FTA and Korean – EU FTA (KOREU 
FTA). In the case of KOREU FTA, Korea’s GDP would improve 1.28 per cent and 3.57 per cent 
and get a 6 per cent increase in exports, on average. The Korea-China FTA has bigger economic 
effects than KOREU FTA on the Korean economy. The Korean economy would obtain a 2 to 4 
per cent increase in GDP growth, and a 0.64 to 3 per cent increase in welfare growth. 
Furthermore, judging from all economic simulation results between Korea and highly advanced 
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and larger economies in the study, the Korean economy has reaped far more economic benefits 
than have other countries (Lee, 2013).  
Sikdar (2011) estimated the impact of India-Asean Free Trade Agreement. The results of the 
simulations were used to assess the impact of this liberalization, both on the external sector and 
on domestic macroeconomic variables in India and ASEAN. The simulation results reveal that 
post-FTA, India’s exports to ASEAN increase substantially, with the largest accesses gained in 
Thailand, Cambodia, Viet Nam, Malaysia, the Philippines and the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic. India experiences a welfare loss due to both allocative inefficiency and negative terms 
of trade effect but in the ASEAN region, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand show positive 
welfare gains with the largest gain accruing to Singapore (Sikdar, 2011). 
Francois and Pindyuk (2013) examined the economic impact on Austria of three possible new 
EU free-trade agreements, that is, an EU-US agreement, an EU-Canada agreement, and an 
EU/Armenia/Georgia/Moldova agreement. The results show that of the three agreements, a 
potential agreement with the USA is by far the most important (Francois and Pindyuk, 2013). 
This follows from the size of the US economy. The USA accounts for roughly one-quarter of 
extra-EU Austrian exports. Overall, the combined impact of the FTAs studied is positive 
(Francois and Pindyuk, 2013).  
Most of the impact follows from investment response. Productivity gains from trade 
liberalisation have led to a combination of increased national income, higher wages, and 
employment, and increased capital stocks for the Austrian economy (Francois and Pindyuk, 
2013). 
According to Laery (2010), AANZFTA would result in significant trade creation in New 
Zealand, thereby improving consumer welfare. In this regard, households are expected to witness 
a consumer surplus of US$50 million annually (Laery, 2010). Laery (2010) noted that although 
trade liberalisation would lead to a loss of tariff revenue in the region of US$26.3 million, this is 
inconsequential, as it represents a paltry share of GDP, and it is even compensated for by the 
welfare gains.  
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Laery (2010) estimated the impact of an ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area 
(AANZFTA) on New Zealand, which came into force in January 2010. AANZFTA was 
estimated to bring an additional US$48.1 billion GDP to the region in the 2000-2020 period. Of 
this, US$25.6 billion would go to ASEAN, US$19.1 to Australia, and US$3.4 billion to New 
Zealand (Laery, 2010).  
Okabe and Urata (2013) examined the impact of trade liberalisation under AFTA on intra-
ASEAN trade. The results show positive and significant trade creation effects from the tariff 
elimination for a wide range of products. Thus, the Asean FTA has been successful in promoting 
intra-AFTA trade. 
Veeramani and Saini (2010) carried out an assessment of the impact of recently signed ASEAN-
India FTA (AIFTA) for selected plantation commodities (coffee, tea and pepper) in India, using 
the SMART model and the gravity model. Overall, the results suggest that the AIFTA would 
cause a significant increase in India’s imports of plantation commodities. The increase in imports 
is mostly driven by trade creation rather than by trade diversion (Veeramani and Saini, 2010). 
The analysis shows that the proposed tariff reduction may lead to significant tariff revenue loss 
to the government (Veeramani and Saini, 2010).  
However, the gain in consumer surplus (due to the fall in domestic prices and the consequent 
reduction in dead-weight loss) outweighs the loss in tariff revenue, leading to a net welfare gain. 
By and large, the simulations based on the SMART and gravity models provide similar results on 
the magnitude of the total increase in imports. The surge of new imports may have adverse 
impacts on the livelihood of the Indian farmers engaged in the production of these commodities. 
Farmers would have to realign the structure of their production, according to the changing price 
signals; and hence, it is critical to provide adjustment assistance to the affected farmers 
(Veeramani and Saini, 2010). 
Fontagne et al (2008) carried out an assessment of the impact of the EU-ACP Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) in the six ACP regions. The results show that ACP exports to 
the EU are forecast to be 10% higher with the EPAs than under the GSP/EBA option. In the long 
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run, average ACP countries are forecast to lose 70% of tariff revenues on EU imports and the 
most affected region is ECOWAS. 
Ghani (2011) estimated the impact of trade liberalisation on the economic performance of the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) member countries that have gone through the 
liberalisation process since 1970. The results show that the effects vary from one country to 
another. On average the liberalisation process has improved GDP per capita in the medium term. 
However, the ratio of imports, exports, and trade over GDP did not improve after trade 
liberalisation. 
With regards to the Carribean and Central America, Hornbeck (2012) examined the Dominican 
Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). The findings 
show that U.S. exports will grow, with gains in agriculture and more modest growth in 
manufactured goods. Part of this growth appears to be related to CAFTA-DR and will likely 
continue as the trade agreement is fully implemented over time. For the Central America region, 
differences among countries can be large, with Costa Rica clearly outperforming the group on 
logistics capabilities, while Nicaragua lags (Hornbeck, 2012). This stark difference may reflect 
various issues including level of economic development and political decisions to support trade, 
in general, and CAFTA-DR in particular.  
Boyer and Schuschny (2008) used GTAP CGE model/database to assess the possible effects of 
an FTA between the MERCOSUR and the EU. From the point of view of the MERCOSUR 
countries, the results suggest that the FTA would be beneficial in fostering their exports, 
especially in the case of light manufactures (Boyer and Schuschny, 2008). Imports to 
MERCOSUR from the EU would be increased, particularly in heavy manufacturing sectors. In 
terms of GDP, the results remain positive in the case of all the MERCOSUR countries in all 
simulated scenarios. However, the welfare implications are unevenly distributed in favour of all 
the MERCOSUR countries in the simulated scenarios.  
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4.3.2 Evidence from Ex Ante Studies 
Othieno and Shinyekwa (2011) investigated the impact of EAC customs union on Kenya using 
the WITS/SMART model. Othieno and Shinyekwa (2011) noted that the trade effects are more 
reflected in the first period of a fully-fledged EAC customs union. This is where all tariff lines 
across all products are at zero per cent, except for products that do not meet the Rules of Origin 
criterion. The result seems to suggest that trade created in 2010 would grow by 513.3 per cent, 
that is, to the tune of US$17.3 million, with a diversion effect on a few products including 
cement, chewing gum, soap products, paints and varnishes, iron and steel, woven fabrics of 
cotton, aluminium, and base metal.  
This indicates that these are the only products that have become competitive against imports 
coming from outside the custom union in Uganda’s market (Othieno and Shinyekwa, 2011).  
Othieno and Shinyekwa (2011) observed that a reduction of the tariff by 2 per cent on imports 
from Kenya subsequently led to a loss in tariff revenue. The results further reflect that the 
welfare effect would be more meaningful and significant if the tariff line on all products were 
zero, amounting to US$507,801 worth of consumer surplus. The negative welfare effect was 
expected on Uganda, given its initial application of MFN tariff structure. The MFN tariffs were 
lower than both the transitional tariff and EACCU CET, as noted earlier.  
Bilal, Dalleau and Lui (2012) evaluated the impact of EPAs on selected countries in West Africa 
and Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA). Their results show that eight countries in West Africa 
(Benin, Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau and Togo) would be 
likely to suffer significant losses in tariff revenue – with the loss ranging from a 6 per cent 
reduction in total tax revenues to 43 per cent. In the ESA region, Bilal, Dalleau and Lui (2012) 
noted that the impact on fiscal revenue was “modest”, while seven countries (Zambia, 
Swaziland, Nigeria, Namibia, Lesotho, Botswana and Malawi) have been estimated to expect a 
relatively “low” impact. 
Onogwu and Arene (2013) have recently investigated the likely trade, revenue and welfare 
consequences for Cape Verde of embarking on free-trade economic-partnership agreements 
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(EPAs) with the EU, using the partial equilibrium analysis. Onogwu and Arene (2013) show that 
Cape Verde stands to lose as much as 35 per cent of its total revenue due to the elimination of 
tariff on imports from the EU. Imports from the EU are expected to increase remarkably for 
Cape Verde, mainly due to trade creation, diversion and consumption effects, while tariff 
revenue would fall, as a result of the increase in duty-free access for her EU imports (Onogwu 
and Arene, 2013).  
The European Union (EU) and the United States (US) are currently negotiating a free-trade 
agreement (FTA). The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is focused on the 
possible effects on welfare and employment. Francois et al (2013) investigated on the impact of 
the transatlantic trade and investment between the EU and the US. The study investigates 
different policy options for the deepening of the bilateral trade and investment relationship 
between the EU and US. The study concluded that reducing transatlantic barriers to trade and 
investment will result in an increase of €545 in the annual disposable income per household in 
the EU and an increase of €655 per family in the US.  
Another study by Khan et al (2015), shows that the TTIP would increase the size of the US 
economy by 0.4 per cent of GDP and the size of the EU by 0.5 per cent of GDP. Their study 
shows the TTIP has a negative impact on less developed countries. They conclude that because 
the less developed countries have not been included in the decision making process, key sectors 
for such countries such as textiles were unlikely to be substantially impacted by the TTIP.  
Still on the TTIP, Cai et al (2015) found that aggregate imports and exports of US will increase 
by 4.58 percent and 3.11 percent respectively while aggregate imports and exports of EU will 
increase by 3.17 percent and 2.02 percent respectively  on the other hand BRICS exports (India, 
Russia, South Africa, China) will suffer negative effects because exports substitution effects of 
US-EU free trade agreement is greater than the spillover effect which will cause real GDP of 
India, Russia, South Africa and China respectively decrease by 0.09 percent, 0.1 percent, 0.08 
percent, 0.12 percent. 
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The North America Free Trade Agreement is an agreement between the United States, Mexico 
and Canada which came into force in 1994. Kehoe (1993) studied the potential impact of a 
NAFTA agreement between the three countries. The study suggests that the agreement will 
create a free trade area larger in population and GDP than the European Community. The results 
of this study revealed that the impact is expected to be favourable in all three countries but 
relatively small in Canada and the United States because they already have they own free trade 
agreement. 
In West Africa, Onogwu and Arene (2013) carried out a study to estimate the impact on Burkina 
Faso of eliminating tariffs on imports from the EU under EPAs, considering trade, revenue and 
welfare effects. The results show that a complete elimination of tariffs leads to small welfare 
gains relative to GDP, but potential tariff revenue losses and trade creation. 
Hamilton (2009) using the TRIST model estimated the short-term impact of a complete 
elimination of tariffs by Burundi on EU imports. The study shows that tariff revenue is projected 
to fall by more than 20 per cent and total revenue by 9.3 per cent. According to Hamilton (2009), 
imports are expected to increase by 1.3 per cent; while it is anticipated that the new average 
collected tariff rate would fall by almost 3 percentage points to 9.3 per cent.  
Still on the Burundi EPAs scenario, Hamilton (2009) considered an EPA, but allows for the 
exclusion of some products from liberalisation. The study assumed that all tariff lines are 
liberalised except for a list of the most revenue-sensitive products, which represent just less than 
20 per cent of overall trade with the EU. The results showed that tariff revenue would decline by 
12 per cent and total revenue by 5.1 per cent (Hamilton, 2009).  
Hamilton (2009) observed little change is projected in the level of imports (increase of 0.8 per 
cent) and the model suggests a fall in the import-weighted collected tariff rate from 12.1per cent 
to 10.5 per cent. 
Hamilton (2009) also estimated the impact of a full trade agreement with the EU for Malawi 
without exemptions of any sensitive products. The model projects an increase in imports by 0.2 
per cent and reductions in tariff revenue of 7.5 per cent, and total revenue by 2.4 per cent. 
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However, after taking into account an exemption of up to 20 per cent of Malawi’s imports, which 
are revenue-sensitive from the EU from tariff liberalisation, the model projects an almost non-
existent revenue impact for the EPA if the products on the exclusion list defined above are 
excluded from liberalisation (Hamilton, 2009).  
In particular, the scenario is projected to result in almost no change in imports or revenue. Given 
that the exclusion list is designed to minimise the revenue impact of the agreement, it was clear 
that the sensitive list prepared by Malawi officials was not revenue-sensitive (Hamilton, 2009). 
Hamilton (2009) estimated the impact of EPAs on Kenya’s revenue. In this regard, the study 
assumed complete tariff liberalisation under the EPA on Kenya‘s trade revenue.  According to 
Hamilton (2009), tariff revenue is projected to fall over the short-term by more than 20 per cent, 
leading to an overall reduction in trade revenue of 5.8 per cent. Imports are estimated to 
marginally increase by 0.4 per cent. Contrary to the Malawi case, an exemption of 20 per cent for 
the sensitive products from the EPA is expected have a significant impact on revenue. Kenya 
could expect a reduction in tariff revenue of 5.7 per cent and a fall of 1.5 per cent in total trade 
revenue (Hamilton, 2009).  
According to Hamilton (2009), these revenue losses are substantially lower than those projected 
under the EPA – without an exclusion list. 
In Ethiopia, Hamilton (2009) estimated the impact of EPAs on the country using a TRIST model. 
The TRIST model contained revenue data on: statutory tariffs, collected tariffs, the excise tax 
and the value-added tax (VAT). The results show that Ethiopia collects the least of its trade 
revenue from excise taxes (10.5 per cent), while tariffs and VAT each account for approximately 
45 per cent of revenue. From Hamilton’s (2009) results, VAT is a major contributor of revenue 
for Ethiopia. It is, therefore, clear that both excise duties and VAT can be important policy 
instruments, which could be used by Ethiopian fiscal authorities to mitigate the loss in import-
duty revenue. 
A unilateral implementation of full liberalisation with the EU by Ethiopia is expected to drive up 
imports marginally by 0.6 per cent; while tariff and total revenue are likely to fall by 17.1 per 
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cent and 8.3 per cent, respectively (Hamilton, 2009). However, after taking into account the 20 
per cent exemption of Ethiopia’s imports from the EU imports from tariff reduction under the 
EPA, based on the most revenue-sensitive products, the assumption is that the country is 
projected to witness a reduction in tariff revenue of 10.5 per cent, and that total revenue would 
fall by 5 per cent (Hamilton, 2009).  
According to Hamilton (2009) this scenario would result in a small increase in the level of 
imports (increase of 0.4 per cent).  
From the analysis, Hamilton (2009) observed that Ethiopia imported ETB32 billion worth of 
goods from 153 import partners, representing 4,137 tariff lines in 2005. According to Hamilton 
(2009), the top ten importers were: Saudi Arabia, China, the United States, India, the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), Italy, Germany, Japan, Turkey and Sweden. 
A similar study conducted by Okello (2008) concluded that while the EAC customs union would 
generate more trade among the member countries, Kenya’s manufacturing sector remains far 
more advanced than those of other member countries; and this could spell doom for Uganda in 
the short and medium term. 
Still in eastern Africa, McIntyre (2005) analysed the potential trade impact of the forthcoming 
East African Community (EAC) customs union. The study looked at the trade linkages among 
the member countries of the EAC and the extent to which the introduction of the EAC common 
external tariff will have on Kenya. The empirical results indicate that the union will have a 
beneficial effect on Kenya’s trade. The results indicate a possible increase in trade of US$193.5 
million with trade creation estimated at US$193.9 million and trade diversion at US$0.3 million 
(McIntyre, 2005). 
Earlier Derosa et al (2003) investigated the new EAC custom union using a quantitative model of 
East African Trade based on simple Vinerian custom union theory. The results indicate that 
Uganda's economic welfare would be significantly compromised if the new customs union 
establishes the common external tariff substantially above the current tariff level in Uganda, as 
presently planned.  
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Derosa et al (2003) however, found that Kenya and Tanzania would benefit because their current 
trade regimes are more protectionist than Uganda's. Furthermore, trade creation in both Kenya 
and Tanzania under the new customs union plan would promote industry competitiveness, but 
not in Uganda where "import discipline" would be reduced for domestic industry. 
Kaluwa and Kambewa (2009) used the WITS/SMART model to carry out the quantitative 
analysis on the likely impact of the COMESA CET on Malawi. The results of the analysis 
indicate that currently Malawi trades mainly with South Africa, and generally with countries 
outside the COMESA region. The CET is expected to result in reduced consumer welfare and 
competitiveness for Malawi’s producers who rely heavily on imported inputs. This is likely to be 
the same case for Zimbabwe, as her major trading partners are South Africa and the EU.  
Brenton et al (2007) studied the impact of EPA FTA on selected countries in COMESA 
(Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi and Zambia) using the Tariff Reform Impact Simulation Tool 
(TRIST). The results show that Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi and Zambia stand to lose revenue 
to the tune of 2.4 per cent, 4.9 per cent, 2.2 per cent and 0.8 per cent, respectively, if they 
implement EPAs.  
Lang (2006) carried out an investigation, which sought to estimate the impact of Economic 
Partnership Agreements on ECOWAS. Lang (2006) observed that imports from the EU to 
ECOWAS would increase by approximately US$ 1.87 billion after implementing EPAs. Lang 
noted that France and the UK would be the two main beneficiaries on the EU side; and other 
studies have found similar results. Nigeria, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire came out as big players 
within ECOWAS, as they were projected to absorb the bulk (two-thirds) of the increased imports 
from the EU.  
According to Lang (2006), trade creation effects represent 81 per cent of the overall trade effect, 
largely exceeding trade-diversion effects. Trade creation benefits are skewed towards Nigeria, 
Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. From the study, trade creation is well spread-out across a large variety 
of goods, even if some concentration may be observed in cars, oil products, clothing and 
medicine. According to Lang (2006), the trade diversion effects seem relatively significant (-7 
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per cent). Crucially, the study reveals intra-regional trade diversion (-6.7 per cent), which shows 
a negative effect on regional integration. From this study, it is clear that in ECOWAS the two 
principles of reciprocity and deeper regional integration are likely to pull in different directions. 
Lang (2006) argued for differentiation and less than full reciprocity in the EU-ECOWAS EPA 
negotiations.  
On the impact of EPAs on government revenue, Lang observed that Ghana and Guinea-Bissau 
are the most affected, although Nigeria witnessed the highest loss in absolute terms. Ghana, and 
especially Guinea-Bissau, could lose up to 20 per cent of its government budget revenues in the 
case of a full liberalisation of EU imports (Lang, 2006).  The EU – ECOWAS - EPA results are 
incomplete concerning welfare gains. It seems that the consumer surplus would mainly be 
improved through the lowering of prices of industrial goods, such as cars, machines and 
equipment.  
Karingi et al (2005) carried out a study to estimate the impact of EPAs in SADC. Karingi et al. 
(2005) reveal that the SADC countries stand to see their imports increasing by US$350.8 million 
(caused by trade creation effects) if an EPA is implemented. The major beneficiaries from EU 
are Portugal, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium and Germany with 32 per cent, 12 per 
cent, 12 per cent, 9 per cent, 9 per cent and 7 per cent, respectively, of increase in exports. The 
worst hit countries are Angola, Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana and Namibia with 62 per cent, 
25 per cent, 6 per cent, 4 per cent and 3 per cent, respectively of new imports going into their 
economies. With respect to revenue, Karingi et al. (2005) observed that the SADC member 
States stand to lose US$153.551 million if EPAs are implemented with the lion’s share of 
revenue loss going to Angola with US$103.255 million.  
McKay et al (2005) considered the likelihood of the establishment of an EPA between the EU 
and the EAC, and observed that all three member states in EAC would be likely to suffer large 
revenue losses. The results show that Uganda would be likely to experience a net welfare gain; 
and Kenya would stand to lose some of its share in Tanzanian and Ugandan markets.  
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Zgovu and Milner (2007) went on to provide a detailed analysis of the trade and welfare effects 
of unilateral of trade within the EU context of non-agricultural products on Tanzania. They 
found that an EAC EPA with the EU would increase imports from the EU by 84 per cent.  
Zgovu and Kweka (2008) estimated the impact of EU FTA, using the partial-equilibrium model 
in Malawi and Tanzania. The researchers showed that Malawian and Tanzanian imports were 
likely to increase by 6 per cent and 1 per cent, respectively, if they adopt EU FTA. Both 
countries are expected to suffer massive revenue losses of 52 per cent for Tanzania and 21 per 
cent for Malawi (Zgovu and Kweka, 2008). Zgovu and Kweka (2008) revealed that welfare gains 
were insignificant in both these countries. 
A study on the impact of EPAs on revenue on East and Southern African countries (ESA) carried 
out by Oxfam (2006) shows that all the seven ESA countries stand to lose revenue if they 
implement the EPAs. The major casualties being Mauritius, Seychelles, Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), Zimbabwe, Zambia, Madagascar and Malawi with losses of US$71.118 million, 
US$24.894 million, US$24.692 million, US$18.431 million, US$15.844 million, US$7.712 
million and US$7.09 million, respectively. 
Tekere and Ndlela (2003) estimate the impact of the EPAs on SADC member States, using 
partial-equilibrium analysis; and they found that an EPA could cause a significant loss of import 
tariff revenue. The study shows that revenue collected from import duties in Tanzania and 
Namibia could fall by 37 per cent and 24 per cent, respectively.  
Hallaert (2007) estimated the impact of EU FTA on Madagascar. The results showed that 
Madagascar is likely to increase exports to the EU by 3.8 per cent due to increased market 
access. However, the EU also stands to increase its exports to Madagascar by 4.9 per cent due to 
trade-creation effects. 
Keck and Piermartini (2005) used a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of 15 regions 
and 9 sectors within the General Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) framework to simulate the 
effects of EPAs on SADC countries. The researchers showed that an EPA would be likely to 
cause an improvement in welfare-enhancing caused by an increase in real GDP and additional 
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gains through increased intra-SADC liberalisation. Sectors which are expected to contribute to 
welfare gains are: animal agriculture and food processing (Keck and Piermartini, 2005). 
Disenyana (2009) looked at the issue and challenges toward an EAC, COMESA and SADC free 
trade area. The paper was written to provide recommendations on the architecture of the 
agreement, regional trade policy, monitoring and consultation mechanisms. Multiple 
membership to different trade regimes risk trade deflection and administrative challenges to 
member states, therefore FTA could minimize and eventually eliminate the contradictions 
brought about by overlapping membership (Disenyana, 2009). The paper shows that greater 
co‐operation and eventually common approaches is vital amongst the three RECs in their 
interaction with key partners. 
Makochekanwa (2012) examined the possible impact of the SADC/COMESA/EAC tripartite 
agreement on the 26 member States. Makochekanwa (2012) estimated the impact of a 100 per 
cent liberalisation on trade creation, trade diversion and welfare, using the WITS/SMART 
model. Makochekanwa (2012) noted that the 26-bloc countries would gain by close to US$2 
billion in terms of trade creation, as a result of the FTA. The Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Angola are expected to take the lion’s share of trade creation (that is 60 per cent of total trade 
created) amounting to US$783 million and US$384 million, respectively (Makochekanwa, 
2012).  
According to Makochekanwa (2012), the dominance of these two countries as winners is not a 
surprise, given that they do not participate in any of the FTA currently available; for instance, in 
SADC they are both members, and also the DRC does not participate in COMESA FTA. Thus, 
any tariff liberalisation to be brought about by way of a tripartite FTA would result in a massive 
reduction of tariffs in these two countries, thus stimulating more imports from T-FTA countries 
into Angola and the DRC (Makochekanwa, 2012). 
On the other hand, Makochekanwa (2012) observed that countries, such as Mauritius, Botswana, 
Swaziland, Namibia, Lesotho and Rwanda, among others, are expected to have insignificant 
trade volumes created by the FTA. Makochekanwa (2012) suggested that all these countries are 
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already liberalised, Mauritius under COMESA and SADC FTAs, while the other countries fall 
under the SACU customs union and the SADC FTA, hence the low trade creation. Rwanda has 
liberalised most of its trade under the EAC customs union and COMESA FTA; and these are the 
regions it has been heavily trading with, over and above the rest of the world.  
Countries such as Eritrea, Comoros, and Seychelles are suggested to have insignificant trade 
creation; and this is expected because they currently have little trade with the other tripartite FTA 
countries. 
On trade diversion, Makochekanwa (2012) finds that a total of US$ 453.6 million worth of trade 
would be diverted from low-cost countries outside the tripartite FTA, to be replaced by less 
efficient FTA countries in the tripartite alliance. The countries to experience the highest trade 
diversions would be Angola (US$ 106 million), Kenya (US$ 61.1 million), DRC (US$ 56.9 
million), Tanzania (US$ 42.2 million) and Uganda (US$41.8 million). These five countries 
would experience a total trade diversion of US$ 308 million, thus representing 68 per cent of 
total FTA trade diversion. 
Countries, such as Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland would experience insignificant 
trade diversion, meaning that no trade would be diverted from low-cost producers outside the 
FTA countries (i.e., ROW) towards less efficient producers in the tripartite countries 
(Makochekanwa, 2012). This is possible, given that these countries import the bulk of their 
imports from those countries, which are already in the tripartite agreement, especially South 
Africa with which it has a customs union arrangement. 
Makochekanwa (2012) found that complete tariff liberalisation under the SADC/COMESA/EAC 
tripartite agreement would result in an estimated US$1 billion loss in customs/import duty 
revenue for all the countries. The countries to suffer the highest revenue loss would be the DRC 
($214 million or 21.4 per cent), Kenya ($211 or 21 per cent), Angola ($160.6 million or 16 per 
cent), Tanzania ($72.5 million or 7.2 per cent) and Zimbabwe ($71.2 million or 7.1 per cent). 
These five countries would have a combined revenue loss of $729.6 million, and would account 
for 73 per cent of the total tripartite revenue loss (Makochekanwa, 2012). According to 
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Makochekanwa (2012), Mauritius, Eritrea, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland have 
experienced an insignificant revenue loss. These countries have already liberalised their 
economies, so this new tripartite agreement would have little effect on their revenues. 
Makochekanwa (2012) estimated a positive welfare effect of around $205.5 million across the 26 
countries in the tripartite agreement. These benefits would emanate from the fact that consumers 
in the tripartite countries would be buying goods at relatively lower prices following reduced 
import duties. Furthermore, they would probably get implicit benefits resulting from the wide 
variety of choice brought by more imports from diverse (T-FTA) countries than before the T-
FTA came into effect. 
Willenbockel (2014) provided an ex-ante computable general equilibrium assessment of the 
planned Tripartite Free Trade Agreement between the member states of the COMESA, the EAC 
and the SADC. The results of the study show that the establishment of a free trade area among 
all 26 partners will is projected to generate welfare gain of US$ 578 million with South Africa 
being the largest real income gainer (Willenbockel, 2014). 
Other early ex ante studies focused mainly on the EC that comprised six original members and 
North America. Verdoorn (1960) found that the EC was trade-creating. He observed that the 
estimated static welfare gains were insignificant, at less than 0.05 per cent of GNP per annum.  
Sobarso (1991) looked at the gain of the Mexican economy under the NAFTA agreement using a 
general equilibrium analysis. The results show that additional gains from trade are present and 
trade liberalisation accompanied by some sort of economies of scale increases real income and 
make the economy more efficient. 
Other studies on the EU Single Market Programme have found similar results indicating that the 
deepening of economic integration in the EU is expected to achieve economic gains that are 
positive and generally significant (between less than 0.50 per cent and more than 3 per cent of 
GDP per annum) and the pro-competitive effects of product standardisation (with increasing 
returns to scale) are the major force behind these gains (Gasiorek, 1992; Haaland and Norman, 
1992). The results also showed evidence of trade diversion following integration, thereby 
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limiting any gains in welfare to the EU, as consumers are now paying higher prices as inefficient 
industries displace low-priced products outside the EU. The EU market also witnessed a serious 
rationalisation of production and the closure of a large number of EU firms that have faced 
declining terms of trade and profit margins.  
Brown et al. (1992), Roland-Horst et al. (1992), and Bachrach and Mizrahi (1992) carried out ex 
ante studies of NAFTA. All three of the studies found that NAFTA provides positive gains to 
members. As expected, the largest proportionate gains were skewed towards Mexico. The 
authors found that although substantial diversion of trade with non-members might occur, the 
impact on welfare in the rest of the world is unlikely to be appreciable.  
In Mozambique, Alfieri, Cirera and Rawlinson (2006) carried out a study on Mozambique WTO 
FTA using the WITS/SMART model. They assumed that Mozambique could unilaterally 
liberalise its trade with the WTO framework, that is, the total elimination of tariffs and duty 
surcharges, while keeping existing VAT and excise taxes. Alfieri, Cirera and Rawlinson (2006) 
show that Mozambique would witness imports increasing by 4.68 per cent if it liberalises its 
MFN rate. Mozambican consumers are expected to record a welfare gain of US$160 million.  
Hess and von Cramon-Taubadel (2007) evaluated the implications of the conclusion of the Doha 
Round on global welfare using both partial equilibrium and CGE models based on data drawn 
from 110 countries/regions. In this study, Cote d’Ivoire was covered under the Sub-Sahara 
region. They observed that the trade liberalisation within the WTO framework would give rise to 
an improvement of global welfare by a staggering US$ 2.5 trillion. The thrust of the trade 
liberalisation is aimed at enhancing welfare gains. The question as to whether Cote d’Ivoire has a 
significant share in welfare gains, which come with the conclusion of the Doha, is an empirical 
one tested in this study. 
From the foregoing discussion a number of observations could be concluded: 
The results from previous studies show that emerging markets/industrialised countries and 
developed economies have significantly benefited from trade liberalisation, as their economies 
show high degrees of complementarities in goods traded. This resulted in growth in intra-
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regional trade, which spurs economic growth. However, evidence from developing countries, 
especially from COMESA, SADC, EAC and ECOWAS, reveals a lack of complementarities, 
weak supply and poor infrastructures, as major barriers to countries in benefiting from trade 
liberalisation. 
Although there is considerable evidence on trade liberalisation in a number of African countries, 
the outcomes of trade reforms varies from one country to another. This variation is caused by 
differences in economic structures, foreign policy and economic geography. It, therefore, follows 
that assessments of trade policy reforms undertaken in other countries cannot be used to 
benchmark Cote d’Ivoire’s trade-policy reforms. It is, therefore, imperative to carry out a 
research on the impact of different trade-policy regimes on Cote d’Ivoire. And this is the main 
objective of this study. 
From the above discussion, it is apparent that the impact of a customs union and FTAs on 
imports, exports, welfare and revenue is ambiguous from a theoretical point of view. The various 
theoretical contributions point to potentially important effects and fundamental guidelines, but no 
general conclusions can be drawn from the theory alone. This, therefore, implies that the 
question of whether a customs union is welfare-increasing or not is essentially an empirical 
question that must be settled by examining the specific data of WAEMU/ECOWAS customs 
union and FTAs on Cote d’Ivoire.  
According to the researcher’s knowledge, studies carried out to evaluate the impact of the 
WAEMU customs union on Cote d’Ivoire did not, however, touch on the revenue implications of 
the customs union. This study, therefore, fills the gap by empirically analysing the revenue 
implications and the prices of the WAEMU customs union. 
According to the researcher’s knowledge, there are no comprehensive studies, which were 
carried out to evaluate the impact of WAEMU/ECOWAS customs union, EU FTA, BFTA and 
WTO FTA on trade, revenue and welfare in Cote d’Ivoire. This study, therefore, fills the gap by 
empirically analysing the revenue implications, exports, imports, trade creation, trade diversion 
and welfare of the of these trade agreements on Cote d’Ivoire.  
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4.4 Summary  
This chapter looked at the theoretical and empirical literature on trade liberalisation. In respect of 
evaluating the theoretical literature, this study examined trade creation, trade diversion, the static 
and dynamic gains of regional economic integration, and the revenue effects of trade 
liberalisation. The argument on the economies-of-scale factor and the policy implications of 
regional trade integration were also examined. The empirical literature assessed the two 
approaches and techniques on the effects of regional trade agreements.  
The ex-ante technique examined the studies done prior to the formation of the economic blocs; 
whereas the ex-post studies scrutinised the influence of the regional trade agreements with the 
assistance of a simple investigation that examines the intra-regional trade-pattern flows after the 
formation of the regional trade agreements.  
The evaluation of empirical literature on the effects of trade liberation entailed an examination of 
existent related studies on trade liberalisation. This was mainly aimed at providing a more 
comprehensive framework necessary in addressing the core-objectives. In this regard, it was 
possible to study and analyse the methodologies applied in previous studies concerning the 
knowledge gap in respect of the effects of trade liberalisation. This was instrumental in 
determining the robust analytical instruments and tools necessary to achieve the objectives of 
this study. 
The findings from the related studies on the effects of trade liberalisation on trade aspects, such 
as the quantity of exports, imports, trade creation, trade diversion, welfare and revenue effects 
have shown varying outcomes from one country to another and one case to another. This 
emphasises the fact that the findings from different studies cannot be generalised for Cote 
d’Ivoire. This also justifies the need to carry out this study as it should be able to highlight the 
unique features on the impact of trade liberalisation and policy changes on Cote d’Ivoire’s 
trading regimes.  
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Through the review of the related literature, it was noted that the WITS-SMART model approach 
has been used in numerous cases in assessing the impact of trade policy on trade variables and 
other aspects. This afforded the researcher the opportunity to confirm that the WITS-SMART 
model approach had been tested in various cases and provided credible results to use in policy-
making for a nation. Upon investigation, the researcher found that no previous study using the 
WITS-SMART model was undertaken to assess the trade liberalisation influences on Cote 
d’Ivoire with WAEMU/ECOWAS customs union, EU FTA, BFTA and WTO FTA, specifically 
on trade creation, trade diversion, exports, imports, revenue and welfare during the period 2008 
to 2014. This convinced the researcher of a knowledge gap that needed to be filled through this 
study.  
The next chapters of this study present the WITS-SMART model specification-estimation 
procedures that were applied in examining the impact of trade liberalisation on Cote d’Ivoire. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores and presents model-specification estimation procedures used in analysing 
the impact-of-trade liberalisation on Cote d’Ivoire, which is the main objective of the study. 
Specifically, the research has estimated the impact of various trade regimes on trade creation and 
diversion, imports, exports, revenue and welfare effects. The partial equilibrium model and the 
World Integrated Trade Solutions/Software for Market Analysis and Restrictions on Trade 
(WITS/SMART) model was used to estimate the impact of trade-policy regimes on Cote 
d’Ivoire.  
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 examines the partial-equilibrium model. The 
WITS/SMART model was used to estimate the impact of Cote d’Ivoire’s trade-policy regimes 
on tariff revenue, imports, exports, trade creation and diversion, and welfare, which are the 
objectives of the study. Subsection 5.3 reviews in detail the WITS/SMART model. Section 5.4 
summarises the important discussions in this chapter. 
5.2 Partial Equilibrium Modelling 
Panagariya (2000) developed the partial-equilibrium model (PE). Milner, Morrissey and McKay 
(2005) further extended the works of Panagariya on the partial-equilibrium analysis. Partial 
equilibrium models are powerful quantitative tools used to simulate and measure the effects of 
changes in trade policy. 
Milner, et al. (2005) provide a simple analytical framework explaining the theory behind partial 
equilibrium modelling. Despite its shortcomings, a partial equilibrium framework is more 
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suitable as it allows the utilization of widely available trade data at the appropriate level of detail 
to capture the principle of special and differential treatment in the simulation analysis.  
The partial equilibrium model contains caveats associated with a static partial-equilibrium 
analysis. The caveats measure the effects of specific changes in tariffs on trade flows, revenue, 
and welfare effects at a given point in time. PE models assess policy-reform impacts on sectors 
that are directly affected, commonly referred to as first-round effects.  
PE models allow for detailed product-by-product analysis; and they are fairly easy to set up and 
implement. The other advantage of PE models is that they require minimal data, as only data on 
trade flows, tariffs, and elasticities are required.  
The SMART model can either be solved with perfectly elastic export supply, as when world 
prices of each variety are given, or by assuming upward-sloping export supply curves. The 
SMART model incorporates three types of elasticities.  
Firstly, when the supply elasticities are deemed to be infinite (=99), which means that an 
increase in demand for a given good will always be matched by the producers and exporters of 
that good without any impact on the price of the good. This assumption is reasonably realistic 
when the importer (Cote d’Ivoire) is a small market and the exporter (the rest of the world) 
consists of large industrialised economies.  
Secondly, when import substitution elasticities record the rate of substitution between two goods 
with different origins. The Armington assumption is incorporated in the SMART model, 
meaning that similar goods from different countries are imperfectly substitutable. In SMART, 
the import substitution elasticity is considered to be 1.5 for each good.  
Thirdly, when import demand elasticity measures the demand response to a shift in import price.  
Stern, Francis and Bruce (1976) revealed that in SMART analysis, the import demand elasticity 
varies at the HS-6 level. 
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Another important assumption made by the model is that of perfect competition, which, for 
example, means that tariff cuts are fully reflected in the prices paid by consumers. 
Partial-equilibrium paradigms or models give a detailed product-by-product breakdown of the 
comprehensive impact; they are quite easy to set up and implement as noted by Mugano (2015). 
The other merits of partial-equilibrium paradigms are that they use minimal data in their 
computations. 
A limitation of PE models is that they are static in nature, allowing only for a comparative static 
comparison of pre- and post-policy change, when all the other variables are held constant which 
is an over simplification of the real world (Fukunaga & Isono 2013). Thus, they ignore the 
second-round effects, as these models do not consider impacts of policy reforms on the wider 
economy, as well as inter-sectoral implications and exchange-rate effects (Veeramani, 2012). 
Dynamic linkages and market feedbacks can be captured in general equilibrium (GE) models, 
which, therefore, are better tools, when dynamic effects and market linkages are deemed to be 
important determinants of the outcome.  
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the static effects of trade liberalisation on Cote d’Ivoire. 
This implies that the demerits of the P.E model are invalid because this study does not need the 
second round effects. 
Studies requiring analysis of second round effects use the general-equilibrium model (GEM) has 
the capacity to capture dynamic linkages and market feedbacks. The GEM, therefore, performs 
better when dynamic impacts and market linkages are seen to be important determinants of the 
outcome. 
The General-equilibrium model is also not immune to criticisms. GE paradigms are criticised, 
since they are susceptible to aggregate bias (Bilal, Dalleau & Lui 2012). they work with 
numerous underlying assumptions, and have vast data requirements, among others. 
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The commonly used GE model and the database for analysing trade-policy changes, the Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), lacks disaggregated data for the majority of African countries, 
including Cote d’Ivoire (Onogwu and Arene, 2013). Only a few African countries are captured 
as individual countries; while the majority of them are presented as composite countries, such as 
the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa (Fukunaga & Isono 2013; Veeramani 2012; Francois & Pindyuk 
2013; Makochekanwa 2012; Lee 2013).  
However, in this study, the main focus is on the static effects of trade liberalisation. Hence, 
partial-equilibrium models emerge as the best available option. The partial-equilibrium method is 
an adequate tool to address the principle of special and differentiated treatment (S&D) in a 
detailed analysis of the trade data. The literature shows that the partial-equilibrium model, 
mainly the World-Integrated Trade Solution (WITS-SMART) model, has been extensively and 
successfully used to quantify the static effects of various FTA and customs unions. 
This study used the World-Integrated Trade Solutions/Software for Market Analysis and 
Restrictions on Trade (WITS/SMART) model, because of its strength in analysing the tariff 
effect of a single market on disaggregated product lines (Shinyekwa and Katunze, 2016; Kumar 
and Shahid, 2014; Karingi et al., 2005; Balassa, 1975; Fukunaga and Isono, 2013; Lee, 2013; 
Veeramani and Saini, 2010; Francois and Pindyuk, 2013; Krueger, 1999; Makochekanwa, 2012; 
Bilal, Dalleau and Lui, 2012 and Onogwu and Arene, 2013).  
The model also has the ability to analyse the effects of trade-policy reforms in the presence of 
imperfect substitutes (Othieno and Shinyekwa, 2011; Choudhry et al, 2013). Unlike other 
models, such as the GE, the WITS/SMART model is more adequate than homogenous goods 
model, when examining tariff preferences, as it avoids corner solutions (Othieno and Shinyekwa, 
2011). 
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5.2.1 The Software for Market Analysis and Restrictions on Trade (SMART) Partial-
Equilibrium Model 
In this study, a World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) and SMART model were applied in a 
partial-equilibrium framework. The WITS brings together various databases ranging from 
bilateral trade, commodity trade flows and various and types of trade protection (Lang, 2006). 
According to Lang (2006), the WITS/SMART model uses the Common Format for Transient 
Data Exchange (COMTRADE) – a commodity-trade statistics; Trade Analysis Information 
systems (TRAINs)-tariff; para-tariffs and non-tariff measures; Integrated Data Base (IDB) and 
Consolidated Tariff Schedules (CTS) databases, which provide simulated analytical tools to 
simulate trade policy analysis, such as the effects of multilateral tariff cuts, free trade agreement, 
preferential trade liberalisation and ad hoc tariff changes (Lang, 2006).  
The SMART model runs on information contained in the UNCTAD managed TRAINS database 
(Lang, 2006; Plummer, Cheong and Hamanaka, 2010; Othieno and Shinyekwa, 2011). SMART, 
therefore, uses TRAINS data for tariff (applied tariffs) and trade values collected in the 
COMTRADE database for simulation purposes. 
The partial equilibrium SMART model was developed by UNCTAD and the World Bank during 
the 1980s, mainly to assess the impact of GATT rounds. The SMART model is contained in the 
World Integrated Trade Solution software (WITS) (Mugano, 2013). This model and the 
simulation tools are part of the WITS trade database and software suite provided jointly by the 
World Bank and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (Plummer, Cheong 
and Hamanaka, 2010).  
The theory of this model is borrowed from Laird and Yeats (1986). SMART allows for the 
evaluation of the impact of a given trade policy change (measured in tariff) on the following 
variables, which are also the objectives of this study: 
• Trade-creation effects; 
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• Trade-diversion effects; 
• Net-trade effect (aggregate-trade creation and trade-diversion effects); 
• Tariff-revenue variations; and 
• Changes in consumer surpluses. 
(i) Trade Creation 
The explanation of the WITS/SMART theory used in this study is summarised from Laird and 
Yeats (1986). According to Laird and Yeats, trade creation captures the trade effects of 
liberalisation that lead to the displacement of inefficient producers in a given preferential trade 
area (FTA, for example). For trade creation to take place, it is assumed that there is full 
transmission of price changes when tariffs or NTBs (ad valorem equivalents) are disbanded. The 
study adopted equation (see equation 5.1.11) which was derived by Laird and Yeats (1986) to 
estimate trade-creation effects. In order to derive the trade-creation model, import demand and 
export supply functions and an equilibrating identity are formulated. 
In this study, the import demand functions for country j, Cote d’Ivoire in this case, from country 
k of commodity i can be expressed as follows: 
Mijk = f(Yj,Pij, Pik)...........................................................................................................(5.1.1) 
The export supply function of commodity i of country k to country j can be simplified as: 
Xijk = f(Pijk)......................................................................................................................(5.1.2) 
At equilibrium, trade between the two countries in a partial-equilibrium model is given as: 
Mijk = Xijk .......................................................................................................................(5.1.3) 
In a free trade and customs union case, the domestic price of commodity i in country j (Cote 
d’Ivoire) from country k would change with the change in an ad valorem tariff as follows: 
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Pijk = Pijk (1+tijk)................................................................................................................(5.1.4) 
The export revenues earned by k are given by: 
Rijk = Xijk .Pijk....................................................................................................................(5.1.5) 
The Trade-creation model, as Laird and Yeats (1986) presented it is done through the total 
derivation of equation 5.1.4, as shown in equation 5.1.6: 
 
Now, the basic illustration for the elasticity of import demand with respect to the domestic price 
can be rearranged as follows: 
 
Substituting from expression (5.1.4) and (5.1.6) into expression (5.1.7) gives: 
 
The standard expression for the elasticity of export supply with respect to the world price can be 
rearranged as follows: 
 
 
From expression (3) it follows that: 
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Finally, to derive the trade-creation effects, substitute (10) into (9), and the result into (8). This 
result is equivalent to exporting country k’s growth of exports of commodity i to country j. The 
expression for trade creation can then be rewritten as follows: 
  
(ii) Trade Diversion 
Trade diversion is the phenomenon that occurs in a free trade area, where efficient producers 
outside the FTA or customs union are displaced by inefficient producers, who are protected by 
the high tariff rate. The WAEMU FTA is used to show how trade diversion is evaluated in this 
study. Trade diversion would be the outcome if, as a result of the establishment of the WAEMU 
FTA, more suppliers from the rest of the world (ROW) into Cote d’Ivoire/WAEMU are 
displaced by inefficient producers from Cote d’Ivoire/WAEMU.  
The formation of WAEMU FTA leads to reduction of tariffs to zero to WAEMU member States 
– without any changes in the tariffs facing the ROW exporters. The principle underlying the 
measurement of trade diversion in SMART is also explained in Laird and Yeats (1986). In order 
to derive trade diversion, the study considered the elasticity of substitution. The elasticity of 
substitution considered here is expressed as a percentage change in relative shares of imports 
from two different sources, due to a one per cent change in the relative prices of the same 
product from these two sources: 
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(iii) Trade Expansion 
In order to derive the total trade effect, trade creation and diversion are summed up (Laird and 
Yeats, 1986). According to Laird and Yeats (1986), it is possible to sum the results across a 
group of importers for single or groups of products, as well as for single sources of supply or 
groups of suppliers. 
(iv) The Revenue Effect 
In theory, the tariff revenue is given as the product of the tax (tariff rate in this case) and the tax 
base (the value of imports). Thus, before the change in the ad valorem incidence of the trade 
barriers, the revenue is given as: 
 
Dividing the left hand side (LHS) of (5.1.13) with the LHS of expression (5.1.5) and the right 
hand side (RHS) of (5.1.17) by the RHS of (5.1.5) gives: 
 
Reducing and substituting from expression (10) gives: 
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Alternatively, this can be written: 
 
(v) The Welfare Effect 
The WITS/SMART model is used to estimate the welfare effects on Cote d’Ivoire. Essentially, 
the welfare effect is mainly attributed to the consumers’ benefit in the importing country, as a 
result of lower import prices due to trade liberalisation. This allows consumers to substitute more 
expensive domestic or imported products with the cheaper imports that are affected by the 
relevant tariff reduction. Increased imports lead to a net welfare gain that can be thought of as the 
increase in consumer welfare; and it is measured as follows: 
 
The coefficient of 0.5 captures the average between the ad valorem incidents of the trade barriers 
before and after their elimination/reduction (Laird and Yeats, 1986). Equation (5.1.13) assumes 
that the elasticity of export supply is infinite. This assumption holds for Cote d’Ivoire, since it is 
a small country, which has no influence on world prices.  
5.2.2 WITS/SMART Assumptions and Relevance to Cote d’Ivoire 
SMART relies on the Armington assumption in modelling consumer behaviour (Karingi et al., 
2005; Karingi et al., 2006; Fukana and Isono, 2013; Mugano, 2014; Lang, 2006; Othieno and 
Shinyekwa, 2011; Fukunaga and Isono, 2013; Lee, 2013; Veeramani and Saini, 2010; Francois 
and Pindyuk, 2013 and Lewis et al., 1999).  
On the supply side, the SMART set-up is that, for a given good, different countries compete to 
export to another given country. The focus of the simulation exercise is on the composition and 
volume of imports into that country. SMART assumes infinite export supply elasticity (that is 
degree of responsiveness of each foreign exporter’s supply to changes in the price) with a value 
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of 99 (Karingi et al., 2005; Karingi et al., 2006; Lang, 2006; Othieno and Shinyekwa, 2011; 
Balassa, 1967; Fukunaga and Isono, 2013; Lee, 2013; Veeramani and Saini, 2010; Francois and 
Pindyuk, 2013; Krueger, 1999; Busse et al, 2004; Makochekanwa, 2012; Bilal, Dalleau and Lui, 
2012; Onogwu and Arene, 2013 and Lewis et al., 1999).  
In other words, the world price of each export variety is exogenously determined, so that 
exporters are assumed to be price-takers. This implies that changes in the level of demand in 
Cote d’Ivoire do not affect world prices; and exporters could continue supplying at any level of 
Ivorian demand. Considering the fact that Cote d’Ivoire is a small player in the global trade 
arena, the assumption of infinite export supply elasticity is retained under this study.  
On the demand side, SMART relies on the Armington assumption, which is based on imperfect 
substitution between different import sources with different varieties. This means that goods, 
defined at the harmonised system (HS) 6 digit level, imported from different countries, although 
similar, are imperfect substitutes. In this study, a value of 1.5 for import substitution elasticity 
was used for each good. The Armington assumption of imperfect substitution is retained for the 
purpose of this study.  
This assumption has a huge implication to preferential agreements, since such arrangements 
would not result in a complete shift of import demands to beneficiary countries.   
5.2.3 Scenarios 
The purpose of this study is to analyse the impact of different trade-reform scenarios. The study 
considered the following scenarios: 
• The impact of ECOWAS FTA on trade creation, trade diversion, imports, exports, tariff 
revenue and welfare in Cote d’Ivoire using a WITS/SMART model is investigated. In this 
regard, a value of 0 per cent is applied to all tariff lines on Ivorian imports from ECOWAS 
member States; 
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• The impact of ECOWAS customs union on trade creation, trade diversion, imports, exports, 
tariff revenue and welfare in Cote d’Ivoire using a WITS/SMART model is evaluated. In this 
regard, a CET of 0 per cent for essential social commodities, 5 per cent for raw materials and 
capital goods, 10 per cent for intermediate goods, 20 per cent for finished goods, and 35 per 
cent for specific goods for economic development imported by Cote d’Ivoire from countries 
outside the ECOWAS region, is applied; 
• The impact of WAEMU FTA on trade creation, trade diversion, imports, exports, tariff 
revenue and welfare in Cote d’Ivoire using a WITS/SMART model is investigated. In this 
regard, a 0 per cent is applied to all tariff lines imported by Ivorian from WAEMU member 
States; 
• The impact of WAEMU customs union on trade creation, trade diversion, imports, exports, 
tariff revenue and welfare in Cote d’Ivoire using a WITS/SMART model is investigated. In 
this regard, a CET of 0 per cent for essential social goods, 5 per cent for both raw materials 
and specific inputs, 10 per cent for intermediate goods, and 20 per cent for finished goods 
imported by Cote d’Ivoire from countries outside WAEMU region is applied;  
• The impact of WTO FTA on trade creation, trade diversion, imports, exports, tariff revenue 
and welfare in Cote d’Ivoire using a WITS/SMART model is evaluated. In this regard, a 0 
per cent is applied to all tariff lines imported by Cote d’Ivoire from WTO member States; 
• The impact of EU FTA on trade creation, trade diversion, imports, exports, tariff revenue and 
welfare in Cote d’Ivoire using a WITS/SMART model is evaluated. In this regard, a 0 per 
cent is applied to all tariff lines imported by Cote d’Ivoire from EU member states; and 
• The impact of Bilateral FTA on trade creation, trade diversion, imports, exports, tariff 
revenue and welfare in Cote d’Ivoire using a WITS/SMART model is investigated. In this 
regard, a 0 per cent is applied to all tariff lines imported by Cote d’Ivoire from the top ten 
major trading partners (South Africa, Ghana, India, China, Nigeria, France, USA, 
Netherlands, Germany and Belgium). 
The fact that a static model is used implies that two situations are needed: the situation before 
trade policy changes being investigated (i.e., the year with the most recent available data, 2012). 
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In this study, trade conditions, which were last used in 2012 under the MFN rates, were 
compared with a situation of free trade agreement (100 per cent trade liberalisation) and customs 
union with recommended CETs. For a customs union, 0 per cent was applied for essential social 
goods, 5 per cent for capital goods and raw materials, 10 per cent for intermediate goods, and 20 
per cent for finished goods. Obviously the trade conditions in 2012 differed from those of the 
FTA and the customs union situation; hence, trade changes were established in the form of trade 
creation, trade diversion, changes in imports and exports and changes in revenue and welfare. 
5.2.4 Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness Test 
SMART’s results may be sensitive to the modelling assumptions and parameter values used. 
SMART does not provide a built-in sensitivity analysis. The researcher performed this manually 
by changing parameter values over a reasonable range, as suggested by Plummer, Cheong and 
Hamanaka (2010) and (Zgovu and Kweka, 2009). 
The price elasticities of demand for Cote d’Ivoire were obtained from Stern (1976), and the 
Armington elasticities from Takarick (2010). The uncertainty as to the actual values for the 
Armington and demand elasticities implied that rigorous sensitivity analysis was required to 
ensure the robustness of the results (Zgovu and Kweka, 2009, Plummer, Cheong and Hamanaka, 
2010; Waglé, 2011).  
Firstly, a ‘base-case’ simulation was run using the elasticities presented in Table 5.1.  
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Table 5. 1: Elasticities Used in Sensitivity Analysis 
Elasticity Lower Bound Base – case*** Upper bound Worst case 
Substitution 0.5 1.44 2 6 
Export Supply 89.1 99 99** 99** 
Import Demand* 2.7 1.44 3.3 6 
* Stern (1976), ** Retained as it is infinite, ***Takarick (2010) 
Given the possible sensitivity of the models’ results to the above value, the simulations were re-
run under various assumptions (see Table 5.1). Upper bounds and lower bounds were established 
for the various elasticities. The base case was re-run, replacing each of the elasticities in turn 
with its upper- and lower-bound values. Given that the objective of the study was to evaluate the 
highest likely impact of the trade reforms on Cote d’Ivoire, a ‘worst case’ scenario was devised, 
using the upper-bound values. 
5.2.5     Data sources and manipulation 
The following data were used in the SMART model in this study: import values from each 
foreign partner; tariffs encountered by each foreign partner’s import-demand elasticity for the 
commodity; export-supply elasticity for the commodity, and substitution elasticity between the 
different varieties of the commodity.  
These data elements were accessible, as they are built into the WITS supported by the 
COMTRADE, TRAINs, IDB and CTs databases. These are real import figures reported by 
countries (in US$) at customs points at different product levels. In periods when the Cote 
d’Ivoire Institute of national Statistics failed to submit trade data, mirrored data were used. 
Mirrored data are data submitted by Cote d’Ivoire’s trading partners, which are used as a proxy 
for Cote d’Ivoire’s trade information. For example, Cote d’Ivoire imports from Ghana reported 
to the International Trade Centre would be considered as Kenyan exports.  
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The UN COMTRADE has all the trade information for Cote d’Ivoire that is needed for this 
work, ranging from exports, imports, tariffs and non-tariff instruments. WITS software, which is 
hosted by the World Bank, was applied in this work. 
The total of 143 import-trading partners of Cote d’Ivoire in 2015 are organised into ten groups: 
India; China; ECOWAS Custom Union; ECOWAS FTA, WAEMU Custom Union; the United 
States of America; Malaysia; the European Union; South Africa, Japan and the Rest of the World 
(ROW). The baseline scenarios assume an export substitution elasticity of 1.5, domestic 
substitution elasticity of 1, and an import-demand elasticity of 0.5.  
5.3 Summary 
The chapter has explored and presented the model-specification estimation procedures used in 
analysing the impact of trade liberalisation on Cote d’Ivoire. The empirical aspects discussed in 
this chapter include the partial-equilibrium model and the WITS/SMART model. Trade creation 
and diversion, trade expansion, revenue effect and welfare-effect models were also discussed.  
The partial-equilibrium model has all the caveats associated with a static partial-equilibrium 
analysis. The partial equilibrium model allows for the evaluation of various trade policy regimes 
on government revenue, welfare, trade creation and diversion, all of which are the objectives of 
this study. For the purposes of this study, the WITS/SMART model was the applied partial-
equilibrium framework. The WITS brings together various databases ranging from bilateral 
trade, commodity trade flows and various types of trade protection (Lang, 2006). 
 WITS also integrates the analytical tools that support the simulation analysis. SMART allows 
room for the evaluation of the effect of a given trade-policy change (measured in the tariff) on 
the trade creation, trade diversion, tariff-revenue variation and change in consumer surplus. This 
is an essential feature of the WITS/SMART model and these outcomes are part of the research 
objectives of this study. 
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SMART allows the researcher to evaluate the impact of a given trade policy change (measured in 
tariff) on the trade creation, trade diversion, tariff-revenue variation and change in consumer 
surplus. This is an important capability of the WITS/SMART model, as these outcomes are part 
of the research objectives of this study. 
The next chapter will discuss the empirical findings and analysis of the revenue and welfare 
implications of the ECOWAS customs union and the ECOWAS FTA on Cote d’Ivoire. In this 
section, there will be a presentation of the SMART simulation results and their analysis. This is 
aimed at addressing the research question posed in the study. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE IMPACT OF ECOWAS COMMITMENTS ON COTE D’IVOIRE 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter Six presents the empirical findings and analysis of the implications of the ECOWAS 
customs union and ECOWAS FTA on Cote d’Ivoire. In this section, the study has estimated the 
impact of these trade-policy regimes on trade creation and diversion, imports, exports, revenue 
and welfare in Cote d’Ivoire. The analysis was conducted using the WITS/SMART model. The 
year of 2014 was adopted as a base year for simulation, using trade information databases, such 
as TRAINS, COMTRADE and WTO-IDB.  
In this study, the SMART model was used, based on the information contained in the 
UNCTAD’s TRAINS database. The year 2014 was chosen because that is the latest year for Cote 
d’Ivoire in the WITS/SMART software for Cote d’Ivoire. For the ECOWAS customs union, the 
WITS/SMART model has used the common external tariff, as specified in the ECOWAS 
nomenclature for social goods, raw materials and capital goods, intermediate goods and finished 
goods, and specific goods as 0 per cent, 5 per cent, 10 per cent, 20 per cent, and 35 per cent 
respectively. For ECOWAS FTA, a 0 per cent is applied to all tariff lines imported by from 
ECOWAS members. These tariffs (for ECOWAS FTA and ECOWAS customs union) were 
applied in the WITS/SMART model against the actual data supplied by the Cote d’Ivoire 
customs authorities in 2014, saved in the TRAINS databases.  
Because the CET and FTA tariffs are different from the 2014 applied rates, this therefore, 
enabled this study to evaluate the impact of ECOWAS customs union and ECOWAS FTA on 
trade creation and diversion, revenue, imports, exports and welfare, which are the objectives of 
this study. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.2 examines a comparison of Cote 
d’Ivoire structure and ECOWAS CET. Section 6.3 discusses the WITS/SMART model 
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simulation results for ECOWAS customs union Section 6.4 discusses the WITS/SMART model 
simulation results for ECOWAS FTA. Section 6.5 provides summary of the chapter. 
6.2  A Comparison of Cote d’Ivoire’s Tariff Structure and the ECOWAS CET 
Cote d’Ivoire as many other low income countries depends heavily on trade taxes as a source of 
revenue. Cote d’Ivoire’s tariff structure is more complex than that of the ECOWAS CET.  The 
country is among the few countries in the region with high tariffs, some of which are above 100 
per cent.  What this means is that the country has to move from its current regime – characterised 
by a large tariff dispersion – in order to comply with the 20 per cent dispersion under the 
ECOWAS CET. 
 In Cote d’Ivoire tariff regime, the 20 per cent band is the most significant, with 2165 tariff lines, 
which translates into 36.7 per cent of the total tariff lines. The 5 per cent tariff band comes 
second, at 36.37 per cent of the total tariff lines, and then the 10 per cent band at 23.27 per cent 
of the total tariff lines, the 35 per cent band at 2.2 per cent of the total tariff lines and the 0 per 
cent tariff band at 1.44 per cent of the total tariff lines (ITC, 2012).  
Cote d’Ivoire custom duties rate follows that of the ECOWAS and ranges from 0 per cent to 35 
per cent. However, it is important to note that goods are also subjected to VAT (18 per cent), 
community levy (0.5 per cent), and statistical duty (1 per cent) upon imports (MOC, 2014). This 
implies that these tariff lines have to be adjusted upwards or downwards, respectively, in order to 
conform to the CET. 
6.3  A Comparison of Cote d’Ivoire’s Tariff Structure with the ECOWAS FTA 
Cote d’Ivoire’s tariff structure is more complex compared to the ECOWAS FTA.  The country is 
among the few countries in the region with high tariffs some of which are closed to 100 percent.  
Only 85 tariff lines, that is, 1.44 percent of total tariff lines are zero rated duties (see table 2.2). It 
therefore means that Cote d’Ivoire has 98.56 percent of its tariff lines remaining that has to be 
liberalised. 
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6.4  The SMART Model Simulation Results 
This section presents the results of the impact of ECOWAS customs union and ECOWAS FTA 
on trade creation and trade diversion, imports, exports, revenue and welfare effects using 
SMART simulations. 
6.4.1  The ECOWAS Customs Union 
The study evaluates the impact of an ECOWAS customs union on Cote d’Ivoire. Specifically, 
the implication of the ECOWAS customs union on trade creation and trade diversion, revenue, 
welfare, imports and exports, which are the objectives of this study, are discussed in this section. 
(a) Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 
Trade creation means that more efficient or lower-cost producers in any of the ECOWAS 
countries are allowed to displace the less efficient or higher-cost producers in Cote d’Ivoire; and 
consumers, therefore, can benefit from these lower prices (Bonga, 2014).  
However, some producers in Cote d’Ivoire would be negatively affected, as their products are 
replaced by products efficiently produced in other countries in the ECOWAS region. This 
implies that Ivorian industries have to improve their production efficiency and sharpen their 
competitive edge in preparation for the customs union. Trade diversion, on the other hand, 
implies that more efficient suppliers from outside the ECOWAS customs union are displaced by 
less efficient producers within the customs union (Andriamananjara, 2011).  
This would be costly for the country, as revenue that could have been generated from imports 
from outside the ECOWAS region, is lost; and the products become more expensive, since they 
would be sourced from higher-cost producers. 
Using the simulation results from the WITS/SMART model, Table 6.1 shows the trade creation 
and trade-diversion effects of the adoption of the ECOWAS CET by Cote d’Ivoire. 
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Table 6. 1: Trade Creation and Trade-Diversion Effects of the ECOWAS CET on Cote 
d’Ivoire (US$ Millions) 
Product category  trade creation trade diversion  total trade effect 
Capital goods 0 0 0 
Raw materials 988 0 988 
Intermediate goods 504 0 504 
Finished goods 0 0 0 
Total  1492 0 1492 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on Smart Simulations 
As shown in Table 6.1, foreign firms are likely to displace local firms (trade creation) by 
US$1.49 billion. Not all product categories have witnessed trade creation (see Table 6.1). Capital 
and finished goods did not experience any trade creation. This means that the country was not 
able to expand its trade with the ECOWAS members for this product category. This outcome has 
to be critically evaluated before the full adoption of the ECOWAS CET. The trade creation was 
observed in the raw materials as well as the intermediated goods. This is a welcome development 
to local consumers, since it results in the fall in prices, thereby creating a surplus for the 
consumer. However, trade creation has ripple effects on the local industry, as it can lead to the 
closure of companies, unemployment, and a vicious cycle of welfare loss, if government does 
not come up with a facility to resuscitate the affected companies.  
The industries which are likely to be severely affected by ECOWAS CET are listed in Table 6.2 
with their respective trade-creation values. 
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Table 6. 2: Commodities Affected by Trade Creation (US$ Millions) 
HS Code Product Description Value 
020329 Animal and Animal Products 801 
870300  Vehicles  167.41 
852352 Electrical, Smart cards 22.35 
730300 Metals, Tube and pipes 8.16 
930700 Military weapons and artillery 7 
871000 Tanks and other fighting vehicles 6.63 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
The results confirm the outcome of the ex ante study undertaken by Olayinka (2014), which 
shows that the adoption of the Common External Tariff (CET) by the ECOWAS countries would 
result in trade expansion in Nigeria. The World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database 
provided the tariff data, while the world prices were sourced from the World Bank commodity 
price. Olayinka (2014) also used a CET of 35 per cent for capital goods, 5 per cent for raw 
materials, 10 per cent for intermediate goods, and 20 per cent for finished goods. His study 
reveals that the ECOWAS-CET reduced domestic prices of agricultural goods. In fact, the 
findings indicate that the CET has so far had a net positive effect on households in Nigeria, 
largely due to the gains from expenditure which would raise the country’s national welfare. 
There is no evidence of trade diversion in Cote d’Ivoire. The outcome is consistent with the 
findings of Shinyekwa and Katunze (2016), Mugano (2013), Cernat (2003) and the argument of 
Meade (1955), Kemp and Wan (1976) and Amponsah (2002) that some regional groupings CET 
are too weak to divert trade from third parties. 
(b) The Revenue Effect 
The WITS/SMART simulations estimate that Cote d’Ivoire will have a total fiscal revenue loss 
of US$286.85 million if the ECOWAS CET is implemented (See table 6.3). This is not 
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significant compare to the total tax revenue collected in 2014 which amounted to US$ 6.12 
billion. 
Table 6. 3: Revenue Effects of the ECOWAS CET on Cote d’Ivoire (US$ Millions) 
Product category Revenue Effect 
Capital goods 0 
Raw materials  -247.11 
Intermediate goods -39.74 
Finished goods 0 
Total -286.85 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on Smart Simulations 
Only raw materials and Intermediate goods would experience revenue losses. Cote d’Ivoire 
stands to lose US$286.85 million of customs revenue if it implements the ECOWAS CET.  The 
ECOWAS CET is higher than Cote d’Ivoire’s bound tariff which currently stand at 14.9 per cent 
(ICTSD, 2012).  
The outcome is consistent with the findings of Okonji (2015), who observed that Nigeria could 
lose US$1.3 trillion in customs revenue if it adopts the ECOWAS CET because of the risks of 
being flooded by European products. The trade agreement will further impoverish the 
manufacturing sector and non-oil export could be the worst hit as the two sectors suffer from 
significant problem of lack of competitiveness. 
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Table 6. 4: Largest Loss in Revenue by Product (US$ Millions) 
HS Code Product Description Revenue Loss % of Total Loss 
01-05 Animal and Animal Products -88.43 30.82 
72-83 Metals -52 18.12 
16-24 Foodstuffs -38.37 13.37 
84-85 Machinery / Electrical -34.27 11.95 
06-07 Vegetable Products -27.2 9.48 
Other Other commodities not listed above -46.5 16.21 
Total  -286.85 100 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on Smart Simulations 
Animal products, metals and foodstuffs are expected to be the major contributors of revenue 
losses in Cote d’Ivoire, with 30.82 per cent and 18.12 per cent and 13.37 per cent of total 
revenue loss, respectively. One of the reasons for these findings is that the agricultural sector in 
Cote d’Ivoire remains very protected with agricultural imports tariff attracting a duty rate of 14.6 
compared to non-agricultural imports of 11.5 per cent (ICTSD, 2012). This rate is clearly higher 
than the proposed CET (5 to 10 per cent) and could have legal problem with regard to the 
existing commitment of Cote d’Ivoire.  
(c) The Consumer Welfare Effect 
One of the main arguments in favour of free trade is that consumers would benefit from lower 
prices. Whether or not this will occur depends on the extent of trade creation, as against trade 
diversion. As shown in Table 6.5, SMART simulation results reveal that Cote d’Ivoire would 
experience a gain in consumer welfare valued at US$38.36 million by implementing the 
ECOWAS customs union. Olayinka (2014), investigated the distributional effects of the 
ECOWAS common external tariffs on Nigeria.  The results show that The ECOWAS CET had 
net positive effects on the welfare of households, largely due to the gains from the expenditure 
basket. 
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Table 6. 5: Welfare Effects of the ECOWAS CET on Cote d’Ivoire (US$ Million) 
 
Product Category Welfare Effect Share in 2014 GDP* (%) 
Capital goods 0 0 
Raw Materials                     49.2 0.14 
Intermediate goods 37.03 0.10 
Finished goods                       0 0 
Total 86.23 0.25 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on Smart Simulations 
The total gains in welfare are insignificant representing 0.25 per cent of 2014 GDP (see Table 
6.5). Capital goods and finished goods did not register any significant gains if the ECOWAS 
customs union is implemented (see Table 6.5).  This can be explained by the fact that capital 
goods and finished goods did not experience any trade creation, hence there was no improvement 
in welfare gains for those products.   
(d) The Impact of ECOWAS Customs Union on Cote d’Ivoire’s Exports 
The impact of ECOWAS customs union can be evaluated from the export viewpoint, derived 
from the SMART simulations. Table 6.6 shows the impact of a full customs union on the export 
of raw materials, capital goods, intermediate goods and finished goods. 
Table 6. 6: The Impact of ECOWAS Customs Union on Exports in Cote d’Ivoire (US$ 
Millions) 
Product Category Exports Before Exports After Change in Exports 
Capital Goods 3.12 3.12 0 
Raw Materials 2213.23 2213.21 -0.02 
Intermediate Goods 436 326 -110 
Finished Goods 1.77 1.77 0 
Total 2654.12 2554.1 -110.02 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on Smart Simulations 
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Cote d’Ivoire’s exports to ECOWAS are expected to plunge by US$110.02 million. The fall in 
exports could have been attributed to the increase in the cost of raw materials and intermediate 
goods used in the production. With the coming into effect of a ECOWAS CET, intermediate 
rates need to be aligned to a higher rate of 10 per cent; yet most goods (raw materials and 
Intermediate goods) imported from ECOWAS into Cote d’Ivoire are currently enjoying the 
benefits of a free trade area. The rise in import tariffs is expected to negatively affect the 
competitiveness of raw materials exports, which constitute the bulk of Cote d’Ivoire exports.  
Shinyekwa and Katunze (2016) found similar results in Rwanda and Burundi. They show that 
imposing a common external tariff on the East Africa Community (EAC) will result in poor trade 
performance by Rwanda and Burundi mainly because of their weak production capacity. 
It is worth noting that Cote d’Ivoire’s exports are dominated by raw materials and semi-finished 
goods (intermediate goods), amounting to more than 90 per cent of the total exports. This is 
consistent with the evaluation of Cote d’Ivoire trade performance (as discussed in Chapter 3). 
This is a worrying outcome for Cote d’Ivoire, considering the vulnerability of export revenue to 
volatile prices and the low income elasticity of exported primary goods. 
(e) The Impact of ECOWAS Customs Union on Imports in Cote d’Ivoire 
The tariff alignment, which comes with a CET is expected to affect Cote d’Ivoire’s imports in 
two ways. Firstly, those tariff lines, which according to ECOWAS nomenclature, are expected to 
be phased down, this would have a positive impact on imports. Secondly, tariff lines, which have 
to be aligned upwards, are expected to negatively affect imports in Cote d’Ivoire. From this 
analysis, it is clear that the effect of ECOWAS CET on imports is not straightforward, hence the 
need to carry out an empirical research, which is one of the objectives of this study. 
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Table 6. 7: The Impact of ECOWAS Customs Union on Imports in Cote d’Ivoire (US$ 
Millions) 
Product Category Imports Before Imports After Change in Imports 
Capital Goods 184 184 0 
Raw Materials 1371 5022 3651 
Intermediate Goods 60 86 26 
Finished Goods 524 524 0 
Total 2139 5816 3677 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on Smart Simulations 
Cote d’Ivoire’s imports are expected to increase by US$ 3.67 billion (36.77 per cent) if a 
ECOWAS customs union is adopted (see Table 6.7). This increase has been mainly driven by 
raw materials and intermediate goods. The ECOWAS CET did not create any imports changes 
from capital and finished goods.   
Cote d’Ivoire’s imports tariff ranges from 15 to 20 per cent. Hence a move to align these tariffs 
down to 20 per cent is not quite a significant move to the previous tariffs rate – thereby, resulting 
in no change from the imports of finished and capital goods. 
The findings of Shinyekwa and Katunze (2016) confirms the results. They revealed that imports 
from outside the EAC region would increase after the adoption of a common external tariff by 
EAC member states.  
This result is also confirmed by the findings of Simiyu (2017) in Kenya, the findings of Castro, 
Kraus and de la Rocha (2004) in Kenya and Tanzania. Castro, Kraus and de la Rocha (2004) 
estimated the impact of EAC customs union on member States using the SMART model. Their 
study shows that EAC CET would significantly increase imports into Kenya and Tanzania. 
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(f) Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness Tests 
Given the uncertainty of the actual values for the Armington and demand elasticities implies that 
rigorous sensitivity analysis was required to ensure the robustness of the main results presented 
in the study. Initially, a ‘base case’ simulation was run, using the elasticities from Armington, 
Stern and Tokarick (as discussed in Chapter 5). Given the possible sensitivity of the models’ 
results to the elasticity values, the researcher had to re-run the simulations under varying 
assumptions. Upper-bound and lower-bound limits were established for various elasticities (see 
Table 5.1).  
Finally, given that the aim of the study was to determine the largest likely impact of the 
ECOWAS CET on Cote d’Ivoire, a ‘worst-case’ scenario was devised, using the upper bound 
values by adding 4. 
Appendix 1(a) reports on the sensitivity analysis and the robustness tests for the trade-creation 
effects in Cote d’Ivoire after the adoption of a ECOWAS CET. Reducing the trade elasticity 
value to 0.5, shows the change in the trade creation from the base case in Cote d’Ivoire. 
Likewise, increasing trade elasticities to 2 and 6 bring no changes to the trade creation. The 
outcome shows that Cote d’Ivoire’s total change in imports remains the same in value – although 
its composition changes, as economic agents are substituted across the various imports. 
Appendix 1(b) reports on the sensitivity analysis and robustness tests on the revenue effect in 
Cote d’Ivoire after the implementation of ECOWAS CET. Reducing trade elasticity to 0.5 
increases revenue loss by 99.85 per cent. Increasing trade elasticity values to 2 and 6 would, 
respectively, increase revenue this loss by 13.85 per cent, respectively. The resulting deviations 
from the middle ground results are generally insignificant. Accordingly, the middle-ground 
estimates could be within sight of the potential sizes.  
Appendix 1(c) reports on the sensitivity analysis and robustness tests on the welfare effect in 
Cote d’Ivoire after the implementation of ECOWAS CET. Reducing the trade elasticity to 0.5 
reduces the welfare gain by 4.4 per cent. Likewise increasing trade elasticity values to 2 and 6 
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reduces the welfare gain by 4.4 per cent. A less than 5 per cent margin of error can be argued to 
be conservative and feasible; and the resulting deviations from the middle ground results are 
generally insignificant. Accordingly, the middle-ground estimates could be within sight of the 
potential sizes.  
Appendix 4(a) reports on the sensitivity analysis and robustness tests on exports in Cote d’Ivoire 
after the implementation of ECOWAS CET. Reducing the trade elasticity to 0.5 decreases 
exports by 0.08 per cent. Increasing the trade elasticity values to 2 and 6 would, respectively, 
decrease exports by 0.26 per cent and 0.81 per cent. The resulting deviations from the middle-
ground results are generally insignificant. Accordingly, the middle-ground estimates could be 
within sight of the potential sizes.  
Appendix 4(b) reports on the sensitivity analysis and robustness tests on imports in Cote d’Ivoire 
after the implementation of ECOWAS CET. Reducing the trade-elasticity value to 0.5 shows no 
change in imports from the base case in Cote d’Ivoire. Likewise, increasing trade elasticities to 2 
and 6 brings no changes to trade creation. The outcome shows that Cote d’Ivoire’s total change 
in imports remains the same in value, although its composition changes, as economic agents are 
substituted across the various imports. 
6.4.2 ECOWAS Free-Trade Agreement  
This section discusses Cote d’Ivoire tariff structure and the ECOWAS FTA, and the simulation 
results on the impact of ECOWAS FTA on Cote d’Ivoire. In this section, a discussion on the 
possible implications of a ECOWAS free-trade agreement on trade creation, trade diversion, 
revenue, welfare, imports and exports, which are some of the objectives of this study, will be 
discussed. 
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(a) Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 
Trade creation means that more efficient or lower-cost producers in any of the ECOWAS 
countries could displace the less-efficient or higher-cost producers in Cote d’Ivoire; and 
consumers would therefore benefit from the lower prices (Viner, 2014). 
However, some producers in Cote d’Ivoire would be negatively affected, as their products are 
substituted by products efficiently produced in other countries in the ECOWAS region. This 
implies that Ivorian industries have to improve their production efficiency and competitive edge 
in preparation for the FTA. Trade diversion, on the other hand, implies that more efficient 
suppliers from outside the ECOWAS FTA are displaced by less efficient producers within the 
ECOWAS FTA.  
This would be costly for the country, as the revenue that would have been generated from 
imports from outside the ECOWAS region is lost, and the products become more expensive, 
since they would be sourced from higher-cost producers. Using the simulation results from the 
WITS/SMART model, Table 6.8 shows the trade-creation effects of the adoption of the 
ECOWAS FTA by Cote d’Ivoire. 
Table 6. 8: Trade Creation Effects of the ECOWAS FTA on Cote d’Ivoire (US$ Millions) 
HS Code Product Description Trade Creation 
240220 Cigarette containing tobacco 514 
271011 Light oils and preparation 4.6 
03379 Fish and Crustacean 3.8 
252210 Quicklime 2.9 
Other Other products 12.93 
Total  538.23 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on Smart Simulations 
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As shown in Table 6.8, the coming into effect of the ECOWAS FTA is expected to result in 
ECOWAS firms expanding their trade into Cote d’Ivoire by US$ 538.23 million. Trade creation 
is traditionally viewed as being positive for the consumer, as it represents the additional 
quantities that the consumers could afford thanks to the liberalisation (Lang, 2006). However, 
some of this increase in consumption may be at the detriment of national producers, if the goods 
concerned were purchased from national producers’ ex-ante.  
Products that bear the largest trade creation are cigarettes containing tobacco, light oils and 
preparation, fish and quicklimes (see Table 6.8). 
There is no significant trade diversion in Cote d’Ivoire. The trade diversion from the ECOWAS 
FTA resulted in US$25 million which is a small amount compared to the trade creation. This, 
therefore, means that ECOWAS member States level of efficiency is very low, such that the 
MFN rates applied to firms outside ECOWAS could not deter them from supplying the Ivorian 
market. This outcome is consistent with the findings of Kumar and Ahmed (2014), Mugano 
(2013), Cernat (2003) and the argument of Meade (1955), Ohyama (1972), Kemp and Wan 
(1976) and Amponsah (2002), who all discovered that some regional groupings’ tariff rates are 
too weak to divert trade from third parties. 
(b) The Revenue Effect 
The implication of the ECOWAS FTA on member States’ fiscal revenue is one of the 
contentious issues under discussion at the regional level. Kumar and Ahmed (2014) noted that a 
free trade agreement has a negative effect of tariff revenue.  Hence, there are fears that the tariff 
cuts that would have to be implemented by most ECOWAS countries to conform to the FTA 
rates would result in tariff revenue shortfalls for most countries.  
Cote d’Ivoire is among the countries that are supposed to undertake a huge transformation of 
their national tariff structures, in order to conform to the ECOWAS FTA rates. As demonstrated 
in Chapter 2, only 1.44 per cent of Cote d’Ivoire’s tariff lines are zero-rated. This, therefore, 
means that 98.56 per cent of the tariff lines, would have to be liberalised.  
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Table 6.9 shows the revenue implications of the ECOWAS FTA on Cote d’Ivoire. The 
WITS/SMART simulations estimate that Cote d’Ivoire would have a total fiscal revenue loss of 
US$28.9 million if the ECOWAS FTA is implemented. The size of this revenue loss is 
insignificant, as it is only 8.2 per cent of the 2014 GDP. However, it is worth noting that the 
revenue loss expected, as a result of the ECOWAS FTA, is insignificant, as it constitutes 0.47 
per cent of the total tax revenue in 2014.  
Although there are only 1.44 per cent of the tariffs that are zero-rated, it is clear from this result, 
that most tariffs are very low, and any movement to zero duties would not affect revenue 
significantly. 
Table 6. 9: Revenue Effect of the ECOWAS FTA on Cote d’Ivoire (US$ Millions) 
HS Code Product Description Revenue Loss 
240220 Cigarette containing tobacco -3.5 
271011 Lights oils and preparations -2.4 
30379 Fish and Crustaceans -2.3 
630900 Worn clothing and other worn articles -1.7 
Other Other products -19 
Total  -28.9 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on Smart Simulations 
The major revenue loss comes from cigarette and lights oils and preparations, with a total loss of 
US$5.9 million (see Table 6.9). This is confirmed by the study of Kumar and Ahmed (2014), 
who looked at the revenue impact of a SAFTA on Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Their 
study revealed that in all three countries the revenue loss was insignificant. 
This outcome also confirms the findings of Brenton, Hoppe and Uexkull (2007), who estimated 
the likely impact of COMESA FTA on Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi and Zambia. They found 
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that the impact of the COMESA FTA was insignificant, as all countries would be expected to 
lose less than 1 per cent of their total revenue. 
(c) The Consumer-Welfare Effect 
One of the main arguments in favour of free trade is that consumers would benefit from lower 
prices. Whether or not this would occur depends on the extent of trade creation, as against trade 
diversion (Mugano, 2015). As shown in Table 6.10, the SMART simulation results reveal that 
Cote d’Ivoire would experience a gain in consumer welfare valued at US$37.8 million by 
implementing the ECOWAS FTA.  
Table 6. 10: Welfare Effect of the ECOWAS FTA on Cote d’Ivoire (US$ Millions) 
 
HS Code Product Description Welfare Gains/ Loss 
230220 Floors, meals and pellets, of fish or of rice 35.3 
630900 Worn clothing and other worn articles. 0.2 
271011 Lights oils and preparations 0.18 
Other Other products 2.12 
Total  37.8 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on Smart Simulations 
The total gains in welfare represent 0.61 per cent of the 2014 GDP, which stood at US$34 
billion. This is quite insignificant. However, the contributions of these welfare gains come from 
the same sources that created trade in Cote d’Ivoire. This shows that there is a causal link 
between welfare gains and trade creation in Cote d’Ivoire. The main reason for this marginal 
gain in welfare is expected to be is because the base year used to do the simulations in this study; 
that is, 2014 was almost at the end of the implementation of a ECOWAS FTA, which was 
expected to be fully implemented in 2000. However, the ECOWAS-wide FTA failed to be 
implemented. 
This is also explained by the fact that 1.44 per cent of the Cote d’Ivoire tariff lines are within the 
0 to 5 per cent band. This is a clear sign that Cote d’Ivoire is on course to implement a 
ECOWAS FTA. 
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This outcome, therefore, underscores the fact that ECOWAS FTA has no significant implications 
for the Cote d’Ivoire welfare. Kumar and Ahmed (2014) found similar results in South Asia Free 
Trade Agreement (SAFTA). Their results show that consumer surplus in Pakistan and India were 
small.  
This is also consistent with the findings of McKay et al. (2005) and Karingi et al. (2005), who 
concluded that, although there are at present of net welfare gains in COMESA countries, these 
are insignificant. 
(d) The Impact of ECOWAS FTA on Cote d’Ivoire’s Exports 
Trade liberalisation provides market access beyond boundaries to participating member States. In 
this case, Cote d’Ivoire through ECOWAS FTA, has an additional market of 14 member States. 
ECOWAS has a population of more than 335 million people with a Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) of US$510 billion (AFDB, 2015). ECOWAS represents a ready market for Cote d’Ivoire. 
Has Cote d’Ivoire been able to increase exports via ECOWAS? This is one of the research 
questions to be answered in this study. 
Using the WITS/SMART model, exporters’ point of views is used to evaluate whether Cote 
d’Ivoire has been able to increase its exports after implementing the ECOWAS FTA. Table 6.11 
shows Cote d’Ivoire’s exports before ECOWAS FTA, its exports after ECOWAS FTA, and the 
changes in exports and geographical distribution of Cote d’Ivoire’s exports within the ECOWAS 
market. 
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Table 6. 11: Impact of ECOWAS FTA on Cote d’Ivoire Exports (US$ Millions) 
 
Partner Exports Before Exports After Change in Exports Share of Exports 
Nigeria 2885.89 3410.3 524.41 91.21 
Senegal 95.41 94.2 -1.21 2.52 
Ghana 71.15 89.71 18.56 2.40 
Guinee 44.21 53.84 9.63 1.44 
Burkina Faso 30.33 33.21 2.88 0.89 
Togo 24 28 4 0.75 
Benin 12.45 12.48 0.03 0.33 
Mali 6.84 7.64 0.8 0.20 
Guinee Bissau 5.11 5.03 -0.08 0.13 
Liberia 2.05 2.22 0.17 0.06 
Niger 1.77 1.84 0.07 0.05 
Sierra Leone 0.31 0.44 0.13 0.01 
Gambia 0.061 0.072 0.011 0.00 
Total 3179.581 3738.982 559.401 100 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on Smart Simulations 
The coming into effect of a ECOWAS FTA is expected to lead to a marginal increase in Cote 
d’Ivoire’s exports of US$559.401 million. This result is in line with the findings of Korinek and 
Melatos (2009). According to Korinek and Melatos (2009), the low level of trade among member 
states is caused by supply-side constraints and the lack of complementarities in the product 
traded, the lack of basic infrastructure, such as information, communication technologies, and 
poor roads the consequent lack of connectivity in most cases. 
However, it is important to note that Cote d’Ivoire’s trade in terms of exports via ECOWAS is 
skewed towards very few countries (three countries in particular). The lion’s share of Cote 
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d’Ivoire’s exports goes to Nigeria with 91.21 per cent. Senegal and Ghana followed with a total 
share of 2.52 per cent and 2.40 per cent of total exports, respectively (see Table 6.12). This 
outcome is consistent with the geographical distribution of Cote d’Ivoire’s exports (as discussed 
in Chapter 3). It is therefore, clear that Cote d’Ivoire is failing to exploit any new markets in 
ECOWAS. 
Table 6. 12: Cote d’Ivoire Major Exports to ECOWAS FTA (US$ Millions) 
 
HS Code Product Description Value 
871419 Tanks and other fighting vehicles 2.12 
240220 Cigarette containing tobacco 540.73 
270900 Petroleum oils 2786 
271113 Butanes 40 
380891 Insecticides 9.24 
870421 Dumpers designed for off-highway use 20.99 
520852 Plain weave, weighing more than 100g/m2 5.06 
761490 Aluminium reservoir, tanks and similar containers 7.55 
30379 Fish and crustaceans 2.49 
250100 Salt and pure sodium chloride 10.69 
330610 Dentifrices 5.55 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
Table 6.12 shows that Cote d’Ivoire’s major exports to ECOWAS FTA include petroleum oils, 
cigarette containing tobacco, butanes and insecticides. Most of these exports are destined to go to 
Nigeria. Again, Cote d’Ivoire’s exports are mainly concentrated in primary and semi-produced 
commodities. 
(e) The Impact of ECOWAS FTA on Cote d’Ivoire’s Imports  
Based on SMART simulations, Cote d’Ivoire’s imports from ECOWAS are expected to record a 
marginal increase of US$538 million, which is merely a result of the trade-creation effect. Table 
6.13 shows the Cote d’Ivoire’s major imports from ECOWAS after FTA. 
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Table 6. 13: Cote d’Ivoire’s Major Imports from the ECOWAS FTA (US$ Millions) 
HS Code Product Description Value 
270900 Petroleum oils 2928 
890520 Floating or submersible drilling or production platforms 2682 
100630 Semi-milled or wholly milled rice 347 
30379 Fish and Crustaceans and other aquatic invertebrate 194 
300490 Medicaments containing vitamins or other antibiotics  178 
100190 Seed 177 
870323 Vehicles 161 
100640 Broken rice 125 
271113 Butanes 117 
252310 Cement clinkers 107 
240120 Tobacco partly or wholly stemmed 100 
271011 Lights oils and preparations 98 
30371 Sardines 89 
843143 Parts for boring or sinking machinery 68 
870421 Dumpers designed for off-highway use 64 
Other Other Products not specified above 5557 
Total Imports 12992 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on Smart Simulations 
As shown in Table 6.13, petroleum products, boats and floating structures, rice, fish and 
crustacean and other aquatic invertebrate, antibiotics, wheat and meslin and vehicles are the top 
Cote d’Ivoire’s imports from ECOWAS market, with import bills of US$2.92 billion, US$2.68 
billion, US$347 million, US$194 million, US$178 million, US$177 million, and US$176 
million, respectively. The lion’s share of these imports comes from Nigeria.  
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(f) Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness Tests 
Given the uncertainty on the actual values for the Armington and demand elasticities means that 
rigorous sensitivity analysis was required to ensure the robustness of the results presented in the 
study. Initially, a ‘base-case’ simulation was run, using the elasticities from Armington, Stern 
and Tokarick (as discussed in Chapter 5). Given the possible sensitivity of the models’ results to 
the elasticity values, the researcher had to re-run the simulations under varying assumptions. 
Upper-bound and lower-bound limits were established for various elasticities (see Table 5.1).  
Finally, given that the aim of the study was to determine the likely impact of ECOWAS CET on 
Cote d’Ivoire, a ‘worst-case’ scenario was devised using the upper-bound values by adding 4. 
Appendix 3(a) reports on the sensitivity analysis and robustness tests for trade-creation effects in 
Cote d’Ivoire’s after the adoption of a ECOWAS FTA. Reducing the trade-elasticity value to 0.5 
shows no change in trade creation from the base case in Cote d’Ivoire’s. Likewise, increasing 
trade elasticities to 2 and 6 brings no changes in trade creation. The outcome shows that Cote 
d’Ivoire’s total change in imports remains the same in value, although its composition changes as 
economic agents come into effect across various imports. 
Appendix 3(b) reports the sensitivity analysis and robustness tests on the revenue effect in Cote 
d’Ivoire after the implementation of ECOWAS FTA. Reducing trade elasticity to 0.5 reduces the 
revenue loss by 27.14 per cent. Increasing trade elasticity values to 2 and 6 would, respectively, 
increase the revenue loss by 29.88 per cent and 37.17 per cent, respectively. The resulting 
deviations from the middle-ground results are generally insignificant. Accordingly, the middle 
ground estimates could be within sight of the potential sizes.  
Appendix 3(c) reports the sensitivity analysis and robustness tests on the welfare effect in Cote 
d’Ivoire after the implementation of ECOWAS FTA. Reducing trade elasticity to 0.5 increases 
the welfare gain by 27.83 per cent. Increasing the trade elasticity values to 2 and 6 respectively, 
would increase the welfare gains by 37.78 per cent and 37.68 per cent. Although the margin of 
error is slightly higher than 10 per cent in the lower bound and worst-case scenario, the deviation 
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of welfare gains from the base results in absolute terms is insignificant (see appendix 3(c)). 
Accordingly, the middle-ground estimates could be within sight of the potential sizes.  
Appendix 4(a) reports on the results of the sensitivity analysis and the robustness tests on exports 
in Cote d’Ivoire after the implementation of ECOWAS FTA. Reducing trade elasticities to 0.5 is 
expected to cause an increase in exports by 16.98 per cent. Increasing trade elasticity values to 2 
and 6, respectively, would increase exports by 17.99 per cent and 18.1 per cent. The resulting 
deviations from the middle-ground results are generally insignificant. Accordingly, the middle 
ground estimates could be within sight of the potential sizes.  
Appendix 4(b) reports on the sensitivity analysis and the robustness tests on imports in Cote 
d’Ivoire after the implementation of ECOWAS FTA. Reducing the trade elasticity value to 0.5 
shows no change in imports from the base case in Cote d’Ivoire. Likewise, increasing trade 
elasticities to 2 and 6, brings no changes in the trade creation. The outcome shows that Cote 
d’Ivoire’s total change in imports remains the same in value, although its composition changes as 
economic agents are introduced across various imports. 
6.5  Summary 
This chapter has presented the empirical findings and analysis of the revenue and welfare 
implications of the ECOWAS customs union and the ECOWAS FTA on Cote d’Ivoire. A 
detailed presentation of the SMART simulation results and their analysis was undertaken. This 
was aimed at the impact of the ECOWAS customs union and the ECOWAS FTA on trade 
creation, trade diversion, revenue, welfare, imports and exports, which are some of the objectives 
of the study. 
All product categories reveal positive trade-creation effects totalling US$1.49 billion, resulting in 
net welfare gains for Cote d’Ivoire if the country adopts ECOWAS CET. For the importing 
country, in this case Cote d’Ivoire, trade diversion is neutral. It does not affect the overall 
imported quantity; but it re-allocates the market shares among the exporting partners based on 
the new relative prices. The increase in imports from the ECOWAS countries is balanced by a 
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decrease in imports from the rest of the world, which results in the trade diversion being equal to 
zero. Thus, trade creation is the only influence on total social welfare.    
The WITS/SMART simulations estimate that Cote d’Ivoire will have a total fiscal revenue loss 
of US$286 million if the ECOWAS CET is implemented, which is shared across all product 
categories. The SMART simulation results reveal that Cote d’Ivoire will experience a gain in 
consumer welfare valued at US$86.23 million by implementing the ECOWAS customs union. 
The total gains in welfare appear to be insignificant.  
Cote d’Ivoire, on the one hand, is expected to witness a marginal decline in exports by 0.54 per 
cent. On the other hand, the country’s imports are expected to increase by 0.87 per cent if it 
implements the ECOWAS customs union. 
ECOWAS FTA will result in trade creation that should offset any trade diversion, resulting in net 
welfare gains for Cote d’Ivoire. If Cote d’Ivoire removes all the tariffs against imports from the 
ECOWAS region and imposes the agreed ECOWAS CET on non-ECOWAS countries, this 
would result in a trade expansion valued at US$538.23 million. The WITS/SMART simulations 
estimate that Cote d’Ivoire will have a total fiscal revenue loss of US$28.9 million if the 
ECOWAS FTA is implemented. SMART simulation results reveal that Cote d’Ivoire will 
experience a gain in consumer welfare valued at US$37.8 million by implementing the 
ECOWAS FTA. ECOWAS FTA is expected to stimulate Cote d’Ivoire’s imports and exports by 
US$538 million and US$559.4 million, respectively. 
Cote d’Ivoire’s exports across the board (whether in customs union or an FTA) were dominated 
by primary and semi-processed products, such as vehicles, petroleum oils, tobacco, butanes, as 
well as insecticides and fish. Within ECOWAS, Cote d’Ivoire’s trade was skewed mainly 
towards Nigeria. 
The study tested for robustness of the results. Based on the reports of sensitivity analysis and 
robustness tests, the results show that deviations from the middle ground results are generally 
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insignificant. Accordingly, the middle-ground estimates could be within sight of the potential 
sizes.  
The next chapter presents the empirical findings and the analysis of the revenue, welfare, trade 
creation, exports and imports implications of the WAEMU customs union and WAEMU free 
trade agreement on Cote d’Ivoire. The first section will present the impact of the WAEMU 
customs union on Cote d’Ivoire; this will be followed by a discussion on the implications of 
WAEMU FTA for Cote d’Ivoire. The SMART simulation results and their analysis are aimed at 
addressing the research question posed in the study. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE IMPACT OF WAEMU COMMITMENTS ON COTE D’IVOIRE 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter Seven presents the empirical findings and the analysis of the implications of the 
WAEMU customs union and WAEMU FTA on Cote d’Ivoire. In this section, the study estimates 
the impact of various trade-policy regimes on trade creation and diversion, imports, exports, 
revenue and welfare on Cote d’Ivoire. The analysis was conducted using WITS/SMART model. 
The study adopted the year 2014 as a base year for simulation, using trade information databases, 
such as TRAINS, COMTRADE and WTO-IDB.  
In this study, the SMART model was used, based on information contained in the UNCTAD 
managed TRAINS database. The year 2014 was chosen because that is the latest year for Cote 
d’Ivoire in the WITS/SMART software for Cote d’Ivoire. For a WAEMU customs union, the 
WITS/SMART model used the common external tariff, as specified in the WAEMU 
nomenclature for essential goods, raw materials, intermediate goods and finished goods as 0 per 
cent, 5 per cent, 10 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively. For WAEMU FTA, a 0 per cent is 
applied to all tariff lines trading with Cote d’Ivoire, and with the other 7 WAEMU members.  
These tariffs (for WAEMU FTA and WAEMU customs union) applied in the WITS/SMART 
model against the actual tariffs applied by the Cote d’Ivoire customs authorities in 2014 were 
saved in the TRAINS databases. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 7.2 examines a 
comparison of Cote d’Ivoire’s tariff structure and those of the WAEMU CET. Section 7.3 
examines a comparison of Cote d’Ivoire’s tariff structure with WAEMU FTA rates. Section 7.4 
discusses the WITS/SMART model simulation results for the WAEMU customs union and 
WAEMU FTA. Section 7.5 provides a summary of the chapter. 
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7.2 A Comparison of Cote d’Ivoire’s Tariff Structure and the WAEMU CET 
The WAEMU customs union provides for the free movement of goods between member 
countries and application of a common external tariff (CET) on imports from other countries. 
WAEMU has member States with overlapping membership with ECOWAS (Diop, 2015). 
Hence, in the spirit of harmonisation of trade rules among the regional blocs to ease trade 
facilitation, the WAEMU CET has been harmonized with that of the ECOWAS CET. This study 
has used the common external tariff adopted by the WAEMU members since its inception in 
2000. 
Cote d’Ivoire’s tariff structure and the WAEMU CET are both based on a cascading principle, 
whereby the duty charged is proportionate to the level of value added. Final goods are levied the 
highest rates, while raw materials and capital goods are charged lower tariff rates. This is done, 
in order to promote the manufacturing sector, and to protect the industries producing the finished 
products from outside competition.  
 In Cote d’Ivoire’s CET tariff regime, the 20 per cent band is the most significant, with 2165 
tariff lines, which translates into 36.7 per cent of the total tariff lines. The 5 per cent tariff band 
comes second, at 36.37 per cent of the total tariff lines, and then the 10 per cent band at 23.27 per 
cent of the total tariff lines, the 35 per cent band at 2.2 per cent of the total tariff lines and the 0 
per cent tariff band at 1.44 per cent of the total tariff lines (ITC, 2012).  
The tariff adjustment that should be undertaken to comply with the CET is likely to have a 
significant impact on the country’s industrial performance, consumer welfare and revenue 
earnings. The effects will be discussed in the next section under the SMART simulation results. 
7.3 A Comparison of Cote d’Ivoire’s Tariff Structure and the WAEMU FTA 
Cote d’Ivoire’s tariff structure is more complex compared to the WAEMU FTA.  The country is 
among the few countries in the region with high tariffs some of which are close to 100 percent.  
The country remains a very protective country with only 94.49 tariff lines, that is, 5.51 percent of 
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total tariff lines are zero rated duties (see table 2.2). It therefore means that Cote d’Ivoire has 
94.49 percent of tariff lines remaining has to be liberalised. 
7.4 SMART Model Simulation Results 
A discussion of the results of the SMART Model simulations in terms of trade creation and trade 
diversion, imports, exports, revenue and welfare effects will be explored in this section. 
7.4.1 WAEMU Customs Union 
A discussion on the impact of a WAEMU customs union on Cote d’Ivoire is carried out in this 
section. Specifically, the impact of WAEMU CET on trade creation, trade diversion, revenue, 
welfare, imports and exports will be reviewed. 
(a)  Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 
Trade creation means that more efficient or lower-cost producers in any of the WAEMU 
countries would displace the less-efficient or higher-cost producers in Cote d’Ivoire; and 
consumers would, therefore, benefit from lower prices (Viner, 2014). 
However, some producers in Cote d’Ivoire would be negatively affected, as their products are 
substituted by products efficiently produced in other countries in the WAEMU region. This 
implies that Ivorian industries have to improve their production efficiency and competitive edge 
in preparation for the customs union.  
Trade diversion, on the other hand, implies that more efficient suppliers from outside the 
WAEMU customs union are displaced by less efficient producers within the customs union. This 
will be costly for the country, as revenue that would have been generated from imports from 
outside the WAEMU region is lost, and the products become more expensive, since they would 
be sourced from higher-cost producers. This implies that consumers will be forced to accept 
lower quality goods (Andriamananjara, 2011).  
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Using the simulation results from the WITS/SMART model, Table 7.1 shows the trade creation 
and trade diversion effects of the adoption of the WAEMU CET by Cote d’Ivoire. 
Table 7. 1: Trade Creation and Trade Diversion Effects of the WAEMU CET on Cote 
d’Ivoire (US$ Millions) 
Product Category Trade Creation Trade Diversion Total Trade Effects 
Raw Materials 1793 0 1793 
Intermediate Goods 1043 0 1043 
Finished Goods 0 0 0 
Total 2836 0 2836 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on Smart Simulations 
The coming into effect of the WAEMU customs union is expected to create a total trade of 
US$2.83 billion for Cote d’Ivoire from its WAEMU member States (see Table 7.1). The results 
confirm the outcome of the study carried out by Goretti and Weisfeld (2008), which shows that 
the implementation of the WAEMU customs union by Cote d’Ivoire is expected to result in trade 
expansion for the country.   
The increase in imports is mainly made up of raw materials and intermediate goods, which Cote 
d’Ivoire imports in these categories, rising by US$ 1.79 billion, US$ 1.04 billion, respectively 
(see Table 7.1). Prior to the trade reforms within WAEMU, the Cote d’Ivoire market was 
protected from foreign competition through high tariffs and other non-tariff barriers, such as 
import quotas. Hence, the inefficient industries in Cote d’Ivoire were able to supply their 
domestic market. With trade liberalisation within WAEMU, commodities from WAEMU were 
able to dislodge Cote d’Ivoire products, which are inefficiently produced, from the market. This 
is welfare-enhancing to households in Cote d’Ivoire, as consumers are now able to increase their 
savings, as they now buy the same commodities at a lower price, thanks to trade liberalisation.  
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However, the Ivorian industry will be threatened with these imports; and if the Government of 
Cote d’Ivoire does not put in place a financial facility to assist industry in raising its 
competitiveness, the country will be faced with the closure of some of its industries. Table 7.2 
shows the major trade-creating products.  
Table 7. 2: Sensitive Sectors 
HS Code Product Description Trade Creation 
240220 Cigarette Containing tobacco 1287 
481910 Cartons, boxes and cases, of corrugated paper or 
paper and paperboard 
31 
870332 Vehicles 22 
 Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
Industries, which are likely to be worst hit by trade liberalisation are those engaged in tobacco 
and manufactured tobacco substitutes, paper and paperboard and motor vehicles (sensitive 
sectors).  
There was no evidence of trade diversion in Cote d’Ivoire. The outcome is consistent with the 
findings of Shinyekwa and Katunze (2016), Mugano (2013), Cernat (2003) and the arguments of 
Meade (1955), Ohyama (1972), Kemp and Wan (1976) and Amponsah (2002), who all found 
that some of the regional groupings in CET were too weak to divert any trade from third parties. 
(b) Revenue Effect 
The implication of the WAEMU CET on member States’ fiscal revenue is one of the contentious 
issues under discussion at the regional level. There are fears that the tariff cuts that have to be 
implemented by most WAEMU countries to conform to the CET rates will result in tariff 
revenue shortfalls for most countries.  
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Table 7.3 shows the revenue implications of the WAEMU customs union on Cote d’Ivoire for 
the year 2014. The WITS/SMART simulations estimate that Cote d’Ivoire will have a total fiscal 
revenue loss of US$449 million as a result of the WAEMU CET for the year 2014. All the 
product categories will experience revenue losses. This outcome is consistent with the findings 
of Makochekanwa (2012), who observed that Zimbabwe will lose US$71.2 million in customs 
revenue if it adopts the tripartite FTA under COMESA, SADC and East African Community 
(EAC). 
Table 7. 3: Revenue Effect of WAEMU CET on Cote d’Ivoire (US$ Millions) 
Product Category Revenue Loss 
Raw Materials -250 
Intermediate Goods -42.66 
Finished Goods -0 
Total -292.66 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations  
The total loss in revenue represents 4.78 per cent of the total tax revenue collected in the same 
year. The revenue loss is, therefore, significant. This outcome is related to the findings by other 
researchers on customs unions in the region. The CET is likely to cause a tariff revenue 
reduction amounting to US$349 million in the entire EAC region (Shinyekwa, and Katunze 
2016). Shinyekwa and Katunze (2016) found that much of this losses was accounted by Uganda 
and Kenya.  
Castro, Kraus, and de la Rocha, (2004) found similar result where they concluded that a CET is 
likely to cause a tariff revenue reduction of 11 per cent of customs revenue in the EAC region. 
Table 7.4 below shows the five products with the highest revenue losses.  
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Table 7. 4: Largest Loss in Revenue by Product (US$ Millions) 
HS Code Product Description Revenue Loss % of Total Loss 
87 Vehicles other than railway, and parts  -59.15 -13.17 
03 Fish and crustacean -32.13 -7.16 
02 Meat -22.44 -5 
10 Cereals  -21.9 -4.88 
07 Edible vegetables -12.71 -2.83 
Other Other Products not specified above -144.33 -49.31 
Total  -292.66 100 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
Vehicles and parts will show the largest loss in revenue in Cote d’Ivoire as a result of the 
WAEMU CET with a 13.17 per cent of total loss in revenue (see Table 7.4). This is followed by 
fish and crustaceans, meat, cereals, and editable vegetables with revenue losses of US$32.13 
million and US$22.44 million, US$21.9 million and US$12.71 million, respectively.  
In Cote d’Ivoire, vehicles currently attract total applied ad valorem tariff of 14.42 per cent. 
Under the WAEMU regime, vehicles and parts are treated as raw materials and intermediate 
goods, which means that they would attract a duty rate of 5 and 10 per cent. Other vehicles are 
treated as finished goods, and would attract a duty rate of 20 per cent. 
(c) The Consumer-Welfare Effect 
Deardorff (2014) defined consumer welfare as the distinct personal benefits that derived from 
consuming a particular good or service. This theory finds individual assessment and 
measurement to be crucial in determining the levels of satisfaction. It is significant to note that 
the rationale behind trade liberalisation is to improve the consumer welfare through lower prices. 
In theory trade liberalisation has also had a positive effect on the producers’ welfare. Thus, 
producers will specialize to produce for a larger market. Hindriks, Myles and Gareth (2013) 
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revealed that a higher level of competition within a region will improve the production 
technique.   
As shown in Table 7.5, the SMART simulation results reveal that Cote d’Ivoire will experience a 
gain in consumer welfare valued at US$ 8.67 million by implementing the WAEMU customs 
union. Makochekanwa (2012), estimating the implications of the COMESA/SADC/EAC 
tripartite agreement obtained the related results of a welfare gain of US$14.4 million for 
Zimbabwe.  
The product categories that exhibit welfare gains are raw materials and intermediate goods 
whereas finished goods did not experience any welfare gains. Intermediate goods recorded 
welfare gains of US$4.08 million, followed by raw materials with a consumer surplus of 
US$4.59 million. 
The gain in welfare from intermediate goods and raw materials can be explained by the need to 
align import duty on raw materials to five per cent, and 10 per cent as is expected for 
intermediate goods. This would improve households’ welfare.  
Table 7. 5: Welfare Effect of the WAEMU CET on Cote d’Ivoire (US$ Millions) 
Product Category Welfare Effect 
Raw Materials 4.59 
Intermediate Goods 4.08 
Finished Goods 0 
Total 8.67 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations  
Welfare gains are insignificant in Cote d’Ivoire, as they represent only 0.14 per cent of 2014 
GDP of US$34.25 billion. This outcome is consistent with the findings from Shinyekwa and 
Katunze (2016). 
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Shinyekwa and Katunze (2016) observed that the introduction of the EAC customs union 
sensitive products will amounts to US$ 3.1 billion for all EAC partner States. They also noted 
that consumer surplus in Kenya increased from US$6 million to US$20 million, which was 
insignificant. 
(d) The Impact of WAEMU Customs Union on Cote d’Ivoire’s Exports 
According to trade theory, trade liberalisation provides extra market access to member States in a 
free trade agreement. Has Cote d’Ivoire been able to penetrate new markets in WAEMU?  
One of the objectives of this study is to evaluate the impact of the WAEMU customs union on 
Cote d’Ivoire’s exports. Table 7.6 shows the developments in Cote d’Ivoire’s exports before the 
customs union and after the WAEMU customs union. 
Table 7. 6: Impact on Exports on Cote d’Ivoire after WAEMU CET (US$ Millions) 
Product Category Exports Before Exports After Change in Exports 
Raw Materials 324.56 306.61 -17.95 
Intermediate Goods 265.55 261.86 -3.69 
Finished Goods 379.06 379.06 0 
Total 969.17 947.53 -21.64 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Simulations Based on SMART Simulations 
Overall, Cote d’Ivoire’s exports into WAEMU are expected to fall by US$ 21.64 million if the 
country adopts the WAEMU customs union (see Table 7.6). One possible explanation for the 
decline in exports is the lack of competitiveness of Cote d’Ivoire’s products especially on raw 
materials and intermediate goods. For finished goods, WAEMU member States under the 
WAEMU regime would import the same quantities of goods from Cote d’Ivoire before and after 
the WAEMU CET. From the SMART simulation analysis, the concentration of Cote d’Ivoire’s 
exports is made up of raw materials and intermediate goods, which by their nature are expected 
to fetch low export revenue. 
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This result is consistent with the findings of Shinyekwa and Katunze (2016) who examined the 
performance of sensitive products in member countries after the establishment of a common 
external tariff. They found that poor performance is revealed among cotton and clothing products 
which experiences a significant decline in intra-EAC trade. 
 (e) The Impact of WAEMU Customs Union on Cote d’Ivoire’s Imports 
The Trade creation, which has been witnessed in this study, has a strong bearing on Cote 
d’Ivoire’s imports. The impact of the WAEMU customs union on Cote d’Ivoire’s imports is one 
of the objectives of this study. Table 7.7 shows how Cote d’Ivoire’s imports responded to the 
WAEMU customs union.  
Table 7. 7: Market View on Cote d’Ivoire after WAEMU CET (US$ Millions) 
Product Category Imports Before Imports After Change in Imports 
Raw Materials 171 323 152 
Intermediate Goods 124 163 39 
Finished Goods 1.1 1.1 0 
Total 334 507 173 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
Overall, Cote d’Ivoire’s imports from WAEMU after the WAEMU customs union are expected 
to increase by US$ 173 million (see Table 7.7). This increase is caused by trade creation effects. 
The surge in imports is expected to be driven up mainly in raw material, such as tobacco 
products, fish and other crustacean, cartons, boxes and cases of corrugated paper. 
This is supported by Shinyekwa and Katunze (2016) who noted that EAC partner countries have 
reduced imports from the rest of the world as EAC countries turn to regional suppliers after 
applying the CET to foreign suppliers. 
 
 THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALISATION ON COTE D’IVOIRE 
 
204 
 
(f) Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness Tests 
Given the uncertainty on the actual values for the Armington and demand elasticities, this means 
that a rigorous sensitivity analysis was required to ensure the robustness of the results presented 
in the study. Initially, a ‘base-case’ simulation was run, using the elasticities from Armington, 
Stern and Tokarick (as discussed in Chapter 5). Given the possible sensitivity of the models’ 
results to the elasticity values, the researcher had to re-run the simulations under varying 
assumptions. Upper bound and lower bound limits were established for various elasticities (see 
Table 5.1).  
Finally, given that the aim of the study was to determine the largest likely impact of WAEMU 
CET on Cote d’Ivoire, a ‘worst-case’ scenario was devised, using the upper-bound values by 
adding 4. 
Appendix 2(a) reports on the sensitivity analysis and robustness tests for the trade-creation 
effects in Cote d’Ivoire after the adoption of a WAEMU CET. Reducing the trade-elasticity 
value to 0.5 shows a change in the trade creation from the base-case in Cote d’Ivoire. Likewise, 
increasing trade elasticities to 2 and 6 bring no changes to trade creation. The outcome shows 
that Cote d’Ivoire’s total change in imports remains the same in value, although the composition 
thereof changes as economic agents substitute across various imports. 
Appendix 2(b) reports on the sensitivity analysis and robustness tests on the revenue effect in 
Cote d’Ivoire after the implementation of WAEMU CET. Reducing trade elasticity to 0.5 
decreases the revenue loss by 0.28 per cent. Increasing the trade elasticity values to 2 and 6 
would, respectively, increase the revenue losses by 0.21 per cent and decrease the revenue losses 
by 0.02 per cent, respectively. A 5 per cent margin of error on the lower bound and upper bound 
limits could be argued to be conservative and feasible; and the resulting deviations from the 
middle ground results would generally be insignificant.  
Accordingly, the middle-ground estimates could be within sight of the potential sizes.  
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Appendix 2(c) reports on the sensitivity analysis and robustness tests on the welfare effect in 
Cote d’Ivoire after the implementation of the WAEMU CET. Reducing trade elasticity to 0.5 
brings no change in the welfare gains. Similarly, increasing the trade elasticity values to 2 and 6 
respectively, bring no change in the welfare gains. The margin of error can be argued to be 
conservative and sensible; and the resulting deviations from the middle ground results are 
generally insignificant. Accordingly, the middle-ground estimates could be within sight of the 
potential sizes.  
Appendix 4(a) reports on the sensitivity analysis and robustness tests on exports in Cote d’Ivoire 
after the implementation of WAEMU CET. Reducing trade elasticity to 0.5 decreases exports by 
1.57 per cent. Increasing the trade elasticity values to 2 and 6, respectively, would decrease 
exports by 2.42 per cent and 4.24 per cent. The resulting deviations from the middle-ground 
results are generally insignificant. Accordingly, the middle-ground estimates could be within 
sight of the potential sizes.  
Appendix 4(b) reports on the sensitivity analysis and the robustness tests on imports in Cote 
d’Ivoire after the implementation of WAEMU CET. Reducing the trade-elasticity value to 0.5 
shows no change in imports from the base case in Cote d’Ivoire. Likewise, increasing trade 
elasticities to 2 and 6 brings about no changes in trade creation. The outcome shows that Cote 
d’Ivoire’s total change in imports remains the same in value, although the composition thereof 
changes as economic agents replace one another across the various imports. 
7.4.2 WAEMU FTA 
The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) is one of the most successful 
experiences of economic integration in Sub-Saharan Africa (Diop, 2015). The WAEMU forms 
one of the focal points shaping Egypt’s increased export orientation towards the African 
continent through the West African gateway, thereby complementing the export promotion 
strategy in place with COMESA in East Africa and CEMAC in Central Africa, in addition to 
major countries with considerable weight, such as Nigeria and South Africa. 
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Cote d’Ivoire’s adoption of the free trade agreement in 1996 and of the CET in 2000 reduced the 
country’s tariff rates (Mansour and Graziosi, 2013). The free trade agreement included the social 
goods only. The WAEMU FTA however, includes all products and will come into effect with the 
removal of import tariffs and related non-trade barriers for WAEMU member states, in order to 
facilitate trade.  
(a) Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 
Regional trade agreements are expected to increase trade among member countries by lowering 
not only tariff rates but also non-tariff barriers (Hayakawa, Ito, and Kimura, 2015). Trade 
creation means that more efficient or lower-cost producers in any of the WAEMU countries 
could displace the less-efficient or higher-cost producers in Cote d’Ivoire; and consumers would, 
therefore, benefit from lower prices. However, some producers in Cote d’Ivoire will be 
negatively affected, as their products are substituted by products efficiently produced in other 
countries in the WAEMU region. This implies that Ivorian industries will have to improve their 
production efficiency and competitive edge in preparation for the FTA.  
If changes in trade patterns due to the regional trade agreements displace lower cost imports 
from the rest of the world, trade diversion results (Korinek and Melatos, 2009). This implies that 
more efficient suppliers from outside the WAEMU FTA will be displaced by less-efficient 
producers within the customs union. This could be costly for the country, as revenue that would 
have been generated from imports from outside the WAEMU region is lost, and the products 
become more expensive, since they would be sourced from higher-cost producers. Using 
simulations results from the WITS/SMART model, Table 7.8 shows the trade-creation and the 
trade-diversion effects of the adoption of the WAEMU FTA by Cote d’Ivoire. 
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Table 7. 8: Trade Creation Effects of the WAEMU FTA on Cote d’Ivoire (US$ Millions) 
HS Code Product Description Trade Creation 
271011  Lights oils and preparations 9.88 
871190 Tanks and other armoured fighting vehicle 1.4 
250100 Salt (including table salt and denatured salt) 1.28 
630312 Blanket of synthetic fibres 0.72 
Other Other products 1.25 
Total  14.53 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
The WAEMU FTA, once it comes into effect, will see the dismantlement of tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers. This would enable efficient foreign firms from WAEMU, who initially failed to enter 
the Ivorian market, due to trade barriers, would now be able to dislodge local firms (see Table 
7.8). Exports of WAEMU member states into Cote d’Ivoire are expected to grow by US$14.53 
million (trade creation). Cote d’Ivoire’s major imports, which show a significant response to 
WAEMU FTA include lights oils and preparations, tanks and other armoured vehicles – with 
total export receipts of US$9.88 million, US$1.4 million, respectively. On the one hand, this has 
a negative effect on Cote d’Ivoire’s industry, especially those that are involved in the 
manufacture of those commodities with which WAEMU member States have created trade. On 
the other hand, consumers stand to benefit from cheaper imported products from WAEMU. 
There was no significant effect of a trade-diversion. This result is consistent with the findings 
from previous researchers. Shinyekwa and Katunze, 2016; Mugano et al, 2013; Abdelmalik, 
Sandretto and Jallab, 2007; Cernat, 2003; Amponsah, 2002; Lewis et al, 1999.   
These researchers noted that some regional groupings’ tariff rates were too weak to divert trade 
from third parties, thereby leading to a higher trade-creation effect than the trade-diversion 
effects. 
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(b)  The Revenue Effect 
The implications of the WAEMU FTA on member States’ fiscal revenue is one of the 
contentious issues under discussion at the regional level. Since developing countries rely on 
tariffs more heavily than developed countries, there are fears that the tariff cuts that have to be 
implemented by most WAEMU countries to conform to the FTA rates will result in tariff-
revenue shortfalls for most countries.  
Table 7.9 shows the revenue implications of the WAEMU FTA on Cote d’Ivoire. The 
WITS/SMART simulations estimate that Cote d’Ivoire will have a total fiscal revenue loss of 
US$ 10.5 million when the WAEMU FTA is implemented.  
Table 7. 9: Revenue Effect of the WAEMU FTA on Cote d’Ivoire (US$ Millions) 
HS Code Product Description Revenue Loss 
27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils -3.4 
25 Salt -1.8 
87  Motor Vehicles -1.1 
85 Electrical Products -0.34 
Other Other products -3.86 
Total  -10.5 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations  
Cote d’Ivoire is expected to lose US$ 10.5 million of customs revenue if it implements the 
WAEMU FTA. This is not a significant loss; it represents 0.17 per cent of the 2014 total tax 
revenue.  This outcome is consistent with the findings of Makochekanwa (2012), who observed 
that Zimbabwe will lose US$71.2 million in customs revenue if it adopts the tripartite FTA under 
COMESA, SADC and EAC.  
Major losers in terms of revenue are mineral fuels, with a combined loss of US$3.4 million, 
followed by salt, motor vehicles and electrical products. These items comprise the second 
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casualty of revenue loss for Cote d’Ivoire with a loss valued at US$1.8 million, US$1.1 million 
and US$0.34 million, respectively. In Cote d’Ivoire, mineral fuels currently attract duty rates of 
about 60 per cent. Under the FTA mineral fuels from WAEMU would have to be duty-free. This 
represents a tremendous climb-down in the tariffs on mineral fuels. 
 (c)  The Consumer-Welfare Effect 
One of the main arguments in support of free trade is that consumers will benefit from lower 
prices. Whether or not this will occur depends on the extent of trade creation, as against trade 
diversion (Viner, 1950). For Cote d’Ivoire, this study shows that the total trade creation will 
surpass the trade diversion, which means that consumers will benefit from the implementation of 
the free trade agreement.   
As shown in Table 7.10, the SMART simulation results reveal that Cote d’Ivoire will experience 
a gain in consumer welfare, valued at US$1.21 million, by implementing the WAEMU FTA. 
Major contributors to welfare gains are: Lights oils and preparations, tanks and other armoured 
fighting vehicle and worn clothing and other worn article (see Table 7.10). 
Table 7. 10: Welfare Effect of the WAEMU FTA on Cote d’Ivoire (US$ Millions) 
HS Code Product Description Welfare Gains/ Loss 
271011 Lights oils and preparations 0.43 
871190 Tanks and other armoured fighting vehicle 0.064 
630900 Worn clothing and other worn article 0.042 
Other Other products 0.674 
Total  1.21 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
Although the WAEMU FTA is welfare-improving in Cote d’Ivoire, it is still insignificant, as it 
represents a mere 0.02 per cent of 2014 GDP. This therefore, means that its impact will not be 
felt across the country. This is consistent with the findings of Keck and Piermartini (2005). They 
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revealed that SADC FTA results in welfare improvements, although in most cases these were 
insignificant. 
(d) The Impact of WAEMU FTA on Cote d’Ivoire’s Exports  
The West African and Economic Union (WAEMU) was created in 1994 by seven West African 
countries using the CFA franc (common currency). The main purpose of the WAEMU is to 
intensify the competitiveness of economic and financial activities of west African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU, 2014). This is done by developing an open market and a 
harmonized legal environment. The WAEMU has implemented a common market based on the 
free movement of persons, goods, services, capital, and the right of establishment. 
The WAEMU presents Cote d’Ivoire with a market access to 7 countries with a population of 
80.34 million people, GDP of US$88.55 billion and income per capita of US$1.1 billion using 
purchasing-power parity. The WAEMU is an important market for Cote d’Ivoire, which has 
historically been a major source of imports, and an export destination (as outlined in Chapter 2). 
The question pertinent to this study is whether Cote d’Ivoire has been able to take advantage of 
this market access. Table 7.11 shows the impact of WAEMU FTA on Cote d’Ivoire’s exports, as 
reported from the exporters’ point of view. 
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Table 7. 11: The Impact of WAEMU FTA on Cote d’Ivoire’s Exports (US$ Million) 
Partners Exports 
Before 
Exports After Change in 
Exports 
Share of   Exports 
(%) 
Benin 13.17 13.25 0.08 3.84 
Mali 8.15 9.25 1.1 2.68 
Senegal 166.64 169.28 2.64 49.16 
Togo 64.13 76.16 12.03 22.12 
Burkina Faso 64.02 69.29 5.27 20.12 
Guinee Bissau 5.11 5.11 0 1.48 
Niger 1.85 1.94 0.09 0.56 
Total 323.07 344.28 21.21 100 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
As shown in Table 7.11, Cote d’Ivoire’s exports are expected to increase by US$21.21 million.  
Improvement in trade with WAEMU member States relations, which normally comes into effect 
with an FTA; Reduction in the cost of production for Cote d’Ivoire as it imports its inputs duty-
free, thereby making its exports competitive in the WAEMU region; and improvement in trade 
facilitation, as the removal of duties reduces delays at the border emanating from thorough 
searches and corruption. 
Synonymous with the ECOWAS situation, Cote d’Ivoire’s exports are still concentrated in a few 
countries, such as Senegal, Togo and Burkina Faso, with these three countries absorbing 91.4 per 
cent of Cote d’Ivoire’s exports. Cote d’Ivoire’s major exports to WAEMU FTA include light oil 
and preparation, salt, tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes (see Table 7.12). 
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Table 7. 12: Cote d’Ivoire’s Major Exports after adopting WAEMU FTA (US$ Millions) 
HS Code Product Description Value 
27 Lights oils and preparations 63.54 
25 Salt 33.58 
24 Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes 24.57 
15 Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products  23.02 
39 Plastic or article thereof 3.38 
31 Fertilizers 2.62 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
(e) The Impact of WAEMU FTA on Cote d’Ivoire’s Imports  
As Cote d’Ivoire opens up to WAEMU member States, the effects of trade creation and diversion 
will feed into Cote d’Ivoire’s import bill. Cote d’Ivoire’s imports are expected to increase by 
US$11.23 million, as reported from the market point of view (see Table 7.13). The increase in 
imports is as a result of the cost of imports, due to tariff removal, which leads to an improvement 
in the cash-flows of economic agents. 
As shown in Table 7.13, wheat, coal products, floating or submersible drilling, vehicle other than 
railway, medicaments containing vitamins or antibiotics, fish and crustacean are the top Cote 
d’Ivoire imports from WAEMU market with import bills of US$7.49 billion, US$3.58 million, 
US$2.68 billion, US$432 million, US$355 million and US$251 million, respectively. The lion’s 
share of these imports comes from Senegal, Burkina Faso and Togo.  
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Table 7. 13: The Impact of WAEMU FTA on Cote d’Ivoire’s Imports (US$ Millions) 
 
HS code Product Description Value 
10 Wheat 52 
27 Coal Products 32 
89 Floating or submersible drilling or production platforms 22 
87 Vehicle other than railway 21 
30  Medicaments containing vitamins or other antibiotics 15.5 
03 Fish and Crustacean 15.1 
24 Tobacco 11.2 
63 Textile article 6.7 
84 Nuclear reactors, Boilers 6.4 
85 Electrical machinery and equipment 6.1 
40 Rubber and articles thereof 5.59 
72 Iron and steel 5.58 
39 Plastic and articles thereof 5.4 
69 Ceramic products 4.6 
22 Beverages, spirit and vinegar 4.4 
73 Articles of Iron and steel  11.2 
Other 
 
9.2 
Total 
 
344.77 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
(f) Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness Tests 
Given the uncertainty on the actual values for the Armington and demand elasticities implies that 
rigorous sensitivity analysis was required to ensure the robustness of the results presented in the 
study. Initially, a ‘base-case’ simulation was run using the elasticities from Armington, Stern and 
Tokarick (as discussed in Chapter 5). Given the possible sensitivity of the models’ results to the 
elasticity values, the researcher had to re-run the simulations under varying assumptions. Upper-
bound and lower-bound limits were established for various elasticities (see Table 5.1). Finally, 
given the aim of the study was to determine the largest likely impact of WAEMU FTA on Cote 
d'Ivoire, a ‘worst-case’ scenario was devised, using the upper-bound values and adding 4. 
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Appendix 3(a) reports on the sensitivity analysis and robustness tests for the trade-creation 
effects in Cote d’Ivoire after the adoption of a WAEMU FTA. Reducing the trade elasticity value 
to 0.5 shows no change of trade creation from the base case in Cote d’Ivoire. Likewise, 
increasing the trade elasticities to 2 and 6 brings about no changes to trade creation. The outcome 
shows that Cote d’Ivoire’s total change in imports remains the same in value, although its 
composition changes as economic agents substitute across the range of the various imports. 
Appendix 3(b) reports on the sensitivity analysis and the robustness tests on the revenue effect in 
Cote d’Ivoire after the implementation of WAEMU FTA. Reducing trade elasticity to 0.5 may 
reduce the revenue loss by 0.061 per cent. Increasing the trade elasticity values to 2 and 6 would, 
respectively, increase the revenue loss by 0.03 per cent and 0.27 per cent. A 5 per cent margin of 
error on the lower bound and on the upper bound can be argued to be conservative and feasible, 
and the resulting deviations from the middle-ground results are generally insignificant. 
Accordingly, the middle-ground estimates could be within sight of the potential sizes.  
Appendix 3(c) reports on the sensitivity analysis and the robustness tests of the welfare effect in 
Cote d’Ivoire, after the implementation of the WAEMU FTA. Reducing trade elasticity to 0.5 
does not change the welfare gains.  Likewise increasing the trade elasticity values to 2 and 6 
would, respectively, leaves the welfare gains unchanged to 1.21 per cent. The margin of error 
can be argued to be conservative and feasible; and the resulting deviations from the middle-
ground results are insignificant. Accordingly, the middle-ground estimates could be within sight 
of the potential sizes.  
Appendix 4(a) reports on the sensitivity analysis and the robustness tests on exports in Cote 
d’Ivoire after the implementation of the WAEMU FTA. Reducing trade elasticity to 0.5 may 
reduce exports by 0.041 per cent. Increasing trade elasticity values to 2 and 6 would, 
respectively, increase exports by 0.09 per cent and 1.1 per cent.   
The resulting deviations from the middle-ground results are generally insignificant. Accordingly, 
the middle-ground estimates could be within sight of the potential sizes.  
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Appendix 4(b) reports on the sensitivity analysis and the robustness tests on imports in Cote 
d’Ivoire after the implementation of the WAEMU FTA. Reducing the trade elasticity value to 0.5 
shows no change in imports from the base case in Cote d’Ivoire. Likewise, increasing trade 
elasticities to 2 and 6 brings no changes to trade creation. The outcome shows that Cote 
d’Ivoire’s total change in imports remains the same in value, although the composition thereof 
changes, as economic agents substitute across the various imports. 
7.5  Summary 
This chapter has presented the empirical findings and analysis of the revenue, welfare, trade 
creation, exports and imports implications of the WAEMU customs union and the WAEMU 
free-trade agreement with Cote d’Ivoire. The first section presents the impact of the WAEMU 
customs union on Cote d’Ivoire. This was followed by a discussion of impact of WAEMU FTA 
on trade creation, trade diversion, revenue, welfare, exports and imports in Cote d’Ivoire, which 
are some of the objectives of the study.  
The WITS/SMART simulations estimate shows that the adoption of a WAEMU customs union 
is expected to result in trade creation of US$2.83 billion. This has a positive effect on welfare, as 
consumers would be afforded cheap products from the region, thanks to trade liberalisation. 
However, local industries displaced from the market could face closure if the government does 
not come up with a financial package to rescue them. 
The WITS/SMART simulations estimate that Cote d’Ivoire will have a total fiscal revenue loss 
of US$292.66 million if the WAEMU CET is implemented. Most of the product categories will 
experience revenue losses. Vehicles other than railway, and parts would reflect the largest loss in 
revenue for Cote d’Ivoire under the WAEMU customs union. In Cote d’Ivoire, vehicles currently 
attract total applied ad valorem tariff of 14.42 per cent. These rates are to be reduced to 0 per 
cent and 20 per cent, respectively, depending on the type of vehicle. Under the WAEMU custom 
union, the public transport vehicles, goods vehicles and ambulances are treated as finished goods 
and will attract a duty rate of 20 per cent. 
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SMART simulation results reveal that Cote d’Ivoire will experience a gain in consumer welfare 
valued at US$8.67 million by implementing the WAEMU customs union. However, this welfare 
gain is insignificant. On imports, WAEMU CET is expected to drive up Cote d’Ivoire’s imports 
by 2.48 per cent. However, exports are expected to fall marginally by 2.23 per cent.  
The WITS/SMART simulations estimate shows that a total trade creation of US$14.53 million is 
expected if Cote d’Ivoire completes the implementation of WAEMU FTA. The coming into 
effect of WAEMU FTA has a negative effect on revenue, as the country is expected to lose about 
US$10.5 million of customs revenue. This was found to be insignificant. 
SMART simulation results reveal that Cote d’Ivoire will experience a gain in consumer welfare 
valued at US$1.21 million by implementing the WAEMU FTA. Major contributors to welfare 
gains are lights oils and preparations, tanks and other armoured fighting vehicle and worn 
clothing and other worn article. However, the impact of WAEMU FTA on welfare in Cote 
d’Ivoire was found to be insignificant. As expected, Cote d’Ivoire’s exports and imports are 
anticipated to rise by 0.066 per cent and 2.48 per cent, respectively. 
The study tested for robustness of the results. Based on the reports of sensitivity analysis and 
robustness tests, the results show that deviations from the middle ground results are generally 
insignificant. Accordingly, the middle-ground estimates could be within sight of the potential 
sizes.  
Next chapter will present the empirical findings and an analysis of the revenue, welfare, imports, 
exports and trade-creation implications of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPAs) for Cote 
d’Ivoire. The SMART simulation results and their analysis are aimed at addressing the research 
questions posed in the study. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIPS ON COTE D’IVOIRE 
 
8.1  Introduction 
Chapter Eight presents the empirical findings and analysis of the implications of the EPAs on 
Cote d’Ivoire. In this section, the study has estimated the impact of trade-policy regimes on trade 
creation and diversion, imports, exports, revenue and welfare for Cote d’Ivoire. The analysis was 
conducted using the WITS/SMART model. The year of 2014 was adopted as a base year for 
simulation, using trade information databases, such as TRAINS, COMTRADE and WTO-IDB.  
In this study, the SMART model was used, based on information contained in the UNCTAD-
managed TRAINS database. The year 2014 was selected because that is the latest year for Cote 
d’Ivoire in the WITS/SMART software. In this study, a 0 per cent is applied to all tariff lines 
imported by Cote d’Ivoire from the 28 EU member states. These tariffs (for the EU) were 
applied in the WITS/SMART model against the actual tariffs applied by the Cote d’Ivoire 
customs authorities in 2014 and saved in the TRAINS databases.  
This enables the study to estimate the impact of EPAs on trade creation and diversion, revenue, 
imports, exports, and on welfare; and these are the objectives of this study.  
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 8.2 examines a comparison of Cote d’Ivoire 
structure and that of the EU FTA. Section 8.3 discusses the WITS/SMART model simulation 
results for EPAs. Section 8.4 summarises the chapter. 
8.2  A Comparison of Cote d’Ivoire’s Tariff Structure and those of the EU FTA 
The country is among the few countries in the region with moderate tariffs, compare to other 
countries in West Africa. Under the EPA liberalisation schedule, during the first 5 years, Cote 
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d’Ivoire will have to liberalised more than half of agricultural imports from the EU which face a 
20 per cent tariff rate (Morrissey, 2011). 
It may be interesting to note Cote d’Ivoire’s current negotiation with the EU towards an FTA has 
been moving at a slow pace. Cote d’Ivoire and the EU have both concluded the negotiation 
towards the FTA. Although the EU has ratified the agreement, Cote d’Ivoire has not yet ratified 
the agreement. Cote d’Ivoire’s authorities are aware of what they stand to lose if no trade 
agreement with the EU is reached. One third of Cote d’Ivoire’s exports to the EU are duty free 
and this generates millions of jobs especially in the vulnerable community (Agritrade, 2014).  
A failure to reach a deal with the EU will raise tariff from zero to over 20 per cent. Such a move 
could wipe out the total country’s exports to the EU.  
The European Commission Directorate-General for Trade (2016) noted that one of the main 
concern is the preferential access for their main exports to the EU such as cocoa, banana and tuna 
considered as sensitive industries. This move implies that the country has to move from its 
current regime, which is characterised by a large tariff dispersion, in order to comply with the 0 
per cent for most of its products.  
8.3  The SMART Model Simulation Results 
This section presents the results of the SMART Model simulations in terms of trade creation and 
trade diversion, revenue and welfare effects. 
(a) Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 
Trade creation is a term mostly used in international economics and trade. This exemplifies the 
case where trade flows are redirected, as a result of the formation of a free-trade agreement or a 
customs-union protocol (Eicher, Henn, and Papageorgiou, 2012). More efficient producers in the 
same regional trade agreement, like the EPAs, would displace less efficient and more costly 
producers. This would lead to the consumers benefiting from the lower prices (Viner, 2014). 
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This implies that Ivorian industries have to improve their production efficiency and competitive 
edge in preparation for the customs union. Trade diversion, on the other hand, implies that more 
efficient suppliers from outside the EPAs could be displaced by less-efficient producers within 
the EU.  
Using the simulation results from the WITS/SMART model, Table 8.1 shows the trade-creation 
and the trade-diversion effects of the adoption of the EPAs by Cote d’Ivoire. 
Table 8. 1: Trade-Creation Effects of the EU FTA on Cote d’Ivoire (US$ Millions) 
HS Code Product Description Trade Creation 
100190 Cereal and other seeds 21.16 
870333 Motor vehicles 18.22 
20329 Meat and other edible meat 16 
291733 Dinonyl or Didecyl orthophtalic acid 13.52 
271019 Light oil and preparation and other 12.9 
930190 Rocket launcher, grenade launcher and others 12.08 
871000 Tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles 9.8 
Other Other products 218.82 
Total  322.55 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
The coming into effect of a full EPA would inevitably result in the dismantlement of tariffs and 
related non-trade barriers in Cote d’Ivoire, thereby exposing the previously protected industries 
to the EU member States. The free-trade agreement would enable the EU industries to penetrate 
Cote d’Ivoire’s market.   
As shown from the SMART Simulations, a total trade of US$322.55 million is created by the EU 
(see Table 8.1). This is welfare-enhancing, as Cote d’Ivoire’s consumers are now getting same 
commodities at a lower price, thereby helping them to save money (consumer surplus). However, 
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this is likely to have ripple effects on local industry, especially those involved in the manufacture 
of cereals and motor vehicles. The results are concurrent with the impact of free trade 
agreements in a number of regional cases of integration.   
In Central Africa, Onogwu and Arene (2013) observed significant trade creation caused by 
EPAs. Karingi et al. (2005) carried out a study to estimate the impact of EPAs in SADC. Their 
studies show that SADC countries stand to see their imports increasing by US$350.8 million 
(caused by trade-creation effects) if an EPA is implemented. Zgovu and Kweka (2008) estimated 
the impact of the EU FTA, using partial equilibrium model in Malawi and Tanzania. The 
researchers showed that Malawian and Tanzanian imports are likely to increase by 6 per cent and 
1 per cent, respectively, if they adopt the EU FTA.  
Mugano et al. (2013) also assessed the impact of EPAs on Zimbabwe in 2013. Their results were 
similar to this study, where the study determined 97 per cent trade creation and less than two per 
cent trade diversion. This confirmed that the coming of free-trade agreements would most likely 
lead to higher trade creation effects with a reduced trade-diversion effect in most cases. 
There is no evidence of trade diversion in Cote d’Ivoire. The outcome is consistent with the 
findings of Shinyekwa and Katunze, 2016; Mugano et al, 2013; Abdelmalik, Sandretto and 
Jallab, 2007; Cernat (2003); the argument of Meade (1955); Ohyama (1972); Kemp and Wan 
(1976) and Amponsah (2002). These authors noted that some regional groupings’ tariff rates are 
too weak to divert trade from third parties. 
(b) The Revenue Effect 
The implications of the EPAs on member States’ fiscal revenue is one of the contentious issues 
under discussion at the regional level. There are fears that the tariff cuts that have to be 
implemented by Cote d’Ivoire to EU countries to conform with the FTA rates will result in tariff 
revenue shortfalls for most countries.  Cote d’Ivoire is among those countries that are supposed 
to undertake some transformation with regards to their national tariff structures, in order to 
conform to the EU FTA rates. Table 8.2 shows the revenue implications of the EU FTA on Cote 
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d’Ivoire. The WITS/SMART simulations estimate that Cote d’Ivoire will have a total fiscal 
revenue loss of US$294 million if the EU FTA is implemented. Major losers include: Motor 
vehicles with a loss of US$25 million, Ceral and other seeds with a loss of US$8.4 million, and 
Onions and Shallots with a loss of US$6.63 million.  
Table 8. 2: Revenue Effect of the EU FTA on Cote d’Ivoire (US$ Millions) 
HS Code Product Description Revenue Loss 
870333 Motor vehicles -25.12 
100190 Cereal and other seeds -8.44 
70310 Onions and Shallots -6.63 
252310 Cement clinkers -6.56 
852910 Aerials and aerial reflectors of all kinds -3.97 
Other Other products -243.28 
Total  -294 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
The total tax revenue collected in 2014 was about US$6.12 billion. The total revenue loss 
expected by Cote d’Ivoire after embracing the EPAs is insignificant, as it represents only 4.8 per 
cent of the total tax revenue collected in the same year.  
The outcome of loss of revenue after member States have embraced the EPAs is consistent with 
the observations made by other researchers in the region.  
More recent studies such as that of Onogwu and Arene (2013), looks at the welfare and revenue 
effect of the EPAs between Cape Verde and the EU. They results show that Cape Verde stands to 
35 per cent of the total revenue loss due to elimination of tariff on imports from the EU. 
Bilal, Dalleau and Lui (2012) evaluated the impact of EPAs on selected countries in West Africa 
and Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA). Their results show that eight countries in West Africa 
(Benin, Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau and Togo) are likely to 
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suffer a significant loss in tariff revenue – with the loss ranging from a 6 per cent reduction in 
total tax revenues to as much as 43 per cent. In the case of ESA region, Bilal, Dalleau and Lui 
(2012) noted that the impact on fiscal revenue was “modest”, while seven countries (Zambia, 
Swaziland, Nigeria, Namibia, Lesotho, Botswana and Malawi) have been estimated to incur a 
relatively “low” impact.  
Lang (2006) also shows that in a case of an EU-ECOWAS EPA, the elimination of tariffs on 
imports from the EU will harm the government revenues in West Africa. Ghana, Nigeria and 
Togo stand a significant loss in revenue of around US$193 million, US$426 million and US$35 
million, respectively if they embrace full-trade liberalisation with the EU. Oxfam (2006) 
estimates shows that Zimbabwe stands to lose US$18.431 million in revenue if it adopts the 
EPAs. The marginal difference between these results can be explained by the different time 
periods at which the researches were undertaken. The current research used the base year of 
2014; while Oxfam used 2000.  
(c) The Consumer-Welfare effect 
One of the main arguments in favour of free trade is that consumers would benefit from lower 
prices. Table 8.3 below depicts the SMART simulation results. These reveal that Cote d’Ivoire 
could expect to experience a gain in consumer welfare valued at US$22.82 million, by 
implementing the EPAs.  
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Table 8. 3: Welfare Effect of the EU FTA on Cote d’Ivoire (US$ million) 
HS Code Details Welfare Gains 
870333 Motor vehicles 2.43 
020329 Meat and other edible meat 1.72 
481910 Cartons, boxes and cases, of corrugated paper or paperboard 1.07 
271019 Light oil and preparation and other 0.63 
Other Other Products not Specified above 22.97 
Total  28.82 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations  
The total gains in welfare represent 0.05 per cent of 2014 GDP, which stood at US$6.12 billion, 
which is quite insignificant. Onogwo and Arene (2013) found that the impact of EU FTA on 
Cape Verde net welfare was insignificant. Their study showed that consumer as well as national 
welfare would increase as a result of trade creation and consumption effects. 
In West Africa, Lang (2006) observed that EU - ECOWAS FTA is improving its welfare, 
although this gain was insignificant. He found that the big economies of ECOWAS that is, 
Nigeria, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire could experience substantial consumer surplus gains. 
The related literature on the region reveals that EPAs are insignificant in accruing welfare gains. 
According to Karingi et al. (2005), SADC member states stand to gain a welfare surplus of 
US$25.577 million if they adopt an EPA with the lion’s share of the gains going to Angola 
(US$14.940 million). The balance is shared amongst 14 SADC member States with the end 
result showing that individual country’s welfare gain from EPAs is insignificant. 
Zgovu and Kweka (2008) have revealed that the impact of EPAs on welfare gains were 
insignificant in Malawi and Tanzania. This is consistent with economic theory and is confirmed 
by the empirical literature. 
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(d) The Impact of EPAs on Cote d’Ivoire Exports 
One of the long-standing arguments put forward by the EU in EPA negotiations is market access 
for Cote d’Ivoire’s products. This research, amongst its objectives intends to evaluate the impact 
of the EU FTA, which comes via the EPAs on Cote d’Ivoire’s exports. The results from the 
SMART Simulations are presented in Table 8.4. 
Table 8. 4: The Impact of EPAs on Cote d’Ivoire Exports (US$ Million) 
Partner Exports Before 
Exports 
After 
Change in 
Exports 
Share of       
Exports (%) 
Germany 255.47 307.41 51.94 9.45 
United Kingdom 170.69 198.41 27.72 6.1 
Sweden 57.12 64.64 7.52 1.98 
Netherlands 241.75 288.22 46.47 8.86 
Italy 154.35 187.32 32.97 5.76 
Ireland 36.96 41.73 4.77 1.28 
Belgium 165.87 189.1 23.23 5.81 
France 1296.5 1497.3 200.8 46.06 
Denmark 14.59 16.37 1.78 0.5 
Spain 200.52 233.2 32.68 7.17 
Cyprus 0.086 0.1 0.014 0.003 
Finland 11.1 11.74 0.64 0.36 
Malta 0.21 0.28 0.07 0.0086 
Portugal 22.54  26.26 3.72 0.8 
Greece 27.7 31.9 4.2 0.98 
Hungary 10.82 12.17 1.35 0.37 
Slovak Republic 2.46 3.03 0.57 0.093 
Bulgaria 1.39 1.67 0.28 0.05 
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Partner Exports Before 
Exports 
After 
Change in 
Exports 
Share of       
Exports (%) 
Czech Republic 18.5 20.92 2.42 0.64 
Poland 28.67  33.8 5.13 1.03 
Slovenia 0.72 0.82 0.1 0.02 
Luxembourg 6.33 7.29 0.96 0.22 
Lithuania 5.88 5.96 0.08 0.18 
Austria 14.46 16.14 1.68 0.49 
Estonia 1.11 1.39 0.28 0.042 
Latvia 25 29 4 0.89 
Croatia  5.14 5.59 0.45 0.17 
Romania 14.87 18.45 3.58 0.56 
Total 2790.8 3250.21 459.41 100.00 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
The adoption of the EU FTA through EPAs was expected to lead to an increase in Cote 
d’Ivoire’s exports to the EU by US$459.41 million (see Table 8.4). France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom, are Cote d’Ivoire’s major export destinations in the 
EU. These five countries are expected to absorb 77.64 per cent of Cote d’Ivoire’s total exports 
via the EU (see Table 8.4). The increase in exports to the EU could be as a result of the: 
Increase in market access that would be available for Cote d’Ivoire, hence the surge in exports; 
Competitiveness caused by a reduction in the cost of raw materials, which Cote d’Ivoire will 
import from the EU for the production of goods destined for the EU market. And, improvement 
in the relationship between Cote d’Ivoire and the EU caused by the mutually beneficial trade. 
Table 8.5 shows Cote d’Ivoire’s major exports to the EU. Cote d’Ivoire’s major exports to the 
EU include Floating or submersible drilling or production platforms, Other seeds, Other 
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medicaments, Motor vehicles, Butanes and Light oil and preparation of US$1.46 billion, US$208 
million, US$124 million, US$71 million, US$40 million and US$28 million, respectively. 
Table 8. 5: Cote d’Ivoire’s Major Exports after EU FTA (US$ Millions) 
HS Code Description Value 
890520 Floating or submersible drilling or production 
platforms 
1460 
100190 Other seeds 208 
300490 Other medicaments 124 
870333 Motor vehicles 71 
271113 Butanes 40 
271019 Light oil and preparation  28 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
(e) Impact of EPAs on Cote d’Ivoire’s Imports 
Cote d’Ivoire’s imports are expected to be significantly influenced by trade creation and trade 
diversion. These are expected to occur due to preferential trade given to the EU after full EPAs. 
The impact of EPAs on imports in Cote d’Ivoire from the market view adopted from the SMART 
Simulation results are presented in table 8.6.  
Cote d’Ivoire imports from the EU before the FTA amounted to US$12.45 billion. However, 
with a completion of an FTA, Cote d’Ivoire’s imports from the EU are expected to grow by 
US$339 million to US$12.79 billion. The increase in imports is expected and supported in 
theory, as it is as a result of the reduction of cost of imports, caused by the removal of import 
tariffs. 
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Table 8. 6: Cote d’Ivoire Major Imports from EU after FTA (US$ Millions) 
HS Code Description Value 
870333 Motor vehicles 79 
271019 Light oil and preparation 67 
020329 Meat and other edible meat 32 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
Table 8.6 shows Cote d’Ivoire’s major imports, after adopting an FTA with the EU. Motor 
vehicles were expected to top the imports with US$79 million followed by Light oil and 
preparation and meat and other edible meat, with an import bill of US$67 million and US$32 
million, respectively. 
g) Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness Tests 
Given the uncertainty on the actual values for the Armington and demand elasticities, means that 
rigorous sensitivity analysis was required to ensure the robustness of the results presented in the 
study. Initially, a ‘base-case’ simulation was run, using the elasticities from Armington, Stern 
and Tokarick (as discussed in Chapter 5). Given the possible sensitivity of the models’ results to 
the elasticity values, the researcher had to re-run the simulations under various assumptions. 
Upper-bound and lower-bound limits were established for various elasticities (see Table 5.1). 
Finally, given that the aim of the study was to determine the largest likely impact of EU FTA on 
Cote d’Ivoire, a ‘worst-case’ scenario was devised using the upper bound values and adding 4. 
Appendix 3(a) reports on the sensitivity analysis and robustness tests for the trade-creation 
effects in Cote d’Ivoire, after the adoption of an EU FTA. Reducing the trade elasticity value to 
0.5 showed no change in the trade creation from the base case in Cote d’Ivoire. Likewise, 
increasing the trade elasticities by 2 and 6 brings about no changes to the trade creation. The 
outcome shows that Cote d’Ivoire’s total change in imports remains the same in value, although 
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its composition changes as economic agents substitute for one another across the various 
imports. 
Appendix 3(b) reports on the sensitivity analysis and robustness tests on the revenue effects in 
Cote d’Ivoire, after the implementation of EU FTA. Reducing trade elasticity to 0.5 is expected 
to decrease the revenue loss by 0.04 per cent. Increasing trade elasticity values to 2 and 6 would, 
respectively, increase the revenue loss by 0.02 per cent and 0.2 per cent. A 10 per cent margin of 
error could be seen as conservative and feasible, and the resulting deviations from the middle-
ground results are generally insignificant. Accordingly, the middle-ground estimates could be 
within sight of the potential sizes.  
Appendix 3(c) reports on the sensitivity analysis and robustness tests on the welfare effect in 
Cote d’Ivoire after the implementation of the EU FTA. Reducing trade elasticity to 0.5 may 
decrease the welfare gains by 0.015 per cent. Increasing trade elasticity values to 2 and 6 would, 
respectively, decrease the welfare gains by 0.079 per cent and 0.0081 per cent. The margin of 
error could be seen to be conservative and acceptable, and the resulting deviations from the 
middle-ground results are insignificant. Accordingly, the middle-ground estimates could be 
within sight of the potential sizes.  
Appendix 4(a) reports on the sensitivity analysis and robustness tests on exports in Cote d’Ivoire 
after the implementation of the EU FTA. Reducing the trade elasticity to 0.5 is expected to 
increase exports by 0.09 per cent. Increasing trade elasticity values to 2 and 6 would respectively 
increase the exports by 7.3 per cent and 9.12 per cent. The deviations of the expected change in 
exports as a percentage on lower-bound, upper-bound and worst-case scenarios from the base 
case were -0.43 per cent, 44.62 per cent and 56 per cent, respectively. The resulting deviations 
from the middle-ground results are generally insignificant. Accordingly, the middle-ground 
estimates could be within sight of the potential sizes.  
Appendix 4(b) reports on the sensitivity analysis and robustness tests on imports in Cote d’Ivoire 
after the implementation of EU FTA. Reducing trade elasticity value to 0.5 shows no change in 
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imports from the base case in Cote d’Ivoire. Likewise, increasing trade elasticities to 2 and 6 
brings about no changes in the trade creation. The outcome shows that Cote d’Ivoire’s total 
change in imports remains the same in value, although the composition thereof changes as 
economic agents replace one another across the various imports. 
8.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented the empirical findings and an analysis of the revenue, welfare, 
imports, exports and trade creation implications of the EPAs on Cote d’Ivoire. The SMART 
simulation results and their analysis were aimed at addressing the research question posed in the 
study. 
By implementing a full EPA Cote d’Ivoire would have trade creation that could offset any trade 
diversion resulting in net welfare gains for the country. If Cote d’Ivoire removes all the tariffs 
against imports from the EU and imposes the WTO MFN on non-EU countries, this may result 
in a trade expansion valued at US$322.55 million.  
The WITS/SMART simulations estimate that Cote d’Ivoire will have a total fiscal revenue loss 
of US$294 million if the EU FTA is implemented. Major losers include Motor vehicles with a 
loss of US$25 million, Cereal and other seeds with a loss of US$8.4 million, and Onions and 
Shallots with a loss of US$6.63 million. The total revenue loss expected by Cote d’Ivoire after 
embracing the EPAs represents only 4.8 per cent of the total tax revenue collected in the same 
year. Although this value is a small proportion of government revenue, it is significant – given 
the increasing importance of customs revenue to the country.  
The SMART simulation results reveal that Cote d’Ivoire should experience a gain in consumer 
welfare valued at US$28.82 million, by implementing the EU FTA.  
Overall, Cote d’Ivoire’s exports and imports are expected to rise by US$459 million and US$339 
million, respectively. 
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From the above analysis, it is apparent that Cote d’Ivoire would both lose and benefit by joining 
the EU FTA. The country will experience an expansion in trade through trade creation, and a 
gain in consumer welfare. However, the government will lose revenue through the massive 
transformation required of the current tariff structure.  
In order to address the methodological concerns on simulations caused by the sensitivity of the 
elasticity parameters used, the study carried out robustness and sensitivity analyses by manually 
changing the elasticities used. The outcome shows that the results presented in this chapter are 
robust. 
The next chapter will present the empirical findings and an analysis of the revenue and welfare 
implications of the WTO FTA on Cote d’Ivoire. This will be followed by the presentation of the 
SMART simulation results and their analysis, which is aimed at addressing the research question 
posed in the study. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE IMPACT OF WTO COMMITMENTS ON COTE D’IVOIRE 
 
9.1 Introduction 
Chapter Nine presents the empirical findings and an analysis of the implications of the WTO 
FTA on Cote d’Ivoire. In this section, the study estimates the impact of trade policy regimes on 
trade creation and diversion, imports, exports, revenue, and welfare on Cote d’Ivoire. The 
analysis was conducted, using WITS/SMART model. The study adopted the year 2014 as a base 
year for simulation using trade information databases, such as TRAINS, COMTRADE and 
WTO-IDB. In this study, the SMART model was used, based on the information contained in the 
UNCTAD-managed TRAINS database. The year 2014 was chosen because that is the latest year 
for Cote d’Ivoire in the WITS/SMART software.  
For the WTO FTA, a 0 per cent is applied to all tariff lines traded with Cote d’Ivoire and other 
159 WTO member States. These tariffs (for WTO FTA) were applied in the WITS/SMART 
model against the actual tariffs applied by the Ivorian customs authorities in 2014 saved in the 
TRAINS databases. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 9.2 examines a comparison of 
Cote d’Ivoire’s structure and the WTO FTA. Section 9.3 discusses the WITS/SMART model 
simulation results for the WTO FTA. Section 9.4 presents a summary of the chapter. 
 9.2 A Comparison of Cote d’Ivoire’s Tariff Structure and that of the WTO FTA 
The country is among the few countries in the region with high tariffs, some of which are above 
100 per cent (ITC, 2012). Cote d’Ivoire has experienced relative success in eliminating, or at 
least reducing tariffs at the intra-regional level with the introduction of the common external 
tariffs and the creation of customs unions. 
 THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALISATION ON COTE D’IVOIRE 
 
232 
 
Only 5.51 per cent of Cote d’Ivoire’s tariff lines are zero-rated. In the case of a unilateral 
liberalisation of trade under the WTO context, this would, therefore, mean that 94.49 per cent of 
Cote d’Ivoire’s tariff lines would have to be phased down to 0 per cent duty (ITC, 2012). 
 It is interesting to note that Cote d’Ivoire has recently ratified the trade facilitation agreement 
with the WTO. The WTO has promised to give Cote d’Ivoire technical assistance and support for 
the implementation of the trade facilitation agreement. Although efforts still need to be made, 
implementing the WTO trade facilitation will result in positive economic impact on the economy 
(WTO, 2014).  
The outcome of this study is, therefore, important as it would help the country to review the 
impact of the Doha Round in advance and to take corrective steps. Even without the completion 
of the Doha Round, the amalgamation of various trade agreements Cote d’Ivoire has signed, 
brings it closer to the WTO FTA. It therefore, becomes necessary to review the impact of the 
WTO FTA on Cote d’Ivoire. 
9.3  SMART Model Simulation Results 
This section presents the results of the SMART Model simulations in terms of trade creation and 
trade diversion, revenue, exports, imports and welfare effects. 
(a) Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 
Trade creation means that more efficient or lower-cost producers in any of the WTO countries 
could displace the less-efficient or higher-cost producers in Cote d’Ivoire; and consumers would, 
therefore, benefit from the lower prices (Handley, 2014). However, some producers in Cote 
d’Ivoire will be negatively affected, as their products are replaced by products efficiently 
produced in other countries in the WTO region.   
This implies that Ivorian industries will have to improve their production efficiency and 
competitive edge in preparation for the WTO FTA. Trade diversion, on the other hand, implies 
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that more efficient suppliers from outside the WTO FTA are displaced by less efficient producers 
within the FTA (Schmieg, 2016). This will be costly for the country, as revenue that would have 
been generated from imports from outside the WTO region is lost; and the products will become 
more expensive, since they would be sourced from higher-cost producers.  
Using the simulation results from the WITS/SMART model, Table 9.1 shows the trade-creation 
and trade-diversion effects of the adoption of the WTO FTA by Cote d’Ivoire. For negotiation 
purposes, it is interesting to look at which WTO countries are bound to benefit the most from the 
Cote d’Ivoire tariff elimination. In total, these countries could gain more than US$1.33 billion 
from their increased exports to Cote d’Ivoire. Table 9.1 shows that the largest gainer would be 
Nigeria (39.17 per cent of additional exports), followed by France and China with 11.2 per cent 
and 8.42 per cent of total export gains respectively.  
These three countries should reap up to 58.79 per cent of increased exports to Cote d’Ivoire. This 
outcome is consistent with the findings of Lang (2006) in ECOWAS. Lang observed that EPA 
was trade-creating; and inefficiently produced goods were being displaced by EU products. In 
the case Asean-China Free trade agreement, Yang and Martinez Zarzozo (2014) have shown that 
Asean China FTA will experience significant and substantial trade creation. 
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Table 9. 1: Increase in Exports after FTA for Individual WTO countries (US$ Million) 
WTO Member Total Export Gains Share in Increased Exports (%) 
Nigeria 521 39.17 
France 149 11.2 
China 112 8.42 
Netherlands 39 2.93 
Germany 36 2.7 
India 29 2.18 
USA 27 2.03 
Belgium 16 1.2 
Ghana 11 0.82 
South Africa 10 0.75 
ROW 380 28.57 
Total 1330 100.00 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
Other countries, which have significantly displaced Ivorian products are Netherlands, Germany, 
India, USA and Belgium with increased exports into Cote d’Ivoire of US$39 million, US$36 
million, US$29 million, US$27 million and US$16 million, respectively (see Table 9.1).  
This trade-creation effect is expected to result in the plummeting of prices of those displaced 
products, thereby enabling consumers to make savings. However, Ivorian producers will be 
seriously hurt unless the government comes up with a clear strategy to resuscitate those 
companies; for example, without a financial facility, they may close shop. Industries that are 
likely to be seriously affected are mainly those involved in the production of motor vehicles (see 
Table 9.2). The top casualties of trade creation are listed in Table 9.2. It is important to mention 
that motor vehicles are extremely vulnerable to displacement by foreign firms as it represent 3.14 
per cent of total trade creation (see table 9.2).  
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Table 9. 2: Products with the Highest Trade Creation Effects in Cote d’Ivoire after WTO 
FTA (US$ Millions) 
Tariff 
Line 
Code 
Product denomination Trade creation 
(US$ Million) 
Share in total 
trade creation 
87000 Motor vehicles 41.88 3.14887218 
100190 Wheat and Meslin 10.6 0.796992481 
842619 Mobile lifting frames, straddles carriers 
and works trucks 
7.02 0.527819549 
291733 Dinonyl or didecyl orthophtalates 6.76 0.508270677 
481910 Cartons, boxes of corrugated paper or 
paperboard 
6.3 0.473684211 
730300 Tubes pipes and hollow profile 5.6 0.421052632 
852352 Smart cards 4.04 0.303759398 
20329 Meat 3.9 0.293233083 
380891 Insecticides 3.2 0.240601504 
271019 Light oils and preparations 3.1 0.233082707 
890600 Other vessels including worships and 
lifeboats 
2.96 0.222556391 
271019 Petroleum oil 2.9 0.218045113 
252320 White cement whether or not artificially 
coloured 
2.51 0.188721805 
63000 Other made up textile articles 2.45 0.184210526 
350691 Products suitable for use as glue or 
adhesives 
1.9 0.142857143 
390410 Vinyl chloride, not mixed with any 
other substances 
1.65 0.12406015 
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380893 Herbicides 1.5 0.112781955 
240220 Cigarette containing tobacco 1.3 0.097744361 
730840 Equipment for scaffolding, propping or 
pitpropping 
1.2 0.090225564 
843143 Parts for boring or sinking machinery 1.11 0.083458647 
Other Other products not specified above 1218 91.57 
Total  1330 100 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
The reason why these products are displaced is that these commodities are currently attracting 
very high tariff rates. In addition to the common external tariff which can go up to 35 per cent, 
motor vehicles also attract ad valorem tax which are imposed based on the importing price of the 
products.  
Trade creation by product specifically from SMART simulations shows that most of the motor 
vehicles come from Germany and France. This outcome is consistent with what is currently 
pertaining in Cote d’Ivoire. Motor vehicles has been Cote d’Ivoire’s highest import from 
Germany (UNCTAD, 2015). A detailed list of products that constitute significant contributions 
to trade creation in Cote d’Ivoire from selected countries is shown in Appendix 18. 
SMART Simulations results show that trade creation should offset trade diversion in Cote 
d’Ivoire – resulting in net welfare gains for the country – if it goes for an FTA under the WTO 
arrangement. If Cote d’Ivoire removes all the tariffs against imports from the WTO group, this 
would result in a trade expansion valued at US$1.33 billion. This result shows that countries 
outside the WTO are insignificant in influencing trade in Cote d’Ivoire. 
For the importing country, in this case Cote d’Ivoire, trade diversion is neutral. It does not affect 
the overall imported quantity; but it re-allocates the market shares among the exporting partners, 
based on the new relative prices. The increase in imports from the WTO countries is balanced by 
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a decrease in imports from the rest of the world. This results in the trade diversion being equal to 
zero.  
Thus, trade creation is the only influence on the total social welfare. Although the trade-creation 
effect of the WTO FTA on Cote d’Ivoire is positive (particularly on consumer welfare). 
However, based on its possible impact on de-industrialisation and unemployment, trade creation 
is likely to present a huge impact on Cote d’Ivoire which may reverse the purported welfare 
gains.   
These findings were supported by Mugano, et al. (2013) who examined the impact of the WTO 
free-trade agreements on Zimbabwe. They also noted a positive trade creation effect valued at 
U$104.573 million resulting from the free trade agreement and no trade diversion effect realised. 
(b) The Revenue Effect 
The majority of member states within the WTOFTA states regard fiscal revenue to be a major 
consideration of being part of the WTOFTA (McGovern, 2015). There are fears that the tariff 
cuts that have to be implemented by most WTO countries to conform to the FTA rates would 
result in tariff revenue shortfalls for most countries.  
Cote d’Ivoire with its complex tariff structure is among the countries that are supposed to 
undertake a huge transformation of their national tariff structure, in order to conform to the WTO 
FTA rates – considering that only 5.51 per cent of tariff lines are liberalised. Table 9.3 shows the 
revenue implications of the WTO FTA on Cote d’Ivoire. The WITS/SMART simulations 
estimate that Cote d’Ivoire will have a total fiscal revenue loss of US$787.74 million if the WTO 
FTA is implemented.  
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Table 9. 3: Revenue Effect of the WTO FTA on Cote d’Ivoire (US$ Millions) 
HS 
Code 
Product Denomination Revenue 
Loss 
Share of Total 
Revenue Loss 
890520 Light vessels, fire floats, floating cranes and other 
vessels 
-134.12 -17.02592226 
100630 Semi-milled or Wholly milled rice -34.7 -4.405006728 
870000 Motor vehicles -29.4 -3.732195902 
30371 Sardines and other fish -28.49 -3.616675553 
100640 Broken rice -12.53 -1.590626349 
271011 Light oil and preparations -11.98 -1.520806357 
252310 Cement clinkers -10.76 -1.365932922 
100190 Wheat and meslin -10.54 -1.338004925 
630900 Worn clothing and other worn articles -6.97 -0.884809709 
871000 Tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles -6.94 -0.881001346 
20621 Meat -6.56 -0.832762079 
380891 Insecticide -5.48 -0.695661005 
Other Other products not specified above -489.27 -62.110594 
Total  -787.74 100 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
Cote d’Ivoire’s total revenue as a percentage of GDP stood at 18.2 per cent; while their total 
revenue (including grant) stood at 22.4 per cent of the country GDP (see Table 2.3 in Chapter 2). 
Analysis from this result shows that the total revenue loss after WTO FTA translates into 12.7 
per cent of the total revenue collected in the same year.  
This result reveals that the impact of unilateral liberalisation of tariffs in the WTO context on 
revenue loss is quite significant.  
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Table 9.3 shows those products, which are expected to experience highest revenue losses. 
Amongst the top losers are Light vessels, fire floats, floating cranes and Semi-milled or Wholly 
milled rice with US$134.12 million (17.02 per cent of total revenue loss) and US$34.7 million 
(4.4 per cent of total revenue loss), respectively. Other products with a significant loss in revenue 
are: motor vehicles, sardines and other fish, broken rice, light oil and preparations, cement 
clinkers, wheat and meslin, worn clothing and other worn articles, tanks and other armoured 
fighting vehicles, meat and insecticide (see Table 9.3). 
These findings do confirm that that the effect of unilateral liberalisation of taxes and tariffs in the 
WTO setting on revenue loss is quite significant as it constitutes more than 10 per cent of the 
revenues collected through taxes from the international trade (IMF 2015). 
This outcome is also consistent with the ex ante studies carried out by Alfieri, Cirera and 
Rawlinson (2006) in Mozambique. Alfieri, Cirera and Rawlinson (2006) found that Mozambique 
will witness a significant loss of revenue if it implements the WTO FTA. 
(c) The Consumer-Welfare Effect 
One of the main arguments in favour of free trade is that consumers would benefit from lower 
prices. Whether or not this will occur depends on the extent of trade creation, as against trade 
diversion. In the case of Cote d’Ivoire, the results have already shown that the total trade creation 
surpasses trade diversion, which means that consumers will benefit from the implementation of 
the trade liberalisation, as argued by Viner (1950).  
As shown in Table 9.4, the SMART simulation results reveal that Cote d’Ivoire is expected to 
experience a gain in consumer welfare valued at US$87.19 million, by implementing the WTO 
FTA. The total gains in welfare are insignificant, as they represent about 0.25 per cent of the 
2014 GDP, which stood at US$34 billion.  
The outcome is consistent with the findings of Ossa (2014), who analysed the WTO trade 
agreement effects in Brazil, China, the European Union, India, Japan, the United States and the 
 THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALISATION ON COTE D’IVOIRE 
 
240 
 
rest of the world. He found that the average welfare gain is 0.5 per cent. Alfieri, Cirera and 
Rawlinson (2006), who researched the implications of a unilateral full liberalisation of trade 
between Mozambique and all the WTO member States. They found that Mozambique stands to 
benefit to the tune of a consumer surplus valued at US$160 million, if it implements the WTO 
FTA. 
Table 9. 4: The Welfare Effects of the WTO FTA on Cote d’Ivoire (US$ Million) 
HS Code Product Description Welfare Gains 
240220 Cigarette containing tobacco 35.48 
870000 Motor vehicles 4.6 
481910 Cartons, boxes and cases, of corrugated paper 2.59 
100630 Semi-milled or wholly milled rice 1.85 
Other Other products not specified above 42.67 
Total  87.19 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
As shown in Table 9.4, tobacco and motor vehicles are major contributors to welfare gains in 
Cote d’Ivoire. It is interesting to note that this result is consistent with the findings on revenue 
loss. The same products came out as major contributors of loss in government revenue. 
Technically, major losers in revenue should be seen in the basket of products contributing 
welfare gains – for the simple reason that these commodities become cheaper to households – 
thereby, enhancing welfare. 
(d) The Impact of the WTO FTA on Cote d’Ivoire’s Exports 
Based on the exporters’ view of SMART simulations results, Cote d’Ivoire stands to gain an 
increase in exports if it implements the WTO FTA. Table 9.5 shows the impact of the unilateral 
trade liberalisation within the context of the WTO on Cote d’Ivoire’s exports and geographical 
distribution (to the top export markets) of the exports. 
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Table 9. 5: The Impact of the WTO FTA on Cote d’Ivoire’s Exports (US$ Millions) 
Partners Exports Before Export After Change Share of Exports 
Nigeria 2885 3406 521 42.49 
France 1297 1446 149 18.03 
China 1433 1545 112 19.27 
Netherlands 241  280 39 3.49 
Germany 256 292 36 3.64 
India 318 347 29 4.32 
USA 290 317 27 3.95 
Belgium 166 182 16 2.27 
Ghana 70 81 11 1.01 
South Africa 110 120 10 1,49 
Total* 7066 8016 950 100 
TOTAL** 12454 13784 1330  
* Total from top ten trading partners, ** Total trade with all WTO members and rest of the 
worldSource: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
As shown in Table 9.5, Cote d’Ivoire exports to the WTO group stood at US$12.45 billion 
before an FTA. After the implementation of the FTA, the country’s exports increased by 
US$1.33 billion to US$13.78 billion in the WTO group. One possible explanation for the 
increase in exports is the increase in market access for Cote d’Ivoire caused by an FTA, and the 
rebound effect of the reduction in costs for Ivorian producers, who import raw materials at a 
lower cost because of the tariff removal for production of export-bound products. 
Cote d’Ivoire’s exports after the WTO FTA include petroleum oils; and they are expected to net 
US$2.92 billion, Floating or submersible drilling or production platforms with an export value of 
US$2.74 billion, Cigarette containing tobacco with export receipts of US$533.37 million, and 
Wheat and meslin, which are expected to net US$174.36 million (see Table 9.6).  
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Table 9. 6: Cote d’Ivoire’s Major Exports to the WTO FTA (US$ Millions) 
HS Code Description Value 
270900 Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals 2927 
890520 Floating or submersible drilling or production platforms 2744 
240220 Cigarette containing tobacco 533.37 
100190 Wheat and meslin 174.36 
100630 Semi-milled or wholly milled rice 144.10 
271113 Butanes 110.93 
100640 Broken rice 105.72 
300490 Mineral or chemical fertilizer 91.9 
30371 Sardines  44.93 
70310 Onions and shallots 39.26 
380893 Herbicides 39.18 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
(e) The Impact of the WTO FTA on Cote d’Ivoire’s Imports  
Trade liberalisation has a positive effect on a country’s imports. The effect of an FTA, as in this 
case, is on price reduction, which has already shown that it has a significant impact on trade 
creation in Cote d’Ivoire. It therefore, becomes pertinent to evaluate the impact of a WTO FTA 
on Cote d’Ivoire’s imports in general, since this is one of the objectives of this study.  
Based on the market view obtained from the SMART Simulations, Table 9.7 shows the impact 
of a WTO FTA on Cote d’Ivoire’s imports. As shown in Table 9.7, Cote d’Ivoire’s imports 
before WTO FTA totalled US$12.45 billion. Cote d’Ivoire’s imports after the coming into effect 
the WTO FTA amounted to US$13.78 billion. The WTO FTA is expected to result in an increase 
in national imports by US$1.33 billion.  
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These findings are consistent with those of Mugano et al. (2013) who evaluated the impact of the 
WTO free-trade agreement on Zimbabwe. Their findings confirmed that after the implementation 
of the WTO free-trade agreement, an expected increase in imports was realised; which yielded 
similar outcomes to those of this study. 
This outcome is consistent with the findings of Alfieri, Cirera and Rawlinson (2006), who 
witnessed a dramatic increase in Mozambican imports after a unilateral implementation of the 
WTO FTA. The increase in imports is consistent with economic theory, as rational economic 
agents import more, due to the improvement in their cash flows, as an FTA means the abolition 
of tariffs, which were stumbling blocks to trade. 
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Table 9. 7: The Impact of WTO FTA on Cote d’Ivoire’s Imports (US$ Millions) 
Imports Before 
WTO FTA 
Change in Imports Imports After 
WTO FTA 
12454.31 1330.62 13784.93 
HS Code Description of Major Imports Value 
270900 Petroleum oils and oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals 
2928 
890520 Floating or submersible drilling or 
production platforms 
2745 
240220 Cigarette containing tobacco 542 
100630 Semi-milled or wholly milled rice 372.13 
30379 Fish and other Crustacean 205.92 
100190 Wheat and meslin 189.19 
300490 Mineral or chemical fertilizer 177.54 
100640 Broken rice 137.35 
252310 Cement clinkers 118.14 
271113 Butanes 117.14 
870323 Motor vehicles of a cylinder capacity 
exceeding 1500cc but not exceeding 
3000cc 
108 
240120 Tobacco partly or wholly stemmed/ 
stripped 
105.68 
271011 Light oils and preparations 105.65 
30371 Sardines 95.80 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
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Cote d’Ivoire’s major imports include petroleum oils, Floating or submersible drilling or 
production platforms, cigarette containing tobacco, Semi-milled or wholly milled rice, Fish and 
other Crustacean (see Table 9.7). 
(f) Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness Tests 
Given the uncertainty of the actual values for the Armington and demand elasticities, this implies 
that rigorous sensitivity analysis was required to ensure the robustness of the results presented in 
the study. Initially, a ‘base-case’ simulation was run, using the elasticities from Armington, Stern 
and Tokarick, as discussed in Chapter 5. Given the possible sensitivity of the models’ results to 
the elasticity values, the researcher had to re-run the simulations under varying assumptions. 
Upper-bound and lower-bound limits were established for various elasticities (see Table 5.1). 
Finally, given that the aim of the study was to determine the largest likely impact of WTO FTA 
on Cote d’Ivoire, a ‘worst-case’ scenario was devised, using the upper-bound values by adding 4. 
Appendix 3(a) reports on the sensitivity analysis and the robustness tests for the trade-creation 
effects in Cote d’Ivoire, after the adoption of a WTO FTA. Reducing the trade elasticity to a 
value of 0.5 shows no change of trade creation from the base case in Cote d’Ivoire. Likewise, 
increasing the trade elasticities to 2 and 6 brings about no changes in the trade creation. The 
outcome shows that Cote d’Ivoire’s total change in imports remains the same in value, although 
the composition thereof changes, as economic agents substitute across the various imports. 
Appendix 3(b) reports on the sensitivity analysis and robustness tests on the revenue effect in 
Cote d’Ivoire after the implementation of the WTO FTA. Reducing trade elasticity to 0.5 show 
no change in revenue from the base case in Cote d’Ivoire. But, increasing the trade elasticity 
values to 2 and 6 would, respectively, increase the revenue loss by 0.00126 per cent and 0.00253 
per cent. The resulting deviations from the middle-ground results are generally insignificant. 
Accordingly, the middle-ground estimates could be within sight of the potential sizes.  
Appendix 3(c) reports on the sensitivity analysis and the robustness tests on the welfare effect in 
Cote d’Ivoire, after the implementation of the WTO FTA. Reducing trade elasticity to 0.5 shows 
 THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALISATION ON COTE D’IVOIRE 
 
246 
 
no change of trade creation from the base case in Cote d’Ivoire. Likewise increasing the trade 
elasticity values to 2 and 6 would, respectively, brings no changes in trade creation. The margin 
of error can be argued to be conservative and acceptable; and the resulting deviations from the 
middle ground results are insignificant. Accordingly, the middle-ground estimates could be 
within sight of the potential sizes.  
Appendix 4(a) reports on the sensitivity analysis and the robustness tests on exports in Cote 
d’Ivoire after the implementation of the WTO FTA. Reducing trade elasticity to 0.5 5 shows no 
change of trade creation from the base case in Cote d’Ivoire. Likewise increasing the trade 
elasticity values to 2 and 6 would, respectively, brings no changes in trade creation. The resulting 
deviations from the middle-ground results are generally insignificant. Accordingly, the middle-
ground estimates could be within sight of the potential sizes.  
Appendix 4(b) reports on the sensitivity analysis and the robustness tests on imports in Cote 
d’Ivoire after the implementation of the WTO FTA. Reducing the trade elasticity value to 0.5 
shows no change in imports caused by trade creation from the base case in Cote d’Ivoire. 
Likewise, increasing trade elasticities to 2 and 6 brings about no changes to trade creation. The 
outcome shows that Cote d’Ivoire’s total change in imports would be the same in value, although 
the composition thereof changes, as economic agents substitute across the various imports. 
9.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented the empirical findings and an analysis of the revenue and welfare 
implications of the WTO FTA on Cote d’Ivoire. This will be followed by a presentation of the 
SMART simulation results and their analysis, which is aimed at addressing the research question 
posed in the study. 
Cote d’Ivoire will have a trade creation that would offset any trade diversion, resulting in net 
welfare gains for Cote d’Ivoire, if it enters into an FTA under the WTO arrangement. If Cote 
d’Ivoire removes all the tariffs against imports from the WTO group, and imposes the agreed 
WTO CET on non-WTO countries, this should result in a trade expansion valued at US$1.33 
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billion. Cote d’Ivoire’s major imports from the WTO FTA member States include petroleum 
oils, Floating or submersible drilling or production platforms, cigarette containing tobacco, 
Semi-milled or wholly milled rice, Fish and other Crustacean, which is expected to create an 
additional trade of US$6793 million. Other products include Wheat and Meslin, Mineral or 
chemical fertilizer, Broken rice with export values of US$189.19 million, US$177.54 million and 
US$137.35 million, respectively. For the importing country, in this case Cote d’Ivoire, trade 
diversion is neutral. It does not affect the overall imported quantity; but it re-allocates the market 
shares among its exporting partners, based on the new relative prices. The increase in imports 
from the WTO countries is balanced by a decrease in imports from the rest of the world, which 
results in the trade diversion being equal to zero. Thus, trade creation is the only influence on the 
total social welfare.  
The WITS/SMART simulations estimate that Cote d’Ivoire will have a total fiscal revenue loss 
of US$787.74 million if the WTO FTA is implemented, which is quite significant. 
The SMART simulation results reveal that Cote d’Ivoire will experience a gain in consumer 
welfare, valued at US$87.19 million, by implementing the WTO FTA. Cigarette containing 
tobacco are major contributors to the welfare gains in Cote d’Ivoire with a value of US$35.48 
million.  Cote d’Ivoire’s exports to the WTO group are expected to increase by US$1.33 billion, 
if Cote d’Ivoire unilaterally liberalises its trade within the WTO. Major commodities could boost 
Cote d’Ivoire’s exports after joining WTO FTA, include Petroleum oils, which are expected to 
net US$2.92 billion, Floating or submersible drilling or production platforms with an export 
value of US$2.74 billion, Cigarette containing tobacco of US$533 million, and Wheat and 
meslin, which are expected to net US$174 million. The WTO FTA would result in national 
imports increasing by US$1.33 billion.  
The increase in imports is logically as a result of improvements in economic agents’ cash flows, 
due to the low cost of importing, since tariffs would have been abolished. Cote d’Ivoire’s major 
imports include Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, Floating or 
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submersible drilling or production platforms, Cigarette containing tobacco, Semi-milled or 
wholly milled rice.  
From the above analysis, it is apparent that Cote d’Ivoire on balance will lose by joining the 
WTO FTA. Government will lose revenue through the massive transformation of the current 
tariff structure. Trade creation effects are likely to pose serious threat on the local industry. The 
welfare gains which are anticipated are both insignificant and cannot compensate revenue loss in 
Cote d’Ivoire. 
The study tested for the robustness of the results presented in this chapter, in order to ascertain 
whether the right parameters were being used during simulations. The results presented in this 
chapter are reliable. 
The next chapter presents the empirical findings and an analysis of the revenue, welfare, imports, 
exports, and trade creation implications of the bilateral free-trade agreements (BFTAs). The 
presentation of the SMART simulation results and their analysis, which is aimed at addressing 
the research question posed here, will be explored in this study. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ON COTE D’IVOIRE 
 
10.1  Introduction 
Eicher, et al (2012) defines bilateral trade agreement as a treaty or settlement pact between two 
countries at a given time, granting them favoured-trading status with each other.  
Abbott, Bentzen, and Tarp (2009) argued that these forms of bilateral trade occurs where trading 
partners standardise business operations, with the main aim of creating a greater level playing 
field for both countries and to derive special benefits from the trade arrangement. This would 
enable the country to protect its domestic market against one nation, to control the application of 
unfair subsidies, and also as a measure to control the dumping of cheap products. 
Chapter Ten presents the empirical findings and an analysis of the implications of the BTA FTA 
on Cote d’Ivoire. In this section, the study estimates the impact of trade-policy regimes on trade 
creation and diversion, imports, exports, revenue and welfare, on Cote d’Ivoire. The analysis was 
conducted using the WITS/SMART model. The year 2014 was adopted as the base year for 
simulation, using trade information databases such as TRAINS, COMTRADE and WTO-IDB.  
In this study, the SMART model was used, based on information contained in the UNCTAD-
managed TRAINS database. The year 2014 was chosen because that is the latest year for Cote 
d’Ivoire in the WITS/SMART software for Cote d’Ivoire. These tariffs (for BFTAs) applied in 
the WITS/SMART model against the actual tariffs applied by the Cote d’Ivoire customs 
authorities in 2014 were saved in the TRAINS databases.  
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 10.2 presents a comparison of Cote d’Ivoire’s 
structure and those of the BFTAs. Section 10.3 discusses the WITS/SMART model simulation 
results for BTA FTA. Section 10.4 provides a summary of Chapter 10. 
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10.2  Cote d’Ivoire’s Bilateral Trade Agreements 
Cote d’Ivoire has concluded over 34 bilateral trade agreements which generally provide for a 
Most Favoured Nation Regime (MFN) and a Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). Within the 
context of WTO Cote d’Ivoire has currently 11 Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) with the 
WTO members which include: The United States, The EU, Canada, Switzerland, Japan, 
Australia (WTO, 2015). It is important to also note that Cote d’Ivoire is not a signatory of the 
Agreement on the Global system of Trade Preferences (GSTP) among developing countries 
(WTO, 2015).  
Although Cote d’Ivoire has not yet signed BFTAs, the government is in the process of reviewing 
its bilateral trade agreements since most of them are outdated (were signed in the 1960s), this 
study hypothetically assumed an FTA for the upcoming bilateral trade agreements. This 
assumption although it is abstract in nature, it is more realistic position for Cote d’Ivoire future 
bilateral trade agreements since most of its trading partners are engaging with Cote d’Ivoire in 
FTAs arrangements such as WAEMU FTA, ECOWAS FTA and EPAs. Hence, in the spirit of 
the need to harmonise trading protocols and smoothen trade facilitation, going forward, Cote 
d’Ivoire is most likely going to engage in FTAs when reviewing bilateral trade agreement.  
This review of the BFTAs has been assumed to start with major trading partners in this study. In 
this study the major trading partners selected on the basis of volume of trade were used as the 
basis to determine Cote d’Ivoire’s major trading partner, as discussed in Chapter 3. The top ten 
Cote d’Ivoire trading partners used in this research are: Netherlands, the United States, South 
Africa, France, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Belgium, Germany, India, and Ghana. 
10.3 SMART Model Simulation Results 
This section presents the results of the SMART Model simulations in terms of trade-creation and 
trade-diversion, as well as the revenue and welfare effects. 
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10.3.1  Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 
Trade creation means that more efficient or lower-cost producers in any of the countries with 
bilateral arrangement with Cote d’Ivoire displace the less efficient or higher-cost producers in 
Cote d’Ivoire; and consumers would, therefore, benefit from the lower prices (Viner, 2014). 
However, some producers in Cote d’Ivoire could be negatively affected, as their products are 
substituted by products efficiently produced in partner countries with bilateral free trade 
agreements with Cote d’Ivoire (BFTAs).  
This implies that Ivorian industries have to improve their production efficiency and competitive 
edge in preparation for the FTA. Trade diversion, on the other hand, implies that more efficient 
suppliers from outside the bilateral group are displaced by less efficient producers within the 
FTA (Viner, 2014). This would be costly for the country, as revenue that would have been 
generated from imports from outside the BFTAs is lost; and, consequently, the products become 
more expensive, since they would then be sourced from higher-cost producers.  
Using the simulations results from the WITS/SMART model, Table 10.1 shows the trade-
creation and trade-diversion effects of the adoption of the BTFA by Cote d’Ivoire. 
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Table 10. 1: Trade-Creation Effects of the BFTA on Cote d’Ivoire (US$ Millions) 
HS Code Product Description Value 
87 Motor vehicles 35.32 
84 Nuclear reactors 24.79 
85 Electric Motors 17.75 
39 Plastic and articles thereof 10.53 
73 Articles of Iron or steel 8.05 
29 Organic chemicals 7.88 
27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation 6.16 
Other   1160 
Total 
 
1265 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
A bilateral free trade agreement is expected to enhance the competitiveness of efficient firms 
within the BFTA with Cote d’Ivoire, at the expense of those Ivorian companies, which were 
previously shielded by tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Foreign firms from the BFTA are expected 
to displace Cote d’Ivoire products in what is known as resultant-trade creation. Foreign firms 
from the BFTAs are expected to increase their exports by US$1.265 billion (see Table 10.1). The 
major products expected to gain a significant market access in Cote d’Ivoire market from BFTA 
firms are motor vehicles, nuclear reactors and electric motors, with import values of US$35.32 
million, US$24.79 and US$17.75 million, respectively.  
Currently, motor vehicles are attracting a duty rate between 20 and 35 per cent, in addition to a 
value added tax of 18 per cent in Cote d’Ivoire. The adoption of BFTA implies that it has to be 
levied 0 per cent duty. The coming into effect of a BFTA would now mean that motor vehicles 
will attract a 0 per cent tariff rate. The trade creation, particularly from electric motors and motor 
vehicles, is expected to come as a relief to consumers in Cote d’Ivoire, as they would probably 
be able to make significant savings, as the prices of these commodities could be expected to fall.  
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These findings were further supported by Mugano (2015) who evaluated the impact of the 
bilateral free-trade agreements on Zimbabwe. The study also revealed a positive trade-creation 
effect of U$104.57 million, resulting from the bilateral free-trade agreement.  
This outcome is consistent with the findings of other researchers. Hamilton (2009) carried out a 
study on the potential effects of a bilateral FTA between the EU and Malawi, and found that 
Malawi expects an increase in imports caused by trade-creation effects by 0.4 per cent. Hallaert 
(2007) estimated a 4.9 per cent increase in imports into Madagascar on the ex ante effects of the 
EU FTA. 
However, the effect of trade creation on local industry is negative. Firms in the production of 
motor vehicles, nuclear reactors and related companies in the value chain, will be threatened with 
closure, unless government comes up with a financial package to mitigate the costs of foreign 
competition, and also to enhance the competitiveness of companies (as proposed by Lang, 2006). 
There is no evidence of trade diversion in Cote d’Ivoire. The outcome is consistent with the 
findings of Shinyekwa and Katunze, 2016; Mugano et al, 2013; Abdelmalik, Sandretto and 
Jallab, 2007; Cernat (2003); and the argument of Kemp and Wan (1976) and Amponsah (2002). 
These authors all suggested that some regional groupings CET are too weak to divert trade from 
third parties. 
10.3.2 The Revenue Effect 
The implications of the BFTA on member States’ fiscal revenue is one of the contentious issues 
currently under discussion at the regional level. There are fears that the tariff cuts that have to be 
implemented by most BFTA countries, in order to conform to the duty-free rates, would result in 
tariff revenue shortfalls for most countries.  
Cote d’Ivoire is among those countries that are supposed to undertake a huge transformation of 
their national tariff structures, in order to conform to the duty-free rates – considering that only 
5.51 per cent of the tariff lines are liberalised. Table 10.2 shows the revenue implications of the 
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BFTAs on Cote d’Ivoire. The WITS/SMART simulations estimate that Cote d’Ivoire will have a 
total fiscal revenue loss of US$278 million if the BFTA is implemented. Major contributors to 
this revenue loss in Cote d’Ivoire are motor vehicles, cereals, electrical machinery and 
equipment, edible vegetables, meat and edible meat offal, and tobacco, with US$34.38 million, 
US$18.63 million, US$9.39 million, $6.6 million, US$6.54 million and US$5.04 million, 
respectively (see Table 10.2).  
Table 10. 2: The Revenue Effect of the BFTA on Cote d’Ivoire (US$ Millions) 
HS code Product Description Revenue Loss % of Total Loss 
87 Motor Vehicles -34.48 12.4 
10 Cereals -18.63 6.7 
85 Electrical machinery and equipment and parts  -9.39 3.37 
07 Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers -6.6 2.37 
02 Meat and edible meat offal -6.54 2.35 
24 Tobacco -5.04 1.81 
72 Iron and Steel -3.32 1.19 
04 Diary products; bird’ eggs, natural honey -3.23 1.16 
33 Oils/Cream for make-ups -1.946 0.7 
Other 
 
-207.6 74.67 
Total 
 
-278 100 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations  
Motor vehicles alone represent 12.4 per cent of the total loss in revenue. Traditionally, these 
commodities are subject to high import taxes and duties; for example, Motor vehicles attracts a 
tariff rate between 20 and 35 per cent, an 18 per cent of VAT plus an additional tax according to 
the price of origin of the vehicle. Duty is approximately 44 per cent of the value assessed by 
Customs. However, the BFTAs requires it now to be imported at a duty-free rate, hence the 
massive loss in revenue. 
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The expected loss in revenue coming into effect if Cote d’Ivoire implements the BFTAs is 
significant, since it represents 4.59 per cent of the 2014 total tax revenue. This outcome is 
consistent with the findings of other researchers in the region. Hamilton (2009) found that the 
bilateral free trade agreement between the EU and Malawi would result in a 20 per cent decline 
in revenue. In Kenya, Hamilton (2009) found a modest loss of revenue of 5.7 per cent if the 
country signs a bilateral FTA with EU.  
Zgovu and Milner (2007) found that a bilateral FTA between Tanzania and the EU would 
generate a revenue loss of 54 per cent. 
10.3.3 The Consumer-Welfare Effect 
Deardorff (2014) defined consumer welfare as the distinct personal benefits that are derived from 
consuming a particular good or service. This theory finds individual assessment and 
measurement to be the crutial determinants of the levels of satisfaction. 
One of the main arguments in favour of free trade is that consumers would benefit from lower 
prices. Whether or not this will actually occur depends on the extent of trade creation as against 
trade diversion. For Cote d’Ivoire, this study reveals that the total trade creation surpasses trade 
diversion, which means that consumers would benefit from the implementation of the BFTAs.   
As shown in Table 10.3, the SMART simulation results reveal that Cote d’Ivoire will experience 
a gain in consumer welfare, valued at US$61.09 million by implementing the BFTA. Tobacco is 
the major contributor to welfare gains in Cote d’Ivoire. Under the BFTAs scenario, US$35.4 
million of savings would accrue to households. Currently, motor vehicles, electrical machinery 
and meat also contribute significant gains to welfare (see Table 10.3). 
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Table 10. 3: Welfare Effects of BFTA on Cote d’Ivoire (US$ Million) 
HS code Product Description Welfare Gain/Loss 
24 Tobacco 35.40 
87 Motor Vehicles 3.89 
85 Electrical machinery and equipment and parts  1.29 
02 Meat and edible meat offal 1.1 
Other 
 
19.41 
Total 
 
61.09 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
The impact of welfare in Cote d’Ivoire after liberalising trade with its top ten trading partners is 
expected to be insignificant, representing only 0.17 per cent of 2014 GDP. 
These findings concur with the recent findings of Simiyu (2017) who assessed the effect of the 
bilateral free trade agreement on Kenya. His findings show that consumer welfare effect in 
Kenya after the implementation of the bilateral free trade agreement will be insignificant. 
In Asia, the Asian Development Bank Institute (2011) revealed that the Thailand-New Zealand 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) brings about US$11.3 million in 
welfare gains for Thailand. 
10.3.4  The Impact of BFTA on Cote d’Ivoire’s Exports  
One of the objectives on this study is to find the impact of BFTA on Cote d’Ivoire’s exports. 
Exporters’ view evaluated from the WITS/SMART simulation model shows that Cote d’Ivoire’s 
exports are expected to increase by US$921.87 million if the country undertakes an FTA with its 
top ten trading partners (see Table 10.4).   
 
 THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALISATION ON COTE D’IVOIRE 
 
257 
 
Table 10. 4: The Impact of BFTA on Cote d’Ivoire Exports (US$ Millions) 
Trading Partner Exports 
 Before 
Exports After Change % Share of 
Total Exports 
Nigeria 2885 3408 523 47.89 
France 1296 1504 208 21.13 
Belgium 701 667 -34 9.37 
India 317 363 46 5.1 
The United States 289 330 41 4.63 
Germany 255 310 55 4.35 
Netherlands 241 290 49 4.07 
South Africa 109.72 126.59 16.87 1.77 
Ghana 70 85 15 1.19 
Burkina Faso 30 32 2 0.44 
Total 6193.72 7115.59 921.87 100 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
The results observed for the exports before the bilateral trade agreement is different from that of 
(Table 3.4) because the model assume an elasticity of substitution of 99 per cent. Hence exports 
‘values are higher. 
This outcome is consistent with economic theory and the empirical evidence. On economic 
theory, FTAs create market access, as trade barriers are dismantled with an FTA (Hindriks et al, 
2013). This is expected to propel the exports of member States in the FTA. On empirical 
evidence, from the study of Simiyu (2017) which shows that Kenya should expect an increment 
in their exports from US$4.159 billion to US$ 4.627 billion after the bilateral free-trade 
agreement. Hallaert (2007) also found that Madagascar’s exports are like to increase by 3.8 per 
cent if the country implements the EU FTA 
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Table 10. 5: Cote d’Ivoire Major Exports in the BFTA (US$ Millions) 
HS Code Product Description Value 
27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation 2841 
25 Salt 632 
24 Tobacco 533 
87 Vehicles 185 
85 Electric Motors 174 
84 Nuclear Reactors 155.82 
30 Pharmaceutical products 143.94 
73 Articles of iron or steel  59 
39 Plastic and plastic thereof 44.38 
48 Paper and paperboard 28.92 
63 Textile articles and clothing 18.6 
22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar 9.23 
26 Ores, slag and ash 8.95 
32 Tanning or dyeing extracts 8.93 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
Nigeria, France and Belgium are the major export destinations for Cote d’Ivoire’s products with 
78.39 per cent of total exports being absorbed by these three countries. Major commodities, 
which are expected to dominate Cote d’Ivoire’s exports after joining the BFTAs include mineral 
fuels, which is expected to net US$ 2.84 billion, salt with an export value of US$ 632 million, 
tobacco with export receipts of US$ 533 million, and vehicles, which is expected to net US 185 
million (see Table 10.5).  
10.3.5  The Impact of BFTAs on Cote d’Ivoire’s Imports 
Conventional theory on trade suggests that a trade reform, which comes in the form of an FTA, 
could be expected to lead to an increase in imports, due to a fall in prices. In the case of Cote 
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d’Ivoire, does this BFTA lead to an increase in the country’s imports? This is one of the research 
questions posed by this study, and is answered in this section. According to Lang (2006), trade 
creation and trade diversion comprise significant stakes in a region/country’s import basket. In 
this study, trade creation and trade diversion were significant; hence Cote d’Ivoire’s imports 
would be strongly influenced by a BFTA. Table 10.6 presents the market view on the impact of 
BFTA on imports in Cote d’Ivoire.    
Based on SMART simulations, Cote d’Ivoire’s imports are expected to increase by US$ 817 
million. The increase in imports is logically as a result of improvements in economic agents’ 
cash flows, due to the low cost of importing, since tariffs would have been abolished. 
Table 10. 6: The Impact of BFTA on Cote d’Ivoire Imports (US$ Millions) 
HS Code Product Description Import Value 
27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation 2928 
89 Ships boats and floating structures 2682 
24 Tobacco 541 
10 Cereals 352 
03 Fish and other crustacean 193 
30 Pharmaceutical products 177 
25 Salt 107 
87  Motor Vehicles  100 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
Cote d’Ivoire’s major imports include mineral fuels, ships boats and floating structures, tobacco, 
cereals, fish and other crustacean (see Table 10.6). 
10.3.6  Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness Tests 
Given the uncertainty on the actual values for the Armington and demand elasticities, this 
implies that rigorous sensitivity analysis would be required, to ensure the robustness of the 
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results presented in this study. Initially, a ‘base-case’ simulation was run, using the elasticities 
from Armington, Stern and Tokarick (as discussed in Chapter 5). Given the possible sensitivity 
of the models’ results to the elasticity values, the researcher had to re-run the simulations under 
varying assumptions. Upper-bound and lower-bound limits were established for various 
elasticities (see Table 5.1).  
Finally, given that the aim of the study was to determine the largest likely impact of BFTAs on 
Cote d’Ivoire, a ‘worst-case’ scenario was devised, using the upper-bound values by adding 4. 
Appendix 3(a) reports on the sensitivity analysis and robustness tests for the trade-creation 
effects in Cote d’Ivoire after the adoption of a BFTA. Reducing the trade elasticity value to 0.5 
shows no change of trade creation from the base case in Cote d’Ivoire. Likewise, increasing trade 
elasticities to 2 and 6 brings no changes to trade creation. The outcome shows that Cote 
d’Ivoire’s total change in imports remains the same in value, although the composition thereof 
changes, as economic agents substitute for the various imports. 
Appendix 3(b) reports on the sensitivity analysis and the robustness tests on the revenue effect in 
Cote d’Ivoire after the implementation of BFTA. Reducing trade elasticity to 0.5 may reduce the 
revenue loss by 0.043 per cent. Increasing trade elasticity values to 2 and 6 would, respectively, 
increase the revenue loss by 0.025 per cent and 0.21 per cent. The results in the upper-bound and 
the worst-case scenarios compared to the base case, confirm that the responsiveness of imports to 
relative price changes is increasing, which has an effect on revenue. A 5 per cent margin of error 
on the lower-bound and upper-bound limits could be seen as conservative and acceptable; and 
the resulting deviations from the middle-ground results are generally insignificant. Accordingly, 
the middle-ground estimates could be within sight of the potential sizes.  
Appendix 3(c) reports on sensitivity analysis and robustness tests on the welfare effect in Cote 
d’Ivoire after the implementation of BFTA. Reducing trade elasticity to 0.5 could increase the 
welfare gains by 0.022 per cent. Increasing trade elasticity values to 2 and 6 would, respectively, 
decrease the welfare gains by 0.011 per cent and 0.018 per cent. The margin of error can be seen 
 THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALISATION ON COTE D’IVOIRE 
 
261 
 
as conservative and acceptable, and the resulting deviations from the middle-ground results are 
insignificant. Accordingly, the middle-ground estimates could be within sight of the potential 
sizes.  
Appendix 4(a) reports on sensitivity analysis and the robustness tests on exports in Cote d’Ivoire 
after the implementation of BFTA. Reducing trade elasticity to 0.5 might increase exports by 
0.072 per cent. Increasing trade elasticity values to 2 and 6 would, respectively, increase exports 
by 1.84 per cent and 4.83 per cent. The deviations of expected change in exports as a percentage 
on lower-bound, upper-bound and worst-case scenarios from the base case are 0.068 percentage 
points, 1.7 percentage points, and 4.69 percentage points, respectively. The resulting deviations 
from the middle ground results are generally insignificant. Accordingly, the middle-ground 
estimates could be within sight of the potential sizes.  
Appendix 4(b) reports on the sensitivity analysis and the robustness tests on imports in Cote 
d’Ivoire after the implementation of BFTA. Reducing the trade elasticity value to 0.5 shows no 
change in imports from the base case in Cote d’Ivoire. Likewise, increasing trade elasticities to 2 
and 6 brings about no changes to trade creation. The outcome shows that Cote d’Ivoire’s total 
change in imports remains the same in value, although the composition thereof changes as 
economic agents substitute for the various imports. 
10.4  Summary 
This chapter has presented the empirical findings and an analysis of the revenue, welfare, 
imports, exports, and trade-creation implications of the BFTAs on Cote d’Ivoire. The 
presentation of the SMART simulation results and their analysis, which is aimed at addressing 
the research question posed in the study, will be further explored later in this study. 
A bilateral free trade agreement would result in trade creation that would offset trade diversion, 
resulting in net welfare gains for Cote d’Ivoire. If Cote d’Ivoire removes all the tariffs against 
imports from its trading partners with bilateral trade agreements, and imposes an MFN on non-
BFTA countries, this would result in trade expansion valued at US$ 1.26 billion. Major 
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contributors to trade creation are: motor vehicles, nuclear reactors and electric motors, with 
import values of US$ 35.32 million, US$ 24.79 and US$ 17.75 million, respectively (see Table 
8). 
For the importing country, in this case Cote d’Ivoire, trade diversion is neutral. It does not affect 
the overall imported quantity, but merely re-allocates market shares among the exporting 
partners, based on the new relative prices. The increase in imports from the BFTAs countries is 
balanced by a decrease in imports from the rest of the world, which result in trade diversion 
being equal to zero. Thus, trade creation is the only influence on total social welfare.  
The WITS/SMART simulations estimate that Cote d’Ivoire will have a total fiscal revenue loss 
of US$ 278 million, if the BFTA is implemented. Major contributors to this revenue loss in Cote 
d’Ivoire would be motor vehicles, cereals and electrical machinery.  
SMART simulation results reveal that Cote d’Ivoire will experience a gain in consumer welfare 
valued at US$ 61.09 million, by implementing the BFTA. However, the impact of the BFTA on 
welfare was insignificant in Cote d’Ivoire. 
Cote d’Ivoire is expected to witness an increase in its exports and imports by US$ 921.87 million 
and US$ 817 million, respectively, if it implements the BFTA The increase in imports is 
logically as a result of improvements in economic agents’ cash flows, due to the low cost of 
imports, since tariffs would have been abolished.  
From the above analysis, it is apparent that Cote d’Ivoire will on average lose by joining the 
BFTA. Government stands to lose significant revenue through the massive transformation of the 
current tariff structure. More so, the industry is threatened with closure due to trade creation 
effects. The welfare gains are insignificant to compensate both loss in revenue and possible 
effects of deindustrialisation like unemployment. 
The study tested for robustness of the results. Based on the reports of sensitivity analysis and 
robustness tests, the results show that deviations from the middle ground results are generally 
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insignificant. Accordingly, the middle-ground estimates could be within sight of the potential 
sizes.  
The next chapter summarises the research findings relating to the imports, exports, trade creation 
and trade diversion, and revenue, the welfare implications of the WAEMU customs union, the 
WAEMU FTA, the ECOWAS customs union, ECOWAS FTA, EPAs, WTO FTA and BFTAs on 
Cote d’Ivoire. The conclusions are drawn, based on the findings. The last section will put 
forward policy options that the policy-makers in Cote d’Ivoire may wish to adopt.  
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
11.1  Introduction 
This chapter summarises the important findings of this study in relation to the research questions 
and the objectives, as articulated in Chapter One. It also provides possible recommendations – 
based on the findings, as well as highlighting the limitations and some suggestions for further 
study. Lastly, the study will hint at related area on the topic of this study, although not discussed 
in detail have contributed to much knowledge. 
11.2 Research Summary 
Trade liberalisation has generated a lot of interest around the world. The effects of trade 
liberalisation are not straightforward. Some countries with robust economic structures – 
particularly industrialised countries – have from it benefited immensely. In contrast, developing 
countries, which include Cote d’Ivoire, have lost out from early efforts to liberalise their 
economies, due to the fragile nature of their economies and the significant reliance of imports 
duties. In Africa, there is no conclusive evidence on the role and impact of trade liberalisation 
and globalisation on human development, livelihoods, social welfare and economic development 
(Githanga, 2015).   
In a number of cases, liberalisation has been followed by misery, the destruction of poor peoples’ 
livelihoods, damage to the environment, and the marginalisation of poor countries and their 
communities (Tekere, 2001).  
On the other hand, recent studies show that potential sources on productivity growth in 
developing countries and emerging market arise from catch-up growth by absorbing technology 
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and ideas from advanced economies, structural change into higher productivity sectors, and 
improved resource allocation within sectors (Dabla-Norris et al, 2013).  
There is a large literature that has shown that economic reforms that reduces barriers to efficient 
factor reallocation, technology adoption and innovation are associated with higher productivity 
growth. Higher quality and quantity of infrastructure and human capital, trade openness as well 
as efficient and well-developed financial systems, and economic institutions that promote 
competition, facilitate entry and exit, and encourage entrepreneurship and innovation have been 
variously found to increase productivity growth at the cross-country, industry and firm level (see 
OECD, 2013; Dabla-Norris 2013; Prati et al, 2013; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2013).  
Cote d’Ivoire has witnessed a slowdown in its economy due to the global recession at the 
beginning of the 1980s which caused the prices of cocoa and coffee, Cote d’Ivoire’s principal 
exports to fall. The recession combined with a soaring commercial interest rate truncated the 
growth of the Ivorian economy and aggravated tensions in an already fragile labour force. The 
government had to adopt the structural adjustment program in order to restore the economic 
stability it once enjoyed. The structural adjustment program consisted of government reduction 
of its spending, ensuring monetary tightening, eliminating subsidies for food, privatisation of 
public enterprises, reductions in barriers to trade. The goal behind the structural adjustment 
program was to decrease the public debt and at the same time increase exports and restore 
economic growth.   
However, the impact on the economy was a complete failure of the policy, GDP per capital fell 
by 15 per cent, the intensity of poverty doubled, external indebtedness grew from 141 per cent to 
175 per cent of GDP, there was also deterioration in the terms of trade (Kingston et al, 2011). 
During 1990 and 1995, spending on healthcare fell slightly and education fell dramatically. 
The outcome of these policies has left the country without foreign exchange reserves, low 
incomes, low capacity utilisation, low FDIs, a decaying economic infrastructure and an ever-
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increasing national debt, all of which have worked against the country’s competitiveness. This 
has left the economy vulnerable to external forces, like foreign competition. 
In order to consolidate gains in competitiveness and achieve high and sustainable growth, the 
Ivorian authorities coordinated efforts to establish and intra-regional custom tariffs among the 
member of the West African and Monetary Union (WAEMU). As evidenced in Chapter 3 Cote 
d’Ivoire’s trade performance within the WAEMU region has shown positive results for the entire 
period of study. The country has literally maintained a positive trade balance with all of its 
trading partners. However, from 2010 to 2011 with partner country such as Benin there has been 
a decrease in the trade balance from US$105.1 million to US$87.5 million and an increase in the 
following year from US$87.5 million and US$124 million (see table 3.3). This inconsistency in 
Cote d’Ivoire’s trade balance is exhibited with most WAEMU partner countries apart from 
Burkina Faso and Mali.  
Cote d’Ivoire is even going further in making ambitious trade liberalisation measures under 
WAEMU, ECOWAS, ACP – EU, WTO and through bilateral trade agreements. It is against this 
background that the study empirically investigated the impact of different trade regimes, which 
were negotiated in the above trading arrangement in Cote d’Ivoire. 
In order to conceptualise the topic, the following research questions were put forward in the 
introductory chapter: Has trade liberalisation led to trade creation for Cote d’Ivoire? Has trade 
liberalisation led to welfare gains? Is the Government of Cote d’Ivoire losing revenue, due to 
liberalisation? Has trade liberalisation led to an increase in imports? Has trade liberalisation led 
to an increase in exports? Is ECOWAS Cote d’Ivoire’s major trading partner? If not, which 
trading bloc is the major trading partner?  
Nine specific objectives were formulated to address these questions; and these specific objectives 
were: To evaluate the impact of WAEMU customs union on imports, exports, revenue, trade 
creation and diversion, and welfare implications for Cote d’Ivoire; to evaluate the impact of 
WAEMU FTA on imports, exports, revenue, trade creation and diversion, and welfare 
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implications for Cote d’Ivoire; to evaluate the impact of ECOWAS customs union on imports, 
exports, revenue, trade creation and diversion, and welfare implications in Cote d’Ivoire; to 
evaluate the impact of the ECOWAS FTA on imports, exports, revenue, trade creation and 
diversion, and welfare implications for Cote d’Ivoire; to evaluate the impact of EU FTA on 
imports, exports, revenue, trade creation and diversion, and welfare implications for Cote 
d’Ivoire ; to evaluate the impact of WTO FTA on imports, exports, revenue, trade creation and 
diversion, and welfare implications for Cote d’Ivoire; to evaluate the impact of bilateral 
agreements on imports, exports, revenue, trade creation and diversion, and welfare implications 
for Cote d’Ivoire; to come up with a trading block that is more beneficial to Cote d’Ivoire 
amongst WTO, EPAs, ECOWAS and WAEMU; and to analyse the implications of the study’s 
findings for trade policy in Cote d’Ivoire. 
In the light of these objectives, this study adopted one empirical framework. The model used in 
this study were the WITS/SMART model. The WITS/SMART model has all the caveats 
associated with a static partial-equilibrium analysis. Partial-equilibrium analysis may be sensitive 
to the elasticity parameters used and ignore interactions with other markets, although interaction 
can be modelled in PEM (Mkenda and Hangi, 2009). In this study three different elasticity 
scenarios were used to compensate for these shortcomings and to gauge the effects on the 
simulations.  
The WITS/SMART model brings together various databases ranging from bilateral trade, 
commodity trade flows and various types of trade protection (Lang, 2006). WITS also integrates 
the analytical tools that support simulation analysis. The SMART simulation model is one of the 
analytical tools used in WITS for simulation purposes. SMART contains built-in analytical 
modules that support trade policy analysis, such as the effects of multilateral tariff cuts, 
preferential trade liberalisation and ad hoc tariff changes. It employs tariff data from the Trade 
Analysis and Information Systems (TRAINS) and the world trade organization integrated 
database (IDB-WTO) and consolidated tariff schedule (CTS-WTO). TRAINS has an advantage 
in that it uses harmonized schedule nomenclature and includes data from 1988. The (CTS-WTO) 
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contains binding tariffs, which are useful when commenting on the negotiated tariff schedules 
(Villa, et al., 2012).  
The partial-equilibrium model allows for the evaluation of various trade policy regimes on 
government revenue, welfare, trade creation and diversion, which are the objectives of this study.  
11.3  The Main Findings 
Based on the evidence from the estimation of results of the empirical framework employed in 
this study, the highlights of the findings cover a summary of the results from the WITS/SMART 
model. 
11.3.1 The Results of the WITS/SMART Model  
The study provides a quantitative analysis of the likely implications of the WAEMU customs 
union, the ECOWAS customs union, WAEMU FTA, ECOWAS FTA, EPAs, BFTAs and WTO 
FTA on revenue, welfare and trade for Cote d’Ivoire. The study used the WITS/SMART partial-
equilibrium model for the analysis.  
The implementation of the WAEMU and ECOWAS customs union would require that member 
States align their national tariffs with those of the agreed CET. And, WAEMU FTA, ECOWAS 
FTA, EPAs, BFTAs and WTO FTA require that Cote d’Ivoire applies zero duties to all the 
member States in these trading blocs. The fulfilment of this requirement means a substantial 
transformation of Cote d’Ivoire’s current tariff structure, since only 22.37 per cent of the total 
tariff lines are complying with the CET. An FTA is an even worse scenario for Cote d’Ivoire, 
considering that only 5.51 per cent of the tariff lines are duty-free, especially under 
circumstances where the customs revenue is increasingly becoming an important source of 
government revenue, with US$1.84 billion in 2014 as opposed to US$1.34 billion in 2000 
(OECD, 2016).  
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Turning to the WITS/SMART simulations, the study provides some interesting and useful 
results, which would be helpful to policy makers in the ongoing trade negotiations. A notable 
result from the analysis is that the implementation of the WAEMU CET, ECOWAS CET, 
WAEMU FTA, ECOWAS FTA, EPAs, BFTAs and WTO FTA presents both benefits and 
challenges for the country.  
(a) WAEMU Customs Union and WAEMU FTA 
A notable result from the analysis is that the implementation of the WAEMU CET will present 
both benefits and challenges for the country. One of the benefits of implementing the customs 
union is the expansion of trade to the tune of US$2.83 billion through trade creation in the 
WAEMU region. Closely related to the trade creation effect is the consumer welfare effect, 
which is also calculated in the WITS/SMART model. The simulation results show a gain in 
welfare valued at US$8.67 million, following the adoption of the WAEMU CET.   
The WITS/SMART simulations estimate that Cote d’Ivoire will have a total fiscal revenue loss 
of US$292 million if the WAEMU CET is implemented. 
Vehicles and parts will show the largest loss in revenue in Cote d’Ivoire as a result of the 
WAEMU CET with a 13.17 per cent of total loss in revenue (see Table 7.4). Overall, Cote 
d’Ivoire’s exports are expected to fall marginally by 21.64 per cent; while imports are likely to 
increase by 0.0248, due to the trade-creation effect. 
The WAEMU FTA would result in a trade creation that would offset trade diversion, thereby 
resulting in net welfare gains for Cote d’Ivoire. If Cote d’Ivoire removes all the tariffs against 
imports from the WAEMU region, and impose the agreed WAEMU CET on non-WAEMU 
countries, this would result in a trade expansion valued at US$14.53 million. The WITS/SMART 
simulations estimate that Cote d’Ivoire would have a total fiscal revenue loss of US$10.5 million 
if the WAEMU FTA is implemented.  
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The SMART simulation results reveal that Cote d’Ivoire would experience a gain in consumer 
welfare valued at US$1.21 million by implementing the WAEMU FTA.  
Overall, Cote d’Ivoire is expected to witness an increase in its exports and imports by 
US$341.28 million and US$11.23 million, respectively, if it fully implements the WAEMU 
FTA. 
(b) ECOWAS Customs Union and ECOWAS FTA 
Based on SMART simulations, Cote d’Ivoire is expected to witness a total trade creation of 
US$1.49 billion from ECOWAS member States – and mainly from Nigeria and Ghana. There is 
no evidence of trade diversion in Cote d’Ivoire. The WITS/SMART simulations estimate that 
Cote d’Ivoire would have a total fiscal revenue loss of US$285.86 million if the ECOWAS CET 
is implemented. Animal products, metals and foodstuffs are expected to be the major 
contributors of revenue losses in Cote d’Ivoire, with 30.82 per cent, 18.12 per cent and 13.37 per 
cent of total revenue loss, respectively if Cote d’Ivoire joins the ECOWAS customs union. One 
of the reasons for these findings is that the agricultural sector in Cote d’Ivoire remains very 
protected  
The SMART simulation results reveal that Cote d’Ivoire will experience a gain in consumer 
welfare, valued at US$86.23 million by implementing the ECOWAS customs union. However, 
welfare gains are insignificant in Cote d’Ivoire. The ECOWAS customs union is expected to 
trigger a marginal decrease in exports in Cote d’Ivoire by 54.3 per cent. However, Cote 
d’Ivoire’s imports are expected to rise by 0.87 per cent because of the trade-creation effects.  
The WITS/SMART simulations estimate that Cote d’Ivoire would experience a total fiscal 
revenue loss of US$28.9 million if the ECOWAS FTA is implemented. The major revenue loss 
comes from cigarette and lights oils and preparations, with a total loss of US$5.9 million (see 
Table 6.9).  
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The SMART simulation results reveal that Cote d’Ivoire will experience a gain in consumer 
welfare valued at US$37.8 million by implementing the ECOWAS FTA.  
The major contributors to the welfare gains are floors, meals and pellets, worn clothing and other 
worn articles. The ECOWAS FTA is expected to cause trade creation that will offset trade 
diversion, resulting in net welfare gains in Cote d’Ivoire valued at US$538.23 million. Major 
commodities, which top the Cote d’Ivoire trade-creation list, include cigarettes containing 
tobacco, light oils and preparation, fish and quicklimes.  
Overall, Cote d’Ivoire’s exports and imports are expected to increase by 0.17 per cent and 0.043 
per cent, respectively, if the country adopts the ECOWAS FTA. 
(c) EPAs 
The WITS/SMART simulations estimate that Cote d’Ivoire will have a total fiscal revenue loss 
of US$294 million if the EPAs are implemented. The SMART simulation results reveal that Cote 
d’Ivoire will experience a gain in consumer welfare valued at US$28.82 million by 
implementing the EPAs.  
By implementing a full EPA with the EU, Cote d’Ivoire would have trade creation that would 
offset trade diversion, resulting in net welfare gains for country. If Cote d’Ivoire removes all the 
tariffs against imports from the EU, and imposes the agreed EU CET on non-EU countries, this 
would result in a trade expansion valued at US$3.25 billion. Overall, Cote d’Ivoire’s exports and 
imports are expected to rise by US$459.41 million and US$339 million, respectively. 
(d) The WTO FTA 
The WITS/SMART simulations estimate that Cote d’Ivoire is likely to experience a significant 
fiscal revenue loss of US$787.74 million if the WTO FTA is implemented. The SMART 
simulation results reveal that Cote d’Ivoire will experience a gain in consumer welfare valued at 
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US$87.19 million by implementing the WTO FTA. Tobacco and motor vehicles are major 
contributors to welfare gains in Cote d’Ivoire.  
Cote d’Ivoire would have a trade creation effect that would offset trade diversion, resulting in net 
welfare gains for Cote d’Ivoire if it goes for an FTA under the WTO arrangement. If Cote 
d’Ivoire removes all the tariffs against imports from the WTO group, and imposes the agreed 
WTO CET on non-WTO countries, this would result in a trade expansion valued at US$1.33 
billion. For the importing country, in this case Cote d’Ivoire, trade diversion is neutral. It does 
not affect the overall imported quantity; but it re-allocates the market shares among the exporting 
partners, based on the new relative prices.  
The increase in imports from the WTO countries is balanced by a decrease in imports from the 
rest of the world, which would result in trade diversion being equal to zero. Thus, trade creation 
is the only influence on the total social welfare. 
Overall, if Cote d’Ivoire unilaterally liberalises its trade within the WTO context, its exports and 
imports are expected to increase by US$950 million and US$1.33 billion, respectively. 
(e) BFTAs 
The WITS/SMART simulations estimate that Cote d’Ivoire will have a total fiscal revenue loss 
of US$278 million if the BFTA is implemented. Major contributors to this revenue loss in Cote 
d’Ivoire are motor vehicles, and cereals. The SMART simulation results reveal that Cote d’Ivoire 
would experience a gain in consumer welfare valued at US$61.09 million by implementing the 
BFTA. The Bilateral free trade agreement would result in a trade-creation that would offset trade 
diversion, resulting in net welfare gains for Cote d’Ivoire. If Cote d’Ivoire removes all the tariffs 
against imports from its trading partners with bilateral trade agreements, and imposes an MFN 
on non-BFTA countries, this would result in trade expansion valued at US$1.26 billion. 
Overall, Cote d’Ivoire imports and exports are expected to rise by US$817 million and 
US$921.87 million, respectively, if it implements the BFTA with its top-ten trading partners. 
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11.4  Conclusion 
Using the WITS/SMART results, a unilateral free trade agreement in all seven scenarios (that is, 
ECOWAS customs union, WAEMU customs union, ECOWAS FTA, WAEMU FTA, EPAs, 
WTO FTA and BFTA) shows that Cote d’Ivoire stands to create trade in all the trade groupings. 
However, the WTO FTA yields the largest increase in trade, followed by BFTA, ECOWAS, 
EPAs and WAEMU. Although the trade-creation effects means more revenue for Cote d’Ivoire, 
it is likely to cause outsourcing and unemployment, as the economy is still recovering from a 
decade-long of political turmoil. There was no evidence of trade diversion in any of these 
scenarios.  
This study supports the views of the sponsors of trade liberalisation, that is, the World Bank and 
the IMF, trade liberalisation leads to an increase in exports and a paradigm shift in the exports 
composition caused by technology transfer and FDIs, Cote d’Ivoire’s export growths appears to 
be substantial after trade reforms. In addition, the composition of exports remained the same, 
with traditional products such as tobacco, minerals and agricultural products dominating the 
export basket. Moreover, both the geographical import sources and the export destinations 
remained concentrated in traditional countries, such as France, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, USA, and China.  
This, therefore, means that Cote d’Ivoire failed to utilise the additional market access created 
through trade liberalisation.  
The study shows that ECOWAS is outstandingly Cote d’Ivoire’s major trading bloc, followed by 
the rest of the world, EU and WAEMU. From this study, it was observed that Cote d’Ivoire’s 
multiple membership does not aid its trade, as this trade was skewed towards ECOWAS only. 
Rather, it creates a potential “noodle-bowl” situation, which impedes the effective use of the 
FTAs – a similar situation observed by Fukunaga and Isono (2013) in Asia, particularly when 
Cote d’Ivoire has signed the ECOWAS customs union, which contradicts the WAEMU CET 
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trading protocol. This situation is complex and creates confusion on the application of rules of 
origin for countries which have dual membership like Cote d’Ivoire.  
The WITS/SMART results show that the benefits of trade liberalisation failed to compensate for 
the losses in Cote d’Ivoire. In many cases, trade liberalisation has seen welfare gains falling short 
of revenue loss – on average by more than 5 times. Although trade creation is beneficial in terms 
of welfare gains, as argued by Viner (1950), Bhagwati (1996) and Panagariya (2000), in Cote 
d’Ivoire, welfare gains in all seven trading protocols evaluated in this study were insignificant.  
Hence, for Cote d’Ivoire to gain from trade liberalisation, it has to increase its investment in 
export quality and price so as to increase the consumer-welfare effects, the revenue effect and 
increase export quantities. 
The seven categories of trade liberalisation evaluated in this study showed different impacts on 
Cote d’Ivoire. Firstly, the WTO FTA was the most threatening to the Ivorian economy. 
Unilateral liberalisation in the WTO has three immediate consequences, which are: 
deindustrialisation, revenue loss and balance-of-payment problems. With respect to 
deindustrialisation, the local industries with output valued at US$1.33 billion stand to be 
displaced from the market. 
With respect to revenue, Cote d’Ivoire stands to lose significant revenue registering US$787.74 
million upon liberalising its trade within the WTO context. The WTO FTA, according to this 
study, is likely to result in an increase in exports, but at a rate that is far below the increase in 
imports in absolute terms, thereby posing a balance-of-payment problem. 
Secondly, the BFTAs come next after the WTO FTA in terms of creating danger for Cote 
d’Ivoire’s economy. The BFTAs are likely to cause the closure of industries, a revenue loss, and 
a trade surplus. With respect to deindustrialisation, local industries with output valued at 
US$921.87 million stand to be displaced from the market. With respect to revenue, Cote d’Ivoire 
stands to lose revenue registering US$278 million, which was found to be significant in this 
 THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALISATION ON COTE D’IVOIRE 
 
275 
 
study. Unlike the WTO FTA, the BFTAs are likely to result in a trade surplus amongst member 
states within the BFTAs, thereby improving the balance-of-payment problems.  
However, it is worth noting that the trade surplus that ensued due to BFTAs is insignificant and 
falls far short of compensating for the loss in revenue and trade-creation effects. 
Thirdly, the ECOWAS FTA in this study is ranked third in its impact on Cote d’Ivoire. The 
ECOWAS FTA poses devastating consequences for Cote d’Ivoire in terms of revenue loss and 
trade creation of US$28.9 million and US$538.23 million, respectively. The impact of revenue 
loss was found to be insignificant in this study. Interestingly, the study shows that the ECOWAS 
FTA generates exports, which exceeded the imports by a small margin. 
Fourthly, the WAEMU customs union is next after ECOWAS FTA in terms of its impact on 
Cote d’Ivoire. The WAEMU customs union has three devastating effects on Cote d’Ivoire, that 
is: trade-creation effects which could lead to industrial closure, revenue loss and contributions to 
the balance-of-payment problems. With respect to the trade-creation effects, local industrials 
with industrial output of US$2.83 billion are likely to be displaced. On the one hand, a potential 
revenue of US$292 million is likely to be lost in the event of the establishment of a WAEMU 
customs union. On the other hand, the exports are likely to fall by 2.23 per cent; while imports 
would be likely to increase by 2.48 per cent, thereby posing a threat to the balance-of-payment 
problems. 
Fifthly, with the ECOWAS customs union, imports are likely to surge by US$677 million; while 
a significant revenue loss of US$286.85 million could be expected. The trade-creation and 
revenue effects of ECOWAS customs union on Cote d’Ivoire are interestingly lower than those 
of the ECOWAS FTA. 
Sixth, the EPAs on balance are not beneficial to Cote d’Ivoire, as the country expects to witness 
a displacement of industries by more efficient firms from the EU by US$322.55 million and 
revenue loss of US$294 million. The gains derived from the expected trade surplus would be less 
than what is needed to reverse these expected losses. 
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Seventh, the WAEMU FTA offers the lowest trade gains and losses to Cote d’Ivoire. Both trade 
creation and revenue losses are insignificant. And, although the expected increase in exports 
exceeds imports, the trade surplus is nevertheless small.  
To sum up, in all seven trade agreement frameworks evaluated in this study, contrary to 
developed countries and emerging markets, the costs of trade liberalisation in terms of trade 
creations and revenue loss exceeds the benefits (that is, welfare benefits and increase in exports) 
in Cote d’Ivoire.  
11.5  Policy Recommendations 
Based on the results discussed in this study, the Government of Cote d’Ivoire and the relevant 
stakeholders could apply policy prescriptions tailored to address the revenue loss, increases in 
exports, exports composition, expanding welfare gains and competitiveness.  
 
11.5.1  Mitigating Revenue Loss 
In this study, the loss of government revenue turned out to be a major challenge across all the 
trade reforms Cote d’Ivoire undertook. It is in line with this, that the researcher recommends the 
following in dealing with the loss of tariff revenue in Cote d’Ivoire. 
(a) Expanding Revenue Base from Domestic Sources 
The government of Cote d’Ivoire should place greater emphasis on targeting cost-based 
incentives rather than profit-based ones to improve the efficiency of the tax incentive. At the 
international level Cote d’Ivoire might also gain by coordinating their tax incentive policy 
regionally. This would help to mitigate the negative spillover from tax competition. 
Cote d’Ivoire needs to broader the tax base and consider improving the collection of revenue 
from alternative sources, such as personal, corporate tax and excise duty, in order to cushion 
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itself against the revenue loss impact of trade liberalisation. In addition, the country should 
reconfigure the income tax bands, so that they become more progressive, thereby raising more 
revenue. The government of Cote d’Ivoire can also consider widening the tax base by taxing the 
informal sector, which has been growing rapidly in the past years. And, fiscal authorities can also 
consider VAT as an important trade policy instrument that could be used to mitigate the loss of 
revenue due to trade liberalisation, as suggested by Gourdon, Monjon and Poncet (2015), Waglé 
(2011) and Lang (2006).  
(b) Strengthening and Capacitating Revenue-Collection Institutions 
Many developing countries, like Cote d’Ivoire, as noted by Waglé (2011) have criticised weak 
tax administrations, as well as large informal sectors (with unrecorded or illicit transactions) 
coupled with the high cost of administering its results in a narrow tax base. A decade long of 
political instability, Cote d’Ivoire has seen an expansion of the informal sector, which has 
become a dominant feature of the Ivorian economy.  The government of Cote d’Ivoire can also 
enhance its revenue administration by bolstering the large taxpayer office, putting up a medium-
size taxpayer office, and strengthens tax and customs’ controls and audits.  
This study, therefore urges developmental partners, such as the IMF, the World Bank and the 
European Union to recognize the importance of tariff for a country like Cote d’Ivoire and assist 
in establishing a sound tax system, which replaces import tariff correction as a pivotal source of 
income. Progressive liberalisation of tariffs in the EPA is also important to Cote d’Ivoire in order 
to limit the damage of the EPA. 
The IMF (2013) pledged to continue to provide significant and long-standing technical assistance 
for data improvements, customs reform, and tax and tariff reform – including mitigating the 
revenue implications of trade liberalisation. Cote d’Ivoire could take advantage of this pledge. 
Capacity-building under the current national development plan would also help the country to 
deal with other sources of revenue leakages outside the informal sector, such rampant transfer 
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pricing, which is bedevilling Africa’s fiscal space. Cote d’Ivoire is no exception to this corrupt 
practice.  
Developing economies tend to rely disproportionately on import duty revenues, particularly 
when compared with more developed countries. However, both developed and developing 
countries have become less reliant on customs duties and other trade taxes since the 1980s (Bilal 
et al, 2012). Hence trade liberalisation in the context of the EPA negotiations has therefore 
occurred against the backdrop of a wider global push for more open trade and declining trade tax 
revenues.  
Keen and Mansour (2009) argued that at the aggregate level, some of the burden of replacing 
custom duties has fallen on indirect taxation, especially with the introduction of sale of value 
added taxes. Hence, it is pertinent that Cote d’Ivoire strengthen its domestic tax-collection 
systems. 
 (c) Organising the Informal Sector 
The Government of Cote d’Ivoire, through its national development plan policy, may need to 
encourage the informal sector to form business clusters. A business cluster involves the 
amalgamation of individual small enterprises or interconnected business into a formidable force. 
This has two clear benefits. Firstly, this would help them to build critical mass, and help the 
formerly weak informal trader to bargain with other established businesses on the same 
wavelength. Hence, the informal sector is incentivised to comply with the move, thereby making 
it easy to implement. Secondly, because the informal sector is now organised into a big entity, 
government should find it easy to collect those domestic taxes, which were previously evaded by 
this sector, such as pay as you earn (PAYE), VAT, corporate tax and excise duties. This will help 
mobilize higher domestic revenue and help towards achieving the country’s national 
development program objectives.  
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(d) Implementing Presumptive Taxes on the Informal Sector 
In Cote d’Ivoire some informal sectors are difficult to organise into a big entity, such as street 
vendors. These are hard-to-tax sectors; and they complicate tax replacement. In order to collect 
tax revenue from this sector, whilst abiding by the principles of an efficient tax collection 
mechanism of simplicity, cost effective, easy to collect and easy to administer, a presumptive tax 
would be ideal for this sector. A presumptive tax is a lump sum tax paid by an operator valid for 
a period of time. The amount of presumptive tax is determined by government, based on the size 
of the economic activity undertaken by such businesses. Traditionally, this is enforceable upon 
renewable of trading licences. Cote d’Ivoire could adopt this method and allow it to be 
implemented by local authorities that collect revenue on behalf of government. Presumptive tax 
has been successfully used in the transport business in India, Belgium, Israel and China. 
(e) Using Sensitive Lists to Mitigate Revenue Loss 
The agreement by member States to have a basket of sensitive products would help to reduce the 
revenue loss for Cote d’Ivoire. In this regard, Cote d’Ivoire’s negotiators should push for 
sensitive products that would not be subjected to tariff reduction for some time. This is crucial, 
as it gives member States the needed policy space to develop their sensitive products. In this 
regard, Cote d’Ivoire needs to consider putting motor vehicles, cereals, electrical machinery and 
equipment, edible vegetables and tubers, meat, aircraft and spacecraft, rice, mineral fuel and 
tobacco, as part of its revenue-sensitive products. The inclusion of these products on the sensitive 
list would, in the short run to medium term, help Cote d’Ivoire to mitigate its revenue loss, while 
building its domestic tax revenue capacity.  
(f) Apply for Effective Structural Adjustment Programmes 
Tax and fiscal reforms are the primary areas where the EU could provide assistance and support 
for the effectiveness of structural adjustment in ECOWAS countries induced by an EPA. Cote 
d’Ivoire should make use of the Cotonou Agreement, which is designed to assist member States 
that incur adjustment costs due to tariff reductions. It is agreed that special consideration will be 
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given to countries which face budgetary adjustments due to regional integration and EPAs. 
Therefore, in the EPA agreement, Cote d’Ivoire can ask the EU to provide grant-financing for 
tariff revenue losses until the tax reform is completed. In addition, the EU should support Cote 
d’Ivoire for a longer time to provide the country with an incentive to ensure that it benefits as 
much from the EPAs as the non-less developed countries. 
Hence, Cote d’Ivoire stands a chance to benefit from the EU if it provides bankable projects on 
infrastructural projects aimed at trade facilitation. It is therefore important that the country starts 
to look at its terms of trade cautiously. 
The ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) should also assist member States 
who lose revenue through trade liberalisation. This, if it comes into being, could benefit Cote 
d’Ivoire significantly, since it has dual membership both in WAEMU and ECOWAS. 
In other trade arrangements, such as the WTO, Cote d’Ivoire, together with other member States, 
should not accept an outcome without aid for trade. The IMF, the Africa development Bank, the 
EU and other multilateral financial institutions should provide assistance to Cote d’Ivoire in 
mitigating its revenue loss.  
(g) Slow Tariff Phase-Down 
In line with suggestions of Lang (2006), this study proposes that Cote d’Ivoire may need to 
lower its tariffs on imports in a gradual way, so as to smooth the fall in its budget revenues. Cote 
d’Ivoire could do this in two ways. Firstly, it could appeal to member States within the various 
trading blocs in which it is participating to be exempted from a tariff phase-down, a provision 
given in the trade agreement as derogation. Cote d’Ivoire needs to stand its ground, in order to be 
heard by its fellow member States, since the country has been through a decade-long economic 
meltdown, which has left its economy on its knees and increased poverty.  
Secondly, Cote d’Ivoire could persuade other member States, as a region, to slow down its 
reform agenda, a move already happening within ECOWAS on the establishment of the new 
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common external tariff for West Africa. Steps have been put in place for the CET to be adopted 
and implemented by all members countries. For Cote d’Ivoire and other member States in 
WAEMU, ECOWAS, EU and WTO there is no urgency to liberalise under the current 
environment, which has seen renewal of protectionism in the developed countries as they grapple 
to stimulate growth after the global economic crisis and its aftermath. 
(h) Reducing Technical barriers to trade 
The technical barrier to trade agreement aims to ensure that technical regulations, standards and 
conformity evaluations procedures do not create hindrance to trade and are not discriminatory. In 
Cote d’Ivoire trade facilitation is hindered by national trade barriers. Among these technical 
barriers this study points corruption and poor infrastructure, duplication of inspection, border 
post checks. Indeed, there is a great number of checkpoints along various trade routes which 
need to be addressed in order to reduce delays especially for the fragile agricultural products. 
Member countries also need to share border management responsibility to facilitate trade and 
reduce unnecessary obstacles to trade.   
11.5.2  Exports Promotion Strategies 
The SMART simulation results show that Cote d’Ivoire’s trade agreements are expected to lead 
to a marginal increase in exports. It is prudent that the country should work on a number of 
measures aimed at boosting exports. Against this background, this study recommends that the 
government and the relevant stakeholders should establish a supply-side facility, export 
subsidies, export-processing zones, trade finance, and trade-promotion organisations. 
(a) Establishing a Supply-Side Facility 
Government needs to put in place a capacity utilisation and a re-tooling loan facility to 
encourage industries to increase their capacity utilisation and to boost their efficiency and 
competitiveness. This would enable the country to build industrial capacity and produce for 
export. 
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Alternatively, government may consider setting up a sovereign wealth fund together with a 
stabilisation fund. Sovereign wealth fund will create a unique opportunity for a country like Cote 
d’Ivoire which relies heavily on its commodities prices. It will allow the country to save foreign 
capital during good times and help withstand macroeconomic challenges during low growth 
period. 
The stabilisation fund will provide funds quickly when commodity prices fall, hence it should be 
invested in safe, liquid assets. In this way, stabilisation funds are similar to the foreign reserves 
of a central bank (Al Sweilem, 2015). 
 International practice has shown that countries have used their own resources to create a 
sovereign wealth fund to build a national fund. 
Cote d’Ivoire could, therefore, use its recent oil discovery to create a sovereign wealth fund. 
Also, measures aimed at plugging smuggling of precious minerals, such as gold and diamonds, 
and ensuring transparency, accountability and the eradication of corruption, should be put in 
place. 
(b) Export subsidies 
Belloc and Di Maio (2011) identified two key export subsidies a nation can employ to stimulate 
exports, that is, a direct export subsidy and a duty drawback.  
Direct export subsidies, which could be applied by Cote d’Ivoire, could take the form of tax 
incentives or financial assistance (grant). With respect to tax incentives, government may waiver 
tax payment for a company, which reaches a set export threshold, thereby promoting exports. 
Thiga and Muturi (2015) supported the use of tax incentives by governments to exporting 
companies reaching a specified threshold. A financial grant could be used for struggling firms, 
especially SMEs, so that they can build capacity to export. This will help support a positive trade 
balance with the country’s trade partners. 
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With respect to duty drawback – Cote d’Ivoire need to adopt the duty drawback systems as its 
trade-policy instrument, this has not been implemented due to tight fiscal space since the 
government is in a process of rebuilding the country’s infrastructure. This study therefore 
recommends the use of a duty-drawback system. Also, for it to be successful, government must 
reduce red tape and bureaucratic procedures in its application. In addition, it must be 
implemented in line with the provision of the WTO. If executed properly, the input cost used in 
production is expected to fall, thereby improving the competitiveness of Cote d’Ivoire’s exports.  
(c) Export-Processing Zones (EPZs) 
Cote d’Ivoire has struggled to generate structural transformation of its economy, especially 
changing its exports structure from a strong dependence on natural resources and increasing its 
production value. The establishment and the use of EPZ is related to remarkable industrial 
development and economic success (Dihn et al, 2012). These zones aim to enhance and diversify 
exports, creating employment and foreign exchange earnings by the accumulation of foreign 
capital. Farole (2010a) defines Export Processing Zones (EPZs) as demarcated geographical 
areas within a country, which are given preferential treatment. The host of afforded to EPZs 
include inter alia subsidies, domestic taxes and custom-duties exemption, favourable regulatory 
policies and good public provision.   
EPZ aim to facilitate, and offer the possibility for long term investment in plants, social 
infrastructure and equipment. FDI is today the largest component of international capital flows, 
and has been an important component of the success of the Asian tigers, China and India (Todaro 
and Smith, 2009; Stein, 2012). 
Foreign investors bring ideas and skills to the host country and may have important 
demonstration effects such as knowledge leaks and technology spillover (Todaro and Smith, 
2009). Based on the success of EPZs around the world, this study recommends the revitalisation 
of EPZs in Cote d’Ivoire. 
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Zeng (2015) recently concluded, for example, that the experiences of EPZs have been 
disappointing in most African countries, which he explains by poor institutions, weak 
governance and inadequate infrastructure (among others). Hence Cote d’Ivoire should try to 
strengthen their domestic institutions and improve its transparency in order to benefit from the 
EPZs. 
(d) Trade finance 
The availability of finance is vital for a healthy trading system. Almost 80 per cent of global 
trade is supported by some sort of financing of global insurance (WTO, 2015). Without the 
necessary trade finance, the opportunity for growth and development are missed. Small and 
medium sized enterprises in Cote d’Ivoire face the greatest hurdles in accessing financing on 
affordable terms. One of the most important obstacles to industrial development is a weak 
financial market, in which producers may face credit constraints and experience difficulties in 
finding the necessary resources to finance their investments. These challenges are synonymous 
with Cote d’Ivoire’s situation. Lack of access to trade finance is key obstacle to low-income 
countries such as Cote d’Ivoire participating in global values chains. 
Hence, this study recommends the government to provide: 
• The improvement of the capacity of the local banking sector to support trade 
• A continued effort by the African Development Bank and other partners for development to 
improve trade financing in Cote d’Ivoire  
• Foreign currency revolving funds, which is granting credit by the exporters’ banks to pay for 
the imports of intermediate inputs; 
• Pre-shipment export finance guarantee schemes, which are targeted at exporters or potential 
exporters that have no sufficient proof of creditworthiness by collateral, but have export 
letters of credit;  
• Matching grant schemes, which are targeted at potentially successful exporters that 
overestimate the risk of the exporting project and so under-invest in it. 
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Some of the big economies in Africa namely, South Africa, Nigeria and even Kenya are trying to 
do more by mobilizing resources and channel them to this market. 
However, these measures should be taken in line with the provision of the Articles 1.1(b), 10, 14, 
and 19 of the World Trade Organisation Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(ASCM). These rules impose that premiums for export credit guarantees should be adequate to 
cover non-performing trade credit and operating costs.  
(e) Strengthen the Capacity of Export-Supporting Institutions 
The mission of the trade promotion organizations (TPOs) is to facilitate the exchange of 
information, reduce the problems of imperfect information, with the aim of increasing and 
diversifying exports. TPOs usually rely on a network of offices abroad, in order to facilitate their 
information-gathering on foreign markets and sales opportunities. TPOs provide a number of 
services which benefit both the private and the public sector including: (a) Dissemination of 
information on export markets; (b) assistance in export marketing; (c) packaging and labelling; 
(d) quality standards management; (e) general training on export activities; (f) legal assistance; 
(g) assistance in obtaining export financing; and (h) trade missions and trade fairs. 
TPO network has grown substantially since its inception. International experience has shown that 
TPOs are instrumental in expanding countries’ exports. South Korea, for example, established 
the Korean Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA). This was founded in 1962; and 
it now counts about 97 offices abroad (Kang, 2010). KOTRA established over 78 overseas 
offices responsible for information dissemination on foreign business practices, cultural and 
market conditions; and it directly supports firms through its overseas investment support centres. 
This testifies that the network of the KOTRA offices located abroad has been a critical factor in 
the success of South Korea’s exports (Kang, 2010). 
Cote d’Ivoire, like other countries, established the association for the promotion of exports of 
Cote d’Ivoire (APEXI) as its TPO, but unlike other international TPOs, it has only a local office; 
and it relies on its ministry, which have more of a political configuration than one of trade. It is 
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against this background that this study recommends that APEXI should be capacitated through 
financial support, human capital development, and by broadening its geographical outreach in 
Cote d’Ivoire, so that it can take centre stage in knowledge management and information 
dissemination related to market access for various sectors of the economy.  
11.5.3  Improving the Competitiveness of Cote d’Ivoire’s Products 
As shown from the results of this study, Ivorian industry is under siege from foreign imports, as 
prices are expected to fall due to increased competition. All trade agreements show that trade 
creation is significant. Trade creation poses threat to Cote d’Ivoire’s products being displaced 
from the market a situation which is causing de-industrialisation. In order to counter this 
problem, Cote d’Ivoire should work on improving the competitiveness of its products; and the 
following measures are preferred by this study. 
(a) Storage of food crops 
The government of Cote d’Ivoire’s revenue which relies mostly on commodity prices revenue 
face enormous challenges due to the price volatilities of these commodities. Hence, the study 
recommends a system of reserve or food security stock which will allow commodities to be 
stored when the demand is low. This will allow farmers and government to be protected against 
low commodity prices. 
(b) Grouping and protection of a sensitive list of products 
Cote d’Ivoire, in order to save inefficient industry from total collapse – due to displacement of 
local products by efficient foreign firms – there is a need to compile a list of products, so that 
they can be exempted from trade liberalisation. These products should include motor vehicles, 
cereal and other seeds, onions and shallots, cement clinkers, aerials and aerial reflectors of all 
kinds, meat and other edible meat, Dinonyl or Didecyl orthophtalic acid, Light oil and 
preparation and other, Rocket launcher, grenade launcher and others, and Tanks and other 
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armoured fighting vehicles. This list includes those major products, which suffered from trade 
creation in Cote d’Ivoire.  
The first five product lists are also revenue-sensitive. Hence, this presents the Government of 
Cote d’Ivoire with an opportunity to seriously consider these products as safety measures. 
Adopting these products on the sensitive list for saving de-industrialisation would save not only 
the industry from collapse; but it also has a multiplier effect of increased revenue generation, as 
the saved industry would generate sustained employment, which would bring more fiscal space 
from improvements in PAYE, VAT, excise duties and corporate tax. 
However, the challenge that the government has to grapple with is to ensure that the total list of 
sensitive products, which are either revenue-sensitive or sensitive to industry and employment, 
should not exceed the 20 per cent allowed under all trade agreements provided under the 
multilateral rules for less than full reciprocity in liberalisation. 
(c) Creation of buffer stock accounts and facilities  
Anderson, Chijoriga, and Philemon (2014) noted that it is necessary for a country that engages in 
trade to have a buffer stock. They argued that in the course of export business many unforeseen 
circumstances arise. Hence, this will serve as revenues or reserve inputs as precaution or 
safeguard against unforeseen shortages or demands.  
 The government of Cote d’Ivoire may need to set up an adaptation facility in order to resuscitate 
companies displaced by foreign firms through trade creation and diversion as suggested by Lang 
(2006). This study reveals that companies involved in the production of motor vehicles, cereal 
and other seeds, onions and shallots, cement clinkers, aerials and aerial reflectors of all kinds, 
meat and other edible meat, Dinonyl or Didecyl orthophtalic acid, Light oil and preparation and 
other, Rocket launcher, grenade launcher and others, and Tanks and other armoured fighting 
vehicles are under threat from foreign competition. Hence, the adaptation facility should focus 
on these products. 
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In addition, with the use of its vast minerals, these industries should be able to build reserves of 
their own funds, which it could use to mitigate revenue loss. However, measures aimed at 
plugging the smuggling of precious minerals, such as gold and diamonds, and to ensure 
transparency, accountability, and the eradication of corruption, should be put in place. 
(d) Investment in infrastructure development 
The recent economic performance in Cote d’Ivoire has been impressive. However, challenges 
remain especially in ensuring inclusive growth and the structural transformation of the economy. 
The current state of Cote d’Ivoire’s infrastructure shows that it is affecting the country’s 
productivity and competitiveness (IMF, 2016). The structural transformation requires revamping 
the infrastructure of the economy. 
The infrastructure gap in Cote d’Ivoire results in inefficiencies which creates additional cost to 
the country. Foster and Pushak (2010) found that the most serious inefficiency as far as 
infrastructure is concerned in Cote d’Ivoire is underpricing of power which results in a financial 
loss of around US$0.2 billion. Cote d’Ivoire has to improve its competitiveness by restoring its 
infrastructure, which collapsed during a decade-long economic decay. In the short-to-medium 
term, Cote d’Ivoire should work on improving supply constraints in electricity, roads, water and 
ICTs.  
Farole (2011) finds a strong correlation between infrastructure quality and levels of investment, 
exports, and employment within EPZs. Energy supply and pricing may have a severe effect on 
the competitiveness of African manufacturing firms (Farole, 2011). 
An improvement in the availability of these infrastructures would enhance productivity and 
allow the economy to be diversified, which would result in the improved efficiency and 
competitiveness of domestic products. 
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11.5.4  Improving Welfare 
Improvements in competitiveness and exports generation, once achieved, are expected to 
significantly improve the welfare of consumers in Cote d’Ivoire. However, in addition, this 
research makes the following suggestions to improve consumer welfare in Cote d’Ivoire: 
(a) Managing Consumer Surplus and Trade-Creation Effects 
From this study, all the trade agreements Cote d’Ivoire is implementing showed trade creation. 
This is welfare-enhancing, according to Viner (2014), as consumers would continue to buy the 
same goods from foreign firms, but at lower prices. However, according to Lang (2006), trade-
creation benefits can be theoretical if the market is dominated by an oligopolistic market 
structure that forms cartels in determining prices, thereby failing to pass on the benefits of trade 
creation to Cote d’Ivoire’s consumers.  
The EU‐ACP Economic Partnership Agreement provides instruments intended to place trade 
reforms firmly in the service of development and regional integration. Schmieg (2016) noted that  
duty‐free and quota‐free access to the European Union since January 2008 with improved rules 
of origin creates new market opportunities that have not been offered by any other industrialised 
country. This is an opportunity for Cote d’Ivoire to improve development processes especially in 
the field of processed agricultural products. 
This study recommends the strengthening of competition policy capacities and the legal systems 
of the custom space and the Consumer Association of Cote d’Ivoire, in order to ensure that trade 
liberalisation delivers its potential benefits.  
(b)Taxes and Spending 
Trade economists which include McCulloch, Winters and Cirera (2001) underscored that in most 
cases trade liberalisation may lead to a loss of government revenues as import tariffs are lowered 
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or eliminated, and that in an effort to fiscal space, governments may cut social expenditures or 
impose new taxes which could disproportionately affect the poor. 
Recent study also conducted by Bilal et al (2012) points out that trade liberalisation is associated 
with revenues losses. Since revenue loss is one of the major challenges to Ivorian economy 
established in this study, there can be temptation for Government of Cote d’Ivoire to cut social 
expenditure and raise taxes on consumers thereby worsening consumer plight. It is against this 
background that this study recommends that government should first consider poverty effects of 
alternative forms of taxation which it may introduce to cover any shortfall especially 
consumption taxes. Conversional wisdom argues that it is generally possible to protect social and 
anti-poverty expenditures even if expenditures do decline. 
11.6  Limitations of the Study 
The models used in this study, that is, WITS/SMART models is a static model. Hence, they do 
not take into account second-round effects. The static nature of these models did not present a 
problem in this study, as the major attention was focused on the short-term effects, which are 
built on the static models. However, it is important to note that the model used only considers 
static gains, and does not take into account the dynamic factors associated with trade 
liberalisation. Other factors that have to be taken into consideration are the increased 
competition, which results in quality products and cheaper products; the increased efficiency in 
domestic industries; and the increase in technology and human-capital improvement. 
In addition, the study did not evaluate the impact of trade liberalisation on output and 
employment in the TRIST model, because of the lack of the relevant data from Cote d’Ivoire 
custom officials. However, this setback did not affect the results of this study, since the effect of 
trade policy on production was outside the objectives of this research. 
11.7 Suggestions for Future Research 
This study focused on the static effects of revenue, trade and the welfare implications of the 
WAEMU customs union, WAEMU FTA, ECOWAS FTA, ECOWAS customs union, WTO 
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FTA, EU FTA and BFTAs on Cote d’Ivoire. There is a need for future studies to go further, by 
analysing these implications in relation to the country’s economic development and growth.  
● The comparative analysis of the effects of trade liberalisation on Cote d’Ivoire using the        
Gravity model, the Computable equilibrium model and the Econometric analysis on trade, 
economic growth and development.  
● The assessment of the impact of WAEMU/ECOWAS trade liberalisation on small and medium 
enterprises through a comparative analysis of Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria.   
Future studies should also try to explore the implications of regional integration, using a general-
equilibrium model which captures the macroeconomic framework of trade policy in Cote 
d’Ivoire. GE models allow for more robust analysis of trade policy, since they capture both the 
first- and second-round effects, which include the inter-industry effects and macroeconomic 
adjustments. 
In the near future, with the availability of the data, the impact of trade reforms on output and 
employment, using the TRIST model, would need to be evaluated. 
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Appendix 1 (a): Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis of ECOWAS CET on Trade Creation 
(US$ Million) 
Product Category Base Case Lower Bound Upper Bound Worst Case 
Capital Goods 0 0 0 0 
Raw Materials 988 988 988 988 
Intermediate Goods 504 504 504 11.045 
Finished Goods 0 0 0 0 
Total 1492 1492 1492 1492 
% Change from Base - - - - 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
Appendix 1 (b): Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis of ECOWAS CET on Revenue (US$ 
Million) 
Product Category Base Case Lower Bound Upper Bound Worst Case 
Capital Goods 0 0 0 0 
Raw Materials -247.11 -0.425 -247.12 -247.13 
Intermediate Goods -39.74 0 0 -40 
Finished Goods 0 0 0 0 
Total -286.85 -0.425 -247.12 -247.12 
% Change from Base - 99.85 13.85 13.85 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
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Appendix 1 (c): Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis of ECOWAS CET on Welfare (US$ 
Million) 
Product Category Base Case Lower Bound Upper Bound Worst Case 
Capital Goods 0 0 0 0 
Raw Materials 49.2 49.2 49.2 49.2 
Intermediate Goods 37.03 33.2 33.2 33.2 
Finished Goods 0 0 0 0 
Total 86.23 82.4 82.4 82.4 
% Change from Base - -4.44 -4.44 -4.44 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
Appendix 2 (a): Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis of WAEMU CET on Trade Creation 
(US$ Million) 
Product Category Base Case Lower Bound Upper Bound Worst Case 
Raw Materials 1793 1793 1793 1793 
Intermediate Goods 1043 1043 1043 1043 
Finished Goods 0 0 0 0 
Total 2836 2836 2836 2836 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations  
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Appendix 2 (b): Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis of WAEMU CET on Revenue (US$ 
Million) 
Product Category Base Case Lower Bound Upper Bound Worst Case 
Raw Materials -250 -250.83 -250.63 -250.02 
Intermediate Goods -42.66 -42.65 -42.66 -42.70 
Finished Goods -0 -0 -0 -0 
Total -292.66 -293.48 -293.29 -292.72 
% Change from Base - 0.28 0.21 0.02 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
Appendix 2 (c): Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis of WAEMU CET on Welfare (US$ 
Million) 
Product Category Base Case Lower Bound Upper Bound Worst Case 
Raw Materials 4.59 4.59 4.59 4.6 
Intermediate Goods 4.08 4.08 4.08 4.08 
Finished Goods 0 0 0 0 
Total 8.67 8.67 8.67 8.68 
% Change from Base - - - - 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
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Appendix 3 (a): Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis of FTAs on Trade Creation (US$ 
Million) 
Trade Reform Base Case Lower Bound Upper Bound Worst Case 
ECOWAS FTA 538.23 538.23 538.23 538.23 
WAEMU FTA 14.53 14.53 14.53 14.53 
EU FTA 322.55 322.55 322.55 322.55 
BFTA 1265 1265 1265 1265 
WTO FTA 1330 1330 1330 1330 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
Appendix 3 (b): Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis of FTAs on Revenue (US$ Million) 
Trade Reform Base Case Lower Bound Upper Bound Worst Case 
ECOWAS FTA -28.9 -27.14 -29.88 -37.17 
WAEMU FTA -10.5 -9.85 -10.82 -13.41 
EU FTA -294 -282 -300 -353 
BFTA -278 -266 -285 -337 
WTO FTA -787.74 -787.74 -787.75 -787.76 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
Appendix 3 (c): Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis of FTAs on Welfare (US$ Million) 
Trade Reform Base Case Lower Bound Upper Bound Worst Case 
ECOWAS FTA 37.8 27.83 37.78 37.68 
WAEMU FTA 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.21 
EU FTA 28.82 29.27 28.59       26.48 
BFTA 61.09 62.44 61.78 59.96 
WTO FTA 87.19 87.19 87.19 87.19 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations
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Appendix 4 (a): Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis of Trade Reforms on Exports (%) 
Trade Reform Base Case Lower Bound Upper Bound Worst Case 
ECOWAS CET -0.54 -0.08 -0.26 -0.81 
WAEMU CET -2.23 -1.57 -2.42 -4.24 
ECOWAS FTA 17.59 16.98 17.99  18.1 
WAEMU FTA 0.066  0.041  0.09  1.1  
EU FTA 0.16 0.09 7.3 9.12 
BFTA 0.14 0.072 1.84 4.83 
WTO FTA 10.67 10.67 10.67 10.67 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
Appendix 4 (b): Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis of Trade Reforms on Imports (%) 
Trade Reform Base Case Lower Bound Upper Bound Worst Case 
ECOWAS CET 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 
WAEMU CET 2.48 2.48 2.48 2.48 
ECOWAS FTA 4.32 4.32 4.32 4.32 
WAEMU FTA 0.00057 0.00057 0.00057 0.00057 
EU FTA 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 
BFTA 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 
WTO FTA 10.67 10.67 10.67 10.67 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
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Appendix 5 (a): Summary of trade by principal trading partners and economic zones 
(Imports cif; Exports fob; US$ Million) 
Descriptions 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Total Exports  8100 9800 10300 10300 11000 10900 12100 13000 11800 
 Imports  6700 7900 7000 7800 6700 9800 12500 11200 9500 
 Bilateral Trade  14800 17700 17200 18100 17800 20600 24600 24200 21400 
 Trade Balance  (1400) (1900) (3300) (2400) (4300) (1100) (-399) (1800) (2300) 
 ECOWAS  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Total Exports  2047 3058 2494 2522 2274 2662 4044 2712 2573 
 Imports  2256 2448 1590 2179 1731 2786 3178 2648 1627 
 Trade Balance  (-209) (610) (904) (343) (543) (-124) (866) (64) (946) 
 ECOWAS (Excl. 
Nigeria and Ghana)  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Total Exports  1239 1983 1216 1071 1308 1364 1331 1646 1638 
 Imports  612 128 121 100 141 209 221 147 173 
 Trade Balance  (627) (1855) (1095) (971) (1167) (1155) (1110) (1499) (1465) 
 WAEMU  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Total Exports  1006 1205 892 957 1100 1272 1224 1452 1524 
 Imports  586 83 75 67 88 184 174 144 167 
 Trade Balance  (420) (1122) (817) (890) (1012) (1088) (1050) (1308) (1357) 
 WAEMU (Excl. 
Burkina Faso)  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Total Exports  666 793 511 597 757 892 745 882 989 
 Imports  64 82 74 63 84 151 144 128 161 
 Trade Balance  (602) (711) (437) (534) (673) (741) (601) (754) (828) 
 EU28  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Total Exports  4065 4697 4980 4015 4159 3854 4005 4538 4976 
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Descriptions 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Imports  2511 2194 2071 1996 1778 2617 2820 3029 3160 
 Trade Balance  1554 2503 2909 2019 2381 1237 1185 1509 1816 
 Nigeria  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Total Exports  644 625 715 668 663 867 862 609 473 
 Imports  1600 2300 1400 2100 1600 2500 2900 2400 1400 
 Trade Balance  -963 -1700 -719 -1400 -906 -1600 -2000 -1800 -970 
 Ghana  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Total Exports  162 450 563 783 303 431 1851 457.2 461.1 
 Imports  44 47 35 15 20 67 71 67 54 
 Trade Balance  118 403 528 768 283 364 1780 3902 407.1 
Burkina Faso 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Total Exports  340 412 381 360 343 380 479 570 535.3 
 Imports  522 0.42 0.98 3.56 4 33 30 16 6.1 
 Trade Balance  -182 411.58 380.02 356.44 339 347 449 554 529.2 
 France 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Domestic Exports  1700 1400 1100 715.9 630.1 501.7 787.6 799.7 762.2 
 Imports  1500 999.6 991.5 931.4 791.1 1200 1300 1400 1300 
 Trade Balance  200 358.2 131.7 -215.5 -161 -708.6 -518.3 -564.5 -549.4 
 United Kingdom  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Domestic Exports  300.3 278.1 259.3 279.7 126.6 257.8 238.7 229.6 290.1 
 Imports  146.5 158.8 103.1 119.2 73.6 172.3 171.7 192.2 241.8 
 Trade Balance  153.9 119.3 156.2 160.4 53 85.5 66.9 37.4 48.3 
 Germany  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Domestic Exports  251.5 694.6 738 521.7 818.9 814.9 750 547.1 721.4 
 Imports  181 224.5 205.2 216.4 183.7 240.2 257 356.7 240.7 
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Descriptions 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Trade Balance  70.5 470.1 532.8 305.3 635.2 574.7 493 190.4 480.7 
 United States  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Domestic Exports  547 945.1 800.3 1100 1300 877.9 741 1100 962.1 
 Imports  180 209.1 228.3 235.7 128.2 254.4 291.6 385.9 417.4 
 Trade Balance  367.2 736 572 824.4 1200 623.5 449.4 702.9 544.7 
 Netherlands 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Domestic Exports  737.1 1100 1400 1500 1300 949.6 966 1300 1400 
 Imports  120.5 155.8 163.5 140.2 135.4 195.6 242.7 245.5 272.6 
 Trade Balance  616.6 944.5 1300 1300 1200 754 723.2 1100 1200 
 China  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Domestic Exports  37.9 45.4 54.8 79.4 116.1 108.9 151.6 143.2 95.2 
 Imports  438.2 542.1 501 545.7 460.5 715.8 1400 980.5 1100 
 Trade Balance  -400.3 -496.7 -446.2 -466.3 -344.4 -606.9 -1300 -837.3 -1000 
Source: UN COMTRADE Statistics 
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Appendix 6 (a): Exports classified by Country of Destination (fob, US$ Million) 
Partner \ Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Andorra 
     United Arab Emirates 7 11 8 13 15 
Afghanistan 0 0 1 12 0 
Anguilla 
     Albania 
     Armenia 
     Netherlands Antilles 
     Angola 0.41 0.81 1 0.11 0.18 
Argentina 
     Austria 59 45 138 75 85 
Australia 
     Aruba 
     Azerbaijan 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina 
     Barbados 
     Bangladesh 
     Belgium 0.36 0.43 0.41 0.56 0.77 
Burkina Faso 0.34 0.38 0.479 0.57 0.53 
Bulgaria 
     Bahrain 
     Burundi 
     Benin 
     Bermuda 
     Bolivia 
     Brazil 
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Partner \ Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Bahamas 
     Bhutan 
     Botswana 
     Belize 
     Canada 
     Central African Republic 
     Congo 
     Switzerland 
     Cote d'Ivoire 
     Chile 
     Cameroon 
     China 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.14 0.9 
Colombia 
     Costa Rica 
     Cuba 
     Cyprus 
     Czech Republic 
     Germany 0.81 0.81 0.74 0.54 0.72 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
     Djibouti 
     Denmark 
     Dominica 
     Dominican Republic 
     Algeria 
     Ecuador 
     Estonia 
     Egypt 
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Partner \ Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Eritrea 
     Spain 181 209 209 245 304 
Ethiopia 
     Finland 
     France 630 501 787 799 762 
Gabon 
     United Kingdom 126 257 238 229 290 
Georgia 
     Ghana 303 431 1851 457 461 
Gibraltar 
     Gambia 
     Guinea 
     Guadeloupe 
     Equatorial Guinea 
     Greece 
     Guinea-Bissau 
     Guyana 
     Hong Kong 
     Honduras 
     Croatia 
     Haiti 
     Hungary 
     Indonesia 46 66 73 273 73 
Ireland 
     Israel 
     India 280 350 250 530 495 
Iraq 
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Partner \ Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Iran, Islamic Republic of 
     Iceland 
     Italy 312 240 200 310 280 
Jamaica 
     Jordan 
     Japan 
     Kenya 
     Cambodia 
     Comoros 
     Saint Kitts and Nevis 
     Korea, Democratic People's Rep. of 
     Korea, Republic of 
     Kuwait 
     Cayman Islands 
     Kazakhstan 
     Lao People's Democratic Republic 
     Lebanon 
     Liechtenstein 
     Sri Lanka 
     Liberia 
     Lesotho 
     Lithuania 
     Luxembourg 
     Latvia 
     Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
     Morocco 
     Madagascar 
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Partner \ Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Mali 245 295 357 368 487 
Myanmar 
     Mongolia 
     Macau 
     Mauritania 
     Malta 
     Mauritius 
     Malawi 
     Mexico 
     Malaysia 
     Mozambique 
     Namibia 
     New Caledonia 
     Niger 
     Nigeria 693 867 862 609 473 
Netherlands 1300 949 965 1297 1427 
Norway 
     Nepal 
     Niue 
     New Zealand 
     Oman 
     Panama 
     Peru 
     Philippines 
     Pakistan 
     Poland 
     Puerto Rico 
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Partner \ Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Portugal 
     Paraguay 
     Qatar 
     Reunion 
     Romania 
     Russian Federation 
     Rwanda 
     Saudi Arabia 
     Seychelles 
     Sudan 
     Sweden 
     Singapore 
     Slovenia 
     Slovakia 
     Sierra Leone 
     Senegal 
     South Africa 616 396 355 892 320 
Sao Tome and Principe 
     El Salvador 
     Swaziland 
     Chad 
     Togo 140 123 105 186 241 
Thailand 
     Tajikistan 
     Tunisia 
     Turkey 108 111 108 178 230 
Trinidad and Tobago 
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Partner \ Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Taiwan, Province of China 
     United Republic of Tanzania 
     Ukraine 
     Uganda 
     United States 1310 877 740 1080 962 
Uruguay 
     Uzbekistan 
     Venezuela 
     British Virgin Islands 
     United States Virgin Islands 
     Viet Nam 111 112 174 424 352 
Wallis and Futuna Islands 
     Yemen 
     Yugoslavia 
     Zambia 
      Total  11 049 10860 12083 12985 11844 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics 
 THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALISATION ON COTE D’IVOIRE 
 
339 
 
Appendix 7 (a): Imports classified by Country (cif, US$ Million) 
Partner \ Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Andorra  
     United Arab Emirates  21 34 45 50 47 
 Afghanistan  
     Antigua and Barbuda  
     Albania  
      Armenia  
      Netherlands Antilles  
     Angola  3 6 661 10 15 
Argentina  23 41 11 13 34 
American Samoa  
     Austria  8 9 14 9 10 
Australia  19 17 31 14 21 
Aruba  
     Other Asian Countries  
     Azerbaijan  
     Bosnia and Herzegovina  
     Barbados  
     Bangladesh  
     Belgium  83 151 166 140 175 
Burkina Faso  4 33 30 16 6 
Bulgaria  
     Bahrain  
     Burundi  
     Bermuda  
     Brunei Darussalam  
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Partner \ Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Bolivia  
     Brazil  87 88 79 72 42 
Bahamas  0 0 1460 612 0 
Bhutan  
     Bouvet Island  
     Botswana  
     Belarus  
     Belize  
     Canada  20 30 23 30 24 
Cocos (Keeling) Islands  
     Central African Republic  
     Congo  
     Switzerland  48 37 42 38 36 
Zimbabwe 
     Chile  
     Cameroon  
     China  450 715 1423 980 1113 
Colombia  
     Costa Rica  
     Cuba  
     Cape Verde  
     Christmas Island[Australia]  
     Cyprus  1 2 1 1 2 
Czech Republic  
     Germany  183 240 257 356 240 
Democratic Republic of Congo  
     Djibouti  
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Partner \ Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Denmark  11 8 14 14 14 
Dominica  
     Dominican Republic  
     Algeria  
     Ecuador  
     Estonia  
     Egypt  
     Eritrea  
     Spain  150 189 201 233 295 
Ethiopia  
     Finland  6 10 11 11 11 
Fiji  
     Faeroe Islands  
     France  791 1210 1305 1364 1311 
Gabon  
     United Kingdom  73 172 171 192 241 
Grenada  
     Georgia  
     French Guiana  
     Ghana  20 67 71 67 53 
Gibraltar  
     Gambia  
     Guinea  
     Guadeloupe  
     Greece  10 23 27 13 12 
Guatemala  
     Guinea-Bissau  
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Partner \ Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Guyana  
     Hong Kong  1 4 4 6 9 
Honduras  
     Croatia  
     Hungary  
     Indonesia  
     Ireland  19 12 10 26 18 
Israel  5 9 16 23 32 
Isle of Man  
     India  179 389 320 556 365 
Iraq  
     Iran, Islamic Republic of  
     Iceland  
     Italy  155 186 161 237 379 
Jamaica  
     Jordan  
     Japan  138 189 191 194 209 
Kenya  2 2 1 1.7 1.7 
Kyrgyzstan  
     Cambodia  
     Kiribati  
     Comoros  
     Saint Kitts and Nevis  
     Korea, Democratic People's Rep. of  
     Korea, Republic of  
     Kuwait  
     Cayman Islands  
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Partner \ Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Kazakhstan  
     Lao People's Democratic Republic  
     Lebanon  15 23 28 27 22 
Liechtenstein  
     Sri Lanka  
     Liberia  37 10 2 - - 
Lesotho  
     Lithuania  
     Luxembourg  0 3 6 6 5 
Latvia  
     Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  
     Morocco  63 80 141 172 205 
Monaco  
     Republic of Moldova  
     Madagascar  
     Marshall Islands  
     Midway Islands  
     The former Yugoslav Rep. Macedonia  
     Mali  
     Myanmar  
     Mongolia  
      Macau  
     Northern Mariana Islands  
     Mauritania  
     Montserrat  
     Malta  
     Mauritius  
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Partner \ Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Maldives  
     Malawi  
     Mexico  3 7 10 12 10 
Malaysia  
     Mozambique  
     Namibia  
     New Caledonia  
     Niger  
     Nigeria  1570 2510 2886 2434 1444 
Nicaragua  
     Netherlands  135 195 242 245 272 
Norway  4 9 6 9 14 
Nepal  
     Nauru  
     Niue  
     New Zealand  9 11 7 10 15 
Oman  
     Panama  
     Peru  
     Papua New Guinea  
     Philippines  5 4 6 3 3 
Pakistan  
     Poland  21 25 28 29 25 
Saint Pierre and Miquelon  
     Pitcairn  
     Puerto Rico  
     Portugal  
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Partner \ Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Paraguay  
     Qatar  
     Reunion  
     Romania  
     Russian Federation  
     Rwanda  
     Saudi Arabia  
     Seychelles  
     Sudan  
     Sweden  37 66 57 52 32 
Singapore  
     Saint Helena  
     Slovenia  
     Slovakia  
     Sierra Leone  
     Senegal  
     Somalia  
     Suriname  
     Sao Tome and Principe  
     El Salvador  
     Syrian Arab Republic  
     Swaziland  
     Turks and Caicos Islands  
     Chad  
     French Southern Territories  
     Togo  
     Thailand  347 287 261 243 229 
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Partner \ Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Tokelau  
     Turkmenistan  
     Tunisia  
     East Timor  
     Turkey  460 715 1423 980 1123 
Trinidad and Tobago  
     Taiwan, Province of China  
     United Republic of Tanzania  
     Ukraine  40 47 47 25 17 
Uganda  
     United States  128 254 291 385 417 
Uruguay  
     Holy See (Vatican)  
     Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  
     Venezuela  
     British Virgin Islands  
     United States Virgin Islands  
     Viet Nam  
     Wallis and Futuna Islands  
     Yemen  
     Yugoslavia  
     South Africa  84 123 110 122 102 
Zambia  
      Total  6719 9769 12482 11177 9532 
Source: UN COMTRADE Statistics 
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Appendix 8 (a): Imports from WAEMU classified SITC Section, (c.i.f, US$ millions) 
SITCR3 \ Year  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Fish and crustaceans 38 51 60 53 82 
Mineral fuels, mineral oils 1 28 28 1 13 
Salt 13 11 12 12 12 
Cotton 7 11 9 11 8 
Vehicles other than railways 2 10 11 3 1 
Edible vegetables - 5 3 7 7 
Fertilizer - 7 3 - 1 
Man-made filament - - - 1 1 
Miscellaneous edible preparations 1 5 9 6 5 
Pharmaceutical products 4 5 4 4 2 
Beverages, spirit and vinegar 4 5 - 1 - 
Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes 4 4 8 7 8 
Residue and waste from the food industries 3 4 5 5 2 
Machinery and mechanical appliances - 3 4 5 2 
Electrical machinery - 3 2 3 1 
Commodities and transactions not classified 
elsewhere  12 35 19 25 22 
Total 89 187 177 144 167 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics 
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Appendix 8 (b): Exports to WAEMU classified SITC Section, (fob, US$ Million) 
SITCR3 \ Year  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Mineral fuels and mineral oils 265 385 393 565 673 
Animal or vegetable fats 173 185 122 108 105 
Plastics and articles thereof 66 71 74 70 71 
Miscellaneous edible preparations 76 55 55 65 70 
Tobacco and manufacture tobacco 56 56 65 67 66 
Soap, organic surface-active agents 59 57 61 60 54 
Essential oils and Resinoids 37 37 39 47 49 
Vehicles other than railways 33 14 11 18 48 
Preparations of cereals 30 33 35 35 39 
Commodities and transactions not classified 
elsewhere  248 326 341 397 349 
Total 1043 1219 1196 1432 1524 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics 
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Appendix 9 (a): Imports from ECOWAS Classified by SITC Section, (cif, US$ Million) 
SITCR3 \ Year  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Mineral fuels 1544 2508 2858 2389 1413 
Fish and crustaceans 55 74 103 54 94 
Tobacco and tobacco substitutes 14 16 26 28 25 
Salt 3 18 14 16 14 
Cotton 8 13 16 20 11 
Pharmaceutical products 3 16 5 5 9 
Machinery mechanical appliances 15 13 22 11 9 
Edible vegetables and certain roots 1 12 3 7 7 
Miscelaneous edible preparations 8 15 11 7 7 
Commodities and transactions not classified 
elsewhere  830 1150 123 112 81 
Total 1734 2800 3181 2649 1670 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics 
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Appendix 9 (b): Total Exports to ECOWAS Classified by SITC Section (fob, US$ Million) 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SITCR3 \ Year  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Mineral fuels 1000 1373 1243 1174 1110 
Essential oil 129 139 110 172 166 
Plastic and article thereof 102 124 123 150 164 
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 249 255 187 207 157 
Miscellaneous edible preparations 93 86 92 103 105 
Soap organic surface active agents, 95 82 79 81 76 
Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes 56 56 65 67 66 
Machinery mechanical appliances 39 59 70 43 54 
Footwear, gaiters and the like 39 59 59 70 51 
Commodities and transactions not classified 
elsewhere  268 1198 2051 625 624 
Total 2 070 1 035 4079 2692 2573 
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Appendix 10 (a): Imports from EU28 Classified by SITC Section, (cif US$ Millions) 
SITCR3 \ Year  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Machinery, mechanical appliances 220 433 399 441 462 
Articles of Iron or steel 134 238 95 161 95 
Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock  177 115 255 293 273 
Mineral fuels, mineral oils 40 71 90 68 241 
Electrical machinery and equipment 134 238 277 205 173 
Pharmaceutical products 147 185 175 208 141 
Cereals 177 197 201 176 141 
Plastics and articles thereof 60 77 85 93 110 
Tobacco and manufactured tobacco - - 29 34 83 
Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere 672 1070 1207 1357 1446 
Total 1761 2624 2813 3036 3165 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics 
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Appendix 10 ( b): Total Exports to EU28 classified by SITC Section (fob, US$ 
Million) 
SITCR3 \ Year  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Cocoa and Cocoa preparations 2638 2155 2112 2974 3532 
Mineral fuel, mineral oils 454 735 776 471 512 
Rubber and articles thereof 546 461 412 329 265 
Edible fruits and nuts 161 167 178 169 152 
Preparations of meat, or fish or crustaceans - 2 16 45 138 
Vehicles other than railways 38 15 213 239 114 
Woods and articles of woods 98 91 85 94 88 
Machinery and mechanical appliances 6 17 17 40 36 
Aircraft, spacecraft and parts thereof 59 36 - 21 19 
Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere  157 176 197 155 151 
Total 4157 3855 4006 4537 5007 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics 
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Appendix 11 (a): Imports from Nigeria by STIC (US$ millions) 
SITCR3 \ Year  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Mineral fuel 1543 2464 2839 2387 1399 
Tobacco and  manufactured Tobacco substitutes 9 11 17 21 17 
Miscellaneous chemical products 5 6 7 10 5 
Machinery, mechanical appliances  1 3 3 - 4 
Soap, organic surface active agents - 3 - - 4 
Essential oils and resinoids 1 3 4 4 3 
Articles of Iron or steel - - - 1 2 
Man-made filament - - - - 2 
Dairy produce bird’ eggs, naural honey - - 1 3 1 
Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere  110 20 15 8 7 
Total 1570 2510 2886 2434 1444 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics 
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Appendix 11 (b): Total Exports to Nigeria classified by SITC Section, (fob, US$ Million) 
SITCR3 \ Year  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Mineral fuel 530 716 728 406 332 
Essential oils and resinoids 40 42 27 59 54 
Animal or vegetable fats and oils 54 64 62 96 49 
Soap, organic surface active agents 2 3 3 8 8 
Miscellaneous edible preparations 4 3 5 5 8 
Machinery, mechanical appliances - 1 7 6 6 
Footwear, gaiters and the like 13 15 15 12 2 
Other made up textile article 4 3 3 1 2 
Manufactures of straw 2 2 1 1 2 
Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere  14 18 11 15 10 
Total 663 867 862 609 473 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics 
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Appendix 12 ( a): Import from China classified by SITC Section, (cif; US$ Millions) 
SITCR3 \ Year  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Machinery mechanical appliances 47 78 115 127 148 
Electrical machinery 82 141 145 142 138 
Iron and Steel 13 20 48 72 116 
Vehicles other than railway 23 52 63 77 98 
Miscellaneous chemical products 28 32 54 95 96 
Articles of Iron or steel 11 29 40 40 78 
Fish and crustaceans 16 28 34 41 42 
Plastic and article thereof 15 20 24 28 39 
Ceramic products 11 20 24 26 24 
Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere  214 295 876 332 334 
Total 460 715 1423 980 1113 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics 
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Appendix 12 ( b): Exports to China classified by SITC Section (fob US$ Millions) 
SITCR3 \ Year  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Cotton 28 65 28 65 68 
Woods and articles of woods 3 10 3 10 23 
Other base metals - - 0 0 15 
Ores, slag and ash - 1 0 1 14 
Rubber and articles thereof 65 18 65 18 13 
Cocoa and cocoa preparations 15 11 15 11 13 
Copper and articles thereof 1 - 1 - - 
Edible fruits and nuts - 1 - 1 - 
Electrical machinery and equipment - - - - - 
Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere  4 2 4 2 5 
Total 116 108 116 108 151 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics 
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Appendix 13 (a): Imports from Netherlands classified by SITC Section: (cif, US$ Million) 
SITCR3 \ Year  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Mineral fuel 4 16 25 12 106 
Edible vegetables 28 26 41 29 34 
Dairy produce bird’ eggs, natural honey 17 24 24 24 24 
Vehicles other than railway 9 9 11 15 14 
Preparations of cereals, flour 4 6 12 14 11 
Machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors 7 19 19 19 11 
Organic chemicals 5 10 12 13 9 
Residues and waste from the food industries 4 6 9 9 7 
Cotton 3 5 6 5 6 
Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere  54 74 83 105 50 
Total 135 195 242 245 272 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics 
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Appendix 13 (b): Exports to classified by SITC Netherlands section (fob, US$ Millions) 
SITCR3 \ Year  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Cocoa and Cocoa preparations 1158 795 739 1103 1303 
Mineral fuels, mineral oils 80 102 180 132 83 
Rubber and articles thereof 42 28 26 21 18 
Edible fruits and nuts 3 6 8 6 14 
Inorganic chemicals  1 - 1 3 2 
Woods and articles of Woods 6 2 - 2 1 
Miscellaneous edible preparations - - - - - 
Machinery, mechanical appliances - 1 1 1 - 
Other made-up textile articles - - - - - 
Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere  6 15 10 29 6 
Total 1296 949 965 1297 1427 
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Appendix 14 (a): Imports from France classified by SITC section, (cif, US$ Million) 
SITCR3 \ Year  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Mineral fuels, mineral oils 6 25 10 11 34 
Meat and edible meat offal 5 10 18 21 19 
Cereals 168 197 197 176 134 
Electrical machinery and equipment 80 122 150 133 108 
Dairy produce bird’ eggs, natural honey 11 14 17 23 18 
Machinery, mechanical appliances 71 154 138 135 153 
Pharmaceutical products 110 141 138 132 99 
Vehicles other than railway or tramway 38 88 152 158 151 
Articles of Iron or steel 13 30 46 49 50 
Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere  289 429 439 526 545 
Total 791 1210 1305 1364 1311 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics 
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Appendix 14 (b): Exports to France classified by SITC (fob; US$ Millions) 
SITCR3 \ Year  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Edible fruits and nuts 38 48 60 58 51 
Cocoa and cocoa preparations 380 299 352 390 379 
Pharmaceutical products 3 5 4 4 4 
Rubber and articles thereof 66 63 38 20 26 
Wood and articles of wood 8 9 10 9 10 
Electrical machinery and equipment 4 7 8 8 2 
Vehicles other than railway 38 15 213 238 111 
Aircraft and spacecraft 58 8 - 1 4 
Coffee, tea and spices 2 6 3 3 2 
Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere  33 41 99 68 173 
Total 630 501 787 799 762 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics 
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Appendix 15 (a): Imports from United States classified by SITC section (cif; US$ Million) 
SITCR3 \ Year  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Mineral fuel 9 5 11 68 87 
Tobacco and manufactured Tobacco substitutes - 1 6 2 - 
Meat and edible meat offal 4 6 4 3 2 
Machinery, mechanical appliances  26 78 98 109 122 
Plastic and articles thereof 26 36 43 38 48 
Paper and paperboards 9 10 8 11 7 
Articles of Iron or steel 3 11 29 30 19 
Electrical machinery and equipment 4 11 10 12 23 
Vehicles other than railways 12 21 15 25 15 
Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere  35 75 67 87 94 
Total 128 254 291 385 417 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics 
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Appendix 15 (b): Exports to United States classified by SITC section (fob, US$ Million) 
SITCR3 \ Year  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Mineral fuel 313 139 29 165 12 
Rubber and articles thereof 136 83 99 74 46 
Machinery, mechanical appliances  6 2 2 3 4 
Essential oil and resinoids - 1 - 1 1 
Edible fruits and nuts 5 8 17 16 21 
Cocoa and cocoa preparations 844 628 576 814 861 
Wood and articles of wood 8 10 10 10 6 
ACPCommodities and transactions not classified elsewhere  6 6 7 5 11 
Total 1318 877 740 1088 962 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics 
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Appendix 16 (a): Imports from Germany classified by SITC (cif; US$ Million) 
SITCR3 \ Year  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Mineral fuel 3 7 4 3 5 
Meat and edile meat offal 4 7 9 13 12 
Electrical machinery and equipment 5 8 9 10 8 
Machinery, mechanical appliances  44 57 66 78 47 
Pharmaceutical products 11 10 7 11 8 
Organic chemicals 3 4 4 5 7 
Essential oils and resinoids 2 1 2 2 2 
Plastic and article thereof 9 10 10 14 12 
Vehicles other than railway 47 64 58 72 53 
Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere  55 72 88 148 86 
Total 183 240 257 356 240 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics 
Appendix 16 (b): Exports to Germany by SITC Section (fob US$ Million) 
SITCR3 \ Year  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Mineral fuel 291 453 404 164 228 
Rubber and articles thereof 156 110 110 89 67 
Wood and articles of wood 8 9 8 6 4 
Animal or vegetable fats 38 10 6 - - 
Cotton - - - 1 1 
Cocoa and cocoa preparations 320 229 213 280 407 
Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere  5 3 8 7 14 
Total 818 814 749 547 721 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics 
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Appendix 17 (a): Imports from South Africa classified by SITC Section (fob, US$ Million) 
SITCR3 \ Year  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Electrical machinery and equipment 2 3 4 4 3 
Pharmaceutical products 1 1 1 - - 
Edible fruits and nuts 3 5 5 5 6 
Machinery, mechanical appliances  7 14 11 7 8 
Plastic and article thereof 20 23 25 23 18 
Articles of Iron and steel 3 8 4 4 3 
Iron and steel 17 14 11 18 13 
Paper and paperboard 6 6 2 3 2 
Vehicles other than railways  11 30 27 27 27 
Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere  14 19 20 31 22 
Total 84 123 110 122 102 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics 
Appendix 17 (b): Exports to South Africa classified by SITC (fob, US$ Million) 
SITCR3 \ Year  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Cocoa and cocoa preparations 5 13 14 13 8 
Essential oil and resinoids 1 2 - 2 1 
Machinery, mechanical appliances  1 - 4 15 - 
Natural or cultured pearls  413 363 323 283 296 
Rubber and articles thereof 181 14 9 4 8 
Ships, boat and floating structure - - - 566 - 
Wood and articles of wood  - 1 1 2 1 
Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere  4 3 4 7 6 
Total 605 396 355 892 320 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics 
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Appendix 18 (a): Composition of Trade Creation in Cote d’Ivoire by Product by Country 
(US$ Million) After WTO FTA 
Member 
HS 
Code 
Product Denomination TCE* 
China 842619 Mobile lifting frames, straddles carriers and works trucks 7.02 
 730300 Tubes pipes and hollow profile 5.6 
 3808 Insecticide 3.2 
 870410 Dumpers designed for off highway use 1.9 
 
851762 Machine for reception, conversion and regeneration of voice 1.619 
 851761 Base station 1.02 
  Other Other Products not specified above 33.7 
  Total 
 
54 
France 870000 Motor vehicles 21.88 
 100190 Wheat and Meslin 10.6 
 481910 Cartons, boxes of corrugated paper or paperboard 6.3 
 852352 Smart cards 4.04 
 20329 Meat 3.9 
 851761 Electrical apparatus for line telephony 3.12 
 
271019 Petroleum oil 2.9 
 392330 Carboys, bottles, flasks and similar articles 2.4 
 330290 Mixtures of odoriferous substances and mixtures 1.45 
  Other Other Products not specified above 53.5 
  Total 
 
110.17 
Germany 870000 Motor vehicles 9.5 
  350691 Adhesive based on polymers  1.9 
 392310 Boxes, cases and similar articles 1.09 
  Other Other Products not specified above 8.81 
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Member 
HS 
Code 
Product Denomination TCE* 
  Total 
 
21.3 
  Total 
 
73.23 
*Trade Creation Effect 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations Based on SMART Simulations 
 
 
 
